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AMERICAN OPINION OF GERMAN UNIFICATION, 1848-1871

BY

JOHN GEROW GAZLEY

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BY

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CHAPTER I

On MY WIFE

PREFACE

THE present study is an outgrowth of an interest in German history quickened by Professor Carlton J. H. Hayes and of a seminar paper suggested by Professor Charles Downer Hazen on the American attitude toward the Franco-German War. Undertaken shortly after the close of the World War, it was particularly interesting to the author because it lent color to his belief that national loves and hatreds are not permanent and ineradicable but on the contrary are inclined to vary with the ever-changing course of events. The United States had at that time just passed through a period when it was popularly believed that every Frenchman was naturally and inherently a hero and every German instinctively and unalterably a baby-killer. A study of the Franco-German War revealed an American sentiment very different from that of 1918. The author being much interested in German history thought it natural and advantageous to enlarge the scope of the investigation to include a study of American opinion toward and during the whole period of German unification. Inasmuch as the process of German unification involved relations with Hungary and even more with France and inasmuch as it would be quite impossible to present adequately American opinion of Germany without a consideration of American opinion of Hungary and of France, it has been deemed advisable to introduce a section on the American opinion of Hungary and a chapter on the American opinion of France.

Since so large a portion of the material has been taken

from newspaper and periodical sources, and since the same article or editorial was frequently used for several statements in the same paragraph, a special problem has arisen in connection with the citing of such material in the footnotes. The author has tried to cite the sources of a direct quotation at the beginning of a footnote, and then to add any other material which dealt with the subject covered in the paragraph.

Most of the labor of collecting materials has been done in the New York Public Library, to the staff of which the author is most grateful. Indeed the work could hardly have been accomplished except for the patient and ever courteous consideration of Mr. L. H. Fox and Mr. E. E. Perley of the newspaper room. In addition the author has made use of material in the Columbia University Library, the Dartmouth College Library, the library of the New York Historical Society, the Library of Congress and the library of the American Antiquarian Society; to the staff of each he wishes to take this opportunity of expressing his appreciation for their kindly assistance.

The correspondence or personal interviews with Professor Julius Goebel, Professor Clara Eve Schieber, Professor Eugene N. Curtis, Dr. Talcott Williams and Professor Gottlieb Betz have been of much value. The kindly suggestions of the author's colleagues in the History Department at Dartmouth College have proved of great help.

Especially does the author wish to acknowledge the debt which he owes to Professors Carlton J. H. Hayes, Dixon Ryan Fox and Charles Downer Hazen of Columbia University. As already mentioned, Professor Hazen furnished him with the original inspiration and advice. Professors Hayes and Fox have read the entire manuscript, and have made criticisms and given encouragement at every stage of the work. To them he owes the deepest gratitude. His

wife, Lois Cassidy Gazley, has not only helped in the tedious and exacting task of proof reading, but has assisted the author in collecting material and in preparing the manuscript for the press.

JOHN GEROW GAZLEY.

DARTMOUTH COLLEGE,
HANOVER, NEW HAMPSHIRE,
OCTOBER 1, 1925.

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INTRODUCTION

To pick fairly a good sample of a large class is not easy. The problem belongs to the science of statistics, and it is a most difficult affair for anyone whose mathematics is primitive, and mine remain azoic in spite of the half dozen manuals which I once devoutly imagined that I understood. All they have done for me is to make me a little more conscious of how hard it is to classify and to sample, how readily we spread a little butter over the whole universe.¹

In these few words, quoted from his *Public Opinion*, Walter Lippmann has admirably stated the chief problem confronting the student who attempts to analyze public opinion. To examine all available sources for a study of American opinion even in the middle of the nineteenth century would require a lifetime. The student might easily go from one library to another and thumb through volume after volume of dusty, crumbling and unwieldy newspapers. In each library he would come across hundreds of volumes of biographies, autobiographies, letters, speeches and journals, many of them local in character, and many of them entirely without references to the subject of interest. But there, tucked away in an obscure corner of an editorial or a letter which no index could possibly reach, he would occasionally find a sentence or two of the most illuminating kind. Such are the toils and the rewards which lie ahead of any investigator of public opinion.

Since the student cannot hope to examine every source of opinion he must of necessity pick and choose. But therein

¹ Lippmann, Walter, *Public Opinion* (New York, 1922), pp. 148-149.

lies the difficulty, how to choose wisely. What are the most important sources? Several baffling problems at once present themselves. To what extent is the opinion which is uttered representative of a group and to what extent is it personal and individual? Does the fact that the opinion is that of an important personage make it any the more representative? Not necessarily so, of course. And yet is not the private letter of a great man often indicative of what he is saying to his friends? And certainly his words carry more weight than those of an unimportant person. It must be remembered also that nearly all recorded opinions are those of important personages, for the opinion of the common man goes unrecorded.

A second difficulty arises as to whether any given expression is an attempt to form and mould public opinion or whether it is a reflection of public opinion. Of course the line cannot be definitely drawn, for very often the utterance partakes of the character of both. Probably the editorials of a great metropolitan newspaper and the speech of a candidate for office are primarily attempts to create public opinion, although it is possible that they may be attempts to keep in accord with public opinion. On the other hand the letters and diaries of individuals are more likely to be reflections of public opinion. But does it greatly matter to the student whether the utterance is a message or an echo? Are not both equally important to him? May not an editorial or a speech succeed in changing or creating public sentiment so that it becomes far more significant than a mere reflection or echo of what people are thinking? And so the investigator devours every kind of evidence. Only he must attempt to make whatever distinctions are possible.

The sources of public opinion fall chiefly into two categories. In the first are the newspapers and magazines—

dailies, weeklies, monthlies and quarterlies. Such periodical literature has furnished more than half of the material for this study. In the newspapers the headlines and news columns have not proved to be of much value as indicating public opinion in the period under review. But the editorial columns, very often conducted by journalists of the first order, have been found to be invaluable, and newspaper editorials will, on the whole, be found to be the one most frequently cited source throughout the study. During times of especial interest in European affairs, the newspapers gave careful and detailed accounts of public meetings, together with the text of the speeches or resolutions. Such evidence is of course highly important. Most of the magazines had some kind of an editorial page only less important than that of the daily newspapers. In addition the magazines frequently published special articles on European affairs, sometimes unsigned and sometimes from the pens of the best writers in the country. The second category consists of the writings of individuals, chiefly of the men who were the makers of public opinion—statesmen, journalists, authors, educators and clergymen. Biographies and autobiographies, collections of speeches, diaries and letters have been used copiously. Many have proved of no value, some have furnished but a few sentences of highly significant material and a small number have been found to be mines of information, comparable in importance to the more prominent magazines.¹

In the following chapters the author has attempted to present American public opinion on the struggle for German unification from 1848 until the formation of the German Empire in 1871. His purpose has been to analyze as well as to state public opinion, to give the causes as well as the

¹ For a complete analysis of the sources, and a more detailed description of the individual newspapers, magazines and books, *cf. infra*, pp. 524-566.

facts. Of course the raw materials which go to make up public opinion are elusive, and the historian of popular thinking can never feel the same kind of surety in his results as can the historian who deals with matters of fact. And yet the great trends of public opinion are tolerably clear to the student. He is able to gauge pretty accurately the temper of a people on a particular problem, and by watching the peculiar prejudices of different groups is even able frequently to predict how they will react to a specific issue. The author realizes clearly enough that there are undoubtedly numerous books, magazines and newspapers which would throw additional light on the state of public opinion. The future will probably unearth a still larger volume of material. And yet he feels reasonably sure that further reading would only have multiplied the references, which might have been continued *ad infinitum*, but that it would not have changed materially many of his topic sentences. He believes that further reading might have added some more striking quotations, but that it would not have modified many conclusions.

CHAPTER I

REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN 1848 AND 1849

ON the morning of March 19, 1848, the American people were startled by large headlines proclaiming the overthrow of Louis Philippe. For the following few days the newspapers were filled, not only with the details of the revolution, but also with lengthy editorials which attempted to prophesy what its outcome might be. Would France succeed in establishing a permanent republic? Would it be a middle-class or a socialist republic? Would a Bonaparte possibly arise again to rob the French people of the fruits of revolution? Would a coalition of hostile foreign monarchs intervene? Would the upheaval in France spread to the other European powers?¹

The last two of these questions must be considered in greater detail. The fear of foreign intervention to overthrow the revolutionists at once presented itself to American publicists. All the other great powers of Europe—Great Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia—were monarchies, and with the exception of Great Britain, were regarded by Americans as thoroughly despotic. They had been members of the Holy Alliance, the ruling idea of which, in the minds of most Americans, was interference in the affairs of other countries for the purpose of stamping out

¹ For a more detailed account of American opinion concerning the French revolution of 1848, cf. *infra*, pp. 233-252.

revolution. The natural inference was that these same powers would interfere to crush republicanism in France.¹

More important was the question as to whether the revolutionary upheaval would spread to the absolute monarchies of Europe, especially to Austria, Prussia and the minor German states. Even before the revolt in France had occurred, an important change of some sort in Germany had been foretold. *The American Quarterly Register and Magazine* for May, 1848, described constitutional progress in Prussia during the years 1846 and 1847, and believed that country to be moving in the direction of popular government. And now when the news came of the French uprising, many voices predicted that it would be the occasion for far-reaching changes in Central Europe. George Bancroft thought that success in France would mean the overthrow of every monarchy in the Germanies. *Brownson's Quarterly Review*, although skeptical of the ability of the French people to establish a democratic republic, saw in their revolution at least a powerful impetus to republicanism in the rest of Europe, a change which *Brownson's* accepted tolerantly but not enthusiastically, except perhaps for Germany. Part of the hostility of the *Washington National Intelligencer* to the new government of France can be traced to its fear that the French were about to embark on a policy of forcible propaganda for republicanism in the other European countries, a course which could only result in a general European war. The following quotation, the

¹ New York *Herald*: March 19, March 22, 1848; New York *Tribune*: March 6, 1848; Cincinnati *Chronicle*: March 25, 1848; Richmond *Enquirer*: March 21, 1848; Washington *National Intelligencer*: March 21, 1848; Scioto *Gazette*: April 19, 1848; *American Quarterly Register and Magazine*: May, 1848; *Works of James Buchanan—Comprising his Speeches, State Papers and Private Correspondence* (Philadelphia, 1909), vol. viii, p. 32; Sumner, Charles, *Works* (Boston, 1870), vol. ii, pp. 92-93. For the opposite view, cf. New York *Evening Post*: March 20, 1848.

last stanza of a poem by Thomas Buchanan Read, later famous as artist and poet, and particularly as the author of *Sheridan's Ride*, sums up the American attitude on this point:

Oh, joy to the world! the hour is come,
When the nations to freedom awake,
When the royalists stand agape and dumb,
And monarchs with terror shake.
Over the walls of majesty
Upharsin is writ in words of fire,
And the eyes of the bondsmen, wherever they be,
Are lit with their wild desire.
Soon, soon shall the thrones that blot the world,
Like the Orleans, into the dust be hurled,
And the word roll on like a hurricane's breath,
Till the farthest slave hears what it saith,
"Arise, arise, be free!"¹

The United States was, then, prepared for revolts in the Germanies. On the morning of March 28, 1848, the *New York Tribune* appeared with the following headlines: "Independence of Prussia," "Resignation of Metternich," "Rising in Bavaria—Constitution forced from the King at the Point of the Bayonet." On the next day the *Tribune* prophesied that Germany would soon be a great federal republic. From that time on, until it became apparent that all hope of the immediate establishment of democracy in

¹ Quoted in *Richmond Enquirer*: April 7, 1848; *New York Tribune*: March 20, 1848; *New York Herald*: March 19, 1848; *Richmond Enquirer*: March 31, 1848; *Washington National Intelligencer*: March 27, 1848; *Portland Transcript*: April 1, April 29, 1848; *Scioto Gazette*: April 5, 1848; *De Bow's Review*: May and June, 1848; *American Review*: Jan., 1848; *American Quarterly Register and Magazine*: May, 1848; *Brownson's Quarterly Review*: July, 1848; Howe, M. A. De Wolfe, *The Life and Letters of George Bancroft* (New York, 1908), vol. ii, pp. 33, 92; Buchanan, *Works*, vol. viii, p. 32; Quaipe, M. M., editor, *The Diary of James K. Polk* (Chicago, 1910), vol. iii, p. 413.

Central Europe must be indefinitely postponed, the American people paid a great deal of attention to happenings in Germany, Austria and Hungary. It is true that they were more interested in the parallel movements in France,¹ and that the amount of interest manifested in European affairs varied greatly in the different sections of the country. The South and West were largely apathetic. It is difficult to find many public men south of the Potomac or west of the Alleghanies who noticed the momentous events abroad, and the Western newspapers especially were silent²—facts which can be best explained, perhaps, by the absorbing interest of these sections in their own affairs and their lack of contact with Europe. All other questions in the South were overshadowed by the slavery issue, and the West was a new country intent on building itself up, with little time to speculate on affairs in Europe. The citizens of neither section traveled in Europe to such an extent as did those of the East. The South received only a small portion of the incoming horde of immigrants, and the economic contact of the West with Europe was almost entirely indirect. But in the more populous regions of the East, and indeed all along the Atlantic seaboard where prosperity was largely and directly dependent upon events in the Old World, there was no lack of interest in the revolutionary movements of the mid-century. News of German affairs was reported in some detail and was usually fairly accurate, although a prominent

¹ But the *Massachusetts Quarterly Review* for March, 1849, said: "Of all the revolutions which this last year has seen, that in Germany deserves the greatest consideration."

² The available letters, journals, speeches and memoirs of the following do not contain any references to the movements in Germany during 1848 and 1849: Abraham Lincoln, Alexander H. Stephens, Salmon P. Chase, John Sherman and William T. Sherman, Jefferson Davis, Henry Clay and Robert L. Dabney. Not a single editorial on German affairs during 1848 and 1849 could be found in the *Cincinnati Chronicle* or the *Warsaw (Ill.) Signal*.

German-American, Gustave Koerner, complained that it was generally taken from English sources and hence was often violently anti-German.¹ Editorials were surprisingly frequent, and sometimes in place of editorials special correspondents told the news and incidentally gave many comments of an editorial nature.

Several of these correspondents deserve particular attention. During most of the years 1848 and 1849, Charles A. Dana was the special correspondent of the *Tribune*, and the American socialist, Albert Brisbane, also wrote for the same paper for a shorter period. George Wilkins Kendall, editor of the New Orleans *Picayune*, was in Europe from early in 1848 to the spring of 1850, and Donald G. Mitchell (Ik Marvel) wrote letters from Paris to the New York *Courier and Enquirer* in 1848 and 1849. Most of these men traveled about the continent and planned to be in whatever city was the center of the revolutionary movement at that particular moment. Their letters are important not only as they represent the views of the authors, but also because of their influence in moulding public opinion throughout the United States. Their despatches were often copied by smaller newspapers and sometimes commented on—not always favorably—by their rivals. They furnish the keenest contemporary American interpretations of the revolutionary movements that we possess.²

Public meetings to celebrate the events were held all over the Union, in such widely scattered cities as New York, New Orleans, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Richmond and St. Louis. Long resolutions of sympathy and encouragement were the usual accompaniments. It will be shown later that many of the meetings at the time of the Franco-German

¹ McCormack, Thomas J., editor, *Memoirs of Gustave Koerner* (Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1909), vol. i, p. 518 *et seq.*

² Cf. *infra*, pp. 527-528.

War were held for purely partisan purposes — to gain the votes of Germans or Irish.¹ However, the public gatherings of 1848 were not the result of party politics, but rather of spontaneous joy and sympathy with the European revolutionary movements. Such meetings, then, are truly representative of American sentiment. That public officials and private individuals shared in the interest is evidenced by the following examples. President Polk's *Diary* for 1848 has many references to European affairs. James B. Angell tells of the intense interest at Brown University where, under the questionings of the students, a French class taught by George W. Greene was turned into a discussion of the revolutions in Europe, and the class time filled with descriptions of the chief actors in those movements. Samuel G. Howe, on the birth of a child in 1848, inscribed in the family Bible after its name the words "*Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité.*" Mention was made of the revolutions of 1848 even in the diary of the precocious John Davis Long, at that time a child of nine years of age. On April 15 he wrote: "The nations of Europe seem to be in [a] state of revolution for Republics," and on April 30: "The revolutionary movement is pervading in Europe."²

Later, in 1849, when the failure of the German revolutions seemed almost certain, many harsh criticisms were made in the United States, but it is difficult to find anything but optimism and good will in the spring of 1848. Prominent newspapers such as the New York *Tribune*, New York *Herald*, New Orleans *Picayune*, Richmond *Enquirer*

¹ Cf. *infra*, pp. 335-341, 365-370.

² Mayo, Lawrence Shaw, *America of Yesterday as reflected in the Journal of John Davis Long* (Boston, 1923), pp. 17, 18; Polk, *Diary*, vol. iii, pp. 413, 423, vol. iv, pp. 18, 47, 56, 57, 169, 178 *et seq.*; *The Reminiscences of James Burrill Angell* (New York, 1912), p. 24; Howe, Julia Ward, *Reminiscences* (Boston, 1900), p. 193.

and *Portland Transcript*, and individuals who were either leaders in American life or representatives of American thought, such as Benjamin Silliman, Charles Sumner, George Bancroft and Julia Ward Howe¹—all were enthusiastic over the course of events in Germany. Even such influential magazines as *Brownson's Quarterly Review* and the *North American Review*, although unable to see any possibility of good in the French revolution, spoke most favorably of the movements in Germany.

ATTITUDE OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

The government of the United States reflected the favorable sentiment of the country toward the German revolutions. President Polk and Secretary of State Buchanan were strongly in sympathy with the efforts to establish a Germanic federal union. Both the President's *Diary* and his last message to Congress state his position clearly. But the feelings of the President found expression in action as well as in words. In fact his administration did much to lay itself open to the charge of violating the traditional American policy of isolation from European affairs, both by interfering in the domestic concerns of a European nation and by giving aid to a belligerent power.

Several incidents will serve to illustrate the policy of the Polk administration. In July, 1848, the President refused to submit for ratification a treaty of extradition with Prussia and some of the minor states of Germany, partly on the ground that a Germanic union would soon be formed, in which case the impending treaty would be void and fresh negotiations would have to be initiated. In the same month, the American minister to Prussia, Andrew J. Donelson, was ordered to proceed to Frankfort to watch the course of the Frankfort Assembly, and in August he was definitely ap-

¹ Benjamin Silliman was a noted American geologist.

pointed as "Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Federal Government of Germany." Donelson was thus placed in a most delicate position. He was at the same time American minister to Prussia and to Germany. He might be compelled at any moment to face in two diametrically opposite directions. Buchanan recognized the difficulty, and his instructions to Donelson put great emphasis upon the maintenance of friendly relations with Prussia at any cost. In January, 1849, Baron Roenne was recognized and received by the President as "Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the German Empire." From March to October, 1848, there had been trouble in Schleswig-Holstein between Danes and Germans. In October a truce had been patched up between the contending parties and in that same month a request came to the American cabinet from the Frankfort Assembly, asking that an American naval officer be allowed to take the position of admiral in the new German navy. Four members of the cabinet—Buchanan, Mason, Walker and Toucey—favored the scheme, but Polk thought such an act improper and doubted his authority to grant the necessary permission. Nevertheless, in December Buchanan wrote Donelson that Commodore Foxhall A. Parker had been given leave of absence by the Secretary of the Navy, John Y. Mason, to go to Germany and to find out the nature of the service required. In the same letter it was stated that if further officers were needed, a congressional resolution giving the President authority to act could probably be obtained without great difficulty. Commodore Parker made the trip to Berlin and Frankfort but found the conditions unfavorable. The armistice would soon come to an end, Germany's navy was practically non-existent, and could not possibly cope with the comparatively large and efficient Danish navy. He thought German unity could not be achieved without civil war, and advised strongly against

any American officer serving in the German navy. While Parker was in Germany he learned of the intention of the German government to purchase a steam-frigate in the United States, and the desire that an American naval officer should assist in the manning and arming of such a vessel. On February 15, 1849, Secretary Mason was approached on this subject by the German Ambassador in the following terms:

I am instructed to request that the government of the United States would designate an officer of the United States Navy . . . to proceed . . . to New York, there to assist the agent in the selection of the vessel to be purchased, and, if any should be purchased, to take the command of her, to superintend the arming and equipment of her, to engage a crew and the necessary number of competent officers: and, when ready, to take her to Bremerhaven, and there to receive the further orders of the government.¹

Commodore M. C. Perry was appointed to this post, at least in so far as the fitting and arming of the vessel were concerned. In addition the officials of the Brooklyn Navy Yard were ordered by the Secretary of the Navy to give all possible aid.²

The advent to power of President Zachary Taylor and Secretary of State John M. Clayton saw a complete reversal of American policy. Minister Donelson was ordered back

¹ *Executive Documents*, 1st Session, 31st Congress, vol. iii, p. 24.

² For an account of the attitude of the administration and of the details of its policy, cf. *ibid.*, p. 19 *et seq.*; Polk, *Diary*, vol. iv, pp. 18, 27, 47, 56, 57, 169 *et seq.*; Buchanan, *Works*, vol. viii, pp. 130, 143 *et seq.*, 151, 152, 167 *et seq.*, 237, 267, 342, 359 (rather facetious letter of Clayton to Buchanan); Richardson, James D., *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents* (Washington, 1897), vol. vi, p. 2480. Buchanan himself seems to have been confused in his conception as to the nature of the government which had been established at Frankfort, for he referred to it at various times as "the new German Confederation," "the Central Government of Germany" and "the German Empire."

to Berlin, and his connection with the German Confederation severed, on the ground that a real Germanic union had little chance of being successful. The instructions of the preceding administration to Commodore Perry and the officials of the Brooklyn Navy Yard were countermanded, and the German ambassador notified that the ship intended for his government could only leave New York after he had promised that it would not be employed in the war against Denmark. The latter power had protested against the action of Secretary Mason, and the Taylor administration considered that American neutrality had been seriously imperiled.¹

CAUSES FOR AMERICAN SYMPATHY WITH THE GERMAN REVOLUTIONS

The chief cause for the almost universal sympathy which was manifested in the United States for the revolutionary movements in Germany is not difficult to discover. The American people had, and still have, an almost passionate love for the conceptions of democracy and republicanism which they have felt to be fundamental to American civilization. The United States had greatly prospered, and the inference was natural that this very prosperity was because of the fact that she had clung so tenaciously to these two ideals. Democracy meant to an American political democracy, manhood suffrage for all whites, and was often confused with the individual liberties of speech, of the press

¹ *Executive Documents, op. cit.*, pp. 18, 19, 28, 32, 33; Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi, pp. 2548-2549. It is interesting to note that three attempts were made in 1850 to reopen diplomatic relations with the German Confederation. In the course of one of the debates Representative John A. McClernand severely criticised the action of the Taylor and Fillmore administration because it had broken relations with the Frankfort Assembly, thereby allying itself with the kings rather than with the people of Germany. Cf. *Congressional Globe*, 1st Session, 31st Congress, pp. 233, 583, 745, 746, appendix, p. 143 *et seq.*

and of association. Americans conceived of a republic as a state without a king. But in addition, and just as important, republicanism in the United States meant federal republicanism, with each state retaining a certain portion of its sovereignty. Before 1848 the important states of the Old World had repudiated both political democracy and federal republicanism. But was not Germany ideally constituted to form such a federal republic? Because of her political condition, divided as she was into some thirty sovereign states, the German republicans and democrats, who were also ardent supporters of German unification, must almost necessarily be driven to establish a federal form of government. The faith, then, of the American people in their own political institutions and ideals—and perhaps no less their vanity—led them to hope and desire that the European nations should copy them. It followed that American sympathy should be extended in the greatest measure to that nation which seemed the most capable of taking over American political institutions.

The Richmond *Enquirer* considered the German revolutionary movements a “reflex” and George Bancroft called them an “echo” of the liberal institutions of the United States. *Brownson's Quarterly Review* and the *North American Review* compared the centralizing tendencies of France with the federative tendencies of Germany, greatly to the advantage of the latter. A unitary or centralized republic could never be so successful as a federal republic. The *North American Review* cited the examples of Switzerland and the United States as sufficient to prove the success of federalism in the reconciliation of liberty with law. In his last annual message President Polk bore witness to the interest of the people of the United States in the efforts “to unite the States of Germany in a confederation similar . . . to our own Federal Union.” Both the President and his

Secretary of State, Buchanan, praised the attempts to establish a united Germany "without unnecessarily abridging the powers of the Sovereign States." The following quotation from an editorial in the *New York Herald* exhibits most clearly a very important cause of American sympathy with the German revolutionary movements, namely, the tickling of the national pride by the compliment which it was hoped Germany was about to pay to American political institutions:

The Germans are eminently practical in their notions. . . . All our observations, when amongst them, tended to produce the conviction that in all Europe there is no people so likely to make so near an approach to our own system, both social and political, as the Germans; and the truth of this belief recent events have most forcibly demonstrated. The tumultuous war of the French Revolution . . . diverted the thoughts and the gaze of the wonderstruck world from what was all this time taking place in Germany. Well, during this time, the people of that country had been phlegmatically and calmly mobbing their ministers, kicking out their kings, upsetting a throne in one place, erecting a republic in another, and when the world looked again there was a confederation of German States, almost completely assimilating to our own. They have been approximating more and more closely ever since, and the day is not distant when the whole of that once grand empire . . . shall form a noble band of republics on the model of our own.¹

A second, and more or less unconscious, cause for American interest lay in the fact that there were a great many

¹ *New York Herald*: Nov. 2, 1848; *Richmond Enquirer*: March 31, 1848; *Brownson's Quarterly Review*: July, 1848; *North American Review*: July, 1848; Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 33; Buchanan, *Works*, vol. viii, p. 130; Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi, p. 2480. The connection with the American states' rights theory can be seen in the *American Review*: Oct., 1848.

German-Americans in the United States who sympathized with the movements almost to a man.¹ In 1850 the total number amounted to somewhat over half a million out of an aggregate population of somewhat more than twenty-three millions. Nearly one-half of these German-Americans resided in the larger cities of the country. Native-born Germans composed more than one per cent of the population of fifteen American states. But New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and New Orleans each counted more than seven per cent of Germans among their inhabitants, while the middle western cities of Louisville, Cincinnati, St. Louis, Chicago and Milwaukee had proportions ranging from seventeen per cent in the case of Louisville to thirty-seven per cent in that of Milwaukee. Fifty-six thousand native Germans lived in New York city, and one hundred and twelve thousand in the state of Ohio.² That the German-Americans were, on the whole, very highly respected by the native population of the United States, is not to be doubted. Of course many statements in praise of them must be discounted, because their rapidly increasing numbers were making them a power in politics which neither party could well afford to disregard. It is pleasant to note, however, that the politicians made no attempt in 1848 to control German votes by an appeal to the almost universal sympathy of German-Americans with the momentous happenings in the Fatherland. The Cincinnati *Gazette* praised the substantial, hard-won achievements of German science and culture, and at the same time took cognizance of the very material aid which the German workingmen had rendered to the United States in the construction of American canals

¹ For a more detailed account of German-American opinion at this time cf. *infra*, pp. 454-457.

² De Bow, J. D. B., *Statistical View of the United States, being a Compendium of the Seventh Census* (Washington, 1854), *passim*. Cf. *infra*, pp. 427-429.

and railroads. Perhaps one of the most disinterested statements is found in James Buchanan's letter to Donelson on August 15, 1848: "A very large portion of our own population . . . consists of Germans and their descendants; and they are distinguished for the sound good sense, the patient industry, and the firm integrity which belong to them in their fatherland. . . . We have no more useful citizens."¹

Besides the widespread sympathy with German democracy and republicanism which existed in the United States, and the influence which the large German population in the country exerted upon American opinion, there was still a third cause for the American interest in the German revolutionary movements of 1848 and 1849. This lay in the belief that a liberal, unified and republican Germany might very greatly benefit American commercial and financial interests. It is very dangerous to put too much emphasis upon this cause of sympathy because it doubtless affected only a very small, though rather influential, portion of the population. Indeed, such a consideration probably never once occurred to the average American citizen. However it would be just as unwise to ignore it entirely. The clearest expression of this phase of opinion is to be found in the instructions which Buchanan sent to Donelson before, and at the time when, he notified the latter of his appointment as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Germanic Confederation. Although the United States had very liberal commercial treaties with many of the German states, it is obvious that it would have been to the benefit of the former to have had a single liberal tariff treaty with a united Germany. Secretary of State Buchanan seems to have been particularly interested in the abolition

¹ Buchanan, *Works*, vol. viii, p. 168; *Cincinnati Gazette*: June 6, 1850. Cf. *infra*, pp. 429-434.

of certain transit duties which had been a feature of the Prussian tariff law of 1818, and which had been carried over into the Zollverein. It is true that these transit duties were not charged between the states which composed the Zollverein, but in 1848 many German states—among others Hamburg, Lübeck, Bremen, Mecklenburg, Hanover and Austria—were not members of that organization. It is also true that the tendency in most of the states outside the Zollverein was towards free trade, but such a tendency did not prevent them from charging transit dues which would increase their revenue. If a federal union could be formed in Germany, there would be but a single duty, levied when the goods entered any German state, and the obnoxious transit duties would thus be abolished.

The instructions sent by Buchanan to Donelson on August 7, 1848, contained the following sentence: "The most important object of your mission will be, to obtain such an adjustment of the German Tariff as will admit our important productions into German ports at a reasonable rate of duty."¹ Later in the year Donelson did consider negotiating a single commercial treaty with the Central German Government at Frankfort and wrote home to Buchanan for instructions. But the latter refused to give his permission because the German states had not yet surrendered their powers over foreign affairs to the Central Government and consequently a treaty with that government under such conditions might be considered an unwarranted interference with German affairs on the part of the United States. The additional fact that the Polk administration was drawing to a close made Buchanan consider it inadvisable to start negotiations at that time.²

The belief that a liberal, republican and unified Germany

¹ Buchanan, *Works*, vol. viii, p. 168.

² *Ibid.*, vol. viii, pp. 130, 152 *et seq.*, 237 *et seq.*, 342.

would greatly facilitate and enlarge the commercial relations of the United States with the German states, was undoubtedly the primary economic cause for American sympathy during this period. An argument, more ingenious than convincing, was put forward by the editor of the New Orleans *Picayune* to prove that vast amounts of capital would be exported to, and invested in, the United States during the period when Europe was in upheaval. He thought that if the European monarchies were all converted into republics, capitalists would necessarily have to invest their surplus money in republics. But since none of the new republics would have any stability, at least for some time, this capital would have to be invested, during the time of uncertainty, in the United States, the only really stable and conservative republic.¹

For a time it appeared as if American shipping interests might be rather directly affected by the course of the German revolution. The attempt of the Frankfort government to purchase ships and to equip them in American ports, gave rise to hopes that some economic advantage might accrue to American interests from the war between the Danes and Germans. But, as already described, the encouragement which was given to such questionable gains by the Polk administration was rather rudely destroyed by the uncompromising neutrality of the succeeding Taylor administration.

The three most important causes, then, of American interest in, and sympathy with, the German revolutionary movements of 1848 and 1849 were: (1) the feeling that Germany was attempting to set up a social and political system, copied more or less directly from that of the United States; (2) the presence of an ever-increasing number of Germans in the United States, who naturally sympathized

¹ New Orleans *Picayune*: March 29, 1848.

with the movements in Germany and who were considered a highly desirable element in the population of the country, and an element so numerous that it was unsafe for any political party to ignore them; and (3) the belief that somehow or other the German movements might fill the pocket-books of American citizens.

It would be both impractical and unprofitable to make the study of American opinion during the crowded years of 1848 and 1849 depend upon chronology. So filled were these years with action, so confused were they, and so little were the various events given their true importance by American contemporary writers, that a chronological study would leave the reader hopelessly at sea. But some more detailed account of American opinion of those factors and events which now stand out as the most significant, or of those factors and events concerning which American opinion was radically to change before German unity was finally consummated in 1871, must be given. We must consider briefly the American attitude upon the following points: (1) the character of the German people; (2) the Austrian government; (3) the Prussian government; (4) the Frankfort Assembly and German unification.

THE CHARACTER OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE

During the early part of the year 1848 American comment upon the German character was nearly unanimous and almost invariably favorable. The adjectives most frequently used when speaking of the German were "calm," "moderate," "hardy," "brave," "kindly," "quiet," "domestic." It was believed that he was a good-natured, easy-going sort of person, extremely fond of home and family, very industrious, and careless of political rights so long as his personal rights in his home and business were respected. Buchanan gave testimony to the "patient and persevering

character" of the Germans. Charles Loring Brace, a visitor in Germany in 1850, was strongly impressed with the domestic virtues of the Germans—"such an economical, simple-living, cultivated people"—and considered that his character had been permanently bettered by living among "so many kind-hearted people." The *Democratic Review* praised the honesty and loyalty of the German people, their thoroughness in carrying through whatever they might start. Such a people, once aroused over political issues, would make more lasting reforms than the more impulsive and reckless Frenchmen. Their moderation was lauded in many quarters. *Brownson's Quarterly Review* thought that the Germans were showing far more statesmanship than any other nation in Europe. Ralph Waldo Emerson was praising the same trait when he said of the German revolutionists: "Now, all goes well, for they know what they want."¹ The New York *Herald* stated that the German character would never allow the violence or the terrorism of the French revolution, and George W. Kendall thought that their careful steering between "royalty and radicalism" was the clearest proof of wisdom and the best sign of ultimate success.²

From the above, it can easily be seen that in 1848 American opinion of the German character was distinctly favorable. But as time wore on, an almost complete change is discoverable in American feeling. The revolution was not

¹ Emerson, Edward Waldo and Forbes, Waldo Emerson, editors, *Journals of Ralph Waldo Emerson* (Boston, 1912), vol. vii, p. 411; New York *Herald*: Nov. 10, 1848; New Orleans *Picayune*: May 4, 1848; *Graham's Magazine*: Dec., 1848 (art. by Joseph R. Chandler); *Brownson's Quarterly Review*: July, 1848; *Life of Charles Loring Brace, Chiefly Told in his own Letters*, edited by his daughter, Emma Brace (New York, 1894), pp. 99, 100; Buchanan, *Works*, vol. viii, p. 168.

² New York *Herald*: Nov. 10, 1848; New Orleans *Picayune*: May 4, 1848.

succeeding, the republic was not being founded, German unity was becoming a joke. Gradually the belief became prevalent that the German people were to blame, that they were unfit for liberal institutions. During the years 1849 and 1850 Americans were critical of the German character, and their feelings grew contemptuous. The *Massachusetts Quarterly Review* thought that all traces of manly independence had been destroyed by the long subjection of the German people to their princes and governments. Kendall came to believe that they were lacking in "patience, stability of purpose, and determination in the accomplishment of their ends." Julia Ward Howe voiced the prevailing belief in their lack of practicality when she said that they "had dreamed of freedom, but had not dreamed of the way to secure it." The *North American Review* spoke with contempt of the pedantry of the German mind. The following quotation from the *New York Tribune* summarizes the later and more distrustful attitude toward the German character:

For the Germans in general, as painstaking scholars, amiable people and liberal and fearless thinkers, we have great respect; but as practical men, political organizers and reformers, asserters of ideas except in the safe categories of seven times potentialized metaphysics, no respect whatever. They conceive excellent designs; but when it comes to action they accomplish little or nothing.¹

AUSTRIA

Since Austria was part of the German Confederation in 1848, since she had been the traditional leader of the German states and since she was to play an important part, usually the dominant part, in German affairs until 1866, no

¹ *New York Tribune*: Feb. 14, 1850; *New Orleans Picayune*: Nov. 19, 1848; *Independent*: Nov. 7, 1850; *Massachusetts Quarterly Review*: March, 1849; *North American Review*: April, 1850; Howe, *Reminiscences*, p. 194.

study of the attitude of the American people toward Germany at this time would be at all adequate which neglected to treat of American opinion of Austria. Mention has already been made of the belief in the United States that Austria would combine with Prussia and Russia to stamp out the revolutionary movements in France. This was only the first indication of the constant willingness on the part of the American people throughout these years to impute the worst motives to Austria. In every act of the revolutionary drama of 1848, 1849 and 1850, she was made to play consistently the part of the heavy villian. Whether she was struggling with Hungary, Italy, Bohemia or Germany, she received but scant sympathy from the people of the United States.

But the hatred for Austria was not extended to the people of that country. Americans rejoiced whenever the Austrians showed signs of revolting from the Habsburgs and establishing a republican government. The Richmond *Enquirer* was delighted with the fall of Metternich in March, 1848. James Fenimore Cooper in his diary, and the *Scioto Gazette* in its editorial columns, showed a friendly interest in the revolutionary movements in Austria in the spring of 1848. Charles Sumner, in an address before the Phi Beta Kappa Society at Union College in July, 1848, referred most sympathetically to the revolt against the "patriarchal despotism" of Austria. The proclamation of a republic in Vienna in October, 1848, elicited favorable comment from the Richmond *Enquirer* and the Portland *Transcript*. The bravery of the population in the resulting siege of Vienna by the imperial forces was warmly praised in the United States, and the *Tribune* made a comparison between the siege of 1848 and the more famous one of 1683, a comparison in which the Viennese of 1848 were likened to the Christian population of the city in 1683, the hoped-for relief

army of the Hungarians to the actual relief army of John Sobieski, and the Austrian Emperor and his army to the Turk and his besieging forces. The fact that no American tears were shed in behalf of the Austrian government, that no unfavorable comment in the United States upon the Austrian revolutions has been discovered, is perhaps the clearest proof of the favor with which most Americans regarded the overthrow of Metternich and the attempt to establish a republic in Vienna.¹

It was not the people, then, but the government of Austria—and especially the Habsburg dynasty—for which the Americans felt such a strong antipathy. The adjective most often applied to the Austrian government was “despotic.” The New York *Herald* spoke of the Emperor Ferdinand as “the imbecile representative of the house of Hapsburgh,” and *Niles’ National Register* called him “the imbecile and sanguinary despot of Austria.” Nor is such hatred hard to understand. It has already been noted that Austria was commonly considered as one of the leaders of the Holy Alliance, toward which the American people had inherited no uncertain feelings. In 1848 and 1849 the Austrian government was struggling against the principles of democracy, republicanism and nationalism, with all of which Americans felt the keenest sympathy. The *Portland Transcript* and *Brownson’s Quarterly Review* wished success to the Italian revolt from Austrian dominion. Perhaps the American people felt more sympathetic with the Hungarian revolution than with any other movement throughout the whole period.²

¹ New York *Tribune*: Nov. 20, 1848; Richmond *Enquirer*: April 11, 1848, Jan. 2, 1849; Portland *Transcript*: Nov. 4, 1848; *Scioto Gazette*: April 19, 1848; Cooper, James Fenimore, *Correspondence of James Fenimore-Cooper* (New Haven, 1922), vol. ii, p. 75; Sumner, *Works*, vol. ii, p. 93.

² For a more detailed account of American opinion on this subject, cf. *infra*, pp. 53-73.

The *North American Review* called Austria a "conglomerate of dissimilar races which had no principle of unity but despotism," and claimed that she had no right to govern Hungary, Bohemia and Galicia.¹

Nor were most Americans any more favorable toward Austria in her relations to purely German affairs. The *American Review* spoke of her as a nation "whose legislation, for the last half-century, has promoted neither the union of the country [Germany], nor the progress of liberty." On the whole the relation of Austria to German affairs was grasped only very gradually by American newspapers, but under the leadership of Charles A. Dana most of them came to realize the important part which she was playing. They saw that the Austrian Empire was a great hodge-podge of nationalities, that in it these very nationalities, Germans, Magyars and Slavs, were struggling for supremacy, and that it was a contest largely between the Slavs, supported by the Emperor, his army and Russia, on the one hand, and the German Austrians, supported at times, though not always, by the Hungarian nationalists, on the other. It is hardly necessary to say that the sympathies of the American people were with the latter. They believed that these German Austrians wished to be united into an empire with the rest of the German people, that the interests of the Slavs were directly opposed to those of the Germans, and that the triumph of the former meant that Austria would become, not an integral part of a new German empire, but its deadliest enemy—a great confederacy of discordant peoples, dominated by Slavs. And when Vienna had been captured and the Hungarians crushed, it seemed

¹ New York *Herald*: Nov. 10, 1848; New York *Evening Post*: June 2, 1848; New Orleans *Picayune*: Dec. 30, 1849; Portland *Transcript*: July 1, 1848; Niles' *National Register*: Dec. 13, 1848; Brownson's *Quarterly Review*: July, 1848; *North American Review*: July, 1848.

as if the Slavs had become predominant in Austrian affairs. The Austrian constitution of 1849, although admired by the *Tribune* and the *North American Review* for its liberality, attempted, in a greater measure than ever before, to unite the various races under Habsburg dominion into a single people. Before this constitution was promulgated it was conceivable that German Austria might be fused into a new Germany without including Hungary and Croatia, but its centralizing tendencies made such a thing impossible. As Kendall said, Germany was "placed under the alternative of receiving into the Federal State the Hungarians, Italians and other revolvers, or of excluding Austria," and the *Herald* called the constitution a "pretense and sham." Austria began to be regarded as the chief opponent of German unity, and thus another factor was added to make her unpopular in the United States. The *North American Review* claimed that Austria was the only state which would offer any obstacles to the formation of a German federal union, and in May, 1849, the *Tribune* expressed the opinion that except for the hostile influence of the Austrian court, a German Emperor might be crowned within a month's time.¹

PRUSSIA

It would be erroneous to believe that American love for Prussia was in any way proportionate to the hatred which was felt for Austria, her rival for leadership in German affairs. Although there was not the same unanimity of dislike for Prussia as for Austria, the feeling toward the two governments was, on the whole, very similar. It was remembered that Prussia as well as Austria had been party

¹ New York *Tribune*: Sept. 26, Nov. 10, Dec. 19, Dec. 21, 1848, April 2, May 17, 1849; New York *Herald*: April 9, 1849; New Orleans *Picayune*: Dec. 6, 1848, April 27, 1849; *American Review*: Oct., 1848; *North American Review*: July, 1848, Jan., 1850.

to the odious Holy Alliance. The *Tribune* claimed that Prussia had been governed as despotically as any other German state, if not more so. The *Massachusetts Quarterly Review* made an especially severe arraignment of Prussia's past policy, particularly of her systematic wars of aggression.¹

On the other hand, there was much praise in the United States for the Prussian people. The *North American Review* referred to Prussia as the leading state of Germany—industrially, commercially and culturally—and hinted at the glory of her future role in German affairs. The *American Messenger* and the *New York Herald* thought that Prussia's Protestantism would make her more receptive to liberal principles and more capable of establishing self-government. In addition, Prussia possessed another institution which, to American eyes, especially fitted her for democratic government. The people of the United States were extremely proud of their system of free elementary education—the common school system, as it was usually called—and considered it as one of the chief bulwarks of their political institutions. The Prussian educational system seemed very like their own and hence made them think that country very suitable for any democratic experiment. In truth the chief reason for the similarity was the fact that the American system had been copied to some extent from that of Germany. Leading American educators like Horace Mann and Henry Barnard admired and consciously copied German educational theories. From 1835 on, American education was profoundly influenced by German pedagogues, and in 1837 Michigan “completely reorganized the public school system on the Prussian plan, coordinated elementary, secondary, and university education, and brought it under gov-

¹ *New York Tribune*: Feb. 14, 1850; *Niles' National Register*: Dec. 20, 1848; *Massachusetts Quarterly Review*: March, 1849. For a very different view cf. *New York Herald*: Dec. 20, 1849.

ernment control." Probably the extent to which Americans had copied Prussia in this respect was not generally recognized. But it was clearly perceived that the Prussian educational system closely resembled that of the United States, and the latter was commonly held to be one of the preeminent causes for the success which the American people had achieved in the practice of self-government. The *North American Review* and the New Orleans *Picayune*, in almost identical language, stated that the common people of Prussia, the laboring classes, were better educated than the masses in any other part of Europe, and therefore both papers believed that the success of liberal and republican principles was less doubtful in Prussia than in any other European state. The *Tribune* said: "Prussia today is Democratic—her thirty years of common schools have settled that."¹

The German to whom probably the greatest amount of space in the American newspapers was devoted during these revolutionary years, was the Prussian king, Frederick William IV (1840-1861). It is therefore important and very interesting to discover American opinion concerning the character and achievements of this man. The *Picayune* had nothing good to say for Frederick William and referred to him indiscriminately as "cunning," "irresolute," "inconsistent," "crazy." Even less complimentary were the epithets hurled at him by the *Tribune*: "hypocritical," "tyrannical," "fantastic," "dilettante," "false," "unscrupulous,"

¹ New York *Tribune*: April 20, 1849; New York *Herald*: Dec. 22, 1851; New Orleans *Picayune*: April 26, 1848; *American Messenger*: July, 1848; *North American Review*: July, 1848, Jan., 1849; Slosson, Edwin E., *The American Spirit in Education* (New Haven, 1921), p. 175. Cf. also *ibid.*, pp. 130-133, 172-179. Slosson makes much of the influence of Germany upon American education in the first half of the 19th century, but Graves, Frank P., *The History of Education in Modern Times* (New York, 1914), says little of German influence until the latter part of the century, except for the work of Mann and Barnard.

"lying villain," "crowned perjurer." The *Massachusetts Quarterly Review* expressed its belief that Frederick William and his brother, later William I, were the most important causes of the trouble in Prussia. The *Scioto Gazette* attributed the king's interest in German unity less to sincerity than to cowardice. The *Richmond Enquirer* attacked him for indecision and vacillation. Henry Wadsworth Longfellow was so incensed by the story of how his friend Freiligrath had been imprisoned for writing a song which expressed sentiments against Frederick William, that he exclaimed in his diary: "*So long as a king is left upon his throne there will be no justice in the earth.*"¹ Although the *American Review* had spoken very favorably of Frederick William in January, 1848, just before the revolutionary outbreaks, and had commended his benevolence, purity of personal life and good intentions, in October, 1848, it attacked him severely for his opposition to liberal principles. But not all of the portraits were so black. Although the *North American Review* condemned him for looking to the past rather than to the future, it praised his honesty, sincerity and industry. Charles A. Dana said that he was "simply a man of fine natural capacities ruined by his education." The *New York Herald* even painted a flattering picture, praised Frederick William's learning, practicality and liberalism, and said: "He has always shown himself favorable to civil and political progress."²

Considerable interest was aroused in the United States by the constitutional struggle in Prussia. According to his

¹ Longfellow, Samuel, editor, *Life of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, with Extracts from his Journals and Correspondence* (Boston, 1886), vol. ii, p. 124; *New York Tribune*: May 23, Dec. 7, Dec. 16, 1848, May 25, Nov. 30, 1849, Feb. 14, Sept. 27, 1850; *New Orleans Picayune*: June 30, 1849, March 22, 1850; *Richmond Enquirer*: June 12, 1849; *Scioto Gazette*: April 19, 1848; *Massachusetts Quarterly Review*: March, 1849.

² *New York Herald*: Dec. 20, 1849; *New York Tribune*: Nov. 10, 1848; *American Review*: Jan., Oct., 1848; *North American Review*: Jan., 1849.

promises Frederick William IV convoked the Prussian Diet, which in its turn provided for the election of a Prussian National Assembly. This body, after a contest for power with the monarch, was prorogued by him in November, 1848, after which event a rump of the Assembly refused to grant any taxes to the king. The deputies were following the famous English precedent of using the taxing power as a lever to wring concessions from the monarch. Some Americans felt that the real turning-point in the German revolution had been reached. If the people conquered in Prussia, they might do so in every German state. But the Prussians did not remain firm; the refusal to pay taxes frightened them; the rump possessed no power and the victory went to Frederick William and his ministry. To Charles A. Dana it seemed as if the whole revolution had failed, at least temporarily.¹

Immediately after his victory, Frederick William promulgated a constitution of his own making, which was pruned down by degrees until it finally became the conservative document of 1850, with the famous three-class system of voting. When first issued, it was quite favorably received by many Americans. Dana thought it more liberal than if it had been framed by the Diet. The *Picayune* called it "liberal and even democratic." On the other hand, the *Massachusetts Quarterly Review* criticized it on the ground that the principle from which it had proceeded was that of "might is right." The *American Messenger* thought it had been granted out of necessity, and the *North American Review* questioned the sincerity of Frederick William's sudden conversion to constitutionalism. The later changes and limitations which were brought about by the king strengthened the opinions of the hostile critics.²

¹ New York Tribune: Dec. 16, Dec. 19, 1848.

² *Ibid.*, Jan. 5, 1849, Oct. 10, Dec. 2, 1850; New Orleans *Picayune*: Oct. 12, 1849; *American Messenger*: Feb., 1849; *Massachusetts Quarterly Review*: March, 1849; *North American Review*: Jan., 1849.

GERMAN UNIFICATION AND THE FRANKFORT ASSEMBLY

The question of German unification was almost inextricably bound up with the revolutionary movements in Austria and Prussia. During these two years it centered in the attempt of the famous Frankfort Assembly, which first met in May, 1848, to establish a central government for the whole of Germany, a government which should be sovereign, and which should displace the separate governments of the various states. The two fundamental problems which the Frankfort Assembly had to solve were the territorial extent of the new Germany and its form of government. In the first place, should the new state include Austria, with her non-German population of Hungarians, Czechs, Croats, Poles, Rumanians and Italians, and Prussia with her Polish subjects? If it did, could the new state truly be called German? But if either or both of these countries should be excluded, the new Germany would be far from complete. In the second place, should the form of government be monarchical or republican? If it became republican, it must face the opposition of all the German princes. If it became monarchical, who should be its monarch? It must be the royal family of either Austria or Prussia, for neither of them would obey any of the lesser princes. But neither of them would obey the other. Such were the very perplexing questions which this assembly had to face.

The attitude of the American people was almost uniformly favorable to German unity and yet almost uniformly hostile to the work of the Frankfort Assembly. It has been noticed that the most important cause of American sympathy with the revolutionary movements of 1848 and 1849 was the hope that Germany might form a federal union similar to that of the United States. *Brownson's Quarterly Review* saw in the possibility of the formation of

a single federal Germany the most important gain that could proceed from the revolution. James Fenimore Cooper said: "A German nation is a great and useful idea!"¹ But no such sympathy was extended to the work of the Frankfort Assembly. Its doings were reported faithfully enough in the news columns, but almost no editorial notice was taken of it until the latter part of 1848.² Thenceforth its actions were reported carefully by the two editorial correspondents, Dana and Kendall. More stress was laid on the faults and mistakes of the Assembly than upon the difficulties which it had to face, although the latter were recognized by some American writers. For instance, the *Massachusetts Quarterly Review* saw the "force of habit and custom" and the lack of experience of the masses in political self-government as obstacles in the way of achieving German unity. Kendall perceived clearly that the various states of Germany were far more intent upon a selfish separate existence than upon any project for a united Germany. One desired one thing, another something entirely different, and it was almost hopeless to expect them to sink their differences for the common good. He said: "If the great Congress assembled at Frankfort . . . can unite and reconcile all the different elements which make up the immense confederation of Germany, they can certainly work miracles."³ Dana saw Germany hopelessly divided into parties with differences as clearly marked as those between the various states. There were absolute monarchists, constitutional monarchists, republicans and

¹ Cooper, *Correspondence*, vol. ii, p. 752; *Brownson's Quarterly Review*: July, 1848.

² On May 22, 1848, the *Tribune* spoke of the fact that the Frankfort Assembly had convened, but the next editorial comment on it in the *Tribune* was by Dana on Sept. 6, 1848.

³ New Orleans *Picayune*: Sept. 14, 1848; New York *Herald*: Nov. 10, 1848; *Massachusetts Quarterly Review*: March, 1849.

socialists, each with a separate program. And each one of these groups was subdivided into many smaller parts. The *North American Review* pointed to the strife between the social classes in Germany. The middle classes opposed the aristocracy, the laboring classes hated them both, while the literary men and university students were contemptuous of all three. How could these various conflicting elements—states, parties, social classes—be made to cooperate with one another in order to form a single government for a united Germany? ¹

One rather well-founded criticism of the Frankfort Assembly was that the majority of its members were not practical, but were interested too much in theoretical discussions of abstract rights. It seemed as though the traditional German love of philosophy and metaphysics had played too large a part in the proceedings at Frankfort. The *North American Review* said that Germany possessed “innumerable theories” for her regeneration, but “not a man to put them into execution.” The *Massachusetts Quarterly Review* characterized the members of the assembly as “fanciful, pedantic, learned professors and similar savants, who fancy that the dreams they indulged in whilst engaged in their libraries could be made realities.” Kendall said:

That the assembly at Frankfort numbers among its members many men of rare talent there can be no doubt; that there are three men among them possessing what we would call plain, practical, commonsense minds . . . is problematical. At all events, up to this time such minds have not been manifest.²

A second criticism was the ultra-patriotism of the Frankfort Assembly. There was little sympathy with its course

¹ New York *Tribune*: Nov. 6, 1848; *North American Review*: Jan., 1849.

² New Orleans *Picayune*: Nov. 14, Nov. 19, Nov. 21, 1848; *North American Review*: Jan., 1849; *Massachusetts Quarterly Review*: March, 1849.

in regard to the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. Dana spoke of the war between Denmark and Germany, which grew out of the desire of the Germans to free the people of the duchies from Danish rule, as the "most insane of martial enterprises." The *American Review* considered that Frederick William was fostering the war spirit in order to silence domestic troubles in Prussia, and characterized the war as one of "illegality, injustice, and violence." The Washington *National Intelligencer* said: "Prussia wants Schleswick, Germany wants Prussia."¹ There was a feeling among many Americans that a large number of Germans were bent upon conquest, and were desirous of obtaining for the fatherland every bit of territory which could in any way be called German. The *North American Review* unreservedly attacked the attempt of the Frankfort Assembly to capture Schleswig and Holstein, accused it of similar designs upon Alsace and Lorraine—designs which had not been executed only because of fear of France—and instanced the retention of Posen by Prussia to prove that German nationality would not voluntarily stop within its natural limits. In the following extract from a letter to the *Pica-yune*, Kendall assails the aggrandizing policy of the Frankfort Assembly, and shows to what absurdity it might lead:

Almost the only acts of the Diet which found any favor at all were of questionable honesty if not of downright injustice—look at the proceedings in relation to Schleswig-Holstein . . . They poked about in search of every little settlement where the German language happened to be spoken, and with songs all about "Fatherland" were for bringing them into the Confederacy at once. Had Schleswig . . . been united . . . there is no telling where they might have stopped. Supposing the inhabitants of New Braunfels, in Texas, had sent

¹ Washington *National Intelligencer*: Sept. 20, 1848; New York *Tribune*: May 23, Sept. 6, 1848; *Graham's Magazine*: Dec., 1848 (art. by Joseph P. Chandler); *American Review*: Nov., 1848.

on word that they did not care about paying State and county taxes, that they spoke German, and were in favor of confederation, annexation and unity, something might have been done even in their behalf.¹

The Portland *Transcript*, in referring to the war between Danes and Germans for Schleswig-Holstein, spoke of the way in which dynastic and nationalistic aggrandizement was hopelessly confused with the parallel struggle between the forces of autocracy and democracy.²

By the spring of 1849 the Frankfort Assembly had at last finished its constitution, excluded Austria from the new empire, and elected Frederick William German Emperor, a title which, after much hesitancy, he refused. It was in these months, and concerning these events, that one finds the most significant and interesting opinions expressed. Very different ideas were held as to the value of establishing a unified German empire with the Prussian king at its head. Late in 1848 Dana had prophesied that such a course would be followed, but he could see no good ensuing from it. The only result would be the addition of a new monarch to the already existing thirty-four sovereign princes. The *North American Review* felt that by elimination Frederick William would be offered the imperial throne, but doubted his ability to establish a strong government. The *Massachusetts Quarterly Review* saw in it merely an attempt to make of Germany an enlarged Prussia. Kendall was apathetic. Whatever the outcome, it would not prove to be of long duration. But the *Tribune* in its editorial columns took a very different attitude. It completely repudiated Dana's cynicism, and saw some value in the formation of a German federal union, imperfect though it might be. It

¹ New Orleans *Picayune*: Feb. 16, 1849; *North American Review*: April, 1850.

² Portland *Transcript*: April 28, May 12, 1849.

admitted the many mistakes of the Frankfort Assembly, but at the same time said:

But it was true to the one idea on which all Germans were and are agreed. It framed a Constitution in which that idea was, after a sort, embodied. Let that constitution be set at work, and you will see a united Germany—not such a one as Destiny means to produce one of these days, but yet a tolerable advance toward it.¹

It may not, perhaps, be stretching one's imagination too far to see in the attitude of the *Tribune* the beginning of a more opportunistic viewpoint toward the German movements, the beginning of a belief that even democracy and republicanism might be sacrificed with justice to the ideal of German unity, that any kind of unity was better than the anarchy resulting from the quarrels of the various princes.

With the failure of the Frankfort Assembly, the German revolution may be said to have come to an end. Feeble efforts to save something from the wreck occurred in the latter half of 1849 and during the year 1850, but they belong logically to the period of reaction which set in after the dissolution of the Frankfort Assembly. Americans had sympathized strongly with the events of the year 1848, and, as will be seen, they were to sympathize still more strongly with the Hungarian revolution. But with its failure and with the failure to achieve German unity, they settled back into a feeling of pessimism and despair about the immediate prospects of a successful revolution in Central Europe, although they refused to believe that the forces of reaction could hold the reins for any considerable length of time.

¹ New York *Tribune*: May 28, 1849, Dec. 21, 1848, May 17, 1849; New Orleans *Picayune*: May 26, 1849; *North American Review*: Jan., 1849; *Massachusetts Quarterly Review*: March, 1849.

CHAPTER II

REACTION IN CENTRAL EUROPE FROM 1849 TO 1853

THE period from the summer of 1849 through the year 1853 may be described as a time when reaction reigned supreme in Central Europe. Hungary was crushed; Schwarzenberg ruled over an Austria seemingly more powerful and conservative than the Austria of Metternich; the Prussian constitution had been modified in such a way as to make it the tool of the king and of the wealthy and conservative classes; and the anachronistic German Confederation, the symbol of German weakness and disunity, had been reestablished at the behest of the Habsburgs. Americans had devoted much thought and sympathy to the earlier revolutionary movements, but the decline of American interest in European affairs corresponded roughly with the increasing strength of the European reaction. There was one exception—Hungary. Americans ceased to care very much about German affairs. The Erfurt scheme, the dispute regarding Hesse-Cassel, and the humiliation of Olmütz passed without arousing any considerable attention in the United States. But the Hungarian uprising created a much greater interest in the minds of most Americans than had any of the German movements of 1848 or 1849. The American people sympathized with the Hungarians during their struggle for independence, they received the Hungarian hero, Louis Kossuth, with a welcome probably greater than that accorded to any other European in that generation, and they hated Austria to almost the same extent that they loved and admired Hungary. Hungary and

Kossuth were, then, the absorbing objects of American interest in Central Europe from 1849 to 1853. A weak and fluctuating attention was devoted to Prussian and German affairs. In addition, however, many Americans made attempts to explain the causes for the failure of the Central European revolutions and a considerable number declared their belief in the temporary character of the reaction and their hope that a better and brighter day would soon dawn for the oppressed people of Austria, Hungary and Germany.

AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY—KOSSUTH AND INTERVENTION

A rather detailed description of American opinion in respect to the Hungarian revolution of 1849 and the visit of Louis Kossuth to the United States is necessary because American sentiment toward Austria was largely conditioned by American sympathy with Hungary. Austria remained a part of Germany, and usually the most important part, until 1866, and no study of American opinion of Germany can be adequate which omits Austria from consideration. But when Americans thought of Austria in 1859 or 1866, they were thinking of the Austria which destroyed the Hungarian Republic of 1849. The very friendly feelings which Americans displayed for Italy in 1859 and the somewhat friendly feelings which they showed for Prussia in 1866 were caused to a great extent by their remembrance of Austria's treatment of Hungary during the mid-century revolutions.

The sentiments of the American people toward the Austrian government continued to be very hostile in the years immediately after 1848 and 1849. Moreover diplomatic relations between the two powers were repeatedly strained, almost to the breaking point. Incident followed incident, each one was provocative in nature, and many aroused popular passions in the United States to a fever heat. All

of the incidents occurred in connection with Hungary and by far the greater part of popular detestation of Austria can be traced to her share in the stern repression of Hungarian independence. But before describing American sympathy for Hungary and her hero, Louis Kossuth, some mention must be made of the more general aspects of the dislike for Austria. Many references were made to the decaying, effete despotisms of Europe, and almost invariably Austria was chosen as the outstanding example of such a government. She was believed to be the puppet of Russia, without whose aid she could never have recovered from the successive blows which fell upon her head from all directions in 1848 and 1849. Her treasury appeared to be in a bankrupt condition, her subject nationalities were thought to be always ready for revolt, and her whole political structure seemed to rest solely on the army. Secret tribunals had been restored, all talk of constitutionalism had been abandoned, and Austria stood forth as an absolute despotism. Henry Wadsworth Longfellow's casual comment shows how completely reactionary Austria was considered. After Louis Napoleon had accomplished his *coup d'état*, Longfellow, who had expected an outburst of indignation in the United States, and believed he saw indifference instead, exclaimed, "Do we live in Austria?"¹ However, it is true that a certain amount of efficiency and power was credited to Austria so long as she possessed the services of Prince Felix Schwarzenberg, who was hated by Americans, but none the less respected. He was characterized by the *Tribune* in 1851 as "shrewd, un-

¹ Longfellow, *Life*, vol. ii, p. 211; New York *Tribune*: Feb. 27, March 25, Sept. 15, 1851, Jan. 30, 1852; New York *Herald*: April 20, 1852; New Orleans *Picayune*: Jan. 18, Feb. 27, 1851; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Nov. 1, 1852; *International Magazine*: March, 1851, March, 1852; *American Review*: Jan., 1852; *North American Review*: July, 1853; Brace, Charles Loring, *Hungary in 1851* (New York, 1853), p. 407; Phillips, Wendell, *Speeches, Lectures and Letters* (Boston, 1892), p. 55.

scrupulous, unyielding." After his death in 1852 the same paper attacked him very bitterly and laid at his door not only the cruelties with which the Hungarian revolt had been crushed, but also the failure of Germany to achieve liberty and unity. But the *Tribune* agreed with the *Herald* that his death would leave Austria in a much weaker position.¹ A very severe outburst against Austria occurred in the early part of 1853 after the failure of a premature revolt in Milan, which had been crushed with the usual Austrian barbarity. The *Tribune* said that the Austrian government deserved to be overthrown and heartily wished success to every effort in that direction. Even more stinging was the comment of the *Herald*:

If, in the legitimate pursuit of our national career, the eagle of Austria were ever arrayed against the eagle of the United States, it would, no doubt, add fresh fury to the zeal of our troops to remind them that the character of the foe was sullied by acts of such fiendish barbarity that even the wildest savages seem humane by contrast.²

Such an outburst as the foregoing cannot be wholly explained by American sympathy with a minor revolt in Italy, but can be understood only in the light of the passions aroused over Hungarian independence and Louis Kossuth's visit to the United States. In the spring of 1848 Hungary had moved toward greater self-government in local matters, but, thwarted in gaining complete autonomy, was finally declared by Louis Kossuth to be an independent republic in

¹ New York *Tribune*: March 25, 1851, April 19, April 27, Aug. 23, 1852; New York *Herald*: April 20, 1852.

² New York *Herald*: April 8, April 5, 1853; New York *Tribune*: Feb. 24, March 7, 1853; Fisher, George P., *Life of Benjamin Silliman, Chiefly from his Manuscript Reminiscences, Diaries, and Correspondence* (New York, 1866), vol. ii, p. 113.

April, 1849. Already powerful Austrian armies, assisted by large units of Croats who had little reason to love Magyar nationalism, were advancing toward the rebellious Hungarians, and eventually the Russian government intervened by sending a large force of troops against Hungary. Against such overwhelming odds the Magyars fought magnificently, but in vain. Their armies were destroyed, their leaders seized and executed, or, like Kossuth, forced to flee for their lives, and their country again brought under the complete and ruthless control of the Habsburgs.

No uncertainty existed as to the attitude of the American people toward these events. They gave unbounded sympathy to Hungary, and a proportionate measure of hatred to Austria. The Richmond *Enquirer* rejoiced in the Hungarian victories in the early part of the struggle, attacked "the monstrous tyranny of Austria" for its inhuman cruelty in the conduct of the war, bore witness to the sympathy of the whole United States with the Hungarian cause and believed that Magyar success would give a powerful impetus to liberalism in France and Germany. The Cincinnati *Gazette* said that the Austrian atrocities in Hungary had received in the United States the "universal denunciation of all classes, ages, sexes and politics." The *Irish American* called Hungary "the last and greatest, the noblest and bravest, of the revolted nations." Daniel Webster, at the Festival of the Sons of New Hampshire, expressed his belief that the Hungarians were more capable of establishing a permanently republican form of government than any other people in Europe. John Tyler condemned the cruelty of the Austrians who seemed to him "to have laid aside the attributes of civilized men, and to have become little better than demons." Joseph H. Choate, writing very much later, compared the feeling in the United States about the struggle for Hungarian freedom with the

American sympathy with the cause of the Entente in the late World War. Gustave Koerner tells of well-attended meetings in many of the larger cities, expressive of American sympathy with Hungary, and denunciatory of Austria. It was at such a meeting that Abraham Lincoln was one of a committee who drew up a resolution demanding that the federal government recognize Hungarian independence. At a similar meeting in Philadelphia, similar resolutions were passed and John Forney, already a leading Democratic journalist, likened the Hungarian struggle to the American Revolution.¹

The hostile feeling against the Austrian atrocities in the crushing of Hungary reached a climax when a resolution was introduced into the United States Senate by Lewis Cass, Democratic Senator from Michigan, "That the Committee on Foreign Relations be instructed to inquire into the expediency of suspending diplomatic relations with Austria." In defense of the proposed resolution, Cass said:

The world, in the darkest period of its history, has rarely witnessed such scenes of gratuitous cruelty as marked the establishment of Austrian supremacy over unhappy Hungary. . . . Now, sir, I say it without reserve, that a Power thus setting at defiance the opinion of the world, and violating the best feelings of our nature, in the very wantonness of successful cruelty, has no bond of union with the American people. The sooner the diplomatic intercourse is dissolved—and dissolved with

¹ *Richmond Enquirer*: June 1, Aug. 28, Aug. 31, 1849, Jan. 15, 1850; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Jan. 12, 1850; *Irish American*: Aug. 12, 1849; Tyler, Lyon G., *Letters and Times of the Tylers* (Richmond, 1885), vol. ii, p. 491; Martin, Edward Sanford, *The Life of Joseph Hodges Choate, as Gathered Chiefly from his Letters* (New York, 1921), vol. i, p. 68; Fulton, John, *Memoirs of Frederick A. P. Barnard* (New York, 1896), pp. 115-116; Nicolay, John G., and Hay, John, *Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln* (New York, 1905), vol. ii, pp. 127, 128; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. i, p. 533 *et seq.*; *The Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster* (Boston, 1903), vol. iv, p. 210.

marks of indignant reprobation—the sooner shall we perform an act of public duty, which, at home and abroad, will meet with feelings of kindred sympathy from all, wherever they may be.¹

Although the Cass resolution was never passed, it aroused considerable debate within the Senate, and considerable comment throughout the country. It was strongly defended by Senator Henry S. Foote from Mississippi, but vigorously attacked by Senators John P. Hale from New Hampshire and Henry Clay from Kentucky. Both of the latter upheld the Hungarian cause and denounced Austria, but Hale thought it inconsistent to break relations with Austria because of her treatment of the Magyars, while American slave-owners refused freedom to millions of negro slaves, and Clay pointed out that such a resolution was impractical, could not possibly aid Hungary, and suggested that something might be done to relieve the distress of the Hungarian refugees. After it had become apparent that the Cass resolution could never be passed, Senator Foote introduced similar resolutions on January 28, 1850, and February 5, 1850, neither of which, however, met with a more favorable reception.² A final attempt was made to accomplish the same end in April, 1850, when Cass introduced an amendment to the appropriation bill which would have cancelled the appropriation for the support of the American chargé d'affaires at the Austrian court, an amendment which was defeated by a vote of twenty-eight to seventeen.³ Senator Robert M. T. Hunter of Virginia said of the sentiment concerning the original Cass resolution: "This resolution has not only the sanction of high authority here, but a large

¹ *Congressional Globe*, 1st Session, 31st Congress, p. 75, appendix, p. 57.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 103-106, 113-116, 233, 293.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 745-746. All who voted for this resolution were Democrats, while the Whigs were united in their opposition to it. Cf. *supra*, p. 26 and note.

portion of the press has sustained it; and efforts have been made to give public opinion such a direction as to place under its ban all those who oppose it.”¹ The *Richmond Enquirer* upheld the resolution, as did John Tyler, who was unable to see how its passage could violate the neutrality of the United States. Governor William L. Marcy of New York took the same point of view, and resolutions were offered in the Pennsylvania legislature demanding that all relations with Austria be severed. On the other hand, the *Cincinnati Gazette* was opposed to the Cass resolution, *Brownson's Quarterly Review*, a scholarly Catholic publication, thought it anti-American and unstatesmanlike, and the *North American Review* attacked Cass as a mere “popularity-hunting politician,” and pointed to the inconvenience, difficulty and danger to Americans who might be traveling in Austria at the time of its passage.²

But *Brownson's Quarterly Review* and the *North American Review* did not sympathize with the Hungarian revolution at all. And they stood almost in isolation. *Brownson's Quarterly Review* spoke of the Magyar struggle for independence as “nothing but a war of the untitled Magyar nobility to maintain their historical right to domineer over the unfortunate peasants of Hungary.”³ Probably the most hostile critic of Hungary in the United States was Francis Bowen, editor of the *North American Review*. In a long

¹ *Ibid.*, appendix, p. 84.

² *Richmond Enquirer*: Jan. 8, Jan. 15, 1850; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Jan. 12, 1850; *Brownson's Quarterly Review*: Jan., 1851; *North American Review*: April, 1850; *Letters and Times of the Tylers*, vol. ii, p. 491; Dickenson, John R., editor, *Speeches, Correspondence, etc., of the late Daniel S. Dickenson* (New York, 1867), vol. ii, p. 42.

³ When *Brownson's* referred to “the untitled Magyar nobility,” it was writing of the Magyar gentry, who held large estates in land, and who were the landlords of Roumanian and Croatian peasants. At the same time it must not be forgotten that many of the peasants were themselves Magyars whose landlords were likewise Magyars.

article published in January, 1850, he declared that American sympathy with Hungary had been misplaced; he praised the Austrian constitution which gave equal rights to all the subject nationalities of the Habsburg dominions, and stated that the Hungarian revolution was only an attempt on the part of the Magyars, with their aristocratic and feudal institutions, to retain their power over the neighboring Wallachians and Croatsians, and to prevent those peoples from gaining the rights which had been guaranteed to them by the Austrian constitution. The effect of the article was to invoke unsparing criticism of its author, and in a further article published in the next issue of the *North American Review*, in April, 1850, he reaffirmed his hostility to Hungary, but at the same time made a severe attack upon Austrian policy and expressed a wish that the whole empire had been overthrown and the Habsburg dynasty dethroned by the recent revolution. So much hostility was aroused by the two articles that Bowen's appointment as professor of history in Harvard College was not confirmed by the Board of Overseers of that institution. Henry Wilson, president of the Massachusetts Senate in 1850, made a savage onslaught upon Bowen and declared that any man who refused to sympathize with Hungary was totally unfit to give instruction to the young men at Harvard College. It was partially as an attempt to refute Bowen's statements that Elizabeth Peabody wrote and published in 1852 a small volume entitled *The Crimes of the House of Austria*. The book was little but a series of quotations from Bishop Coxe's *House of Austria*, and tried to prove that Austria's treatment of Hungary was exactly what might have been expected, that the whole history of the Habsburg family showed that they had destroyed the freedom of every nation with which they had come into contact — Bohemia, Spain, the Netherlands, Poland, Germany and finally Hungary.¹

¹ *Brownson's Quarterly Review*: Jan., 1851; *North American Review*:

That President Taylor took cognizance of the sympathy of his country with the Hungarian cause is evident from the fact that a confidential agent of the American government was sent to Hungary to watch the progress of events there and to report as to the possibility of permanent Hungarian success, in which case the President intended formally to recognize the new state. On June 18, 1849, A. Dudley Mann received his commission from the President and Secretary of State, John M. Clayton. Very significant is the following sentence in his instructions: "If it shall appear that Hungary is able to maintain the independence she has declared, we desire to be the very first to congratulate her, and to hail, with a hearty welcome, her entrance into the family of nations."¹ No less positive was the statement in President Taylor's message to Congress of March, 1850, to the effect that American recognition would most certainly have been forthcoming in the event of Hungarian success.² Of course Mr. Mann was unable to make a favorable report, and the United States did not recognize Hungary.

Jan., April, 1850; Nason, Rev. Elias, and Russell, Hon. Thomas, *Life and Public Services of Henry Wilson* (Boston, 1876), pp. 110-114; Peabody, Elizabeth, *Crimes of the House of Austria against Mankind* (New York, published for the Benefit of the Hungarian Fund, by Rudolph Garrigue, 1852), especially preface pp. iii, iv and pp. 225-230. For Bowen's troubles with Harvard cf. articles in *National Cyclopaedia of American Biography* (New York, 1901), and *Encyclopaedia Americana* (New York, 1918). An attack similar to those upon Bowen was made by the *Cincinnati Gazette*, May 15, 1850, upon the American Consul at Paris because he had attacked Hungary.

¹ *Senate Documents* [Executive Documents], 1st Session, 31st Congress, no. 43.

² *Ibid.* And yet on February 28, 1850, a resolution was introduced into the House by Alexander W. Buel, Democrat from Michigan, to the effect that the Whig administration should be censured for not having recognized the independence of Hungary during the previous summer. Cf. *Congressional Globe*, 1st Session, 31st Congress, p. 143.

But Mr. Mann's mission, together with the very evident sympathy with Hungary which was freely expressed in all quarters of the Union, led the Austrian chargé d'affaires, the Chevalier Hülsemann, to make a bitter protest against what he considered the violation of American neutrality. The reply of Daniel Webster, who had become Secretary of State, called forth a storm of applause from the American people, for it not only denied the charge of Hülsemann to the effect that the United States had violated her neutrality, but it also laid down the general principle that American sympathy would always be active in behalf of oppressed nationalities. The letter was received favorably everywhere. The *Picayune* praised it as "a declaration of American principles in direct conflict with the doctrines of European despotisms." And the *Herald* said: "We question if any document that ever emanated from the State Department gave more general satisfaction than the reply . . . to the insolent and supercilious letter of the Austrian Minister."¹

Hardly had the ink of the Hülsemann letter and Webster's reply had time to dry before the stage began to be set for the most dramatic incident in the whole period, the visit of Louis Kossuth to the United States. As early as February 5, 1850, Senator Pierre Soulé from Louisiana had offered a resolution to the effect that the government of the United States should intervene with the Turkish government on behalf of the Hungarian refugees, and that ships

¹ New York *Herald*: Jan. 3, 1851; New York *Tribune*: Jan. 3, 1851; New Orleans *Picayune*: Jan. 12, 1851; Webster, *Writings and Speeches*, vol. xii, p. 170 *et seq.* In a letter to George Ticknor, Webster admitted that his reply to Hülsemann had been "boastful and rough," and defended himself on two grounds, firstly, that he had desired to show the states of Europe the growing importance of the United States, and secondly, that he had desired to touch American national pride, and "make a man feel *sheepish* and look *silly* who should speak of disunion." Cf. *ibid.*, vol. xvi, p. 586.

should be furnished by the American government to transport them to the United States. Although the resolution was never brought to a vote, a similar one was introduced a little more than a year later, on February 17, 1851, by Senator Foote, was slightly amended by Senator James Shields from Illinois, and passed on February 26, as amended. On March 3 it passed the House of Representatives. Even before its passage by the latter body, Webster had written to the American chargé d'affaires at Constantinople, George P. Marsh, asking him to make a request of the Turkish government for the release of the Hungarian refugees, who had been held in semi-surveillance in Turkey, and offering an American ship to convey them to the United States.¹ Early in December, 1851, the illustrious Magyar, accompanied by a large suite, arrived in New York.

In his annual message to Congress in 1851, Millard Fillmore, President since the death of Taylor, suggested that some thought ought to be given to the manner in which Kossuth should be received, an extraordinary recommendation for a presidential message, when one considers that it concerned a private individual. On December 1, 1851, a joint resolution was offered by Senator Foote to provide for a suitable reception to Kossuth by Congress. So much hostility appeared, however, that Foote withdrew his resolution on December 4, but on the same day a similar one was introduced by Senator William H. Seward from New

¹ *Congressional Globe*, 1st Session, 31st Congress, p. 293, 2nd Session, 31st Congress, pp. 580, 710, 777; Webster, *Writings and Speeches*, vol. xii, pp. 265-268. Three separate attempts were made to provide Kossuth and his companions, and indeed, all Hungarians who might desire to settle permanently in the United States, with free public lands. The first attempt occurred on Jan. 25, 1850, at the instance of Senator Seward, the second was made by Senator Foote on Feb. 5, 1850, and the third came in the House on Dec. 17, 1851. Cf. *Congressional Globe*, 1st Session, 31st Congress, pp. 244, 293, and 1st Session, 32nd Congress, p. 122.

York. On December 8, the situation was complicated by the introduction of a slightly different resolution, more definite in form, by Senator Shields. Great opposition developed, largely because of fear that Kossuth would interpret a public reception by Congress as an encouragement to his desire for diplomatic or military intervention. The debate dragged on until December 12, when the original Seward resolution was finally passed by a vote of thirty-three to six, and it passed the House on December 15 by a still more overwhelming vote of one hundred and eighty-one to sixteen.¹

In examining the debate and the balloting on these resolutions, it is clear that party lines were not adhered to, but it is equally clear that nearly all of the opposition came from the South. All six votes in the Senate and the sixteen in the House were cast by Southerners. And yet the South was not united in its opposition, for such prominent Southerners as Jefferson Davis of Mississippi, Henry S. Foote of Mississippi, Robert Barnwell Rhett of South Carolina, and Robert M. T. Hunter of Virginia voted to receive Kossuth. On December 16, Senator Shields introduced a resolution to organize a committee of reception, a motion which was readily passed by the large majority of thirty to fifteen, but a similar resolution introduced into the House on December 17, by David M. Cartter from Ohio, encountered a determined filibuster which was organized by Alexander H. Stephens from Georgia, and was only passed after great difficulty on January 5, 1852 by a vote of one hundred and twenty-three to fifty-four. On January 5 and January 10, 1852, Louis Kossuth was formally received by the Senate and the House of Representatives respectively. But the opposition in Congress was steadily increasing, and when a

¹ Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi, pp. 2655, 2656; *Congressional Globe*, 1st Session, 32nd Congress, pp. 5, 30, 31, 34, 90, 96.

motion was made in the Senate to print Kossuth's letter of thanks for his reception, it was passed on February 18, 1852, by a bare majority of one.¹

The rest of the session was occasionally enlivened by spirited debates on the question of intervention. There was no doubt as to what Kossuth desired—money, arms, men and the diplomatic or military intervention of the government of the United States. Within a short time the whole country was divided into two camps, those who thought that the time had come for the United States to interfere in the affairs of the Old World in behalf of the principles of nationalism and republicanism, and those who felt that, for one reason or another, the United States should attend to her own affairs, and let Europe solve her own problems. Anti-interventionist resolutions which had been passed by the Georgia and Alabama legislatures, were introduced into Congress, as well as pro-interventionist resolutions from the Maine legislature and the voters of the 11th Ward in New York City.² However the policy of intervention never had a serious chance of being indorsed either by Congress or by the administration. That Daniel Webster was absolutely opposed to any interference can be seen in his private letters. On December 30, 1851, he wrote to Samuel Blatchford: "I shall treat him with all personal and individual respect, but if he should speak to me of the policy of 'intervention' I shall 'have ears more deaf than adders.'" ³ And yet on January 7, 1852, at a banquet in Washington in honor of Kossuth, at which Lewis Cass and Stephen A.

¹ *Congressional Globe*, 1st Session, 32nd Congress, pp. 106, 199, 200, 225, 590.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 244, 282, 451, 672. Senator Seward sponsored the resolutions of the voters of the 11th Ward in New York City.

³ Webster, *Writings and Speeches*, vol. xviii, pp. 501, 502. Cf. also *ibid.*, vol. xviii, p. 497. Samuel Blatchford was an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court.

Douglas were also prominent speakers, Webster expressed himself somewhat differently: "We shall rejoice to see our American model upon the Lower Danube and on the mountains of Hungary. . . . I limit my aspirations for Hungary, for the present, to that single and simple point,—Hungarian independence, Hungarian self-government, Hungarian control of Hungarian destinies."¹ This speech brought forth another letter of protest from Chevalier Hülsemann which was sent directly to President Fillmore, and caused Webster to write at length to Charles J. McCurdy, the American chargé d'affaires at Vienna, a denial of any intention of official intervention on the part of his government. In this communication, Webster stated his belief that the interventionist fever throughout the country was dying out to a great extent. Nevertheless the tension between Hülsemann and the State Department was not relaxed, and on April 29, 1852, the Austrian chargé d'affaires notified Webster that he was leaving the country and that August Belmont, the Austrian consul at New York, would represent Austria in his absence. In June, 1852, however, negotiations were reopened with Hülsemann, who had merely retired to Havana.²

Even more flattering than Kossuth's public and formal reception in Washington was his popular triumph throughout the country. He was received publicly in many cities, among others, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Annapolis, Harrisburg, Cincinnati and Boston, and by the legislatures of Ohio, Pennsylvania and Maryland. As early as January, 1850, a large number of people in Cincinnati had turned out to hear Dr. Benjamin Franklin Tefft's discourse

¹ *Ibid.*, vol. xviii, pp. 461, 462.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xvi, pp. 588-593; *Senate Documents* [Executive Documents], 1st Session, 32nd Congress, no. 92.

on Kossuth.¹ Henry Wilson was chairman of the legislative committee which met and welcomed Kossuth in Springfield. Josiah Quincy was one of the speakers at the legislative banquet which was given to Kossuth in Faneuil Hall, and Ralph Waldo Emerson made a speech of welcome at Concord in which he addressed Kossuth as "the foremost soldier of freedom in this age." Daniel Webster had the honor of declining, because of poor health, to make a welcoming speech at Plymouth, and Rufus Choate made Kossuth the subject of the Phi Beta Kappa Address at the University of Vermont in 1852. Frederick Seward tells of Kossuth's visit to Albany—a welcoming committee composed of the mayor and other city officials, and the activity of the Hungarian Liberty Association, of which he himself was the president and William Barnes, a promising young lawyer and son-in-law of Thurlow Weed, the treasurer. Invited by Henry Ward Beecher, Kossuth made an address in Plymouth Church in Brooklyn, which was so largely attended that "some ten thousand dollars were realized from the sale of tickets." George Ticknor says that Kossuth made about six hundred addresses in the United States. Most of them were open to the public—for a consideration. Money was one of the things essential to a successful revolution, and Kossuth issued Hungarian bonds as tickets of admission. Rhodes agrees with Ticknor that Kossuth's net collections amounted to about ninety thousand dollars. However, it is most probable that the actual contributions were much greater, but a large part of them seem to have been spent on entertainment.²

¹ *Cincinnati Gazette*: Jan. 26, 1850, Feb. 10, 1852; *International Magazine*: Feb., 1852; Fisher, *Life of Benjamin Silliman*, vol. ii, p. 113. Dr. Tefft was at that time editor of the *Ladies' Repository*, and later was president of Genesee College.

² Nason and Russell, *Life of Henry Wilson*, pp. 98-99; Quincy, Edmund,

Nearly every expression of opinion was favorable to the great Hungarian. Charles Sumner, Horace Mann, George P. Marsh, James W. Alexander, Thomas Robbins, Richard H. Dana, John H. Raymond—all were enthusiastic. Washington Irving said: "He is a kind of man that you would idolize."¹ Henry I. Bowditch, well known physician, considered the United States unworthy of such a man. Moncure D. Conway, eminent as a clergyman and journalist, made a special trip to Washington to see Kossuth and describes a typical scene where many American ladies and gentlemen were moved to tears by the eloquence of the Hungarian, and where ladies were giving him their rings, necklaces and other jewelry to be used for the cause. Wil-

Life of Josiah Quincy (Boston, 1868), p. 502; Emerson, Ralph Waldo, *Miscellanies* (Boston, 1878), p. 361; Webster, *Writings and Speeches*, vol. xvi, pp. 643-645; Brown, Samuel Gilman, *The Works of Rufus Choate* (Boston, 1862), vol. i, p. 183; Seward, Frederick W., *Reminiscences of a War-time Statesman and Diplomat* (New York, 1916), pp. 98-105; Beecher, William C., and Scoville, Samuel, assisted by Mrs. Henry Ward Beecher, *Biography of Reverend Henry Ward Beecher* (New York, 1888), p. 257; Rhodes, James Ford, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to the McKinley-Bryan Campaign of 1896* (New York, 1920), vol. i, p. 241; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Feb. 27, 1852; *Life, Letters and Journals of George Ticknor* (Boston, 1876), vol. ii, pp. 276-277. Ticknor was rather hostile to Kossuth.

¹ Irving, Pierre M., *The Life and Letters of Washington Irving* (New York, 1864), vol. iv, p. 101; Sumner, *Works*, vol. iii, p. 5; *Life of Horace Mann*, by his Wife (Boston, 1865), p. 363; Marsh, Caroline Crane, editor, *Life and Letters of George Perkins Marsh* (New York, 1888), vol. i, p. 251; Hall, John, editor, *Forty Years' Familiar Letters of James W. Alexander, D. D., Constituting, with the Notes, a Memoir of his Life* (New York, 1860), vol. ii, p. 167; Tarbox, Increase N., editor, *Diary of Thomas Robbins* (Boston, 1887), vol. ii, pp. 1028-1030; Adams, Charles Francis, *Richard Henry Dana, A Biography* (Boston, 1890), vol. i, p. 216; *Life and Letters of John Howard Raymond* (New York, 1881), pp. 266-267. James W. Alexander was a prominent New York Presbyterian clergyman; Thomas Robbins was a Connecticut clergyman and historian, sometime librarian of Hartford Theological Seminary; Richard H. Dana was an eminent lawyer and author of *Two Years before the Mast*; John H. Raymond was the second president of Vassar College.

liam J. Stillman was so enthusiastic that he undertook a confidential mission for Kossuth on a quest for the crown jewels of Hungary.¹

And yet there was something unreal, insincere, faddish about the enthusiasm of the American people for Kossuth. It was not genuine. In Stillman's words, the arrival of Kossuth "set all America in a flame of shallow enthusiasm." Washington Irving said that New York must always be lionizing someone, although he admitted that in this instance the lion was a more worthy object than was usually the case. Frederick Seward, son of W. H. Seward, shows clearly to what extent Kossuth had become a fad: "A permanent impress had been made upon America by Kossuth's visit. . . . Hungarian hats, Hungarian wine, Hungarian bands, Hungarian music and dances began to come in vogue. Hungarian history is to be studied."² Longfellow, who had complained before Kossuth's arrival of the carping criticism of the great Hungarian which he found among many young Americans, and who felt himself

¹ *Irish American*: Dec. 20, 1851; Bowditch, Vincent Y., *Life and Correspondence of Henry Ingersoll Bowditch* (Boston, 1902), vol. i, pp. 251-252; *Autobiography, Memories and Experiences of Moncure Daniel Conway* (Boston, 1904), vol. i, pp. 110, 111; Stillman, William James, *The Autobiography of a Journalist* (Boston, 1920), vol. i, p. 144 *et seq.*

² Seward, Frederick, *Reminiscences*, pp. 100-101; Stillman, *Autobiography*, vol. i, p. 142; Irving, *Life and Letters*, vol. iv, pp. 99-101. The origin of the Kossuth hats is an interesting one and well illustrates the extent to which everything Hungarian had become a fad. An enterprising New York merchant, John N. Genin, took a lot of dead stock in hats, "fastened the left side of the brim to the crown, ornamented it with a black feather, and, boarding the vessel at Sandy Hook, presented all of the refugees . . . with Kossuth hats, which they wore on the march up Broadway." Low-crowned soft felt hats at once became popular, and the manufacturers subsequently recognized Mr. Genin's services by presenting him with a silver service valued at \$1,200. Cf. article on Genin in *Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography*.

great admiration for Kossuth, nevertheless asked, "But why need people go *clean daft*?"¹ And when Kossuth asked for the active intervention of the United States, the bubble burst. The American people were willing to shout for Kossuth, to give him expensive banquets and public receptions,² to pay money to listen to the flood of oratory, but departure from the traditional American foreign policy could not be thought of. Some Americans there were who sincerely believed in intervention. Samuel G. Howe severely rated Charles Sumner for his luke-warmness. "I am not at all moved by what you . . . say about a war costing us five hundred millions—of course we must first settle if it be *right*, and then meet the cost as we best may."³ John H. Raymond prophesied that the summer of 1852 would bring new revolts in Europe, and a war in which the United States could not remain neutral. He said: "It is a day, indeed, for wise conservatism to apply the brakes; but this train is bound to go through, and I rejoice to believe that

¹ Longfellow, *Life*, vol. ii, pp. 204, 211.

² That the receptions to Kossuth were costly can be seen by the bill which was rendered to Congress for his expenses in Washington.

"To board for Governor Kossuth and suite, having ten parlors and twenty-two chambers, thirteen and a half days—twenty-three persons	\$3,588.00
"Champagne, sherry, madeira, cigars, lemonade, bar-bill, washing, medicines, post office stamps, portage and messengers, hack-hire...telegraphs, sugar, brandy and whiskey in rooms, porter and ale, envelopes, barber's bill—amounting in all to	658.82
"Bill for carriages engaged for Governor and suite	319.50
"Total	\$4,566.32"

Cf. *Congressional Globe*, 1st Session, 32nd Congress, p. 1692.

³ Richards, Laura E., editor, *Letters and Journals of Samuel Gridley Howe* (Boston, 1909), vol. ii, p. 354. Cf. also *ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 370. For Sumner's views, cf. *Works*, vol. iii, p. 5, and Bigelow, John, *Retro-spections of an Active Life* (New York, 1909), vol. i, p. 123.

the Conductor is Divine.”¹ But the great majority of the American people were opposed to any active intervention. The New York *Herald*, the Cincinnati *Gazette*, the Portland *Transcript*, all favorable to Kossuth personally, strongly opposed armed aid for him. Washington Irving hoped that his countrymen would not follow this “second Peter the Hermit, into schemes of foreign interference, that would rival the wild enterprises of the Crusades.”²

The question of intervention became an issue in the campaign of 1852, and was used by politicians of both parties to their own advantage. Lewis Cass was accused of trying to gain votes of the foreign-born by his pro-interventionist policy, and Seward's biographer makes practically the same charge against him. Both Democrats and Whigs inserted a strong non-interventionist plank in their platforms, but the Free Soil Party was not so hostile. The *Tribune* complained that the Democratic platform was more ambiguous than that of the Whigs in this respect, and hence would alienate the votes of fewer naturalized citizens, who were strongly in favor of intervention. W. J. Stillman makes the charge that certain Democratic politicians, with Franklin Pierce's knowledge and consent, were guilty of attempting to bribe Kossuth to support the Pierce candidacy by offering him “two ships of war ready for service, and a sum of money, the exact amount of which I cannot now remember, but I think it was half a million dollars.” On the other hand, the Cincinnati *Gazette* accused Pierce of being the Austrian

¹ Raymond, *Life and Letters*, p. 267.

² Irving, *Life and Letters*, vol. iv, p. 101; New York *Herald*: Jan. 30, Feb. 20, 1852; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Oct. 28, Nov. 5, Dec. 29, 1851; New Orleans *Picayune*: April 18, 1852; Portland *Transcript*: Jan. 10, 1852. The *Herald* attacked the idea of a Hungarian loan and thought Kossuth's schemes for intervention “mere moonshine,” and “utterly chimerical.” The Cincinnati *Gazette* was favorable to Kossuth himself: cf. Oct. 27, 1851.

candidate because the Democrats had the support of August Belmont, the Austrian consul and banker to the Austrian court.¹

Two groups in the United States were definitely opposed to Kossuth and to all his schemes to gain American intervention. Strangely enough, they were the two opposite poles on the slavery issue—the slave-holding element in the South, and the rabid abolitionists in the North. According to supporters of Kossuth from all over the country, Southern slaveholders saw the inconsistency in giving aid to the European revolutionist and at the same time upholding the institution of negro slavery. Was it not even dangerous for ardent supporters of the fugitive slave law to encourage fugitive Hungarians? Needless to say, Southern statesmen did not openly avow such motives, but the votes in Congress above referred to, together with the Stephens filibuster in the House and the anti-interventionist resolutions of Southern legislatures, all seem to show that for some reason or other the South was not so friendly to Kossuth as the rest of the country.² On the other hand, the abolitionists of the North were perfectly frank. William Lloyd Garrison openly attacked Kossuth in the *Liberator* for his refusal to condemn negro slavery in America, and Wendell Phillips asked why the American people should interfere in the internal affairs

¹ New York *Tribune*: June 25, 1852; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Nov. 1, 1852; North American *Review*: April, 1850; Brownson's *Quarterly Review*: Jan., 1851; Bancroft, Frederic, *The Life of William H. Seward* (New York, 1900), vol. i, p. 312 et seq.; Stanwood, E., *A History of the Presidency* (Boston, 1898), vol. i, pp. 251-252, 255-256; Stillman, *Autobiography*, vol. i, p. 144.

² Mann, *Life*, p. 345; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. i, pp. 577-579; Marsh, *Life and Letters*, vol. i, p. 25; Stillman, *Autobiography*, vol. i, p. 140; Portland *Transcript*: Jan. 10, 1852. Cf. *supra*, pp. 62, 63. However, Rhodes takes the view that opposition to Kossuth did not come from the South to any extent, *History of the United States*, vol. i, p. 242.

of Austria, if Kossuth was unwilling to take a definite stand on the fundamental issue in American politics.¹

Two other incidents, one in 1851 and the other in 1853, prevented the resumption of really friendly relations between Austria and the United States. In the latter part of May, 1851, Charles Loring Brace, a young American clergyman, was arrested by the Austrian police while he was traveling in Hungary and was not released until a month later. The charges were that he was a spy, that he was carrying communications from one Hungarian revolutionist to another, that he was bringing messages from the Hungarian refugees to their political friends in Hungary. As a matter of fact, Brace was very sympathetic with the Hungarian cause, but was entirely innocent of the charges against him. His real purpose was to see Hungary as intimately as possible, as he had just seen Germany. Charles J. McCurdy, the American chargé d'affaires, intervened in his behalf with several able and pointed letters which undoubtedly aided greatly in securing Brace's acquittal. Unfortunately, as Mr. Brace seemed to think, the affair did not create the stir in the United States which he had expected and hoped that it would, although the Senate was interested enough to make a special request for the official correspondence on the subject. When Mr. Brace returned to the United States, he published in 1852 a little volume entitled, *Hungary in 1851; with an Experience of the Austrian*

¹ William Lloyd Garrison, *the Story of his Life*, told by his children (New York, 1889), vol. iii, p. 345; Phillips, *Speeches, Lectures and Letters*, pp. 66, 67. A different kind of opposition is shown by an anecdote from one of Webster's letters. The illustrious Secretary of State was given three imported Hungarian cattle, but in his letter to his overseer he advised that the bull not be named Kossuth for the donor disliked the great Magyar. Webster suggested that the bull might be called Saint Stephen. Cf. Webster, *Writings and Speeches*, vol. xvi, pp. 648-649.

Police. It was a rather careful and well-balanced description of the country, although the author was frankly pro-Hungarian. He sympathized with the sufferings of the Hungarian people, admired Kossuth, praised the personal qualities of the Magyars — their hospitality, bravery, simplicity, sincerity, patriotism. He palliated their treatment of the Wallachians and Croats, blamed the latter peoples for not supporting Hungarian independence, and had good words for the ancient Hungarian political institutions. On the other hand, he admitted that the minority races of Hungary had grievances, and praised certain Austrian reforms, notably those in the field of higher education. *Hungary in 1851* was well written, made a somewhat unsuccessful attempt to be judicial, and accorded with the expressed opinions of most American newspapers.¹

An incident which aroused much greater interest in the United States was the Koszta case in 1853. Martin Koszta, a Hungarian refugee who had taken out his first citizenship papers, was seized by the Austrian government while under Turkish jurisdiction and was rescued by an American captain, Ingraham. The Austrians demanded not only that Koszta be surrendered, but also that Captain Ingraham be disgraced. Secretary of State William L. Marcy refused the Austrian demands in a strong letter which was widely approved in the United States. Intense enthusiasm was

¹ *Senate Documents* [Executive Documents], 1st Session, 32nd Congress, no. 91; Brace, *Life*, pp. 138, 139, 147; Brace, *Hungary in 1851*, *passim*. The last-named book was dedicated to Mr. McCurdy. One other book was published in this country on Austria and Hungary during this period, viz., Stiles, William H., *Austria in 1848-1849. Being a history of the late political movements in Vienna, Milan, Venice, and Prague; with details of the campaigns of Lombardy and Norara; a full account of the Revolution in Hungary* (New York, 1852). In this two-volume work, Mr. Stiles, who had been the American chargé d'affaires at the Austrian court in 1848 and 1849, stated in his preface (p. iv) his intention of writing an unprejudiced account.

stirred up by the affair and nearly every newspaper was in favor of taking firm measures with Austria. A mass meeting which voiced American feeling was held in New York on September 21, 1853, in which Senator John P. Hale from New Hampshire and John Cockran, prominent New York lawyer, participated, and to which Robert J. Walker, ex-Secretary of the Treasury, and Edward Everett, eminent orator, sent letters of sympathy.¹

PRUSSIA AND GERMAN UNIFICATION

The wealth of material concerning American opinion of Austria and Hungary is in striking contrast to the almost complete indifference of the American public to the happenings in Prussia and Germany from the dissolution of the Frankfort Assembly to the outbreak of the Crimean War. A few scattered editorials, and an incidental remark dealing with Germany thrown into an article on general European affairs, is about all that can be found. There were no especial conflicts such as the Mann mission, the visit of Kossuth, or the Koszta case, to embitter the relations between Prussia and the United States, and yet American opinion seems to have been only slightly more disposed to favor Prussia than her rival Austria. The two states were frequently spoken of in the same breath, and usually described as equally despotic. It is true that the *Herald* spoke of "the rising power of Prussia in Germany," and described her as possessing a constitutional government, but the *Tribune* spoke more often of Prussia than any other American paper and it attacked her almost invariably. The character and policy of Frederick William IV were again

¹ New York *Herald*: Aug. 20, Sept. 4, Sept. 23, Sept. 25, Sept. 30, 1853; New York *Tribune*: Sept. 5, 1853; New Orleans *Picayune*: April 27, 1853; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Aug. 9, 1853; Portland *Transcript*: Oct. 8, 1853; *Senate Documents* [Executive Documents], 1st Session, 33rd Congress, no. 40.

denounced and he was referred to as a "weathercock." While traveling in Germany, Charles Loring Brace wrote in one of his letters, "*There is a God, and I believe yet that mean deceiver and elegant tyrant in Berlin will meet his due.*"¹ The King of Prussia was charged with abolishing the last vestige of constitutionalism in his dominions, and with muzzling the press. In short, Prussia was considered entirely reactionary; for the provincial diets had been recalled, the elective feature of the upper chamber had been destroyed, the people had been subjected to domiciliary visits, and political offenders had been arbitrarily arrested, imprisoned and subjected to the most barbarous treatment.²

A series of incidents connected with the problem of German reorganization after the failure of the Frankfort Assembly aroused a feeble interest in the United States. Hardly had the Frankfort Assembly finally been dispersed, when Frederick William called together a congress of the German sovereigns to meet at Erfurt for the purpose of discussing plans for a new German confederation. The Erfurt parliament proposed to exclude Austria entirely from the new Germany, and to make the leadership hereditary in the Hohenzollern dynasty. At first it had remarkable success in gaining the adhesion of many of the minor states, and a parliament was elected which functioned for a short time. Naturally Austria was jealous of such a confedera-

¹ Brace, *Life*, pp. 102-103; *New York Tribune*: April 4, June 21, 1851, April 19, May 14, Aug. 24, 1852; *New York Herald*: Nov. 3, Dec. 2, Dec. 27, 1852; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Oct. 21, 1851; *American Review*: March, 1851; *Congressional Globe*, 1st Session, 32nd Congress, pp. 82-90 (remarks of W. H. Seward in United States Senate on Dec. 12, 1851); Howe, *Letters and Journals*, vol. ii, pp. 353-354.

² *New York Tribune*: Oct. 10, Dec. 2, 1850, Feb. 17, June 21, July 3, Sept. 15, Sept. 17, 1851, May 4, May 14, 1852; *New York Herald*: Oct. 23, 1852; *New Orleans Picayune*: Aug. 22, 1852; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Oct. 21, 1851; *Portland Transcript*: March 2, 1850; *North American Review*: Oct., 1852; Howe, *Letters and Journals*, vol. ii, pp. 353-354.

tion and sought the first opportunity to defeat the scheme which so greatly increased the power of her rival and excluded her completely from German affairs. The opportunity arose over the Hesse-Cassel question. The elector of that principality had given his people a liberal constitution in 1831, which he now proposed to disregard in 1850. Austria and Bavaria supported the elector, while Prussia gave halfhearted assistance to the people. For a time war seemed imminent, and Prussia and Austria mobilized their respective armies. Finally Prussia gave way at the famous conference at Olmütz, and allowed the Austrians and Bavarians to reinstate the elector in power. Austria used the occasion to demand also that the Erfurt scheme be abandoned, and Prussia was so unprepared for war that she gave way and submitted to most humiliating terms. The Erfurt plan had failed, but still Germany remained unorganized, and consequently during the first half of the year 1851 conferences of representatives of the German states were held at Dresden to determine upon some plan for reorganization. Austria's attitude throughout was one of arrogance. With Hungary and Italy subdued, she prepared, under the able leadership of Count Schwarzenberg, to resume her old preponderance in German affairs. At one time it even seemed likely that her demand to have all of her non-German possessions included in the new Germany might be accepted. So low had the prestige of Prussia sunk that she, who but a year before had ardently hoped for a Germany from which Austria would be entirely excluded, was now only too willing to propose the reestablishment of the old German Confederation of 1815. Since most of the minor states supported Prussia against the extreme claims of Austrian arrogance, the old Confederation of 1815 again came into operation. To all outward appearances, Germany was no nearer to unification than she had been before the revolution of 1848.

The above-mentioned events brought forth a few scattered comments on the part of the American press, but there was no such interest as had been taken even in the debates of the Frankfort Assembly. There was some hope that the Erfurt scheme might really effect German unity. The *New York Herald* and the *Cincinnati Gazette* were hopeful that Prussia might succeed, and the *New York Tribune* was enthusiastic. To the latter paper it seemed necessary for the larger German states to devour the smaller ones if unity was ever to be achieved. And did not the Erfurt plan provide that Prussia should absorb the minor states of Germany? Somewhat later *Harper's Magazine* maintained that a union of German states under Prussian leadership had very nearly been accomplished by the Erfurt plan. On the other hand, Kendall of the *Picayune* was pessimistic. He believed that German political unity was something only of the distant future, at a time when the people of Germany should possess union of sentiment. The *North American Review* thought German unity both impracticable and undesirable, said that the really essential unity had already been achieved through the Zollverein, and prophesied that a politically unified Germany would be a horrible, centralized bureaucracy. The *Portland Transcript* voiced its lack of faith in any permanent accomplishment by the Erfurt plan, when it said: "The German powers are quarreling about their everlasting, never-beginning central government."¹

American opinion was even more unfavorable to the action of Prussia on the Hesse-Cassel question. It was not that the American people favored Austria or the Elector of

¹ *Portland Transcript*: April 13, 1850; *New York Tribune*: June 5, 1850; *New York Herald*: Dec. 20, 1849; *New Orleans Picayune*: April 19, 1850; *Cincinnati Gazette*: May 28, 1850; *Harper's Magazine*: Jan., 1851; *American Review*: June, 1850; *North American Review*: April, 1850.

Hesse-Cassel, but the feeling was general that the Prussian government was merely playing a game to deceive the world and her own subjects, and that sooner or later she would give way to Austria. It was felt that since Prussia was, technically at least, a constitutional state, she ought to go to the support of the Hessians who were struggling to retain their constitution. The people of the United States hoped that Prussia might do the heroic thing, but did not believe that she would. The affair was also thought to be merely another episode in the struggle between Austria and Prussia for supremacy in Germany. The *Picayune* summed up the feeling in the following:

The rivalry between Prussia and Austria for the control of Germany finds new provocations for hostility in the controversies which have sprung up in the smaller states between the people and their governments. To thwart the plans of Austria, Prussia is ready to find some pretext for embarking on what is really the liberal side in German politics, though it is not likely that she will do so on liberal grounds. . . . It will be a convenient action to Prussia, that it coincides with her present policy to espouse the cause of states that are struggling for constitutional improvement. The lovers of free government expect nothing good from the spontaneous action of Prussia.¹

American journalists realized that the Dresden Conferences were still another act in the old contest for predominance in German affairs. They saw that Austria held the whip hand over her rival, and it was suspected that the power of Russia was lurking behind Austria. The proposition that Austria should bring her non-German possessions into the new Germany was the object of attack. The *Inter-*

¹ New Orleans *Picayune*: Nov. 2, Dec. 7, 1850; New York *Tribune*: Oct. 10, Nov. 16, Nov. 23, Nov. 29, Dec. 2, Dec. 5, 1850; New York *Herald*: Oct. 4, Oct. 12, Nov. 17, 1850; *Harper's Magazine*: Jan., 1851.

national Magazine voiced the impatience of the American people with the endless intrigues and conferences which brought German unity not a step nearer. The *Tribune* even hoped that Austria might triumph so decisively that all Germany would be unified under her sway, because the Austrian autocracy was so frank and so brutal that it could be more easily overthrown than the more veiled despotism of Prussia and the minor states.¹

From the spring of 1851 to the fall of 1853 the references to German affairs disappeared almost completely. The *International Magazine* and the *Portland Transcript* spoke favorably of an unsuccessful attempt on the part of Austria to enter the Zollverein, but in general Germany was considered to be in a state of complete political reaction and therefore unworthy of the notice of Americans. The constitutions of the various states had been either withdrawn or almost completely nullified. Germany was said to be the most king-ridden of all European countries. At one time her people were referred to as being "divided, separated, denationalized and enslaved," at another as lying "crushed and dumb beneath the hoofs of the Cossacks." The *New York Herald* considered the German people incapable of republican institutions until they had been better prepared by a long course of democratic education.²

As has been noted above, there were in 1850 three un-

¹ *New York Tribune*: Jan. 17, March 25, 1851, April 27, 1852; *New York Herald*: Jan. 4, March 28, 1851; *New Orleans Picayune*: Jan. 18, Feb. 27, March 19, 1851; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Nov. 30, 1850; *International Magazine*: April, May, 1851; *Harper's Magazine*: May, 1851.

² *New York Tribune*: July 24, Sept. 17, Nov. 6, 1851, Jan. 1, Jan. 17, 1852; *New York Herald*: March 23, May 6, May 21, 1852; *New Orleans Picayune*: Aug. 21, 1851; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Nov. 30, 1850, April 7, 1852; *Portland Transcript*: Sept. 21, 1850, May 28, 1853; *International Magazine*: March, 1852; *Harper's Magazine*: Oct., 1851; *American Review*: Nov., 1851; *Congressional Globe*, 1st Session, 31st Congress, pp. 745-746.

successful attempts in Congress to break relations with Austria and Prussia and to reestablish relations with the central German power. The first came on January 28, and was sponsored by Senator Foote, the second on March 22 through a resolution by Representative John A. McClernand from Illinois, and the third on April 16 through the agency of Senator Cass. It is significant that each one of these moves was initiated by a Democrat and that in two of the three cases the administration was severely attacked, not only for withdrawing its representative from the Frankfort Assembly, but also for refusing to allow the Germans to fit out a warship from an American port. In explaining his motion, Senator Cass stated that German unity, if it was ever to be secured, must come through the agency of the central government.¹

The German counterpart to Kossuth was Professor Gottfried Kinkel, who came to the United States in the latter part of 1851 and created considerable interest in German affairs. His avowed purpose was to secure a loan of two million dollars at five per cent interest, to be used for furthering revolutionary schemes in Germany, and to be repaid when the first popular German assembly should convene. Kinkel's triumph was by no means so complete as that of Kossuth had been, and he created no such general furor. But Kinkel was introduced to the President while in Washington, and made addresses in New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Albany, Chicago, Buffalo, St. Louis, New Orleans, all of which were made in English and were attended by many native Americans. He succeeded in carrying away a goodly sum of money, somewhat over one hundred thousand dollars, according to the *New York Herald*. On the other hand, a German authority claims that Kinkel

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 26 and note. *Congressional Globe*, 1st Session, 31st Congress, pp. 233, 583, 745, 746, appendix p. 143 *et seq.*

collected only ten thousand dollars in the United States. The truth probably lies somewhere in between the two estimates. Kinkel's mission was warmly approved by the *Tribune*; the *Cincinnati Gazette* was tolerant but skeptical; the New Orleans *Picayune* thought the project impractical; and the *Herald* denounced Kinkel as a humbug and made charges that the money was being spent largely to defray his traveling expenses and to purchase property in England for his personal advantage.¹

WHY DID THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1848 AND 1849 FAIL?

There was no doubt about the facts. The revolutions of 1848 and 1849 had failed in all Central Europe—in Austria, in Hungary and in Germany. Many were the speculations as to the causes for the failure. Each newspaper and periodical had its own explanation, but at least three fairly distinct general causes can be discovered. In the first place, as has been noted above, many people in the United States considered the Germans unfit for democracy or union.² Back in 1848 the *Portland Transcript* and the *Washington National Intelligencer* had remarked that the German people lacked political ability and were incapable of establishing permanent republican institutions. The *North American Review* called the Germans impractical and said, "Their civil polity is nothing but pedagogy."³ Daniel Webster declared that the Germans, in spite of their great learning,

¹ *New York Tribune*: Sept. 17, 1851, Jan. 19, Feb. 19, 1852; *New York Herald*: Jan. 30, Feb. 7, Feb. 20, Feb. 25, May 6, 1852; *New Orleans Picayune*: Jan. 15, April 18, 1852; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Oct. 28, Nov. 5, Nov. 13, 1851; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. i, pp. 573-577; Henne am Rhyn, Otto, *Gottfried Kinkel, Ein Lebensbild* (Zurich, 1883), p. 68.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 35, 46.

³ *North American Review*: April, 1850; *Cincinnati Gazette*: April 15, 1851; *Washington National Intelligencer*: Sept. 20, 1848; *Portland Transcript*: April 29, 1848.

"have not the power of self-government which a common town-meeting . . . possesses." The fact that the Germans had produced no great leaders was additional proof of their unfitness for republicanism or unity. The Washington *National Intelligencer* had attacked the prominent figures of the Frankfort Assembly for a lack of ability and sincerity. The *North American Review* looked in vain for a German statesman to appear who might bring order out of chaos. Kendall combined an attack upon Germany for an inability to produce leadership with a prediction which is rather remarkable in the light of later German history:

And is it not strange that amid all these commotions and up-risings in favor of liberty . . . no one man has risen in Germany with the influence, the mind and the will to direct the masses in their struggles? But so it is. . . . Eventually the man will rise . . . and still the wild waves of riot and revolution. Despotism may rule for a space, anarchy may for a time hold sway; but in the end . . . the people will rise masters of those who have so long oppressed them, and free and liberal institutions will obtain throughout Germany.¹

A second very common explanation of the failure of Germany's revolution was the belief that it had been too radical and socialistic. The excesses of socialism had frightened the middle classes, who should have been the very backbone of the movement, and had driven them to seek refuge in the old monarchical governments. In the early part of 1848 Edward Bates had stated his belief that the introduction of socialism would destroy every chance of success. The *Cincinnati Gazette* said that the "*political geometry*" of Fourieristic socialism could never produce

¹ New Orleans *Picayune*: June 30, 1849; Washington *National Intelligencer*: Sept. 20, 1848; *North American Review*: Jan., 1849; Webster, *Writings and Speeches*, vol. iv, p. 210. Webster repeated his words on another occasion, on July 4, 1851; cf. vol. iv, pp. 298-299.

any beneficial or substantial change. The *North American Review*, the New Orleans *Picayune* and the New York *Herald* all took the same view. In commenting on the failure of the revolution, the latter paper said, "It may be all attributed to socialism."¹ On the other hand, the New York *Tribune* was quite favorable to the socialistic element in the German revolution. Horace Greeley and Charles A. Dana had been connected with the Brook Farm experiment in Massachusetts and were considered dangerous radicals by such journals as the *Herald* and the *Picayune*. Far more dangerous and radical was Albert Brisbane, the American Fourierist, who was a special foreign correspondent of the *Tribune* for a short time in 1848 and 1849. These men desired to see socialism established in Germany, and praised every tendency which pointed in that direction. The friendliness of the *Tribune* to socialism is evident from the fact that in October, 1851, it hired Karl Marx as a special correspondent, and his weekly articles appeared from that time on throughout the decade of the fifties. The early papers dealt with the German revolutionary movements of 1848 and 1849, and were later gathered together and published under the title *Revolution and Counter Revolution*. It is difficult to estimate what effect Marx's articles on Germany produced on American opinion. Dana wrote Marx that they were "read with satisfaction by a considerable number of persons, and are widely reproduced." But it must be remembered that the first article appeared late in 1851, and that the events dealt with had occurred two or more years previously. Naturally the articles were socialistic in character and blamed bourgeois liberalism for the failure of

¹ New York *Herald*: April 28, 1849; New Orleans *Picayune*: Nov. 14, 1848; Cincinnati *Gazette*: April 15, 1851; Washington *National Intelligencer*: May 2, 1848 (quotation from Edward Bates cited in Missouri *Republican*: April 24, 1848); *North American Review*: Jan., 1849.

the revolution. One of the most extreme statements of sympathy with German socialism was the following from the pen of Albert Brisbane:

Socialism is even more extensively adopted and widely discussed in Protestant Germany than in France. In Germany it has penetrated the minds of all classes. . . . All the progressive and advanced minds of Germany . . . are Socialists. . . . The German mind likes to go to the heart of matters; they pay but little regard to the form or pretension of a thing, but care only for the reality. Hence they have little consideration for a Republic in name and political in its character only, such as that of the United States which, abstractedly maintaining justice and equal rights, can allow the existence of poverty and degradation of the working classes, and tolerate even Slavery. This kind of Democracy or Republicanism the Germans cannot understand and will not accept; in their eyes it is as bad as an absolute monarchy which permits the same abuses.¹

Although many Americans considered that the German people were unfit for democracy, and although many more thought that an excess of radicalism and socialism had caused the failure of the German revolutions, neither of these was believed to be the most important reason why the Germans had failed. Rather it was the fact that the German people had not overthrown their princes. They had compromised with the monarchical principle, instead of holding out for republicanism, and failure had been the result. This opinion was expressed by nearly every newspaper and seems to have been almost unanimous. The *Herald* accused them of patching up their system with bits

¹ New York *Tribune*: March 9, 1849 (The above quoted article called forth a bitter attack from the *Herald*, and even the *Tribune* felt itself bound to disavow all responsibility for the opinions set forth there), Nov. 6, 1848; Marx, Karl, *Revolution and Counter Revolution, or, Germany in 1848* (London, 1896), note by editor, p. viii.

of monarchy and aristocracy. The *Picayune* said that at least one beneficial result had proceeded from the German revolutions, for the German people had at last been shown conclusively that no faith could be put in their princes. The *Cincinnati Gazette* blamed the Germans for putting back into power the very princes from whom they had so recently revolted. *Harper's Magazine* and the *Portland Transcript* saw the chief obstacle to German unity in the opposition of the German princes, and the *Tribune* thought that a particular prince, Frederick William IV of Prussia, was in a great measure responsible for Germany's troubles. Charles A. Dana stated his conviction that the republic was the only path which could ever lead to German unity. It was felt that the German princes had proved false to the cause of the Fatherland, not only because of their own selfish interests and conflicting ambitions, but also because of their fear of and dependence on Russia. The belief applied especially to the Habsburgs, because they had conquered Hungary only with the aid of Russian bayonets and were under a great obligation to that power. But when Prussia gave way to Austria, she was likewise accused of being merely a tool of the Tsar.¹

In spite of the complete realization that the revolutions in Central Europe had failed, and that Germany and Austria were in the grip of a stark despotism, the American press and public were, for the most part, optimistic about the future. Only the *North American Review* was consistently pessimistic. To that periodical it seemed that German unity could not be established nor German peace and

¹ New York *Tribune*: Dec. 16, 1848, Sept. 27, Nov. 23, Dec. 2, Dec. 31, 1850; New York *Herald*: Oct. 1, 1848, Dec. 20, 1849, July 2, 1850; New Orleans *Picayune*: July 28, 1849; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Aug. 3, 1853; *Portland Transcript*: May 28, 1853; *Harper's Magazine*: Jan., 1851; *American Review*: June, 1850; Buchanan, *Works*, vol. viii, p. 167 *et seq.*

tranquillity be assured in the near future, and it believed that a German republic would be a colossal blunder. At one time the *Herald* said that the Germans had no conception of true liberty, and that a German republic was an impossibility, but at another time it saw great possibilities for the success of a Prussian republic because that state was Protestant. In a third editorial it prophesied that Germany was surely destined, sooner or later, to become an aggregation of republics on the American model. It was merely a question of time. Samuel G. Howe thought that there had been, in spite of the current reaction, "an immense gain to the cause of liberty in Germany." The *Richmond Enquirer* said that Germany would not long remain quiescent under tyranny, and the *Cincinnati Gazette* believed that the masses would continue to agitate until they had gained what they desired. John H. Raymond thought that the summer of 1852 would bring new revolutions in Central Europe, and Kendall said that, although it would take time, the Germans would be "among the first to establish firm democratic institutions on the continent of Europe." A poem in the *Democratic Review*, more praiseworthy in its sentiment than in its form, was dedicated to the memory of Robert Blum, the German leader of the Frankfort Assembly who had been executed by the Austrians for his part in the Vienna revolt in the autumn of 1848. It was entitled *Blum Still Lives*, and its whole burden was the conviction that the spirit of Blum, the spirit of democracy and liberalism, could not be destroyed in Germany. The *New Englander* said, "Germany shall have the national unity for which she sighs."¹ The following quotation from the

¹ New York *Herald*: Nov. 17, 1850, May 22, Dec. 22, 1851, May 6, Oct. 23, 1852; New Orleans *Picayune*: June 13, 1849; *Richmond Enquirer*: June 1, 1849; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Oct. 21, 1851; *North American Review*: Jan., 1849, April, 1850; *Democratic Review*: Jan., 1852; *New Englander*: Aug., 1850; Howe, *Letters and Journals*, vol. ii, p. 325; Raymond, *Life and Letters*, p. 267.

Tribune is an excellent expression of the unwillingness of the American people to accept the reaction as final, and is a harbinger of their later interest in the struggles of Germany to achieve what she failed to accomplish in 1848 and 1849:

We said that the end of Germany is accomplished, but this is not so. Dynasties and Governments come to their end but not a great nation. German princes are humbled, disgraced, but the German people do not share the stain. . . . The native instinct of liberty and justice that ruled the aboriginal tribes from which they descend, still throbs within them and these events only strengthen and deepen its latent vitality.¹

¹ New York *Tribune*: Nov. 23, 1850. Cf. also *ibid.*, July 3, July 24, Aug. 14, 1851, Jan. 30, 1852.

CHAPTER III

THE CRIMEAN AND ITALIAN WARS

It is not perhaps a sign of virtue, but it is at least in accord with a very human trait that the American people are always more fascinated by European international complications than by domestic changes, no matter how beneficial, in the various European states. Not even a European revolution will create as much interest as a European war. It is not surprising then, even though Prussia and Germany did not participate actively in the Crimean or Italian Wars of the mid-century, that many predictions about the probable course of the German powers appeared in the American press. It was quite generally believed, at least for a time, that Prussia and the minor German states would necessarily be involved in each contest. As a by-product of such speculation the newspapers quite naturally discussed German affairs in some detail. The relations between Austria and Prussia, the contest between the two powers for predominance in Germany, the jealousies of the German princes, and the hopes and chances for German unification—all were the subjects for editorials in the American press. As the next chapter will show, the American references to German affairs in the decade from 1853 to 1863 were few and far between, except during the Crimean and Italian Wars. The internal affairs of Germany were not striking enough to call forth many remarks from American writers, but the fear or hope, as the case might be, that Prussia or Germany might interfere in either war, paved the way for some scattered comment on the course of events in Germany.

Such is the justification for devoting a chapter to two wars in which Prussia and the minor German states took no active part, and in one of which Austria likewise was a neutral.

THE CRIMEAN WAR

Before examining what the American people thought of Prussian and Austrian policy during the Crimean War, it is necessary, in order better to understand American opinion on that subject, to see what Americans thought of the major parties to the struggle. Did they favor the Allies or Russia? To which side did their sympathies incline, and why? In answer, it can be stated that American feeling was very sharply divided, but not thoroughly aroused. There were certainly some Americans who were completely neutral, but probably the great majority took sides either with Russia or with the Allies. And yet it is doubtful whether the sympathy shown for either party was deep or strong. Surely the feeling never became passionate, as had been the case during the Hungarian revolt. The American people favored Russia or the Allies in the same spirit as spectators who had little at stake might favor one or another contestant in a horse-race. Neither the pro-Russian or the pro-Allied group seemed convinced of its position, and both groups continually made reservations in their respective statements. No instance of flaming protest or very real sorrow can be discovered when Russia was finally defeated, in spite of the fact that there had been during the war a rather large and noisy pro-Russian group in the United States. Naturally the neutrals were not so loud in the expression of their feeling as those who sympathized with the one or the other contestant. And yet it is not difficult to discover examples of indifference or neutrality. The *New York Tribune* and *Putnam's Magazine* urged the American people to keep a

strictly neutral attitude. The New York *Herald* stated its belief that the majority of the Americans were indifferent, and the Portland *Transcript* was unable to discover any reason why Americans should be sympathetic with either party. It was pointed out that no great principle was involved in the war, and that in no case would the European masses benefit. Theodore Parker said that the North was indifferent because it was making money from both the Allies and Russia and cared little which was successful.¹

At the very outset of the war it is probable that most Americans slightly favored the Allies. It was rather felt that Russia had been the aggressor against Turkey, and that England and France were fighting a just war to protect the weak against the strong. The Cincinnati *Gazette* thought that the Allies represented the great forces of civilization against the barbaric Russian despotism, and the Portland *Transcript* saw in Russia the embodiment of European reaction. The former paper favored the Allied cause throughout the war, as also did James Buchanan and Moncure D. Conway.² But later a noticeable shift occurred in American opinion, so that perhaps the majority of Americans favored Russia and were opposed to the Allies. Several elements help to explain this decided change. Of course there was a certain amount of very natural sympathy with Russia because she was being defeated, although such sympathy

¹ New York *Tribune*: Jan. 5, 1855; New York *Herald*: Jan. 19, 1855; Portland *Transcript*: April 29, 1854; Putnam's *Magazine*: May, 1854; Weiss, John, *Life and Correspondence of Theodore Parker* (New York, 1864), vol. ii, pp. 156-157.

² New Orleans *Picayune*: Aug. 30, 1855; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Sept. 28, 1855; Portland *Transcript*: Jan. 21, Nov. 4, 1854; Irish *American*: Oct. 14, 1854; *Letters and Times of the Tylers*, vol. ii, p. 517; Conway, *Autobiography*, vol. ii, p. 220; Buchanan, *Works*, vol. ix, pp. 284-285. Buchanan was American Minister to Great Britain during the Crimean War.

with the underdog was not so apparent as in the Danish War of 1864 or in the Franco-German War. It was seldom expressed but nevertheless existed as an underlying factor.

Far more important was the fairly common conviction among Americans that France and England were opposed to any further expansion of the United States in North America, to the fulfilment of what was called the "manifest destiny" of the United States. Americans realized that France and England were great commercial powers, and it was thought that both had cast longing eyes on Mexico, Central America and the West Indies, which were likewise the goal of American imperialists. The alliance between the two countries was quite commonly believed to be directed against the further territorial growth of the United States. As early as February, 1854, the *New York Herald* argued that as the Allies had united to prevent the further expansion of Russia in Turkey, so they probably had planned, after Russia had been humiliated, to check the enlargement of the United States in the New World. The *Richmond Enquirer*, *Putnam's Magazine* and John Tyler gave expression to the same belief, and the *New Orleans Picayune* stated that the price of American sympathy for the Allies would be a complete disavowal by them of any intention to interfere in the hoped-for annexation of Cuba to the United States. *Brownson's Quarterly Review* and the *Portland Transcript* attributed the pro-Russian feeling in the United States to the hatred of the American people for England, and the *Richmond Enquirer* said that the Allies had alienated American sympathies by their policy of meddling in the affairs of the western hemisphere.¹

¹ *New York Herald*: Feb. 28, Sept. 26, 1854, March 28, 1855; *New Orleans Picayune*: April 19, June 18, Nov. 22, 1854; *Richmond Enquirer*: Oct. 11, Dec. 27, 1855, March 28, 1856; *Portland Transcript*: Nov. 4,

During the course of the war several events occurred which tended to strengthen the belief that the Allies, and France particularly, were bent on imperialism in the New World, and which consequently tended to direct American sympathy toward Russia. Circumstances leading to the arrest of the French consul at San Francisco were believed to be evidence of Napoleon's desire to secure a foothold on the American continent. The *Picayune* protested against the supposed French interference with American rights on the Galapagos Islands. The appearance of a French warship at San Juan, the attempt on the part of the Allies to prevent the consummation of a favorable commercial treaty between the United States and San Domingo, and the proposal of the Congress of Paris to abolish privateering—all were proofs to the Richmond *Enquirer* of a deeply laid plot on the part of France and England to seize power in Central America and the West Indies, and to pick a quarrel with the United States which could only result in war. Far more serious was the arrest by the French government, in the fall of 1854, of Pierre Soulé, the American Minister to Spain, as he was traveling through France, on the ground that he was opposed to the Second Empire. Although the *Herald* and the *Tribune* deplored the appointment of such a man to the court of Spain, nevertheless both concurred with the *Picayune* in requiring an explanation of Napoleon's action. The *Tribune* demanded that the American minister should be recalled from France, and even that all commercial intercourse should be suspended. The *Picayune* said

1854; *Putnam's Magazine*: May, 1854; *Brownson's Quarterly Review*: July, 1854, Jan., 1855; *Letters and Times of the Tylers*, vol. ii, p. 517; *John Lothrop Motley and his Family. Further Letters and Records*, edited by his daughter and Herbert St. John Mildmay (New York, 1910), p. 43. For a denial of the statement that the Allies were attempting to interfere in American affairs, cf. *New Orleans Picayune*: June 18, 1854, Jan. 19, Feb. 23, 1855; *Cincinnati Gazette*: May 9, 1853.

that if all Americans who hated Napoleon III were to be treated in like manner, it was difficult to see how friendly relations between the two countries could be maintained, since "there are very few Americans who do not entertain these sentiments." The Richmond *Enquirer* called the insult to Soulé an affront to the national honor, insisted that the government require a satisfactory explanation, and cited the action of Napoleon as evidence of the hostility with which the Anglo-French alliance regarded the United States. On the other hand, the Portland *Transcript* ridiculed the fuss which had been made over the Soulé affair, and asked whether the United States had not insulted Spain and France by sending as diplomatic envoy a man who favored filibustering expeditions against Cuba and who was notoriously opposed to the Napoleonic regime.¹

A second cause for American dislike of the Allies was the widespread belief that they were opposed to the institution of American negro slavery. It was said that the Allies were only waiting to conquer Russia before they would be ready for an armed attack upon the South for the purpose of destroying her most cherished institution. Such arguments were probably the most important reasons for the anti-Allied sentiments of southern papers like the New Orleans *Picayune*, the Richmond *Enquirer*, and the northern pro-slavery New York *Herald*. John Tyler feared that the Allies were trying to disrupt the American union by stimulating anti-slavery agitation. In addition, the South saw much in Russian serfdom which resembled American slavery. Naturally, then, the pro-slavery elements in the United States flocked to the Russian banner. Theodore Parker and

¹ New York *Tribune*: Nov. 13, Nov. 16, 1854; New York *Herald*: May 26, Nov. 13, Nov. 14, 1854; New Orleans *Picayune*: Nov. 18, 1854, March 30, 1855; Richmond *Enquirer*: Nov. 16, 1854, Oct. 11, 1855, March 28, May 23, 1856; Portland *Transcript*: Nov. 18, Nov. 25, 1854.

Andrew D. White thought that the Southern sympathy for Russia could be explained by reference to the fact that Russia was the only great European power which sympathized with the American slave-holder, who in turn saw his labor system reflected in Russian serfdom. The *Portland Transcript* sarcastically advised the Russian government not to free its serfs if it desired to retain its supporters in the United States. The following statement from the *Richmond Enquirer* is indicative of pro-Russian sentiment or its causes in the South: "Russia . . . has domestic institutions similar to our own. . . . No people in Christendom are so happy and contented as the Russians, except the people of our Southern States."¹

Several other considerations are of importance in explaining the causes for the antagonistic feeling toward the Allies. The *Herald* believed that the propaganda of French and Irish exiles in the United States against the Allies would prove to be a factor in arousing American sentiment against France and England. That the *Herald* was not entirely incorrect in its guess is clear from the attitude of the *Irish American* which, although admitting that the cause of Turkey was "that of right against wrong, of the weak against the strong, of liberty against absolutism," said that it would have no objection to hearing of "a hundred privateers entering Irish harbors with the Russian flag at the mast-head, with an Irish and foreign invading contingent, to strike a blow against English power." It was also claimed that Napoleon was as much a despot as Nicholas of Russia. Napoleon's desire to prevent domestic revolution through a

¹ *Richmond Enquirer*: Nov. 15, May 8, May 9, 1855, March 28, 1856; *New York Herald*: Oct. 14, 1855; *New Orleans Picayune*: May 13, 1855; *Portland Transcript*: Jan. 5, 1856; *Letters and Times of the Tylers*, vol. ii, p. 517; Parker, *Life and Correspondence*, vol. ii, pp. 156-157; *Autobiography of Andrew Dickson White* (New York, 1905), vol. i, p. 455.

successful foreign war was alleged to be his chief motive. The war was believed to be only a struggle for the balance of power, and for territorial aggrandizement. The Allies were thought to be opposed to the Russian partition of Turkey in order that they might be able to partition her themselves. The Richmond *Enquirer* said: "They would protect, as wolves protect lambs."¹ The argument was advanced that the Allies were fighting the cause of Mohammedan Turkey against Christian Russia. In the latter part of the war, many Americans came to believe that Austria would surely go over to the side of the Allies. Whenever the chances of Austrian participation appeared likely, it was pointed out that Austria could never enter a war for a liberal purpose, and that France and England must have guaranteed troops to Austria to suppress any possible uprising of Poles, Hungarians or Italians. Consequently the Allies would be fighting indirectly to uphold the absolute power of Austria over the struggling nationalities within her empire. It was inconceivable that Americans could sympathize with such a cause. It was even suggested that Russia might be able to arouse the Hungarians and Italians against Austria, and hence become the champion of oppressed nationalities.²

In general the very causes for anti-Allied feeling were the causes for pro-Russian feeling in the United States. To the

¹ Richmond *Enquirer*: Jan. 25, April 8, 1856; New York *Herald*: March 29, 1854, Jan. 11, 1855; New Orleans *Picayune*: June 1, 1855; Cincinnati *Gazette*: July 29, Sept. 30, Oct. 18, 1853; Portland *Transcript*: Jan. 21, April 29, 1854; Irish *American*: Feb. 25, 1854; *Letters and Times of the Tylers*, vol. ii, p. 515; Parker, *Life and Correspondence*, vol. ii, pp. 156-157.

² New York *Herald*: Feb. 28, March 9, March 24, 1854; New Orleans *Picayune*: Dec. 28, 1854, Feb. 7, June 1, 1855; Richmond *Enquirer*: Dec. 28, 1854; American *Messenger*: May, 1854; Parker, *Life and Correspondence*, vol. ii, pp. 156-157; Alexander, *Familiar Letters*, vol. ii, p. 202. Motley said that most Americans hated Austria. Cf. John Lothrop Motley and his Family, p. 43.

Southern slaveholder the fact that the Allies hated and menaced American slavery while Russia upheld an institution very like it was a sufficient cause for sympathy with Russia. For the American imperialist, friendliness towards Russia was caused by the belief that the Allies had designs on Central America and the West Indies, whereas Russia had no such ambitions, her aims conflicted in no way with those of the United States, and she could not successfully assail the United States for lack of a fleet. There is no want of proof of pro-Russian sentiment during the Crimean War. An attack was made upon the *Tribune* for its "love of Russia." In November, 1854, the following despatch was sent to the New Orleans *Picayune* by its Washington correspondent: "During the last week I have conversed much on the subject with intelligent, well-informed, diplomatic politicians and military men. It is clear to my mind, that the prevailing sentiment is becoming settled against the Allies and in favor of Russia."¹ In December, 1854, the *Herald* wrote: "Public opinion here is undoubtedly favorable to Russia. There is no necessity for disguising the fact. . . . Not that we love Russia more, but that we hate her less."² Andrew D. White, the American attaché at St. Petersburg, tells of an American group, chiefly from the South, who were in favor of active intervention on the Russian side. They had agents in Russia who were so noisy in their propaganda and activities as to be distinctly embarrassing to the American attaché. Very interesting and probably quite typical is the list of reasons given by James W. Alexander to explain his pro-Russian attitude: firstly, that the Allies were aiding the Turk who was "antichristian, . . .

¹ New Orleans *Picayune*: Nov. 9, 1854, Aug. 30, 1855; New York *Tribune*: Aug. 8, 1855; Richmond *Enquirer*: Nov. 15, 1855, March 28, 1856; Parker, *Life and Correspondence*, vol. ii, pp. 156-157.

² New York *Herald*: Dec. 17, 1854. Cf. also *ibid.*, Sept. 26, 1854.

bloody, and doomed;" secondly, that the Tsar was the natural counterpoise to the Pope whose cause was supported by France; and thirdly, that Russia was the only great power from which the United States could expect much aid in case of a collision with France and England. Perhaps the best and most complete summary of American sympathies during the Crimean War may be found in the *New York Herald*:

One set of writers believe that the American people are at heart opposed to the Allies, that five out of six side with Russia in the contest. Another suppose that the real feeling of this country is favorable to Great Britain. . . . Among the former class are to be found nine-tenths of the politicians, including those who influence the administration organ at Washington, and many Southern men, who have not forgiven the attempts of the British aristocracy to interfere with slavery in the Southern States. Among the latter are ranged all the merchants on the seaboard, whose interests are intimately interwoven with those of their correspondents and customers on the other side of the water.¹

Even more chaotic and confused than the opinions regarding France and Russia, were those regarding Austria and Prussia. No two writers agreed with one another about the action of the German powers, and no one writer held the same opinion for any appreciable length of time. Nor was the confusion entirely the fault of the American press. Rather it should be blamed upon the vacillation and uncertainty of the German powers themselves, which were constantly shifting from one side to the other, seeming one week to favor the Allies and the next, Russia. As Kendall wrote to the *Picayune* from Paris in July, 1854:

¹ *Ibid.*, Jan. 19, 1855; *Leslie's Weekly*: Feb. 23, 1856; White, *Autobiography*, vol. i, p. 455; Alexander, *Familiar Letters*, vol. ii, p. 202. The administration organ was the *Washington Union*.

The diplomacy of the German powers is as difficult to understand as their abstruse and most mystical metaphysics: any one who can just now arrive at the real intentions of Austria and Prussia, as to the part they will play in the pending war, will confer a great favor upon all the political *quidnuncs* of Europe. One day they are to act against Russia, the next day they are to act with Russia, and the next they are to take no side.¹

During the first part of the war the central thought in the United States in regard to German affairs was the belief that the governments of Germany were in direct opposition to the people and that the antagonism between government and people would be the deciding factor in determining the policy of the German powers. In some quarters it was firmly believed that the people of Germany were in favor of the Allies and opposed to Russia, while the governments of Austria, Prussia and the minor German states took an exactly opposite attitude. The governments of the German states were seen to be similar in aim and structure to that of Russia, and in the case of Prussia there was a close family connection with Russia, which would naturally tend to bind the two governments more tightly together. It was thought that Austria and Prussia wished to aid the Tsar and that they would have done so had not they feared revolutions in their own dominions. The *Portland Transcript* called Austria a puppet of Russia. One paper predicted that the German people would even be strong enough to compel their governments, contrary to their wishes, to make war on Russia. Other papers which believed in the same fundamental antagonism between the German people and their governments, asserted that the people were interested neither in the cause of the Allies nor in that of Russia, but were only interested in overthrowing their own governments, and

¹ New Orleans *Picayune*: Aug. 5, 1854.

would surely seize any opportunity which might be offered by the entrance of those governments upon a foreign war.¹

Later in the war the belief that the antagonism between the German people and their governments was the decisive factor in the course of the German powers, gave way to the conviction that the really determining influence was their deep-seated hatred and distrust of each other. It was seen that both Austria and Prussia were using the war as a means of strengthening their own power in Germany, that they were jockeying for position, and that their attitude toward the Crimean War was conditioned almost solely by its relation to the struggle for the mastery of Germany. *Putnam's Magazine* charged Austria and Prussia with "boundless duplicity and perfidy" because their policy was directed to encourage both contestants, if possible to avoid war themselves, and to leave both Russia and the Allies in an exhausted condition.²

As has been noticed, in the early part of the war most Americans felt that Austria would aid Russia either because of gratitude or because of the natural affinity between the two governments. But as the war progressed, it became apparent that Austrian policy was swinging over toward the Allies and the belief became quite general that Austria would give armed support to the Allied cause. For one thing, it was recognized that Austria had no desire to see

¹ *New York Tribune*: April 21, May 19, Nov. 13, 1854; *New York Herald*: Oct. 17, Dec. 14, 1853, Jan. 13, Feb. 1, April 7, April 17, May 17, 1854; *New Orleans Picayune*: Feb. 19, May 11, 1854; *Portland Transcript*: Jan. 21, Aug. 12, 1854, Feb. 24, 1855; *Irish American*: April 8, 1854; *Harper's Magazine*: June, 1854; *Putnam's Magazine*: Feb., 1855; *American Messenger*: May, 1854.

² *New York Tribune*: Dec. 26, 1854, Feb. 10, March 28, 1855; *New York Herald*: May 13, June 12, July 1, Aug. 25, Dec. 25, 1854, Feb. 16, 1855; *Portland Transcript*: Feb. 24, 1855; *Leslie's Weekly*: June 1, 1856; *Putnam's Magazine*: Feb., 1855.

Russia grow too powerful in the Balkans, and that she even had designs upon some Turkish territory for herself. Then too the belief that most of the German people hated Russia made it seem likely that Austria would be backed up by them in case she declared war upon Russia. But many Americans who concurred in the belief that Austria would gain popularity among the German people by making war against Russia were like the *Tribune*, which doubted whether Austria would really dare to wage such a war in the face of the strength of Pan-Slavism in Galicia, Bohemia and Croatia. The *American Messenger* said that Austria's hands were tied by fear of uprisings in Lombardy and Hungary, and the Richmond *Enquirer* doubted that Austria would really make war on the side of the Allies when she had more to gain through peaceful intervention.¹

During the early part of the war, and even later by the *Herald*, the course of Prussia was held up to utter contempt. The *North American Review* thought that Prussia would gladly sell herself to the highest bidder. At the outset it had been felt that Prussia would never attack Russia because of the family connection between the two courts. But later it was pointed out that weightier considerations were at the bottom of Prussia's policy of neutrality. The traditional hatred of France and the Bonaparte family, the fear for the loss of her Rhenish provinces, the power of the Prussian army and its pro-Russian sympathies, were all shown to be factors which helped to explain Prussia's course. But above all, Prussia was bound to profit very handsomely in an economic way from her policy of neutrality. It was through her ports that Russia was able to get the materials of war,

¹ New York *Tribune*: Dec. 7, 1854, Feb. 4, May 7, Sept. 13, 1855; New York *Herald*: July 25, 1854, May 16, 1855; New Orleans *Picayune*: July 11, 1854, Feb. 18, 1855; Richmond *Enquirer*: Dec. 28, 1854; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Oct. 18, 1853; *American Messenger*: May, 1854.

and Prussian merchants naturally reaped immense profits. By the end of the war, even the *Herald* was willing to admit that Prussia had acted according to her true interests in refusing to take up arms for either side.¹

As the war progressed, the *Tribune* tended to become the champion of Prussia in her struggle for German supremacy. In a series of remarkable editorials in 1854 and 1855, the *Tribune* outlined a rather definite policy in regard to German affairs. In the first place, it attacked very severely the radicals and liberals, both for being impractical and visionary, and for pinning their faith on the unification of Germany under a centralized government after the model of the First or Second French Republic. It proclaimed a federal republic, on the model of that of the United States, to be the natural and proper government for a rejuvenated Germany. It praised German particularism which furnished both the basis for German self-government and also the necessary counterpoise to the entirely pernicious belief in centralization. It warned against Austrian predominance in German affairs, and claimed that Austria had always cloaked schemes of aggrandizement under the mantle of German unification. It declared that an almost unfathomable gulf existed between Protestant, manufacturing, northern Germany, as exemplified by Prussia and Saxony, and Catholic, agricultural, southern Germany, as exemplified by Austria, and made it very clear that its sympathies were entirely with the northern section. It proclaimed Protestantism as the true religious basis for German nationality. It glorified both the Prussian army and Prussian foreign policy. Several of the most significant extracts from these editorials deserve to be quoted:

¹ New York *Tribune*: Feb. 2, Feb. 20, May 19, Nov. 13, 1854, April 16, 1855, April 4, 1856; New York *Herald*: Nov. 4, 1854, Jan. 5, Jan. 21, Oct. 21, 1855, March 30, 1856; New Orleans *Picayune*: May 9, Dec. 24, 1854; *North American Review*: April, 1854.

History renders it impossible to deny that for centuries Austria has sought to subdue Germany, or to absorb it all, as a province of her own, and rendering all the Princes her satellites. . . . Thus every step that strengthens Austria endangers Germany. . . . We do believe in the mischievous preponderance of Austria over Germany. . . . Germany runs more danger from the clutches of the Austrian eagle than from the hug of the Russian bear.¹

But a Hapsburg may after all not be the center round which these national cravings may be realized. It is not the first time that their house has put forth the shibboleth of German interests the more skillfully to promote their own aggrandizement and crush the liberties of others. . . . German interests are in reality identified with Protestantism in which they took their birth, and are therefore in direct antagonism to Catholicism. These Protestant interests are represented by Prussia, supported by Saxony and Wurtemberg. . . . Prussia, often through fearful obstacles, and against strong odds, has ever marched bravely and indefatigably to her destiny. Few countries, if any, have ever shown such power of organization. Within the space of a century and a half Prussia has raised herself from a small sandy province to the position of a secure and perfectly modeled monarchy. . . . A character for impartiality is a characteristic on which the nation, statesmen and King of Prussia pride themselves and which they endeavor to deserve. Prussian diplomacy has never enjoyed a reputation for craft and cunning, but always the reverse.²

THE ITALIAN WAR OF 1859

The German question popped up again in 1859 with the advent of the Austro-Sardinian War, in which Sardinia with the aid of France defeated Austria within the course of four months. There were several series of questions which

¹ New York *Tribune*: Nov. 22, 1854. Cf. also *ibid.*, Feb. 19, April 10, May 23, July 30, 1855.

² *Ibid.*, May 23, 1855.

arose out of this war, about which the American people had very definite opinions. In the first place, how did they view the struggle for Italian independence and unification? Did they sympathize with the Sardinian cause during the war? Did they favor the uprisings in the duchies of Modena, Parma and Tuscany, and their annexation by plebiscite to Sardinia? Did they sympathize with Garibaldi's expedition to Sicily and Naples? In other words, what was the American attitude toward the Italian question? In the second place, how did they judge the actions of Napoleon in regard to the Italian question? What did they believe his motives to be in entering the war of 1859? What were their feelings about the truce of Villafranca? What final judgment did they pass on Napoleon's achievements for the Italian cause? In the third place, how did they feel toward Austria? Did they sympathize at all with her cause? And in the fourth place, how did they regard the actions of Prussia and the rest of Germany throughout the war? Did they approve of Prussia's armed neutrality? Did they think that she should have entered the war on the side of Austria, or that she should have kept a still more strict neutrality? Did the war arouse any discussion about the future of Germany? What effect would the unification of Italy have upon the unification of Germany? Such were the questions upon which Americans expressed themselves in connection with the Italian movements of 1859 and 1860. Each group of questions must be examined separately, although it must be kept clearly in mind that each one is very intimately related to every other.

In the first place, what was the American feeling in regard to the Italian question itself? The answer is relatively simple, for American opinion was fairly unanimous in upholding the cause of the Italians. They were a people struggling for independence from a foreign ruler, Austria.

The American people had watched their revolutions of 1848 and 1849 with warm sympathy, and had duly hated Baron Haynau for his barbarous treatment of the Italian cities. It is true that many Americans probably would have preferred to see an Italian republic under the auspices of Mazzini than a constitutional monarchy under the auspices of Victor Emmanuel and Cavour. But the republican cause had been somewhat discredited by the radicalism of Mazzini's Roman Republic, and when Sardinia began the struggle in 1859, American sympathy was not withheld because of an earlier preference for an Italian republic. The good government and general prosperity of Sardinia were contrasted with the corruption, despotism and general backwardness of Austrian Italy. When the duchies of Modena, Parma and Tuscany rose in rebellion against their rulers and asked to join Sardinia, most Americans rejoiced and said that they must be allowed to choose their own government, for they were acting in accord with the sacred principle of self-determination. Again, there was open sympathy with Garibaldi's expedition to the Two Sicilies and with the annexation of those portions of Italy to the newly formed kingdom. One indication of the general friendliness for the Italian cause can be found in the meeting which was held in New York, February 17, 1860, to express American sympathy with Italy. At this meeting one of the speakers was Henry Ward Beecher, while a letter was read from John A. Dix. Gustave Koerner and James Buchanan bore witness to the almost universal feeling of friendliness for the Italian cause. Charles Eliot Norton declared that "every lover of freedom" would "join in the wish" for an independent and united Italy. George P. Marsh said that he had never felt half as much interest in any European question as in the liberation of Italy, and John L. Motley's sympathies were "warmly with Sardinia." Henry Adams

says that his sister "like all good Americans . . . was hotly Italian," and Charles Sumner wrote to William W. Story, "Three cheers for Italy."¹

It is much more difficult to gauge American opinion in regard to the part which was played by Napoleon III in the Italian question. It is safe to say that almost no one thought that Napoleon was sincerely interested in the welfare of the Italians. It was madness to suppose that he was helping the Italians on any altruistic grounds. He might be attempting to substitute French rule for Austrian in Italy, or trying to appeal to the vanity and love of glory so characteristic of the French people, or possibly, feeling that his grip on France was slipping, he might be endeavoring to strengthen his position at home and distract the attention of the French people from abuses in their own government, by embarking upon a foreign venture. But at any rate he was not in the war for the good of Italy. George W. Kendall of the *Picayune* said:

It is absurd to suppose for a moment that Louis Napoleon cared as much for the oppressed people of Lombardy as he does for a bundle of the shuck or paper cigarites [*sic*] he is in the habit of making, nor had he a particle of sympathy for any other portion of the downtrodden Italians; all his antecedents are but plain . . . evidence that he cares for no one but himself.²

¹ New York *Herald*: April 19, 1857, Feb. 18, Nov. 13, Nov. 22, 1860; New Orleans *Picayune*: July 24, Nov. 22, 1859, Aug. 3, 1860; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Feb. 11, May 10, Sept. 9, Sept. 30, 1859; Portland *Transcript*: May 28, Oct. 1, 1859; Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. i, p. 219; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, p. 78; Buchanan, *Works*, vol. x, p. 317; Marsh, *Life and Letters*, vol. i, pp. 409-410; Curtis, George William, editor, *The Correspondence of John L. Motley* (New York, 1889), vol. ii, p. 65; *The Education of Henry Adams* (Boston, 1918), p. 85; James, Henry, editor, *William Wetmore Story and his Friends. From Letters, Diaries and Recollections* (Boston, 1904), vol. ii, p. 41; Norton, Charles Eliot, *Notes of Travel and Study in Italy* (Boston, 1881), p. vi.

² New Orleans *Picayune*: Sept. 10, Jan. 30, March 3, April 7, May 19,

Such Americans felt that no liberty, no benefit, could accrue to Italy from the work of a man who had so strangled liberty in France, and that his aid boded no good to the true welfare of Italy. Koerner thought that the American people regarded the Sardinian alliance with Napoleon as very ominous for Italy, and Asa Gray said: "From such a war . . . no good can spring, in any result."¹ Even more pessimistic was the *Portland Transcript*: "Between the two contending powers Italy will be devastated but not liberated."² To the *New York Tribune* there seemed little to choose between the tyranny and despotism of Napoleon and the tyranny and despotism of the Habsburgs, while *Brownson's Quarterly Review* preferred that of Austria as being more honest and frank.³

But although the opinions of the above-mentioned group

1859; *New York Herald*: Jan. 20, Feb. 16, Feb. 27, March 8, 1859; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Feb. 10, Feb. 11, May 10, July 14, July 18, July 26, 1859; *Portland Transcript*: April 9, May 14, May 21, 1859, March 24, 1860; *Irish American*: Feb. 12, 1859; *Brownson's Quarterly Review*: April, 1859; *New Englander*: Aug., 1859; *North American Review*: Jan., 1860.

¹ Gray, Jane Loring, editor, *Letters of Asa Gray* (Boston, 1893), vol. ii, p. 452; *New York Herald*: March 8, 1859; *New Orleans Picayune*: June 11, June 24, 1859; *Portland Transcript*: May 28, June 4, 1859; Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. ii, p. 65 *et seq.*; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, p. 78.

² *Portland Transcript*: May 28, 1859.

³ *New York Tribune*: May 7, 1859; *Brownson's Quarterly Review*: July, 1859. Perhaps some Americans were influenced against Napoleon because of French activity in Central America in search for a canal route. No direct connection between distrust of Napoleon in Italy and his activity in Central America has been discovered, but the *Cincinnati Gazette* was much exercised over French schemes for an Isthmian canal, and it is reasonable to suspect that perhaps some Americans were influenced unconsciously by fear of French diplomacy on the Isthmus to question Napoleon's plans for Italy. Cf. *Cincinnati Gazette*: Jan. 14, Jan. 24, Feb. 8, 1859; *Richmond Enquirer*: Feb. 4, 1859.

were probably those of the majority, their views were by no means universally held. In fact there was an influential number who felt that although Napoleon might not be acting from altruistic motives, yet he was undoubtedly giving great aid to Italy. It was pointed out that Sardinia could not possibly have whipped Austria single-handed. What did Napoleon's motives matter, so long as Italy was being liberated through his aid? It was frankly admitted that Napoleon's régime was despotic, but it was claimed to be despotic in a sense fundamentally different from Austrian despotism. Whereas the Austrian type was based upon tradition and divine right, the French type was founded upon the suffrages of the people of France, and hence was vastly preferable. John Bigelow referred to the fact that France was fighting in the cause of constitutionalism, that she was giving aid to the oppressed of Italy. The *Cincinnati Gazette* was skeptical as to the sincerity of Napoleon's motives, but said that Italy must gain if freed from Austrian control and thought that Napoleon's motives need not be considered. Even the *Portland Transcript* admitted grudgingly that Napoleon might be "an agent in the hands of Providence, in promoting the liberties of Europe unwittingly." William T. Sherman was willing to credit the Emperor of the French with sincerity in his attempt to establish Italian unity and independence. The *Herald* went so far as to claim Napoleon as the protector of the rights of nationality, the "exemplar of national independence and of democracy suited to the times and to the atmosphere of Europe." The following quotation from one of Theodore Parker's letters will sum up the feeling of the minority who were suspicious of Napoleon's motives, but who were none the less hopeful for Italy's success through French aid:

No doubt the Austrians are the Devil to Italy; their name is

legion, and they have possessed it many a sad year. . . . Now Napoleon III., the prince of that class of devils, the very Beelzebub, comes to cast them out. It is good to get rid of the old German devil, even if a new French one turns him off in this rough fashion; it is of a kind that goes not out except by fire and sword. I rejoice therefore in every French victory; it gives Italy some chance for freedom.¹

But those Americans who distrusted the value of French aid to Italy found their position much stronger after the truce of Villafranca. Napoleon was immediately accused of betraying the Italians and of breaking his sworn pledge. Motley and Parker were indignant. The *Cincinnati Gazette* paraded its early willingness to overlook Napoleon's motives and declared: "Let him, now that his duplicity is exposed, stand condemned as a detected charlatan, and be hated and despised accordingly."² The emperor's proposal to erect an Italian confederacy under the presidency of the Pope was not looked upon favorably in the United States. His unwillingness at first to accede to the annexation of the Italian duchies to Sardinia gave another cause for attack, and finally his support of the Pope and his opposition to Garibaldi's expedition to Sicily and Naples confirmed the belief that Napoleon had basely deserted the Italians in their time of need. The *Picayune* said:

¹ Parker, *Life and Correspondence*, vol. ii, pp. 301, 304, 314-315; New York *Herald*: March 4, May 18, May 21, May 27, June 7, June 18, 1859; New Orleans *Picayune*: Feb. 8, 1859; *Cincinnati Gazette*: May 18, July 14, 1859; *Portland Transcript*: May 14, June 4, Oct. 1, 1859; *Irish American*: July 30, 1859; *Atlantic Monthly*: Jan., 1861; *New Englander*: Aug., 1859; Thorndike, Rachel Sherman, editor, *The Sherman Letters, Correspondence between General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891* (New York, 1894), pp. 70-71.

² *Cincinnati Gazette*: Aug. 1, July 25, July 26, July 27, Aug. 3, Aug. 10, 1859; New York *Herald*: Aug. 1, 1859; New Orleans *Picayune*: July 24, July 27, Aug. 3, Sept. 10, 1859; *Portland Transcript*: July 30, 1859; *Atlantic Monthly*: Jan., 1861; Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. ii, pp. 70-71; Parker, *Life and Correspondence*, vol. ii, pp. 334-335.

The treatment of the Italian question by the French Emperor is in singular contrast with the professions and promises with which he commenced the war upon Austria. . . . In all the efforts of the Italians to frame governments and select rulers for themselves, they have found an inflexible adversary in the French Emperor.¹

But Napoleon's activities in connection with the events just mentioned did not by any means alienate all of his support in the United States. The truce of Villafranca was explained in various ways—that half a loaf was better than none, that Napoleon could not possibly have captured Venetia without the greatest sacrifice, that he feared a general revolutionary outbreak in Europe. The *Portland Transcript* pointed to the fact that Napoleon was not asking for any territory for himself in return for the very considerable aid which he had rendered to Italy, and took a very moderate stand when it said: "Writers on European affairs can't seem to agree as to whether Louis Napoleon has accomplished anything for Italy or not. Some of them declare that the Italians are betrayed and others that they are liberated. We rather guess both are about half right."² Later the vindicators of the emperor triumphantly pointed to his recognition of the annexation of the Central Italian duchies and of the Two Sicilies to the new Italian kingdom. At the meeting in favor of Italian unification which was referred to above, the following resolution was passed: "That we hail with thankfulness the policy of non-intervention in

¹ New Orleans *Picayune*: Dec. 17, Aug. 11, Oct. 1, Oct. 18, Nov. 12, Nov. 22, 1859, Aug. 3, Sept. 27, 1860; New York *Herald*: Nov. 13, Nov. 24, 1860; Cincinnati *Gazette*: July 27, 1859; Portland *Transcript*: July 30, 1859, March 24, 1860; Parker, *Life and Correspondence*, vol. ii, p. 304.

² Portland *Transcript*: Aug. 13, July 30, 1859; New York *Herald*: July 25, July 28, July 29, Aug. 3, Aug. 5, Aug. 15, Aug. 31, 1859; Richmond *Enquirer*: Aug. 1, Aug. 19, 1859.

Italian affairs so clearly laid down in the French pamphlet . . . and the consistent and magnanimous declarations of the Emperor of the French in accordance with that policy.”¹ Very much later even the *Tribune*, always hostile to Napoleon III, admitted that “the liberation of Italy from foreign rule is undoubtedly, to a large extent, his work.” The New York *Herald* showed itself very sympathetic with the Napoleonic achievements when it wrote: “How . . . it can be argued that Napoleon has done but little for the future of Italy, it is beyond our power to understand.”² The remarks of the *Atlantic Monthly* were fairly typical of the more strongly pro-Napoleonic Americans:

What Italy desired, what alone she needed, was freedom from foreign intervention; and that she got through the interposition of French armies, and that she could have got from no other human source. . . . What other potentate did anything for that country in 1859, or has done anything for it since that memorable year? Neither prince nor people, leaving Napoleon III and the French aside, has so much as lifted a hand to promote the regeneration of Italy.³

With regard to Austria, the problem is once more simple. American opinion was almost unanimously hostile to Austria. It was Austria which had exemplified the spirit of the age of Metternich, it was Austria which had produced a Haynau to practice barbarities upon the Italians in 1849, it was Austria which had crushed Hungary. The American

¹ New York *Herald*: Feb. 18, 1860, Sept. 15, 1859, Jan. 12, Aug. 12, 1860; New Orleans *Picayune*: Feb. 17, 1860; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Sept. 30, 1859, Feb. 10, 1860; Richmond *Enquirer*: June 14, 1860; Portland *Transcript*: Oct. 1, 1859.

² New York *Herald*: Nov. 3, 1859; New York *Tribune*: Jan. 23, 1867.

³ *Atlantic Monthly*: Jan., 1861. The reason why the Irish American sympathized with France is interesting: “The great, the absorbing interest, we feel, is that our Celtic brethren may triumph over the Teuton race.” June 18, 1859.

feeling of hatred for Austria was a thing of long standing; to as great a degree as the American people favored the cause of Italy, to just as great a degree did they hate Austria. Theodore Parker described her as "the hindmost State of Christian Europe, the most mediæval and despotic." Henry Adams says that Austria was regarded as an "evil spirit" in 1859. The *Cincinnati Gazette* spoke of "the talons of the Hapsburg vulture." It was a severe indictment which was drawn up against Austria. It was felt that she desired war to wield her vast and conglomerate dominions more closely together. She was on the verge of bankruptcy, and her subjects were discontented because of a long course of misrule and corruption. The only cementing forces in the empire were military power and loyalty of the various peoples to the Catholic Church. Neither was considered by most Americans as a force of liberalism or progress. Motley called the Austrian empire "a fictitious, artificial sham." She had forfeited all right to rule over the Italian duchies because of the cruelty and harshness of her rule, the misuse of her power. Since Austria ruled Italy badly and in spite of Italian protest, Austria was the real aggressor in the war. George P. Marsh called the war the Austrian "crusade against human liberty." Charles Sumner hoped that the Austrian empire might cease to exist. The *Portland Transcript* said, "Every friend of free institutions will ardently desire that Austria may be soundly thrashed and forever driven out of Italy."¹ The follow-

¹ *Portland Transcript*: May 14, March 12, May 28, Nov. 12, 1859; *New York Herald*: Jan. 24, May 6, May 17, 1859; *New Orleans Picayune*: Feb. 8, May 14, May 19, June 16, June 21, 1859; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Feb. 11, April 9, May 10, May 12, 1859; Parker, *Life and Correspondence*, vol. ii, pp. 302, 314-315; *Education of Henry Adams*, p. 84; Longfellow, Samuel, editor, *Final Memorials of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow* (Boston, 1887), p. 59; Marsh, *Life and Letters*, vol. i, p. 410; Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. ii, p. 67; James, *Story and his Friends*, vol. ii, p. 41.

ing quotations from representative, yet very different, American papers show clearly enough the American viewpoint toward Austria:

In a word, the subjects of Austria in Italy have been governed without their consent, and in spite of their *dissent* and protest. Viewed in any rational light, then, Austria has no right to govern any part of Italy. . . . To our minds, this disposes of all just claim on the part of Austria to external sympathy in the present struggle. . . . Grant . . . that neither France nor Sardinia deserves unqualified sympathy; and still the fact remains that Francis Joseph is not the rightful ruler of Lombardy or Venice, and that all his attempts to force his laws and his form of government upon the unwilling people of the Austrian provinces . . . have no better authority than usurpation.¹

An enemy to reform in every shape, whether religious, social or political, it is continually evoking the slumbering elements of revolution and endangering the peace of Europe by the irritating character of its repressive measures. The war against Austria is therefore essentially a war of progress, the stationary tendencies and narrow political dogmas of the Middle Ages representing the actual conditions of that Power.²

It is not difficult to discover, in the public journals of this country, and from the drift of daily conversation on the subject of the war in Italy, that American feeling is decidedly anti-Austrian. . . . The Americans will be anti-Austrian because hatred of tyranny . . . is an American instinct.³

Nevertheless Austria was not without the sympathy of at least one powerful element in American opinion, for she received the warm support of most Roman Catholics under

¹ *Cincinnati Gazette*: May 12, 1859.

² *New York Herald*: May 27, 1859. Cf. also *ibid.*, June 15, 1859.

³ *New Orleans Picayune*: June 24, 1859. Cf. also *Cincinnati Gazette*: Feb. 26, 1859.

the leadership of Archbishop Hughes. Catholics generally favored Austria to the same extent that they opposed Sardinia and France. They believed that a united Italy meant an anti-clerical Italy, and the destruction of the temporal sovereignty of the Pope. Napoleon was severely attacked for taking an attitude they considered detrimental to the best interests of the Church, while Austria seemed to them the very backbone of Papal support and the true defender of the Faith. The attitude the ultra-Catholics took paved the way for the charge which was made by the *Herald* that the war was one between anti-clericalism and ultramontanism. The Catholic position was well stated by *Brownson's Quarterly Review*:

As between the French and Austrians in this war, our sympathy is with the latter. Austria . . . has done nothing to provoke hostility, and the war is one of pure aggression on the part of France and Sardinia. We know the talk about bad government, but everybody knows that the most prosperous and best governed part of Italy, is that part which is under Austrian rule.¹

From the beginning, it was expected, hoped, or feared, as the case might be, that Prussia, together with the rest of Germany, would enter the war upon the side of Austria. Before the war began, it was believed that if Austria should be sustained by Prussia, Napoleon would not dare to precipitate war; later, the extension of the war to the rest of Europe was believed to hinge upon Prussia's attitude. The chief reason why the other German states were expected to help Austria can be found in the very obvious relationship which existed between them in respect to language and culture. It was also thought that the German states feared France and believed that a successful war against

¹ *Brownson's Quarterly Review*: July, 1859; *New York Herald*: May 10, July 2, 1859; Feb. 22, July 2, 1860. The references in the *Herald* are to editorials or accounts of speeches by Archbishop Hughes.

Austria in Italy would be but the prelude to an aggressive war in Germany. At times the charge was made that even liberal Germans felt that a foothold in Italy was necessary for a great and unified Germany. But as Prussia and the other German states hesitated to enter, American opinion began to change and then tried to find explanations for Prussian hesitation. For one thing it was pointed out that a war to deprive Austria of her Italian possessions was really no concern of the German states, which could afford to wait until their own possessions were directly menaced. But a more common and satisfactory explanation lay in the recognition of the rivalry between Prussia and Austria for the leadership in Germany. It was perfectly natural for Prussia to refuse to enter a war to help her rival. As a matter of fact, wasn't she far more interested in seeing Austria humbled and perhaps deprived of her Italian provinces? Gradually it came to be believed that Prussia really had different interests in this matter from the rest of Germany, or, at least, from Austria. Prussia would only enter the war when the feeling in Germany became so strong that she would lose her influence with the other German states by remaining neutral.¹

It was the recognition of the rivalry between Prussia and Austria for German leadership which led to a discussion of what the effects of the war would be upon Germany itself. It was believed by some that Germany was upon the brink of revolution, and early in the war, the *Herald* prophesied

¹ New York *Tribune*: May 30, June 13, July 2, July 8, 1859, Oct. 2, 1860; New York *Herald*: March 13, March 24, March 26, March 31, May 27, June 10, June 11, June 17, June 21, July 6, July 8, 1859; New Orleans *Picayune*: May 8, May 31, June 17, June 23, 1859; Cincinnati *Gazette*: June 27, July 8, 1859; Richmond *Enquirer*: Aug. 6, Aug. 15, 1859; Portland *Transcript*: May 21, July 9, 1859; Irish *American*: July 23, 1859; *Brownson's Quarterly Review*: April, 1859; Marsh, *Life and Letters*, vol. i, pp. 409-410; Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. ii, p. 65 *et seq.*

a republican movement in Germany which would destroy the various thrones and dynasties. But American publicists did not think that the Italian war would move Germany so much in the direction of republicanism or democracy as in the direction of union. The Italian movement was a movement toward unification and it was thought that the force of example might have a similar effect upon Germany. It was shown how Germany had been embarrassed during the war because of lack of unity. The Richmond *Enquirer* thought that Prussia's rulers were obstacles standing in the way to prevent German unification. John L. Motley regretted that Prussia did not possess a young, ambitious, able sovereign who might be able to take advantage of the opportunity to seize the crown of a German Emperor. Such a solution of the German question would have been, in his estimation, of great benefit both to Germany and to all Europe.

The New York *Tribune*, so hopeful about German unity at the time of the Crimean War, was pessimistic in 1859. It attacked German liberalism which desired to unify Germany in such a way as to keep a part of Italy under German dominion, and saw little chance of unification so long as the jealousies of the different states and particularly the jealousies between Austria and Prussia, remained. The *Herald* likewise was doubtful in the early part of the war, when it said: "It must be recollected that German unity has been proved by the events of 1848 to be, in a great measure, a myth."¹ But later it came to believe that German unity might well be achieved under Prussian auspices and in several very interesting editorials prophesied remarkably well the course which German unification was

¹ New York *Herald*: June 17, May 21, May 23, June 24, Sept. 18, 1859, Oct. 2, 1860; New York *Tribune*: Aug. 27, 1859, Oct. 2, 1860; New Orleans *Picayune*: Aug. 14, Oct. 18, 1859; Richmond *Enquirer*: Oct. 15, 1859; Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. ii, p. 65 *et seq.*

actually to take. The change came almost immediately after the statement quoted above:

Since the time of Frederick the Great, Prussia has been striving to obtain a dominant power over the other States, and Austria has been as persistently resisting her by foul as well as by fair means. . . . In all homogeneous nations the North always predominates. . . . It is not at variance, then, with probability or historical antecedents that Prussia should ultimately gain the ascendant and become the great Power in Germany.¹

The two more striking prophecies came in the latter part of 1860:

Let Austria be entirely excluded from Italy and Germany, and given as an indemnification Turkey in Europe. . . . Prussia should have the whole of Germany, as being the most progressive of the northern governments.²

We may yet live to see the entire preponderance of Prussia, or perhaps the reconstruction of a German Empire under the dynasty of Hohenzollern.³

The *Cincinnati Gazette* was also enthusiastic over the prospect for German unity. It deplored the division of Germany into many small states, it attacked severely the German princes who opposed the consolidation of the Fatherland, but saw in Prussia signs of progress in liberty and democracy, signs which might well give hope to all German liberals in their desire for a closer German unity. The *Gazette* praised Germany for her Protestantism and freedom of speech and religion, and gave utterance to the following idyllic sentiments:

¹ New York *Herald*: June 21, 1859.

² *Ibid.*, Oct. 30, 1860.

³ *Ibid.*, Nov. 2, 1860.

The mere statement of these Germanic relations, makes the conclusion inevitable, that there must be a German Union, if there be any forethought or defense for future. . . . Germany is the sole guardian of liberal institutions, and free opinions on the continent of Europe. She holds in her hands all of hope.¹

¹ *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 18, 1859. Cf. also *ibid.*, Jan. 7, July 8, 1859.

CHAPTER IV

INTERNAL CONDITIONS IN GERMANY. 1853-1863

THE foreign relations of Germany during the Crimean and Italian Wars have been covered in the previous chapter. The present chapter will deal with a consideration of the domestic affairs of Germany from 1853 to 1863 inclusive. It was a time when much was happening in Germany, although she seemed outwardly quiescent in comparison with the preceding revolutionary period or the stirring scenes which were to follow from 1864 to 1871. Likewise it was a period when the attention of the United States was fully occupied with domestic problems, and but little space in American journals, and but little attention in the thought of individual Americans, remained for foreign affairs. And whatever space or attention was given to foreign questions, was largely devoted to the vexing relations with England and France in connection with their attitude during the American Civil War. Consequently but little was said or thought about German affairs, and yet that little must be examined carefully if the subsequent period is to be understood. The question can logically be studied by considering American opinion first of Austria, then of Prussia, and finally of Germany as a whole; and it will be convenient to treat of cultural, economic and political conditions in regard to each. The account of cultural conditions will be found to be brief, that of economic conditions somewhat longer, while that of political conditions, including the personalities of the rulers in Austria and Prussia, will come in for the greatest share of interest and space.

AUSTRIA

Practically nothing was said about cultural conditions in Austria except in connection with the relations between church and state. Austria was certainly the great Catholic state of Central Europe. Her devotion and loyalty to the Pope and the Church seemed to many Americans positively medieval, and was believed to be the chief cause of her lack of progress in political as well as spiritual liberalism. In the latter part of 1855 Austria signed a concordat with the Pope which brought about a storm of abuse from Protestant America. It was charged that by this agreement all control of education and marriage relations had been handed over to the Church, that the Pope had been given a large measure of judicial power and that all books hostile to the Roman Church were to be proscribed. It is no wonder that a union of church and state so contrary to American theory and practice should have been unfavorably criticised. The *Tribune's* remark was typical: "To the Pope, however, he [Francis Joseph] prostituted himself and his realm, restoring priestly power and supremacy in a truly medieval manner."¹

That many Americans recognized the economic weakness of Austria has been noted in previous chapters.² In 1855, Austria seemed to be in the hands of speculators, business men had lost confidence in the government, and so great was the deficit in the treasury that it was pointed to as explaining why Austria had not entered the Crimean War. A meritorious attempt at permanent reform of economic and financial matters was made by the Austrian government at the very end of 1855. A national bank was to loan money on easy terms to all business men, whether farmers or industrialists,

¹ New York *Tribune*: Jan. 1, 1856, Dec. 10, 1855, July 3, Oct. 10, 1857; New York *Herald*: Dec. 25, 1855, Feb. 9, 1856; Cincinnati *Gazette*: April 9, 1859; Philadelphia *Press*: July 30, 1862, Aug. 7, 1863.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 52, 110.

some of the crown domains were to be sold as security for sums which the government owed to the bank, extensive railway construction was to be promoted, and the remnants of the medieval guilds were to be swept away. These reforms received a large measure of praise from the American press, but the feeling was only temporary, for by 1857 Austria was again spoken of as being bankrupt. Several editorials which were written in 1859 and 1860 pointed out the rottenness in Austria's financial system. The issuance of paper money in large quantities, the suspension of specie payments by the banks and the refusal of the government to receive its own depreciated notes in payment of taxes, all seemed to prove the ruinous character of her financial policy. It was said in 1859 that she had precipitated war because the enormous expense of keeping such large forces on a war footing was rapidly putting the government in a disadvantageous position. The corruption of public officials was believed to be an important cause for her defeat in the Italian War. So bad was her financial state in 1860 that she seemed to be on the verge of dissolution. The *Herald* said at that time: "Bankrupt in her exchequer, and without the means of stimulating public confidence; with ruinous frauds being every day perpetrated upon her, it would seem that the star of Austria has begun to set. . . . It seems to us, therefore, that the Austrian empire is on its last legs."¹

But it was not alone financial chaos which was thought to make Austria weak. Far more important was the clash of dissident nationalities. No other fact about Austria was referred to so often. How could she make reforms when her

¹ New York *Herald*: May 5, 1860, May 9, 1856, May 17, 1859, March 15, Aug. 25, 1860; New York *Tribune*: Jan. 1, Jan. 18, Jan. 25, Feb. 21, 1856; New Orleans *Picayune*: July 25, 1855, May 22, 1859; Richmond *Enquirer*: May 19, 1860; Portland *Transcript*: June 2, 1860; *Leslie's Weekly*: Nov. 24, 1860; Ticknor, *Life, Letters and Journals*, vol. ii, p. 348.

subject populations were anxious for nothing less than complete independence? It was the fear of an uprising in Hungary or Italy which prevented Austria from taking an active part in the Crimean War, and it was the same fear which necessitated such an enormous military establishment with its consequent ruinous drain on the treasury. The *Cincinnati Gazette* called Austria "a conglomerate country," and *Leslie's Weekly* spoke of "that incongruity of elements which has hitherto rendered all her attempts at reform abortive." The *National Quarterly Review* believed that the fact that Austria was "composed of an unprecedented number of heterogeneous races" was evidence that she carried "the elements of dissolution within her bosom." The *Richmond Enquirer* was convinced that "the diversity of races" was a more important cause for Austrian weakness than her bad government. Not only did the American people recognize the permanent sore in the Austrian empire which arose from the clash of dissident peoples, but they also resented the attempt of German Austria to rule over Magyars, Croats, Italians, Poles and Bohemians. No very striking incident arose during the period to call forth an expression of American feeling on this subject except the Italian War of 1859. But need any more be said to indicate the attitude of most Americans than to refer to their opinion, as stated above,¹ toward Austria upon the Italian and Hungarian questions? The *New Englander* voiced American sentiment accurately when it referred to Austria as "that monstrous medieval thing, which sits enthroned upon the heart of Europe, and lives upon the dismemberment of Poland, the disorganization of Germany, and the subjugation of Hungary and Italy."²

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 53-73, 109-III.

² *New York Tribune*: Jan. 17, 1863; *New York Herald*: Sept. 23, 1855, May 9, 1857, Feb. 19, 1859, April 3, Aug. 25, 1860; *Cincinnati Gazette*: April 9, 1859; *Richmond Enquirer*: Feb. 18, 1860; *Portland Transcript*:

But the Austrian government was considered to be just as despotic in its administration as in its policy toward the minor nationalities. The attitude of the American people toward that government has been noted in former chapters,¹ and the same opinions, which need not be repeated here, continued to be expressed. Before 1860 she had no national legislative assembly and the people had no part in governing themselves. The sole strength of the government lay in the army which had a monopoly of the best and most lucrative positions the nation had to offer. The *National Quarterly Review* said, "In Europe the shadow of . . . the House of Hapsburg was like that of the upas tree to liberty," and the *Herald* characterized the Austrian government in the following words, "It rules by itself, through itself and for itself."² Whenever an American desired to make an odious comparison in speaking of the despotic policy of any government, reference was invariably made to Austria. William Cullen Bryant called the policy of the slave states in reference to freedom of speech "as absolute as the monarchical despotism in Austria," and the New Orleans *Picayune* used the following comparison in reference to Lincoln's policy of using force to prevent secession:

Such empires as Russia and Austria have a natural affinity for the principles of government developed at Washington. Such potentates as Alexander and Francis Joseph recognize worse imitations of themselves in Abraham Lincoln. . . . The

June 2, 1860; *Leslie's Weekly*: May 8, 1858, Nov. 24, 1860, March 30, 1861; *American Messenger*: May, 1854; *Brownson's Quarterly Review*: Jan., 1855, April, 1859; *National Quarterly Review*: Dec., 1863; *New Englander*: Aug., 1859.

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 35-39, 51-73, 96-99, 109-111.

² *National Quarterly Review*: Sept., 1860; New York *Herald*: May 27, 1859, July 25, 1854, April 27, 1856, April 3, Aug. 25, Dec. 1, 1860, March 2, 1861; New Orleans *Picayune*: Aug. 11, 1859; *Putnam's Magazine*: Feb., 1855.

Lincolmites may rejoice in the fellowship of the imperial despots, who are dealing with Venice and with Poland as the Washington Government deals with Missouri and Maryland.¹

It would have been only natural if American antipathy toward Austria had led to a constant vilification of her emperor Francis Joseph. In 1849 he had been stigmatized as the "woman-whipper,"² but as time went on, he came to be regarded in a more favorable light. True enough the *Portland Transcript* had nothing but contempt for the Austrian Emperor whom it considered "only fit to be a Lieutenant in his own army," and in 1860 said that if he did not abdicate, it would be so much the worse for him. The *Freeman's Journal* referred to Francis Joseph as the "amiable and weak Emperor." The *Tribune* called him "perjurer," "the young Nero of Austria," and "a consummate diplomatic trickster," but at the same time admitted that he had outwitted all the other sovereigns during the Crimean War. About the same time the *Herald* spoke of him as "an almost beardless boy, without any very extraordinary mental qualities," but yet considered him to be "the new arbiter of Europe." In fact it was generally recognized in 1856, after the close of the Crimean War, that the "cold and crafty policy of Austria" had achieved a notable triumph. The *Richmond Enquirer* said: "Austria . . . has risen from the ground with the pride and strength of a first class power."³

By 1859 the *Herald* had become enthusiastic about the

¹ New Orleans *Picayune*: June 19, 1861, Aug. 11, 1859; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Dec. 5, 1859; Godwin, Parke, *A Biography of William Cullen Bryant, with extracts from his private correspondence* (New York, 1883), vol. ii, p. 122.

² New Orleans *Picayune*: Dec. 30, 1849, referring to the whipping of women by his generals in Hungary and Italy in 1848 and 1849.

³ *Richmond Enquirer*: April 8, 1856; New York *Tribune*: Jan. 9, Feb. 2, 1855, Oct. 2, 1856; New York *Herald*: July 19, 1854, Sept. 3, 1863; *Portland Transcript*: June 24, 1854, April 26, 1856, Jan. 14, 1860; *Freeman's Journal*: April 4, 1863.

diplomatic ability, the energy and the independence of Francis Joseph, and said that he had "a mind destined yet to make its mark upon the affairs of Europe." But what aroused American respect for the ruler of Austria was the perseverance with which he attempted a real rebuilding of the crumbling edifice over which he presided. Notice has been taken of his financial reforms in 1855 and 1856, and of the favorable comment which they elicited.¹ Far more important were the constitutional changes of 1860 and 1861, which converted "at one stroke a military despotism into a Constitutional Monarchy." The desperate condition of Austria after the Italian War was realized by many American observers of the course of events in Europe. The *Portland Transcript* called Austria "the sick man" of Europe and believed that the empire was about to dissolve. The *Cincinnati Gazette* blamed Francis Joseph, "the insincere and perfidious autocrat," for the seemingly hopeless plight of Austria. Had he not broken his promises to make reforms? When the emperor at first broached a remedy, the *Picayune* was sceptical and put but "very little faith in the practical reforms which are to emanate from the imperial pleasure in Austria." But the establishment of provincial diets with large powers of self-government, the grant of liberty of speech and of the press, the promulgation of a constitution for all the Austrian dominions in 1861, and the appointment of a ministry responsible to an elected representative parliament, helped to convince Americans of the sincerity of the emperor's conversion to liberalism. The *Herald* felt admiration for a man who could thus profit by defeat, and spoke of his "good sense and magnanimity." Although John L. Motley, the American minister at Vienna, sneered at the Austrian constitution and parliament, his attitude was not typical. More characteristic were the following comments by the *Philadelphia Press*, the *New York Tribune* and the *New York Herald*:

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 118, 119.

When some further reforms are effected . . . Austria will be one of the freest countries in continental Europe.¹

Austria . . . made the unexpected attempt to regain her lost position in Europe by resolutely abandoning the principles of absolute monarchy and making an apparently sincere trial of constitutional forms of government.²

Not England herself has a more constitutional government than hitherto despotic Austria is to have.³

PRUSSIA

There is a great deal more material about Prussia than about Austria, although it is not concerned primarily with Prussian cultural conditions. One American newspaper described the Prussians as "a quiet, humble, patient, and law-abiding people," and some attention was devoted to the educational system and the religious situation in Prussia. Not so much emphasis was laid upon Prussian education as during the revolutionary period, but it was generally believed that the Prussians were a highly intelligent people because of their institution of compulsory public education. However, *Putnam's Magazine* attacked the educational system of Prussia because, in spite of its seeming liberalism, it was in reality organized on "the drill-sergeant principle," was a bulwark of the autocracy, and made use of religion the better to strengthen the absolute power of the monarch.⁴ Most Americans favored the established religion of Prussia probably just be-

¹ *Philadelphia Press*: July 17, 1863; *New York Herald*: March 3, May 9, May 30, Aug. 3, Aug. 12, 1859; *New Orleans Picayune*: Aug. 11, 1859; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Jan. 6, 1860; *Richmond Enquirer*: Feb. 18, 1860; *Portland Transcript*: June 2, 1860; *Leslie's Weekly*: March 30, 1861; *John Lothrop Motley and his Family*, pp. 178-179.

² *New York Tribune*: Aug. 17, 1863.

³ *New York Herald*: March 19, 1861. Cf. also *ibid.*, Dec. 1, 1860.

⁴ *Ibid.*, June 13, 1861; *New Orleans Picayune*: Nov. 2, 1858; *Philadelphia Press*: July 17, 1863; *Putnam's Magazine*: April, 1853.

cause it was Protestant rather than Roman Catholic. In several of the editorials which advocated German unity under Prussian leadership, such leadership was upheld on the ground that Prussia was Protestant and the leading Protestant state of Germany. Very little discrimination was made between Protestants or between Catholics. In the minds of most Americans everything Protestant was good, and everything Catholic bad. The *New York Tribune*, usually excessively pro-Protestant, did make two attacks upon Prussian Lutheranism. At one time it said that there was no essential difference between the place of the Evangelical Church in Prussia and that of the Roman Catholic Church in Austria. Church and state were united just as firmly in the one country as in the other, and, it was pointed out, the Evangelical clergy interfered outrageously with individual liberty. In a somewhat different connection, it attacked Prussia for being interested in Protestantism only when it was to her advantage, and claimed that she had not been its consistent protector. As might have been expected, *Brownson's Quarterly Review* was very hostile to Prussian Protestantism and said that freedom in Prussia had advanced in proportion as the Evangelical Church had been divorced from state control.¹

Even less interest was taken in economic conditions in Prussia, with the exception, as we shall see, of the Zollverein. In 1856 it was believed by the *Tribune* that Prussia had embarked upon an era of speculation which might lead her into dangerous paths. In the same editorial, the statement was made that the Junkers were preparing the country for a vast social upheaval by their policy of depressing the agricultural laborers into their former status of serfdom, and by their attempts to forbid strikes on the part of urban workmen.

¹ *New York Tribune*: May 23, 1855, May 5, 1856, July 7, 1857, Aug. 27, 1860; *Cincinnati Gazette*: April 9, July 18, 1859; *Brownson's Quarterly Review*: April, 1861.

In 1859 the same paper praised Prussia for not wasting her economic resources by taking part in the Crimean War.¹ The other papers took little, if any, notice of economic conditions within Prussia, as distinct from Germany as a whole.

But if there was very little comment on cultural and economic conditions in Prussia from 1853 to 1864, considerable attention was paid to political matters. Before examining the American attitude toward the two Prussian monarchs of the period and the struggle between king and parliament, there must be some reference to the Prussian military system. Universal military service was recognized to be the rule in that country and its efficiency was candidly admitted. Prussia was conceded to have the finest infantry in Europe, and it was seen that her power rested, to a great extent, upon her army. The fact that Prussia was increasing her military establishment did not destroy the faith of the Richmond *Enquirer* in her pacific intentions, and the New York *Tribune* saw in the system of universal military service a matter for praise—a great force which was working for democracy. In a rather remarkable panegyric on the Prussian military system, the *Tribune* said:

The Prussians are constituted and trained to be a military people; every able-bodied young man, even the sons of the highest aristocracy, must, without exception, serve at least one year as a common soldier in the ranks. . . . [An army is democratic] only where the highest and lowest classes are indiscriminately and compulsorily mixed in the ranks, as in Prussia.²

Nevertheless, it may be said that the only serious dispute which the United States ever had with Prussia during the

¹ New York *Tribune*: July 2, 1859, Aug. 27, 1860.

² *Ibid.*, March 1, 1855; New York *Herald*: April 28, 1860, June 13, 1861; Richmond *Enquirer*: Feb. 4, 1860.

whole period from 1848 to 1871, arose from the Prussian military system. An extremely thorny question developed from the fact that every Prussian was compelled to serve in the army for a certain length of time. If one came to the United States without having completed his time of service, and then at some later date returned to Prussia, he was held as a deserter, whether he were an American citizen or not. Since the desire to escape military service was the impelling motive to many a Prussian who came to the United States, such a claim on the part of the Prussian government practically denied him the right ever to return to the land of his birth. The question was somewhat similar to the famous Koszta case, in which an Austrian citizen who had taken out his first papers was rescued from an attempt on the part of Austria to seize him while he was in Turkish waters.¹ Some Americans appealed to this case as a precedent, although, as the *Picayune* pointed out, there was a subtle difference between an attempt to seize a man who was under the jurisdiction of a third power, and one who was under the jurisdiction of his native country. A protest against the Prussian system had been raised as early as July, 1852, by the *New York Tribune*, and a case had arisen in 1854, but no definite action was taken by the American government at the time. It was only in 1859 that the question became acute, when a case arose in regard to which the American Secretary of State, Lewis Cass, took the stand that American citizenship was not a shield to protect a naturalized citizen in case he should return to his native country and be seized for services which he owed there. The position thus taken by Secretary Cass was vigorously upheld by the *New Orleans Picayune* and the *New York Herald*. The *Picayune* said that while complete protection was a principle well worth attempting to have incorporated into international law, it was not worth fighting over.

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 72.

On the other hand, many Americans, among them such prominent men as John Minor Botts, prominent Virginia politician, Henry A. Wise, Governor of Virginia, and Felix K. Zollicoffer, Representative to Congress from Tennessee, attacked Secretary Cass for his failure to give complete protection to naturalized Americans. The *Richmond Enquirer* deprecated the talk of the use of force against Prussia, stated that no insult to the United States was probably intended by the Prussian contention, and yet said that it would be foolhardy not to recognize that a resort to force might be the final solution. *Harper's Weekly* was more frank in its hostility. In 1858 it advocated an embargo on Prussian merchandise to bring Prussia to terms, and in 1859 its attitude was positively menacing when it said: "If any contingency should place Prussia in peril—if, for instance, we should ever have a Government with pluck enough to insist upon her respecting our citizens—she would need a friend badly."¹

In general it can be said that political conditions in Prussia were not regarded with the approval of the majority of the people of the United States. The *Tribune* spoke of "our hostility to the political system of Prussia." Her government was linked with those of Austria and Russia as being without political liberties or representative institutions. The engagement of an English princess to the crown prince of Prussia in 1855 was not considered a very good match for the Princess Victoria, because of the insecurity of the Hohenzollern dynasty. The *Herald*, which believed that the Prussian government was about to fall at any moment, said, "The Prussian government is a tenant, and not a landlord—it occupies the estates of the kingdom by sufferance."² And the

¹ *Harper's Weekly*: Aug. 13, 1859, Aug. 25, 1858, July 30, 1859; *New York Tribune*: July 8, 1852; *New York Herald*: June 3, June 16, July 14, July 15, July 16, 1859; *New Orleans Picayune*: Feb. 17, 1854, June 11, July 17, Aug. 20, 1859; *Richmond Enquirer*: June 6, 1859.

² *New York Herald*: Oct. 21, Sept. 23, 1855, April 27, 1856; *New York Tribune*: Jan. 2, 1854, Oct. 20, 1855; *Putnam's Magazine*: Feb., 1855.

Tribune, at the end of a long editorial in which it claimed that the Junkers were gradually concentrating all political power into their own hands, painted the following dismal picture of Prussia in 1856:

A disunited dynasty, a Government broken up into hostile camps, the bureaucracy quarreling with the aristocracy, the aristocracy with the middle class—a general commercial crisis, and the disinherited classes brooding in the spirit of rebellion against all the upper layers of society: such is the aspect of Prussia at this hour.¹

The *Tribune* became increasingly hostile to Prussia during the late fifties and early sixties. The attack was usually directed against Prussian diplomacy and foreign policy. No better arguments could have been used by a paid propagandist for German unity under Austrian auspices, for the *Tribune* pointed out the artificiality of Prussia's position as a separate state, and the corrupt diplomacy by which it had become a great power. Two brief quotations will show just how bitter the *Tribune* was in 1860:

After all, Prussia herself remains on sufferance among the five great Powers; events and not her intrinsic strength, assigned to her a corner in the Pentarchy. Prussia, as it is, is an artificial existence.²

Every foot of land owned by Prussia and the House of Hohenzollern was acquired by successive violations of the public law then existing and obligatory, by outrage of the right and property of others. Of all the States of Europe, Prussia alone is without even the name of a genuine ethnic nationality, and is a patchwork of stolen property.³

At least twice during the period, American opinion was

¹ New York *Tribune*: May 5, 1856.

² *Ibid.*, Aug. 27, 1860.

³ *Ibid.*, Nov. 9, 1860. Cf. also *ibid.*, Sept. 7, 1860, March 18, 1861; *Atlantic Monthly*: Jan., 1861.

almost unanimous in its hostility to Prussian foreign policy. When the Prussian government offered aid to Russia in its attempt to subdue the Polish rebellion of 1863, the *Freeman's Journal* said, "It belongs to Prussia to be the base and servile accomplice of Russia—without sharing in the benefits."¹ More bitter was the comment of the *Portland Transcript*, "Only Prussia is mean enough to play jackal to the Russian Bear."²

The Neufchatel question which arrayed American opinion solidly in opposition to Prussia, is deserving of especial attention. A brief analysis of the issues which were involved must be made before the American opinion of the problem can be examined. Neufchatel was one of the small Swiss cantons which had belonged to Prussia prior to the French Revolution, had revolted at that time, but later had been restored to her in 1815. In 1848 Prussia had recognized the annexation of the canton to the Swiss Confederation, but the recognition was not voluntary and patriotic Prussians hoped to regain the lost province. In 1856 an attempted uprising against the Swiss, which was engineered by certain pro-Prussian noblemen, was suppressed by the Swiss government and the conspirators imprisoned. At this point the Prussian government intervened and demanded the immediate release of the prisoners. Upon the absolute refusal of the Swiss to accede to the Prussian demands, a Prussian ultimatum was delivered and both countries prepared for war, which was finally prevented mainly through the mediation of Napoleon III. A compromise followed, by which the king of Prussia surrendered his rights to dictate to the Swiss government, and the latter liberated the conspirators out of friendship for Napoleon III. Such in brief was the Neufchatel question.

¹ *Freeman's Journal*: April 4, 1863.

² *Portland Transcript*: March 21, 1863.

Whatever love for Prussia had previously existed in the United States was entirely destroyed for the time being. For once American opinion was unanimous in opposing Prussia and in upholding Switzerland. Back in 1851 the New York *Herald* had severely attacked the pretensions of the Prussian king as being a preposterous feudal claim. In 1857 Prussia seemed clearly the aggressor. "Prussia seems bent on war," said the Portland *Transcript*.¹ Prussia's claims were declared to be antiquated and trivial, while the Richmond *Enquirer* spoke of the "unanswerable argument" and the "righteous cause" of the Swiss. To most Americans it appeared as a struggle between the principles of republicanism and democracy on the one hand, and those of absolute monarchy on the other. It is not to be wondered at that American sympathy was all with the Swiss, or that the settlement of the dispute in favor of Switzerland pleased everyone in the United States. To the *Tribune* it seemed the vindication of the principle of self-determination, and the *Herald* saw fit to congratulate Louis Napoleon upon his pro-Swiss intervention. During the course of the dispute, the American Minister at Berne, Theodore S. Fay, offered to intervene on behalf of the Swiss, and made a journey to Berlin for that purpose, although his intervention was made in his 'officious'² rather than in his official character. The spirit of the act was warmly praised by the *Tribune*, while the *Picayune* complained that his action had not been favorable enough to the Swiss. On January 17, 1857, a meeting to express sympathy with Switzerland was held at Delmonico's and was attended by about one thousand persons. The following resolution, passed at that meeting, although it is perhaps more indicative of hope for future achievements than

¹ *Ibid.*, Jan. 17, 1857; New York *Herald*: Oct. 21, 1851.

² i. e., he acted in his capacity as an individual, rather than in his capacity as Minister of the United States.

proof of past ones, yet surely shows a strong pro-Swiss sentiment in New York: "Resolved, that we testify our gratitude to the American press and the people of this beautiful and noble country . . . for the warm support which they have already given to the cause of our country, awaiting perhaps an occasion for a more substantial manifestation."¹ The following quotations show how bitter was the feeling against Prussia in the United States during the Neufchatel crisis:

If the fight must come, we shall, as we trust, witness the severe castigation of Prussian impudence. . . . With such a war threatened against Switzerland, every true American must regret that the impossibility of direct communication renders it so difficult for our Government and our People to take decided measures to support her cause.²

As an issue of practical right . . . the Prussian is without the color of justice. . . . But unhappily there is another forum for the adjudication of such matters, where our hero of the black eagle has things pretty much his own way. It is where might makes right, and the dragoon sabre weighs down the clumsy old sword of justice.³

Perhaps even more hostility was evoked by the character and internal policies of the Prussian monarchs than by their foreign policies. References have been made in earlier chapters to the dislike for Frederick William IV, which was manifested by many Americans,⁴ and after 1853 his unpopularity increased rather than decreased. The *Cincinnati Gazette* said that Prussia had lost greatly in prestige during Frederick William's reign, and blamed the liberals for having ever put

¹ New York *Herald*: Jan. 18, Jan. 25, 1857; New York *Tribune*: Jan. 20, Jan. 26, 1857; New Orleans *Picayune*: Jan. 27, Feb. 2, 1857; Richmond *Enquirer*: Jan. 2, Jan. 21, 1857.

² New York *Tribune*: Jan. 13, 1857.

³ *Harper's Weekly*: Jan. 24, 1857.

⁴ Cf. *supra*, pp. 41, 42, 73, 74, 84.

any faith in a man so dominated by divine-right theories of government. It attacked him for having destroyed the liberties of Prussia through "gross treachery," and, although admitting that he was a scholar and a gentleman, thought him totally deficient in character. The increasing rumors of the insanity of the king gave credence to stories of intemperance, and the belief became current that Frederick William was a "bibulous king." The *Portland Transcript* said: "The king of Prussia, we know is an imbecile, and Punch says he is a sot. At all events he is a breaker of solemn oaths, and a traitor to his people."¹ The *New Orleans Picayune* described his condition thus: "The cause popularly assigned for these maladies is long continued and brutalizing intemperance. Strong drinks have destroyed his constitution, and reduced him to a state of driveling idiocy, varied by grotesque and pitiable hallucinations."² From which there was drawn a goodly moral on the "vanity of earthly greatness." At the time of the king's death almost no editorial notice was taken of the event except, curiously enough, by the *Picayune*, which spoke of the false rumor which had been current about his heavy drinking propensities, and said of him: "Being a king, in times to which he was not equal, he will be written down as a very poor monarch, and may not escape the taint upon his name of being a bad man, which he was not."³

As it became more and more apparent that Frederick William IV was becoming hopelessly insane, the Prussians' demand for a regency became greater and greater. For a time there was a severe contest between that court faction

¹ *Portland Transcript*: June 24, 1854, Jan. 3, 1857; *New York Tribune*: April 15, 1854; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Nov. 9, 1858; *New Orleans Picayune*: Sept. 15, 1854.

² *New Orleans Picayune*: Nov. 2, 1858.

³ *Ibid.*, Jan. 31, 1861.

which opposed the regency and another group which favored it. To most Americans a regency seemed absolutely necessary under the circumstances, and they denounced all efforts to prevent its establishment. When the regency had become a fact, it seemed to most observers in the United States as if Prussia were entering upon an era of prosperity. At any rate, nothing could be much worse than the continued rule of Frederick William IV, "who retained his reason longer than he did the affections of his people." The new regent, William, brother to the king and heir to the throne, was regarded very favorably by the American press. Since his first act as regent was the removal of the unpopular Manteuffel ministry, the impression went abroad that he was possessed of very liberal tendencies, and that his elevation to power would mean the orderly advance of Prussia on the road to constitutional, representative government. Several editorials during 1858 and the early part of 1859 reflected the sentiments of the American people, and the hope they felt at the accession of a prince seemingly so liberal. The most conservative was the *Tribune*, which said:

In Germany, the hopes of the Liberals have been revived by the changes of men and measures consequent upon the Prussian Regency.¹

Leslie's Weekly said:

The Prince of Prussia, though scarcely to be termed a man of liberal opinions, is characterized by strong common sense and honest straightforwardness; . . . he has the reputation of a tendency to popularize the government of his country, and to extend the few privileges with which it is at present endowed.²

¹ New York *Tribune*: Jan. 1, 1859, Nov. 14, 1857, June 24, Dec. 23, 1858; New Orleans *Picayune*: Nov. 2, 1858; Portland *Transcript*: Feb. 20, 1858; *Leslie's Weekly*: March 13, Nov. 27, 1858.

² *Leslie's Weekly*: Nov. 27, 1858.

Even more optimistic was the *Picayune* :

The new Regent has been distinguished . . . by a firm support of liberal opinions in Prussia. . . . His views have been uniformly expressed in favor of a Constitutional Government, and of an enlarged and free participation of subjects in the management of public affairs.¹

The only discordant note was sounded by the *Cincinnati Gazette*, which thought William no less a believer in divine-right monarchy than his brother, and described the regent as "wanting learning, amiability or refinement." A change of ministry might be expected, but that was all. The *Gazette* would melt no further than to say, "A nominally Liberal Government has come into power in Prussia."²

By the end of the year 1863, however, every illusion about the liberality of the government of the Prussian regent, who in the meantime had become William I, had quite disappeared. The cause for such a change can be found in the fact that the intervening years had been marked by a struggle between the king and his parliament, a struggle which increased in bitterness with each year. Before examining American opinion of the constitutional struggle in Prussia, it may be well to make a brief explanation of its nature. According to the Prussian constitution of 1850, all financial measures must have the assent of the lower house of the Prussian Landtag. No sooner had William become regent than he introduced a plan to lengthen the term of military service and to carry through extensive military reforms. Since these reforms necessitated a large increase in military expenditure, it was necessary for them to be passed by the lower house. But the majority of that body was composed of progressives, a party in favor of retrenchment and bitterly hostile to militarism,

¹ New Orleans *Picayune* : Nov. 2, 1858.

² *Cincinnati Gazette* : Nov. 9, 1858, Jan. 7, 1859.

and consequently in opposition to the proposed reforms. Another cause which made them oppose the new measures was their fear of the increased power which such an enlarged army would give to the monarch. The lower house refused, therefore, to pass the bills, or to make the necessary appropriations for them, and the king dissolved the house. New elections were held which resulted in an increased majority for the progressive party. Consequently a deadlock ensued which continued from 1861 to 1866. Each year the parliament met, the military bills were introduced and defeated, the house refused to make financial grants to the government, it was regularly dissolved by the monarch, new elections were held, the result each time was an increase in the progressive majority. During these years the government was carried on illegally by the Prussian premier, Count Bismarck, who collected taxes, spent the money thus collected for military improvements and increases without any parliamentary appropriation, and was finally able to break the deadlock by the wave of patriotic support resultant from the war with Austria in 1866.¹

From the very beginning of the struggle, American opinion heartily supported the parliament, and duly assailed the government. It is interesting to see that it was not so much the increases in the army which caused American ill-feeling toward the Prussian government, but rather the persistency with which that government tried to force the military changes upon the legislature, and the regularity with which the king dissolved that body for not falling in with his wishes. It seemed another struggle for power between king and people, of might versus right; it was that phase of the

¹ Bismarck claimed legality for his procedure on the ground that the constitution failed to specify the course of action in case of a deadlock on the budget between the crown and the two houses of the legislature, and he pointed out that he possessed the support of the king and the upper house against the lower house.

question which interested the American people, and which unhesitatingly brought their sympathy around to the side of the parliament. The old king was severely attacked for his obstinacy and his talk about the divine right of kings. He was criticised for the destruction of the freedom of the press, for disregard of the constitution, and was accused of pursuing a policy of complete reaction. It seemed as if he had done far more to provoke a revolution than ever had Louis XVI or Charles X of France, or Charles I of England. Nor was there any doubt in the minds of the American people about the final outcome of the struggle. The unanimous will of the people must triumph, and each election seemed to prove ever more conclusively that the will of the Prussian people was firmly united. Their moderation was openly praised, and they were said to be wise not to start an immediate revolution, but to wait for the more sure triumph which must come eventually. The *Press* of Philadelphia advised the king to abdicate in favor of his son who seemed to be of a more liberal mind, and predicted a well-justified revolution which would overthrow the monarch unless he consented to abdicate.

Several quotations from editorials written in 1863 will show just how important the American people considered the constitutional struggle in Prussia, and how firmly they believed in the righteousness of the people's cause:

Such an overwhelming unanimity of the Prussian people forbodes, of course, the transformation of Prussia into a democratic State. Whether a few years sooner [or] later, the change is inevitable. It is hardly necessary to add, that the majority of the new Prussian Chamber are ardent admirers of the Constitution of the United States.¹

¹ *New York Tribune*: Nov. 14, 1863, March 27, Nov. 11, Nov. 28, 1862, Jan. 17, Feb. 26, June 12, June 25, Aug. 17, Nov. 11, Dec. 9, 1863; *New York Herald*: Nov. 8, Nov. 16, 1862, Feb. 23, March 1, June 18, Sept. 8, Nov. 27, 1863; *Philadelphia Press*: June 16, June 18, July 8, July 17, Aug. 7, 1863; *Leslie's Weekly*: Oct. 11, 1863.

In Prussia we see the people electing deputies all averse to the policy of the King, while this monarch, with that display of stubbornness and want of conciliation which have distinguished his course since his advent to the throne, makes addresses to these deputies in direct opposition to the popular views they are elected to sustain. . . . The condition of the Prussian government is precisely that which existed in France previous to the downfall of Charles X.¹

This sovereign, . . . with just capacity sufficient to use it to the public detriment, would make a respectable drill-sergeant. On the throne, he is a positive nuisance. His purpose is to govern, if he can, independent of the constitution and laws which he swore to sustain and obey, and he has dismissed the national Legislature, undertaking to govern without its aid or sanction, to collect taxes without the slightest legal right to do so, and to gag Public Opinion. . . . There [Prussia] they will find an intelligent and well-informed population grossly misgoverned by an old man, whom it were charity to consider singularly weak-headed rather than wilfully bad-hearted. . . . There they will find a Monarch who has perjured himself before God and man by violating his coronation oath. . . . The issue of such a state of things must be a popular outbreak.²

The only prominent American who did not warmly sympathize with the cause of the Prussian parliament was John L. Motley, at that time American Minister to Austria. He had been a university friend of Bismarck, and in 1855 had predicted that Bismarck would become chief minister of Prussia "unless his obstinate truthfulness . . . stands in his way."³ In 1863 Motley again praised Bismarck although he recognized in his friend a frank reactionary, and said, "I believe that Prussia is by the necessary conditions of its existence a

¹ New York *Herald*: Nov. 27, 1863.

² Philadelphia *Press*: July 8, 1863.

³ Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. i, p. 225. Cf. characterization of Bismarck by the Philadelphia *Press* as "a venal minister," July 8, 1863.

military monarchy, and when it ceases to be that, it is nothing. . . . I don't believe much in continental constitutionalism."¹

GERMANY

Much more attention was paid to cultural conditions in Germany as a whole than in either Austria or Prussia. There are general references to the qualities of the German character, there are the reactions of travelers and students in Germany, there are comments upon the German religious situation, and there are statements which show the very great impress of German scholarship and learning upon the intellectual classes of the United States. Most of the comments upon the German character were favorable. The typical German was described as "staid," "brave," "loyal," "well-educated," "free," "adventuresome," "good-natured." Charles Sumner spoke of the warmth of affection and simplicity of life which characterized the German people. Travelers in Germany were equally enthusiastic. Horace Greeley went there in 1851 and sent his impressions to the *Tribune* in the form of a letter. He spoke of the uniform courtesy, kindness of heart, and lack of pretense, which he had met with everywhere. The truly democratic bearing of the people and their refusal to be abjectly servile to the titled nobility, was emphasized. He praised their patience and willingness to bear the tyranny of their rulers without useless grumbling. Henry Adams tells of the love which he had for Germany, "the simple character; the good-natured sentiment; the musical and metaphysical abstraction; the blundering incapacity of the German for practical affairs."²

Beside the feeling that the typical German was a thoroughly

¹ John Lothrop Motley and his Family, pp. 178-179.

² Education of Henry Adams, p. 83; New York Tribune: Aug. 11, 1851; New York Herald: Nov. 23, 1863; New Orleans Picayune: Nov. 2, 1858; Cincinnati Gazette: April 9, 1859; Sumner, Works, vol. v, pp. 188-189.

worthy and good-natured individual, another cause for American sympathy with German culture lay in the belief that Germany was predominantly Protestant. The *Cincinnati Gazette* laid great emphasis upon Germany's Protestantism. It was Protestantism which gave to her freedom of thought and freedom of worship. "Pontifical Rome has not been able to subdue the German mind," said the *Gazette*.¹ On the other hand, the *Richmond Enquirer* described Germany as "infidel" and "socialistic," and Charles Loring Brace was sceptical about the value of German religion because of the very lax observance of the Sabbath. It is interesting to note, however, that Brace did not at all object to German beer-drinking. He remarked upon the negligible amount of drunkenness which he had seen in Germany and thought the moderate drinking of beer and wines probably very healthful.²

But the chief bond of union between German and American culture was the university. German learning and German scholarship won praise in almost every quarter. The high state of German culture and literature made it seem improbable to the *Herald* that Germany would long remain in a state of political servitude. The *Atlantic Monthly* thought the German university system was a sufficient cause for national pride. The *Harvard Magazine* praised the earnestness, the hospitality and good-nature of the German students and compared them very favorably with American college men. In describing conditions at Harvard in the fifties, Henry Adams says that the institution was dominated by a veneration for Germany. All serious scholars must copy German methods, and themselves study in Germany, if pos-

¹ *Cincinnati Gazette*: April 9, July 18, 1859, June 8, 1860.

² *Richmond Enquirer*: Oct. 25, 1855; Brace, *Life*, p. 92. For a comparison of similar charges against the Germans in the United States, cf. *infra*, pp. 436-438.

sible. The shining lights of the Harvard world—Emerson, Longfellow and Lowell—were all imbued with German ideas. Emerson himself said, "I think the Germans have an integrity of mind which sets their science above all other."¹ Perhaps the voice of Yale can be heard in the comment of the *New Englander*: "The Germans deserve to be considered as the teachers of the world. So far as knowledge and research are concerned, it may be safely and truly said, that they surpass all other nations."² No less enthusiastic was the *Harvard Magazine*: "It is from her Universities that all that is best and noblest in the life and history of Germany has sprung, and in them her brightest hopes for the future lie."³ The only criticism adverse to German learning appeared in *De Bow's Review*, which made a severe arraignment of German influence upon American thought. Without saying so openly, and without proving his point, the writer inferred that German learning was to be held largely responsible for the peculiar ideas which were prevalent in the North in 1860, the year in which the article appeared. The acerbity of the article justifies quotation:

German learning and research, and German speculation, have unsettled or subverted everything. . . . German literature has injured, and will upset American institutions at the North, and disturbs the peace, happiness and security of the South. The Yankees had a long lucid interval after the Revolution, but German books and German immigrants have again run them stark staring mad, and prepared them for acts of mischief and desperation.⁴

¹ Emerson, *Journals*, vol. ix, p. 30; *New York Herald*: May 21, 1859; *Atlantic Monthly*: March, 1861; *Harvard Magazine*: April, 1858; *Education of Henry Adams*, pp. 61-62.

² *New Englander*: Nov., 1857.

³ *Harvard Magazine*: April, 1858.

⁴ *De Bow's Review*: Sept., 1860 (art. by George Fitzhugh).

It is clear that on the whole the feeling of the people of the United States was distinctly favorable to German culture and to the German people. The following quotation from the *North American Review* sums up the whole attitude and is particularly interesting in its comparison of the Germans with their chief European rivals for cultural supremacy, the English and French:

In a word, comparing the three leading nations of Europe,—the French, the English, and the German,—we should characterize them thus. The French have talent, the English common sense, and the Germans genius. The French are vain, the English proud, and the Germans self-centered. The French are theoretical, the English practical, and the Germans ideal. The French live in a world of fancy, the English of fact, and the Germans of thought. The Frenchman is gay, the Englishman comfortable, and the German happy. The Frenchman is an Epicurean in his philosophy, the Englishman a Baconian, and the German a Platonist. The Frenchman has manners, the Englishman morality, and the German religion. The Frenchman has taste, the Englishman head, and the German heart. The Frenchman flashes like a fire made of saltpetre, the Englishman burns and smokes like a fire of his own bituminous coal, while the German glows and heats, and will continue burning like a good solid anthracite fire, hard to be kindled and hard to be put out.¹

Considerable interest in economic conditions in Germany was displayed by certain American newspapers, chief among which were the *New York Herald* and particularly the *New York Tribune*. It was the Zollverein, or Customs Union, which attracted American attention. Inasmuch as that union had Prussia for its heart and center, it is often difficult to

¹ *North American Review*: April, 1861. The articles in the *North American Review* were not signed, but the one quoted was very possibly written by Francis Bowen, the editor, who took a lively interest in foreign affairs.

distinguish between American comments upon the Zollverein as it affected Prussia alone or Germany as a whole. As early as 1834 Prussia had united most of the states of northern and central Germany into a single commercial union, with no restrictions upon commerce or trade between any of its members. Gradually the number of members increased until only Austria and the Hanse cities remained outside. In 1852 it was believed that a strong movement was on foot to bring Austria within the organization, and such a consummation was ardently hoped for in the United States. However the movement had for its only result a commercial treaty between Austria and Prussia which American papers believed would be the stepping stone for the later entry of Austria into the Zollverein.¹

The comments of the American press upon the Zollverein were both economic and political in their nature. In the first place, it was pointed out that the Zollverein meant a very greatly increased material prosperity for all of its members. To its credit were laid the phenomenal growth of German domestic and foreign trade and commerce, the rapidly increasing wealth of the German people, and the extensive railroad construction in Germany. Manufactures had been greatly multiplied, wages were much higher, and agriculture had improved. The *Herald* said, "Germany has grown into immense prosperity by her free commercial union," and again, "The growth of the cotton, woolen and other manufactures in the Union, since its formation, has been exceedingly rapid."² Although the *Tribune* concurred with the *Herald* in recognizing the economic benefits which arose from the

¹ New York *Tribune*: Feb. 12, May 15, 1852, Feb. 24, March 17, 1853, Sept. 2, 1857.

² New York *Herald*: July 31, Aug. 1, 1859; New York *Tribune*: Feb. 21, July 7, 1853, Jan. 31, 1856, Sept. 2, 1857, Feb. 2, 1859; New Orleans *Picayune*: Dec. 23, 1860.

abolition of internal duties between the various states of the Zollverein, the *Tribune* particularly praised the customs union because of its adoption of the protective system. The *Tribune* was one of the strongest exponents of a protective policy for the United States, and the great economic gains which Germany had achieved as a result of the Zollverein were all attributed to the policy of a protective tariff. German protection was held up as a constant and shining example for the United States to follow if she desired real economic prosperity. Evidence of the extravagant praise given by the *Tribune* to the Zollverein because of its protective features, can be seen in the following quotations:

In conclusion we would beg our readers to remark:

- I. That protection has enabled Germany to quadruple her consumption of cotton in sixteen years.
- II. That protection has thus made a market for food which so far cheapens cotton cloth that Germany now exports it to other countries.
- III. That protection has relieved Germany from the necessity for exporting raw wool, and has raised the prices to the great benefit of the farmer.
- IV. That protection has enabled Germany to combine her food and her wool so cheaply that she now exports them to foreign countries in competition with England.
- V. That the farmer has thus profited by higher prices for food and wool, and lower prices for cloth.
- VI. That he has thereby been enabled almost to double his consumption of iron in the short period of 16 years, and to substitute good roads for bad ones—and finally,
- VII. That while the great internal trade has rapidly increased, the foreign one has not only not diminished, but has also largely increased.¹

The revenue from the Prussian mines has quadrupled since

¹ New York *Tribune*: Feb. 21, 1853, Feb. 12, March 11, 1852, July 7, April 6, 1853, Jan. 31, 1856, Sept. 2, 1857, Feb. 2, 1859, Sept. 15, 1861.

1820. The value of land, . . . the rate of wages, have all gone up under the Zollverein. . . . Industry of every kind is in process of rapid growth and development. The rates of wages and the certainty of employment for the laboring classes are increasing. Nowhere in Christendom can we find the example of a more solid and progressive prosperity than in Prussia and the other German States. And it is protection which enables the people to do it all.¹

That the *Tribune* was in accord with the great American economist, Henry C. Carey, can be seen from his statement that the protective policy of the Zollverein had "tended toward diversifying employments, and thus [had fitted] each and every man for more perfect association with his fellow-men."²

The political effects of the Zollverein were likewise freely discussed in the United States. It was claimed that with the growth of wealth must come a corresponding increase in political power, that as the country became more and more prosperous it would become more and more difficult to keep it in a shackled condition politically. It was clearly seen that the establishment of the customs union under Prussia's leadership had very greatly strengthened her position in Germany, and had given her a decided advantage over Austria in the struggle for German supremacy. The *Herald* wrote: "To Prussia the credit of this great measure is due, and she has reaped the benefit of it more than any other German State. . . . This commercial league has given Prussia such a political preponderance in Germany that she is no longer second to Austria."³ Nor were the American people slow to recognize

¹ *Ibid.*, Sept. 2, 1857.

² Carey, Henry C., *Principles of Social Science* (Philadelphia, 1858), vol. ii, p. 131.

³ New York *Herald*: July 31, Aug. 1, 1859; New York *Tribune*: Feb. 2, 1852, April 10, 1855.

the very close connection between the Zollverein and schemes for German unification. The Zollverein, it was contended, was merely the first, but a most important link in the chain which was eventually to bind Germany into a single political entity. Political union must sooner or later follow economic union. That the *Herald* recognized the importance of the Zollverein as a stepping stone toward further German unification, is evident from the following:

The political effect of this union . . . has been to create a perfect fusion of all small and conflicting interests into one grand confederation, having one common interest. . . . It is, indeed, evident that the spirit and object of this confederation have been to unite and strengthen Germany as one great nation, by throwing down those barricades of material warfare and of international intercourse.¹

Even more striking was the comment of the *Tribune*: "This immense achievement is one of the grandest in European history. By it are created the United States of Germany— independent States—yet linked in commercial interests and protected against the arch-destroyer, British free trade."²

It is difficult to make a clear distinction between political conditions in Austria or Prussia, and Germany as a whole. In the previous chapter and in the sections on Prussia and the Zollverein in the present chapter, some notice has been taken of American opinion of political conditions in Germany—of the widespread demand for political reform, of the rivalry between Austria and Prussia, of the profound desire for a closer political unity among the various German states.³ All that can be done here is to emphasize and give further evidence of the same motifs. Many examples can be brought

¹ New York *Herald*: Aug. 1, April 26, 1859.

² New York *Tribune*: Sept. 2, 1857, Sept. 15, 1861; *North American Review*: July, 1848.

³ Cf. *supra*, pp. 96-101, 112-116, 128-139, 145.

forward to show that most Americans considered Germany to be governed despotically. Charles Sumner and Abraham Lincoln spoke of the oppression and tyranny which the German suffered in his native land. The *Portland Transcript* said that the German people had been deprived of their liberty, and the *American Messenger* described them as "panting for freedom."¹

But the focus in which American opinion of German political conditions centered, was the belief that Germany needed, above everything else, political unity. Germany was thought to be weak and the prey of tyrants because she lacked unity. In explaining why Germany remained disunified, reference was usually made to one or more of the following facts. In the first place, there was the German Confederation, with its constitution which clearly created a loose confederacy instead of a close union. In the second place, there was the fact that Germany was divided into many small states, each with its own brand of local patriotism, and each with its own prince who might be more or less liberal, but who was none the less selfish in his desire to keep his throne and none the less desirous of fostering the spirit of particularism. It was very clearly felt in the United States that the princes of the minor states must be deprived of their power before Germany could become either liberal or unified. The *Tribune* saw no harm in a scheme by which the larger states would devour the smaller, but rather believed such a process to be a necessary preliminary to unity. In the third place, there was the jealous rivalry of the two great German states, Austria and Prussia, each primarily interested in its own welfare, more patriotic for itself than for the common fatherland. At one time Prussia was believed only to be waiting for Austria to dis-

¹ *Portland Transcript*: March 25, 1854; *American Messenger*: May, 1854; Nicolay and Hay, *Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln*, vol. vi, pp. 119-121; Sumner, *Works*, vol. iii, p. 215.

solve in order to seize some of the fragments for herself. The *Richmond Enquirer* said, "Prussia and Austria are naturally rivals, not allies."¹

To a certain extent the attitude of the American people toward Austria and Prussia was pragmatic, i. e., they favored that state which seemed at any particular moment the one most likely to succeed in drawing the smaller German states about her into a closer union. Usually the feeling was slightly in favor of Prussia as the more suitable power to effect union. It has been noticed that the *New York Tribune* in 1855, and the *New York Herald* and the *Cincinnati Gazette* in 1859 believed in a Prussianized Germany.² Motley favored a German empire under Hohenzollern auspices and said, "Then there might be a real Germany."³ On the other hand, there was some pro-Austrian feeling in 1862 and 1863, when conferences were held under Austrian leadership, conferences from which it was hoped the long-desired unity might issue.⁴ A partial explanation for the change in sentiment may be found perhaps in the somewhat liberal constitution which had been given to Austria in 1861 and in the fact that Prussia was at the same time

¹ *Richmond Enquirer*: Aug. 15, Aug. 6, 1859, Feb. 18, May 25, 1860; *New York Tribune*: June 13, 1856, Oct. 10, 1857, Jan. 17, Oct. 8, 1863; *New York Herald*: April 23, 1858, June 11, July 31, Aug. 11, Oct. 25, 1859, March 15, June 16, July 6, 1860, Sept. 19, 1863; *New Orleans Picayune*: Aug. 28, Oct. 18, 1859, May 23, July 10, July 13, Aug. 1, 1860; *Philadelphia Press*: July 30, 1862; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Jan. 7, July 18, 1859; *Leslie's Weekly*: July 21, 1860; *Harper's Weekly*: July 14, 1860; *Atlantic Monthly*: Jan., March, 1861; *Danville Review*: June, 1863; Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. ii, p. 331.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 100, 101, 114-116.

³ Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. ii, p. 67; *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 8, 1859; *Richmond Enquirer*: Oct. 15, 1859, May 25, 1860.

⁴ *New York Tribune*: Sept. 25, Oct. 14, 1862, Jan. 17, Aug. 17, Sept. 7, Oct. 8, 1863; *New York Herald*: Sept. 18, Sept. 19, Sept. 23, Sept. 25, 1863.

in the throes of reaction, and under the control of ultra-conservative leaders. But probably the chief explanation was that Austria was, for the moment, favoring German unity.

German unification seemed near at hand several times in the period covered by this chapter. In addition to the Crimean and Italian Wars and the Austrian conferences just alluded to, there were conferences in Baden in 1860, conferences which were attended by Napoleon III and most of the German princes. Much was hoped for from the conferences, but little was accomplished. Nearly every phase of American opinion about German political conditions was exhibited in the editorials regarding this Baden conference: the possibility of revolutionary outbreaks; the jealousy between Austria and Prussia; the selfishness of the princes; the need for democratic reforms in the individual states. In the early sixties there was much talk of a German union which would be accomplished through Prussian leadership and with French aid. The comparison with Italy was complete. Prussia was to fill the shoes of Sardinia, Austria would ineffectually oppose the movement, France would aid Prussia and would demand and receive the Rhine provinces as compensation.¹

Before concluding the present chapter, it is necessary to point out very definitely that in the period between 1853 and 1863 the American people did look upon German unity as a highly desirable goal. The *Cincinnati Gazette* spoke of "the community of interest, customs, culture, and aspiration . . . which renders consolidation extremely natural and desirable," and predicted that the idea of German unity would "never be abandoned, at least until a struggle has been made to give it practical form and substance." *Leslie's Weekly*

¹ New York *Herald*: May 21, June 11, 1859, March 15, June 16, July 6, 1860, June 16, July 28, 1862, Sept. 19, 1863; New Orleans *Picayune*: May 23, July 6, July 10, July 13, 1860; Philadelphia *Press*: July 30, 1862; Richmond *Enquirer*: June 26, Nov. 20, 1860; *Leslie's Weekly*: July 21, 1860; *Harper's Weekly*: July 14, 1860.

said, "We think that the solidarity of Germany would be as great a boon to the world as that of Italy."¹ The following quotations from the *New York Tribune* and the *Portland Transcript* do little more than to enlarge upon the same idea:

We may therefore soon hear of the establishment of a new State in the center of Europe, with a population of from forty to sixty millions of inhabitants. The character of the leading men and papers of Germany is sufficient guarantee that new-Germany will be a more democratic State than either England or France.²

What a part the great German empire might play in the affairs of Europe if it were united by the forms of nationality instead of being loosely connected by the slender ties of a confederacy!³

¹ *Leslie's Weekly*: July 21, 1860; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Jan. 7, Feb. 11, 1859.

² *New York Tribune*: Sept. 25, Oct. 14, 1862.

³ *Portland Transcript*: Nov. 21, 1863. Cf. also *New Orleans Picayune*: Aug. 1, 1860.

CHAPTER V

THE SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN QUESTION AND THE DANISH WAR OF 1864

IN the summer of 1863 the Schleswig-Holstein question again became threatening. The decree of the Danish king, Frederick VII, on March 30, 1863, which established a separate constitution for Holstein without the consent of the Holstein estates, caused a wave of anger throughout Germany against Denmark. To issue such a decree without the consent of the Holstein estates was a violation of the promises which Denmark had made in 1851 and 1852. The decree also aroused fears that Schleswig would be incorporated within Denmark, fears which seemed all too well justified when a new constitution for Denmark and Schleswig was approved by the Danish parliament on November 13, 1863. The story is too involved for detailed treatment here, but the upshot was that the Germanic Confederation ordered and carried out federal execution against the Danish king in Holstein early in January, 1864. Shortly afterwards Austria and Prussia broke away from the policy of the Confederation and took the matter into their own hands. The result was a war between Denmark and the two great German powers.

The American press paid considerable attention to the war of 1864, although not to such an extent as it had done to the Crimean and Sardinian wars of the past, or was to do to the Austro-Prussian and Franco-German wars of the future. The most important cause for the comparative lack of interest in the Danish War was the fact that the attention of Americans was still focused on their own Civil War. It

is perhaps remarkable, in the face of the titanic struggle at home, that any attention was paid to such an apparently petty squabble over two minor duchies in Europe. An evidence, however, that some interest was taken in the affair and that the average American was unable to fathom its ins and outs, was a request from James Russell Lowell to John L. Motley asking the latter for an article to appear in the *North American Review* on "the natural history of that diplomatic cuttlefish of Schleswig-Holstein. . . . The creature has bemuddled himself with such a cloud of ink that he is almost indiscernible to the laic eye."¹ In general it may be said that Americans did not take a very definite stand in favor of either party to the war of 1864. It cannot be said, as in 1870, that the great majority of Americans sympathized very strongly with one contestant and hated the other with as great intensity. Certain papers were quite friendly to Denmark, and others quite friendly to the inhabitants of the duchies, if not to Austria and Prussia. It will be seen that American opinion was fairly unanimous in certain of its beliefs, but the people of the United States were not unreservedly pro-Danish, pro-Austrian or pro-Prussian.

However the Schleswig-Holstein question had engaged American attention several times previously to 1864, notably during the revolution of 1848, at which time most Americans had blamed the Germans severely for that aggressive attitude which appeared as one of the chief causes of the failure of the Frankfort Assembly.² In the period between 1848 and 1864 only occasional articles dealt with the topic. In 1850 the *Portland Transcript*, in speaking of the renewal of the war between the German Diet and Denmark, ridiculed the fuss which was being made over such a small patch of

¹ Norton, Charles E., editor, *Letters of James Russell Lowell* (New York, 1894), vol. i, p. 335.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 47, 48.

territory. In 1851 the *American Review* regretted that the United States had not had an able diplomatic representative in Prussia who might have urged Prussia to take a more courageous stand, and showed unmistakable sympathy for the "gallant little States now delivered by Russian autocracy to Danish despotism." On the other hand, the *Richmond Enquirer* in 1860 rather thought that Prussia had shown too much sympathy with the duchies even when they had not complained of Danish encroachments. It spoke of the Schleswig-Holstein question as "the puzzle of nearly two generations; nobody was ever able to prove, nor was there ever, perhaps, anybody able to understand, whether they are Danish or German." In a lengthy editorial in 1857 the *New York Tribune* opposed Germany's attempt to prevent the Danish king from bringing all his dominions under the same administrative system, and ridiculed the desire of Prussia and Austria to preserve the autonomy of Schleswig and Holstein within Denmark, while Prussia refused the same autonomy to the Poles and Austria to the Hungarians and "Schlaves" within their respective dominions. In 1861 the same paper attacked Denmark severely for her policy of tyranny and administrative centralization, although it was still sceptical about the sincerity of the German powers in their demands for the rights of the duchies. Again the incongruity was pointed out between the despotic governments of the German states and their claims in behalf of Schleswig and Holstein. And early in 1863 the *Tribune*, at the same time that it condemned both Denmark and the German powers for their selfish policy, demanded a plebiscite in the disputed areas as the obvious and only just means of settling the troublesome question. In contrast to these views, an editorial in the *New York Herald* in 1861 fully justified Prussia in her threatening attitude toward Denmark and advised the latter state to yield before a war should be begun. The editorials of the

New Orleans *Picayune* in 1858 and 1861 give little idea of the attitude of that paper, although a slight sympathy with the independence of the duchies may be detected.¹

AMERICAN SYMPATHIES DURING THE DANISH WAR

Before examining American sympathies during the Danish War, it must be confessed that some Americans were frankly apathetic. Edward Everett thought that a general European war over Schleswig-Holstein would be a war fought for "insignificant causes," and the New York *World* believed the Schleswig-Holstein question to be "the most tedious and uninteresting of all the diplomatic disputes." John Bigelow considered the war only a "new struggle of sovereigns for the right to rule," and said, "Neither of the combatants are in the right."² The *Irish American* claimed that the only issue in the war was whether the inhabitants of the duchies should pay taxes to the King of Denmark or to the Duke of Augustenburg. John L. Motley felt much the same: "I take great comfort in being comparatively indifferent to the results of the contest. As to its being decided on the merits, that is of course out of the question."³

There were really four parties to the Danish War of 1864—Denmark, the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, the Germanic Confederation which represented Germany as a whole, and the two great German powers, Austria and Prussia. What was the attitude of the American people toward each?

¹ New York *Tribune*: Dec. 2, 1857, Feb. 12, 1861, June 8, 1863; New York *Times*: Oct. 2, 1864; New York *Herald*: Feb. 24, 1861; New Orleans *Picayune*: May 1, 1858, Feb. 15, 1861; Richmond *Enquirer*: June 7, 1860; Portland *Transcript*: Aug. 17, Nov. 2, 1850; *American Review*: March, 1851.

² New York *World*: Feb. 1, 1864; Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. iii, p. 15; Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. ii, p. 149.

³ Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. iii, pp. 11, 50; *Irish American*: Feb. 20, 1864.

At the very outset of the war, American opinion was perhaps slightly anti-Danish. The Danish king was condemned for attempting to break the treaty of 1852 and for trying to incorporate Schleswig into the Danish kingdom. But as the war progressed, and particularly after Austria and Prussia had intervened, a rather strong sympathy for Denmark began to appear. The *New York Herald*, the *Philadelphia Press*, the *Portland Transcript*, *Leslie's Weekly* and *Harper's Weekly* were all pro-Danish. In the first place, Denmark possessed a comparatively liberal constitution which was contrasted very favorably with the despotic governments of her antagonists. Much more important was the ever ready sympathy for the under dog. Denmark was extremely small, unequal in man power, wealth or resources to her unscrupulous opponents. "Poor little Denmark," and "the injured but sternly defiant Danes," were terms used by the *Portland Transcript* and the *Philadelphia Press* respectively. The *New York Herald* called upon Napoleon III to come to the aid of Denmark in accordance with his principle of help for oppressed nationalities, said that the seizure of Schleswig and Holstein would create a new Venetia or Hungary in European affairs, and compared the dismemberment of Denmark to the partition of Poland. John Slidell voiced the same feeling when he said: "The weak have no rights, the strong no obligations. The much vaunted reign of public opinion throughout the world is powerless to save Denmark from the most lawless spoliation."¹ Asa Gray hoped that "poor brave Denmark will not be crushed out of existence," and

¹ Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. ii, p. 190; *New York Times*: Jan. 9, 1864; *New York Herald*: Feb. 21, April 2, April 3, May 4, 1864; *New York World*: July 6, Aug. 17, 1864; *Philadelphia Press*: July 11, July 29, Aug. 31, 1864; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Feb. 20, 1864; *Richmond Enquirer*: April 21, 1864; *San Francisco Bulletin*: Dec. 20, 1864; *Portland Transcript*: Feb. 20, July 23, Aug. 20, 1864; *Leslie's Weekly*: June 4, 1864; *Harper's Weekly*: May 14, May 28, 1864.

said at another time, "Just look now at poor Denmark, which has the misfortune to be small, and so is made to suffer!"¹ In addition to sympathy with a weak power, the liveliest admiration was aroused by Denmark's gallant and single-handed fight against hopeless odds. Even John L. Motley exclaimed, "Who can help approving the pluck with which little Denmark stands up to her two gigantic antagonists?"² The *Philadelphia Press* said, "Denmark has lost everything but her honor."³ The following editorial comment from *Leslie's Weekly* is at once evidence of American sympathy with Denmark and a summary of the causes for that sympathy: "The war waged on the petty kingdom of Denmark by Prussia and Austria has excited the utmost sympathy for that unfortunate realm, which, under its gallant King, has steadily battled against the invading host with its petty army, contesting madly each line of defense."⁴

But the existence of a friendly feeling for Denmark did not prevent certain American papers, prominent among which were the *New York Tribune* and the *New York Times*, from exhibiting strong sympathy with the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. It was believed by such papers that the duchies should be independent of Denmark and united under the leadership of the Duke of Augustenburg. The people of the duchies were said to be largely German in their language and culture, and in accordance with the sacred principle of nationality, should be members of the Germanic Confederation rather than a part of Denmark. The *New York World* called the Danish constitution "justly offensive" to the Danish duchies. The principle of the plebiscite was invoked, by which, it was believed, the duchies would surely vote in

¹ Gray, *Letters*, vol. ii, pp. 523, 528.

² Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. iii, pp. 12, 50.

³ *Philadelphia Press*: July 29, 1864.

⁴ *Leslie's Weekly*: June 4, 1864.

favor of independence under the Duke of Augustenburg. The real questions at issue were those of nationality and the right of self-determination. The *Tribune* stated its belief in the following:

Those who wish to form a just opinion of the conflicting claims in this complication . . . will have to decide the question—whether the demand of a people to regulate their own destiny, and to preserve their own laws intact, or the stipulations of a number of princes disposing of two independent States in order to perpetuate “the balance of power” in Europe, deserve the greater sympathy. In such an alternative, the decision of the American press cannot be doubtful.¹

Motley, however, was cynical, and said: “As to the merits of Schleswig-Holstein, are there any? Considered as private property, these eligible little estates may be proved to belong to almost anybody.”² Later on, when it became apparent that Prussia had her eye on the duchies, sympathy was again shown with the fate of the Schleswig-Holsteiners. Their helplessness in the face of Prussian intrigue was commented on, and it was pointed out that they had only exchanged an easy-going despotism for one far more complete and exacting. As the *Times* said: “We venture to predict that . . . the people of Schleswig-Holstein will find that, in throwing off the rule of Denmark, they have exchanged a very peaceable King Log for a King Stork of most voracious appetite.”³

¹ New York *Tribune*: Jan. 11, March 4, July 15, Aug. 17, Sept. 12, Nov. 23, 1864; New York *Times*: Jan. 9, Jan. 31, May 8, June 19, 1864; New York *World*: Feb. 2, 1864; Richmond *Enquirer*: April 21, 1864; Portland *Transcript*: Feb. 27, 1864.

² Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. iii, p. 11.

³ New York *Times*: June 11, Aug. 24, 1865; New York *Tribune*: April 21, 1865; *Nation*: Oct. 19, 1865.

American opinion was sharply divided in respect to the part which Germany as a whole had played in the Danish War. On the one hand, the war was regarded as a nationalistic crusade to recover German provinces. It will be seen in a later part of the chapter that many Americans saw in the unanimity with which the German people welcomed a struggle with Denmark to secure Schleswig and Holstein, the best promise of a unified Germany. The *New York Times* said that if the German Confederation allowed the duchies to be incorporated in Denmark, it would be permitting a "secession." Is it any wonder that the *Times* staunchly supported the German cause? In so far as Germany appeared in the light of injured nationality, she received American support.¹ But on the other hand, the German states were regarded as having been aggressive, desirous of robbing Denmark of her territory. They had begun the war and the responsibility rested with them. And this belief in the aggressiveness of Germany was widespread. The *Portland Transcript* said that the small German states were anxious for a war in which they had little to lose. Germany was thought to be greedy for the duchies in order to increase her commercial power and to secure a good seacoast. The *New York Herald* called the claim of the confederation a trumped-up one, "without a shadow of right." Charles Francis Adams, American Minister at London, wrote: "The Germans seem to have made up their minds . . . to gobble up little Denmark. Possibly it may stick in their throats a little."² The Phila-

¹ *New York Tribune*: Jan. 11, Jan. 26, 1864; *New York Times*: Jan. 9, Jan. 28, 1864; *New York World*: Feb. 1, Feb. 2, 1864; *San Francisco Bulletin*: Dec. 20, 1864; *Richmond Enquirer*: April 21, 1864.

² Ford, Worthington C., editor, *A Cycle of Adams Letters, 1861-1865* (Boston, 1920), vol. ii, pp. 128-129; *New York Herald*: Jan. 18, Jan. 27, Feb. 23, Feb. 25, June 17, Aug. 9, 1864; *New York World*: Feb. 2, 1864; *Philadelphia Press*: July 11, Dec. 31, 1864; *Richmond Enquirer*: April 21, 1864; *Portland Transcript*: Jan. 23, 1864, Aug. 19, 1865; *Leslie's Weekly*: April 9, Sept. 3, 1864.

delphia *Press* stated its hostility to the German cause in even less uncertain terms:

We are in favor of nationalities, and so far as this war was an effort of the people to unite all of Germany under one Government, our sympathies were with the Germans. . . . But Germany, proud in her strength, made the war one of aggression. . . . Germany has incurred a degree of odium and dislike that will cling to her for another generation.¹

It is probable that a portion of the hostility to Germany was in reality directed only at Prussia and Austria. If there was any unanimity among the American people in regard to the Danish War, it can be discovered in their opposition to the policy of the great German powers. It was felt by some Americans that Austria and Prussia were the real aggressors in the war, that all might have been settled amicably had they not been determined to wage war in their own behalf. They were regarded as despotic and reactionary in comparison with liberal Denmark. Their intervention was described as "the crusade of despotism against Denmark," and the powers themselves were referred to as "the armed despoilers of Denmark." They were accused of violating the treaty of 1852. That they were regarded as bullies is clear from a remark of Miss Lily Motley's, "It is difficult to see what 'glory' can be obtained when two large and powerful armies like those of Austria and Prussia contrive to obtain advantages over a small country like Denmark."² It was thought that they had not given the Danes a fair chance to retire honorably by making some concessions. Their terms of peace were declared to be harsh, and they were accused of desiring to seize the whole of Denmark. Reference was made to the

¹ Philadelphia *Press*: July 29, 1864.

² John Lothrop Motley and his Family, p. 193; New York *Times*: Oct. 24, Oct. 30, 1864, Sept. 29, 1865; New York *Herald*: Jan. 18, 1864; Philadelphia *Press*: July 11, 1864; Portland *Transcript*: Feb. 27, 1864.

"ill-gotten gains" of Austria and Prussia, and the Philadelphia *Press* spoke of their "rapacity."¹

A most important cause for American hostility to Austria and Prussia was the feeling that those two powers had declared war against Denmark solely in order to prevent the glory of a successful war from redounding to the credit of the nationalistic and liberal party of Germany. They cared little for the independence of the duchies, but they feared greatly the power which might accrue to the German party of democracy and union from a successful war with Denmark. But by beginning the war themselves, they could dictate the terms of peace, could prevent the German democracy from gaining the glory and could still pose as the leaders of the German people. By those Americans who saw in the war an excellent opportunity to achieve German unity, such motives could be regarded only with distrust and opposition. Austria and Prussia were betraying the sacred cause of German unification.²

A still further cause of the marked hostility of Americans toward Prussia was the belief that she was waging war for the sake of territorial aggrandizement. Far from wishing the independence of the duchies, Prussia desired to detach them from Denmark in order to annex them to herself. "Prussia fights for conquest," said *Leslie's Weekly*.³ The

¹ New York *Times*: Oct. 30, Nov. 20, 1864; Philadelphia *Press*: Aug. 31, Dec. 31, 1864; Richmond *Enquirer*: April 21, 1864; New York *World*: July 2, 1864; John Lothrop Motley and his Family, p. 209.

² New York *Tribune*: Dec. 15, 1863, Jan. 11, Jan. 26, Feb. 3, Feb. 6, Feb. 22, March 2, March 16, July 26, Aug. 9, 1864; New York *Times*: Jan. 9, Jan. 16, Jan. 28, Feb. 2, Feb. 5, Feb. 15, March 9, 1864, Sept. 29, 1865; New York *Herald*: Feb. 21, March 10, 1864; New York *World*: Jan. 15, Feb. 2, Feb. 4, 1864; Richmond *Enquirer*: April 21, 1864, Feb. 22, 1866; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Feb. 20, 1864; Portland *Transcript*: Feb. 27, 1864; San Francisco *Bulletin*: Dec. 20, 1864; Harper's *Weekly*: May 14, May 28, 1864; *Nation*: Dec. 7, 1865.

³ *Leslie's Weekly*: April 9, 1864; New York *Tribune*: April 30, June

Duke of Augustenburg was to be used as a tool, and to be discarded as soon as possible. It was pointed out that the duchies would be especially valuable to Prussia because of their excellent seacoast and the fine harbor of Kiel. Prussia had persevered in her schemes for annexation, despite the jealousy of the other great powers, and the unwillingness of the people of the duchies or of Germany to sanction such a plan. At one time it was rumored that Prussia had tried to make a bargain with Denmark according to which Denmark was to retain Schleswig, while Prussia was to annex Holstein and Lauenburg. At another time she was believed to be busy with intrigues to have the provinces handed over to the Duke of Oldenburg instead of to the Duke of Augustenburg. Oldenburg might be induced through gratitude to give Prussia at least a share of the spoils. While the dispute between the two princes was going on, the *Philadelphia Press* remarked:

But there are two claimants for the Duchies. . . . It will be for the Federal Diet of Germany to choose between these two claimants. If the choice be much longer delayed, Prussia may illustrate the fable, by swallowing the oyster herself, and leaving the shells to the pair of Duchy-hunters. Do this Prussia certainly will, if ever she gets a safe chance.¹

And when Prussia purchased Lauenburg, the *Nation* voiced much the same opinions:

8, July 26, Aug. 6, Aug. 17, Aug. 24, Sept. 12, 1864, April 21, July 6, Aug. 25, 1865; *New York Times*: Nov. 20, 1864, June 11, Aug. 24, 1865; *New York World*: July 6, 1864; *Philadelphia Press*: Aug. 31, 1864, May 1, 1865; *Portland Transcript*: Aug. 19, 1865; *Nation*: Oct. 19, Dec. 7, 1865; *Freeman's Journal*: Sept. 30, 1865.

¹ *Philadelphia Press*: Aug. 31, Dec. 31, 1864, May 1, 1865; *New York Tribune*: July 26, Aug. 6, Aug. 17, Sept. 12, 1864, April 21, July 6, Aug. 25, 1865; *New York Times*: Nov. 20, Dec. 20, 1864, June 11, Aug. 24, 1865; *New York World*: Aug. 17, 1864; *Portland Transcript*: Feb. 27, 1864; *Leslie's Weekly*: April 9, 1864; *Nation*: Oct. 19, Dec. 7, 1865; *John Lothrop Motley and his Family*, p. 210.

If there was anybody in Germany who supposed that Prussia acted from any other motive than the promotion of her own interests, . . . all we can say is that there must be some very simple people in that fine country. . . . Prussia has got possession of Lauenburg, but that is merely by way of lunch. She means to dine on the Duchies.¹

In summing up, the Richmond *Enquirer* indicated clearly American opinion of several aspects to the question, and in addition is interesting for expressing the parallel which many Southerners saw in the position of both Danes and Schleswig-Holsteiners to the position of the South in the American Civil War:

There is at this moment a war going on in Europe, which, both in the relative strength of the contending parties and in the principles at stake, bears so striking a resemblance to our own great revolution that it deserves our interest and our sympathy. It is the contest between the little kingdom of Denmark and the German Confederacy. On one side a very small State set upon by a good many States, some of them very big ones, and yet holding stubbornly its own, and with a million and a half, defending itself bravely against forty millions of people that have come to plunder and to murder. On the other hand, two provinces of a monarchy fighting for their national independence, claiming the right of self-government and their own peculiar institutions.²

THE DANISH WAR AND PRUSSIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM

There was still another cause beside those mentioned above for distrust of Prussian motives in the Danish War. Many Americans firmly believed that Prussia had entered the war solely to distract attention from domestic issues. Bismarck and King William, having failed in their efforts to gain

¹ *Nation*: Oct. 19, 1865.

² Richmond *Enquirer*: April 21, 1864.

support of the Prussian legislature through a policy of bullying and coercion, were now trying the old trick of arousing patriotism by means of a foreign war. In such a way might the necessary support of the chambers be won over to the side of the government, and the much-desired cooperation of the Prussian people be gained for the government's large military budgets. The *New York Times* accused Bismarck and King William of attempting to utilize the popular enthusiasm for war so that they "need not make any attempt to conciliate the national representatives." And the *Continental Monthly* expressed the same opinion still more clearly: "Thus, temporarily at least, the popular mind is again diverted from internal politics; and perhaps the Government was moved as much by a desire to effect this diversion as by any other motive."¹ At a later time it was also seen that the triumphant outcome of the war had greatly increased the prestige of Bismarck and his royal master.²

More attention was paid to the constitutional struggle itself in 1864 and 1865 than in previous years, although American sentiment in regard to it did not materially change. The same attacks were made upon King William and his minister, Bismarck, the same sympathy with the Prussian people was felt, the same admiration for the course of the deputies was expressed, the constitution was again declared to be a sham, and the same optimism about the final result was still voiced. The *Nation* described King William as possessing only mediocre ability, with a soul which had no higher ideal than that of a drill-sergeant. The *Philadelphia Press*

¹ *Continental Monthly*: Oct., 1864 (art. by Charles M. Mead, who, according to the editor, had just returned from a year's study in Germany); *New York Tribune*: Feb. 6, 1865; *New York Times*: Jan. 24, 1864; *Philadelphia Press*: May 1, 1865; *Nation*: Dec. 7, 1865.

² *New York Tribune*: Feb. 6, 1865; *New York Times*: Dec. 4, 1864, Feb. 5, 1865.

said, "A straight waistcoat would suit him better than the purple robe of State."¹ He was compared with Charles I of England, and the same end was prophesied for him. His failing health and probable death in the near future were pleasantly anticipated. In some quarters, however, it came to be believed that he personally was in favor of stopping the struggle with his legislature by making some concessions, but that he was being held back from such a laudable desire by his evil genius, Bismarck. The latter was thought to be far more reactionary than his master, and it was said that he stood squarely in the middle of the path to peace, blocking any possible escape through compromise. It is true that he possessed a large amount of genius which might have made him an imposing figure in the eighteenth century, but in the nineteenth he was decidedly out of place. Prussia could not progress so long as he remained at the helm, nor would the liberals of Prussia ever compromise so long as he retained power. By the *Nation* he was described as "the most reckless political gambler ever at the head of the foreign affairs of a great state," and was characterized as a member of the Napoleonic school of statesmen—men who secretly hated democracy, usually opposed it openly, but sometimes used it to further their own ends—men who scrupled at nothing, but who, through their very love of power and lack of conscience, often unwittingly aided movements of progress.²

The Prussian nobility, and the Catholic and Lutheran churches, which were believed to have favored the autocracy, also came in for their share of opprobrium at the hands of American journalists. Attacks were made upon the Prussian government for its militarism and the accompanying

¹ *Philadelphia Press*: July 7, May 1, 1865; *New York Times*: Feb. 5, Feb. 26, Aug. 7, Aug. 18, 1865; *Nation*: Oct. 26, Dec. 7, 1865, Feb. 1, 1866.

² *New York Times*: Dec. 4, Dec. 20, 1864, Feb. 12, 1865; *Philadelphia Press*: May 1, July 7, 1865; *Nation*: Oct. 26, Dec. 7, 1865.

heavy taxation, for its restraints upon the freedom of the press, for its oppression of the minor nationalities within its boundaries, and its frequent miscarriage of justice in favor of the nobility and the privileged. The people of Prussia were sometimes praised for their moderation and patience, and sometimes blamed for their hesitancy in taking decisive action. Those Americans who praised them believed that the attempt of the Prussian government to override and disregard the constitution must eventually fail. The long continued struggle was gradually but surely educating the Prussian people in the theory and practice of political democracy, and was creating a body of liberal voters such as could not be found elsewhere in Europe. The *New York Tribune* said:

Certain it is that the continuance of the conflict promotes the political education of the people; that almost all classes of the people . . . are becoming more and more unanimous in their devotion to liberal principles; and that no country in Europe contains at present so overwhelming a majority of liberal voters as Prussia. If the firm devotion of the immense majority of a people to liberal principles is a guarantee of the ultimate establishment of liberal institutions, Prussia will be among the first countries in Europe in which the principles of true democracy will be triumphant.¹

Those Americans who held such views were undoubtedly in the majority. But on the other hand the Prussians were blamed for a hesitancy which either showed cowardice or proved that they were not so badly off as they pretended to be. As the *New York Times* said:

If they would only suffer in silence we would respect their forbearance; but to proclaim their sense of wrongs so loudly and

¹ *New York Tribune*: Feb. 6, July 6, 1865, Jan. 17, 1866; *New York Times*: Oct. 2, 1864, Feb. 5, Feb. 12, Feb. 26, Aug. 7, Aug. 18, Sept. 27, 1865; *Philadelphia Press*: May 1, July 7, 1865; *Nation*: Oct. 26, Dec. 7, 1865.

so incessantly, without taking effective measures to throw off the oppressor, leads other nations to suspect that, after all, their political grievances are theoretical rather than practical, and that in reality the noise they make is out of all proportion to the harm received.¹

Nor was the *Times* alone in its scepticism, for William H. Seward, Secretary of State, thought the constitutional struggle in Prussia was futile. The view of John L. Motley was very similar: "I believe that Prussia is about as likely to become a republic as the United States to turn into a military monarchy."²

THE DANISH WAR, GERMAN UNIFICATION, AND THE FUTURE

In the two preceding chapters, which covered the period from 1853 to 1863, witnesses have been cited to prove that German unity was regarded in a very favorable light by the great majority of Americans.³ It is also certain that when most Americans thought of a unified Germany, they thought of a liberal, democratic Germany rather than a militaristic, autocratic German Empire such as actually was created through the genius of Bismarck. And there is evidence that American opinion had not greatly changed in 1864. The *Nation* wrote of Germany's "legitimate position as the champion of liberal principles," and the *New York Times* thought that a German union would mean "constitutional government, the restraint of Kings by parliaments, popular suffrage and accountability of Princes to the people in constitutional methods." Similar was the statement of the *San Francisco Bulletin*: "Surely there is no more inviting field than the petty German States for applying the now recognized

¹ *New York Times*: Aug. 7, 1865.

² Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. iii, p. 31; *John Lothrop Motley and his Family*, p. 209 et seq.; Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. ii, pp. 188-189.

³ Cf. *supra*, pp. 100, 101, 115, 116, 147-150.

principle of national unity to the overturning of princes, and the elevation of popular sovereignty.”¹

Mention has already been made in this chapter of the strong hope on the part of many Americans in the early part of 1864 that a war against Denmark on the part of all Germany would provide a powerful impetus toward German unity. Mention has also been made of the fact that perhaps the chief cause for mistrust of the part played by Austria and Prussia was the belief that those powers had entered the war in order to check the rising tide of union throughout Germany.² The war was regarded by many Americans as perfectly justifiable because it was an attempt on the part of the German people to bring back into the fold two provinces in danger of separation. It was a war in support of the sacred principle of nationality. But indirectly such a war might accomplish far more than the mere retention of two petty German provinces within the Confederation. Through such a war a sentiment of unity might be aroused, so strong as to bring appreciably nearer a real consolidation of the various German states. The German people seemed more unanimous in their zeal for the duchies than they had been on any issue since 1848, and it was the liberal leaders who were heading the agitation for a war against Denmark. The *Times* called the popular movement on behalf of the duchies “an instinctive and general uprising of the great German people for the sake of national unity.” The *Tribune* thought that should the German people be able to annex the provinces to Germany, they would have gained an initial victory which would carry them far on their struggle “for the consummation of a Union of all the German States.”³

¹ San Francisco *Bulletin*: Dec. 20, 1864; New York *Times*: Jan. 28, 1864; *Nation*: Oct. 26, 1865.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 158-160.

³ New York *Tribune*: Dec. 15, 1863, Jan. 11, Jan. 16, Jan. 26, March 4,

In the early part of the war it had been hoped that the great German powers, Austria and Prussia, would be unable to derive any advantage from the struggle. The argument was that Austria and Prussia would either be compelled to support a movement begun by the people, or be forced to place themselves in direct opposition to the clearly expressed will of the people. In neither case could the German powers benefit. And when they did seize control of the movement and were able to use it for their own purposes, a wave of indignation spread over the United States. The *Times* was very pessimistic: "Again does the unity, so long hoped for, for which the best thinkers and truest friends of liberty in Germany have so patiently labored, fall to pieces by the hands of the Kings, and the struggle begun for a popular union is, perhaps, ended in a civil war."¹ But such pessimism was by no means permanent. During the negotiations for peace, it was rumored that, in order to prevent her complete humiliation, Denmark had offered to enter the Germanic Confederation. The proposition aroused considerable speculation in the United States. A splendid naval base, Kiel, would be procured for a united Germany which might become the successful rival of Great Britain on the seas. The *Herald* thought that a union between Denmark and Germany might be a signal for the German republicans to overturn the Prussian and Austrian governments and to "form of the Confederation one great and powerful nation." Even after the close of the war some Americans were still hopeful for a union of Germany under liberal auspices. It might not come immediately, but could not long be postponed. The German

July 15, Sept. 12, Nov. 23, 1864; *New York Times*: Jan. 9, Jan. 28, 1864, June 11, 1865; *Richmond Enquirer*: April 21, 1864; *Portland Transcript*: April 23, 1864; *Nation*: Dec. 7, 1865.

¹ *New York Times*: Feb. 5, March 9, 1864; *New York Tribune*: Dec. 15, 1863, Jan. 26, 1864; *Richmond Enquirer*: Feb. 22, 1866.

princes had again destroyed the hopes of the German people, and hence must be driven from their thrones. Their treachery during the war had only increased the hatred for them and could not help strengthening the agitation for a union. The *Tribune* believed that as soon as the Schleswig-Holstein question was definitely settled "the agitation for the establishment of a National Unity of Germany will recommence with greater vigor than ever." The *Herald* claimed that Germany was a land of chronic revolution, and stated that it would not be surprised to see as a result of the Danish War "a total reconstruction of Germany."¹

It is both significant and interesting to note that certain parallels existed in the American mind between the German struggle for unification and the American Civil War to prevent disunion. Such parallels were not clearly expressed and only indirect proof can be offered to show that they were present at all. Reference has been made to the way in which the *New York Times* justified the German war against Denmark, i. e., that the war was merely aimed to prevent a forced "secession" of two German provinces.² Much more important was an attempt on the part of the *Times* to appeal to the German-American vote. The *Times* declared that the American Civil War was a struggle for national unity against the subversive tendencies of states' rights, and a parallel was drawn to German attempts at unification. It was pointed out that the German-Americans knew well the dangers and follies of separate tariffs and customs, of separate armies, taxes and coinage, that therefore they ought to support the North against the South, and particularly that they ought to

¹ *New York Tribune*: July 26, Aug. 2, Aug. 6, Aug. 9, Aug. 24, Sept. 12, Nov. 23, 1864; *New York Times*: Aug. 8, 1864; *New York Herald*: March 10, April 6, July 25, Aug. 9, 1864; *San Francisco Bulletin*: Dec. 20, 1864.

² *New York Times*: Jan. 9, 1864. Cf. *supra*, p. 158.

vote the Republican ticket in the election of 1864. For was not the Republican party the party of unity and the Democratic party the party of disunity? Although the *Times* was making a frank bid for German-American votes on this issue, its appeal was not necessarily insincere, for the widespread conviction among Northerners that the Civil War was fought to maintain national unity made very natural the sympathy with Germany's attempts in a parallel direction. One rather long quotation is justifiable here:

To the German mind, the opposing subjects of "State rights" and "Union" are old and familiar topics. No people, the world over, has had such bitter cause to curse the theory of a loose Confederacy, or to appreciate the value of Union, as the German. Their history is a consistent record of the oppression of small States by large, and popular rights torn away through the division and jealousies of petty communities. . . . Our German fellow-citizens know too well what disunion costs, what burdens it lays on the peasantry, what power it gives to ambitious leaders and oppressive rulers, to wish to incur any danger of it here. For centuries the popular aspiration of the great German people has been against the South Carolina heresy—the independence of the members of a Confederacy—and in favor of the doctrine of our fathers—a Union of the people.¹

But although there still existed some hope in the United States, after the Danish War of 1864, that Germany might be unified under liberal auspices, there was a growing consciousness of the increasing power of Prussia, and almost imperceptibly an ever greater number of Americans became reconciled to the idea of a union of Germany under Prussian auspices. It has been shown in other parts of the present chapter

¹ New York *Times*: Nov. 4, Oct. 19, Nov. 1, 1864. It has also been noted above that some Southerners drew a parallel between themselves and the people of Schleswig-Holstein who were fighting for "national independence." Cf. *supra*, p. 162.

that the course of Prussia in 1864 was exceedingly unpopular in the United States.¹ She was believed to have started the war either to thwart a liberal movement toward German unity, or to silence domestic criticism through a successful foreign war, or to seize valuable territories for her own aggrandizement. It is certain that the people of the United States did not consider any one of the three a good or sufficient cause for war.

But as it became more and more apparent that the aim of Prussia was the annexation of the duchies, the opinion became current in the United States that the swallowing of Schleswig and Holstein was only the first step in a process which would eventually lead to a complete Prussianization of at least North Germany. A Prussian unification began to be talked of, and not always with entire disapproval. Prussia's aggrandizement in the past at the expense of Austria, Poland and Saxony was referred to, in order to show that annexation of the duchies was what might be expected of her. And to the *Tribune*, at least, such a solution of the Schleswig-Holstein question was not so very unsatisfactory. If Prussia did not annex the duchies, they would become an independent state in a confederation whose weakness was the independence of its component parts. What value could be gained from creating an additional state which could only decrease the efficiency of the central German government? Bismarck was thought to be spending his time in digging up old documents which might give Prussia a legal justification for seizing the duchies. It was believed that the Prussian minister-president was intriguing with Napoleon III, relative to an increase in Prussian power in Germany, for which Napoleon might find compensation in Rhenish Prussia. As the *Richmond Enquirer* said: "If Napoleon has found his Count de

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 159-163.

Cavour in Prussia, he is in a fair way of getting his German Savoy, and the Germans are also likely to get the unity of their empire.”¹ Bismarck’s conduct seemed to be directed toward German unification under Prussian auspices, and at the expense of the rights of the smaller states. The *Nation*, which believed that Bismarck’s boldness and lack of scruple had been of great detriment to Prussia’s welfare, stated that German unity could be effected only through Prussian leadership. The *Philadelphia Press* predicted in a remarkable way the advent of the North German Confederation:

Prussia, which is very grasping, wants to form a Protestant empire in North Germany. Between Prussia and Holstein lie portions of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, and the Kingdom of Hanover. All three are Protestant! If Prussia could only annex these two Grand Duchies and the Hanoverian Kingdom, and also the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, she would gain a desirable addition of territory, and, which is not less important, the seaboard which she wants on the North Sea and the Baltic, with a fair chance of becoming a maritime Power.²

It was natural enough to infer from the growth of Prussia a corresponding decrease in the power of the minor states and of the German Confederation. The manner in which Prussia and Austria had openly flouted the Diet of the Confederation in the final disposition of the Danish duchies, was a direct blow in the face to the prestige of the Confederation, and so indirectly to that of the minor German states. Nor were there many tears shed over the loss in prestige on the part of the Diet. The *Nation*, at the same time

¹ *Richmond Enquirer*: Nov. 16, 1865; *New York Tribune*: April 21, 1865; *New York World*: Feb. 2, 1864; *Philadelphia Press*: Aug. 31, 1864, May 1, 1865; *San Francisco Bulletin*: Dec. 26, 1864.

² *Philadelphia Press*: Aug. 31, 1864, May 1, 1865; *Richmond Enquirer*: Nov. 16, 1865; *Nation*: Oct. 26, 1865.

that it condemned the selfishness of Bismarck's policy, rejoiced at its result in so far as it proved the incapacity of the Confederation, and demonstrated that Austria and Prussia were the only possible nuclei for German unity. Earlier in the war John L. Motley had ridiculed the Diet in the following terms:

It is amusing to watch the chaos in the councils at Frankfort. The Diet is at its last gasp. . . . The Bund means mischief, and wriggles about, full of the most insane excitement, to the thirty-fourth joint of its tail, but can do no harm to any one. Decidedly the poor old Bund is moribund.¹

From the very beginning of the Danish trouble, some Americans feared that it might broaden out into a general European war, involving the possible interference of Russia, France or Great Britain. At the close of the war, the *Press* voiced the opinion that the ever-troublesome question was not settled, but might lead to a further struggle between the victors, and in 1865 this idea became more and more general. Austria was not credited with having entered the war because of disinterested love for the Schleswig-Holsteiners, and her very natural resentment toward the ambitious designs of Bismarck was noted. It was even suggested that her interests might lead her to espouse the cause of the minor states at the same time that she was thwarting Prussia. The rivalry between the two powers was frequently alluded to, and war seemed imminent in the summer of 1865. The *Times* claimed that Austria and Prussia were "jealous of each other," and that the smaller German states were "disgusted with both." Very similar was the remark of the *Portland Transcript*: "Austria and Prussia, having robbed Denmark

¹ Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. iii, p. 12; *New York Tribune*: Aug. 25, 1865; *New York Times*: Aug. 24, 1865; *Richmond Enquirer*: Nov. 16, Dec. 28, 1865; *Nation*: Oct. 19, Dec. 7, Dec. 28, 1865.

of the Duchies, have now fallen together by the ears over the spoil." ¹ After the Convention of Gastein was made, it became apparent that the threatened war had been averted for the time, although the treaty was regarded as neither satisfactory nor permanent. The *Freeman's Journal* thought that Austria had been cheated by Prussia and wrote: "Austria is a gentleman—Prussia a *black-guard*. When a gentleman associates with a black-guard, he *ought* to pay the scot!" ² But although Americans saw the imminent possibility of a war between the two great German powers as a result of their inability satisfactorily to dispose of the Danish duchies, they do not seem to have suspected that Bismarck had used the Schleswig-Holstein matter from the first as a pretext for picking a quarrel with Austria.

¹ *Portland Transcript*: Aug. 19, 1865, Jan. 2, March 5, 1864; *New York Tribune*: Aug. 25, 1865; *New York Times*: June 11, Aug. 18, Sept. 27, 1865; *New York World*: Aug. 17, 1864; *Philadelphia Press*: May 1, Aug. 31, 1865; *Nation*: July 27, Oct. 19, Dec. 7, 1865.

² *Freeman's Journal*: Sept. 30, 1865; *New York Times*: Aug. 24, 1865; *Nation*: Oct. 19, Dec. 7, 1865.

CHAPTER VI

THE AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN WAR OF 1866 AND THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION

IN the spring of 1866 it became very evident that the Danish War had not settled finally the ever troublesome question of Schleswig and Holstein. The encouragement given by the Austrian government to the Duke of Augustenburg fell in admirably with Bismarck's plans to find a pretext for deciding once and for all the long-standing rivalry between Prussia and Austria for the supremacy in German affairs. After several months of acrid diplomatic correspondence, war broke out in June, 1866, between the two great German powers, Prussia, which was supported by Italy, and Austria, to whose cause most of the minor German states adhered. In an almost unbelievably short time the admirably trained and equipped Prussian armies had overrun those German states which had backed Austria, and had brought the empire of the Habsburgs to its knees. In the resulting treaty of Prague, Austria was forced to lose Venetia, to consent to the dissolution of the German Confederation and to withdraw entirely from German affairs. Although she was not compelled to cede any territory to Prussia, the latter was amply compensated by the annexation of the Danish duchies, of Hanover, Nassau, Hesse-Cassel and Frankfort-on-Main. Shortly afterwards there was founded the North German Confederation, a federal union of the German states north of the Main, strongly centralized under Prussian leadership.

It is clear that the above mentioned events were by far the

most important in German history from the time of the revolutions of 1848 to the Franco-German War and the formation of the German Empire. Since the war of 1866 settled the rivalry between Austria and Prussia, and since one of its results was the formation of the North German Confederation which was a real, though partial, German union under Prussian auspices, it is necessary to analyse American opinion of these momentous events. It is proposed first to see what notice was taken of the diplomatic correspondence which led up to the war, and to study the American reaction toward it. What did the American people believe to be the causes of the war? What power was held responsible for its outbreak? In the second place, an examination of American opinion during the war must be undertaken. To which side did the American people lean, and for what reasons? Were they pleased or disappointed with its results? Thirdly, the American attitude toward the North German Confederation must be noted. Was it regarded as a step in the direction of German unification? Was its constitution considered liberal or the reverse? What was the American sentiment toward the chief problems which arose after its establishment; specifically its policy toward the conquered provinces, and its relations with the South German states?

It will be noticed throughout the chapter that there existed a large amount of muddled and inconsistent thinking about Germany during the period under review. At no time from 1848 to 1870 did Americans possess less logical and clear-cut ideas than in 1866 and in 1867. As a matter of fact events in Germany were confusing. Things happened with startling rapidity, indeed with so much rapidity that American observers were unable to interpret them intelligently. Moreover there were conflicting notions in American minds which prevented clear thinking. There were two Germanies, a militaristic, aggressive, despotic Germany, and an intelligent,

educated, liberal Germany. And these two conceptions of Germany became hopelessly confused when the attempt was made to create a united Germany, an attempt with which nearly all Americans warmly sympathized.

THE CAUSES OF THE AUSTRO-PRUSSIAN WAR OF 1866

In a discussion of the causes of any war, the historical student usually makes a distinction between those which are fundamental and underlying and those which are immediate and directly lead up to the outbreak of hostilities. The distinction, at any rate, is convenient for purposes of organization. In the spring of 1866 Americans who watched international events were able to see clearly the approach of a war between Prussia and Austria. It is interesting to note how they interpreted the series of diplomatic exchanges between the two German powers, to see what they regarded as the issues involved. At least five separate interpretations can be distinguished from the mass of editorial comment in the American press. (1) The war was merely a quarrel between two robber nations over the booty which they had obtained from an unjust conquest. (2) The war was caused by the unscrupulous ambition of Bismarck working for territorial aggrandizement in strict harmony with the settled traditions of the Prussian monarchy. (3) The war was an episode in the century-long struggle of the two rival powers for German hegemony. (4) The war was an attempt to reorganize Germany, to abolish the old German Confederation, and to erect some more durable union, a union which should be in closer accord with the wishes of the German people. (5) The war was part of a scheme of Napoleon III designed to tear up the treaties of 1815, and to make a new map for Central Europe. Such were believed to be causes, or explanations, of the war of 1866. Of course they overlap, and in the editorials from which they have been extracted, they fre-

quently appear in rather hopeless confusion. Oftentimes several issues can be seen in the same editorial, and each paper changes its interpretation from time to time during the period under review. But the fact of their close connection makes it none the less true that the five separate though related notions were then floating in the mind of the American public. In addition there were varying opinions as to the occasion for the war. Which power was most directly responsible for the appeal to arms?

The most common explanation of the struggle was that Prussia and Austria were fighting like common robbers over the spoil which they had gained in their unrighteous war with Denmark. Time and again the editorials went back to the war of 1864, and, tracing the events of the last two years, showed how the cession of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein had been a constant bone of contention. The dismemberment of Denmark was considered just as iniquitous as the partition of Poland. Joy was expressed at the retributive justice which was thus making the duchies a curse to both robbers. The *New York Herald* expressed the general feeling in a striking manner when it said, "Austria and Prussia should be indicted at common law for burglary in the first degree."¹ The *Cincinnati Gazette* said, "Prussia and Austria, having dismembered Denmark, are now quarreling over the stolen booty."² The inconsistency of the two powers was pointed out, how they had made war against Denmark

¹ *New York Herald*: April 25, July 8, 1866.

² *Cincinnati Gazette*: April 12, April 16, April 19, 1866; *New York Herald*: March 10, May 23, July 8, 1866; *New York Times*: March 25, 1866; *New York World*: May 15, 1866; *Philadelphia Press*: April 15, April 28, 1866; *Richmond Enquirer*: May 25, 1866; *San Francisco Bulletin*: May 16, June 30, 1866; *Nation*: March 8, May 25, June 15, 1866; *Portland Transcript*: April 7, May 26, 1866; *Harper's Weekly*: July 14, 1866; *Irish American*: April 21, 1866; Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. iii, p. 96 *et seq.*

presumably to aid the Duke of Augustenburg and the German Confederation in securing the Danish provinces, and then when attempts were made to incorporate the duchies into the Confederation or to hand them over to the Duke of Augustenburg, had justified their refusal by saying that the provinces had belonged to Denmark in the first place and that she had ceded them to Austria and Prussia, and not to the Duke or the Confederation.

There can be no doubt that Prussia, under the able but unscrupulous leadership of Bismarck, was regarded by most Americans as the aggressor in the struggle. The willingness of Austria to compromise, to allow the inhabitants of the duchies to choose their own form of government, was referred to with praise. Austrian "patience and forbearance" were admitted by Mrs. John Lothrop Motley and in general Austria was thought to be willing to make peace on almost any terms. The friendliness of the minor German states toward Austria was taken to be evidence of their belief in her pacific intentions.¹ But it was clear that Prussia was eager for a fight. Her policy was repeatedly described as insolent and arrogant. It was believed that Prussia could easily have compromised, had there been the slightest desire to do so on the part of her government. She was thought to be bent on her traditional policy of unscrupulous aggrandizement, and was considered desirous of obtaining, not only her own share of the booty from the Danish War, but both provinces in their entirety. The *New York Herald* said that Prussia, having swallowed Schleswig-Holstein, was suffer-

¹ *New York Herald*: March 29, April 17, 1866; *New York Tribune*: May 1, May 14, May 17, May 23, 1866; *New York Times*: June 8, June 19, June 28, 1866; *New York World*: April 3, 1866; *Savannah Republican*: July 9, 1866; *Nation*: May 4, May 25, 1866; *Harper's Weekly*: July 14, 1866; *Freeman's Journal*: June 2, June 30, 1866; *Southern Review*: Jan., 1869; *John Lothrop Motley and his Family*, p. 249; *Motley, Correspondence*, vol. iii, p. 96 *et seq.*

ing from indigestion, and the *Cincinnati Gazette* accused her of having already treated the Danish duchies as conquered provinces. It was remarked that honor usually existed among thieves, but that Prussia was an exception, and it was predicted by the *Philadelphia Press* that Austria would probably be defeated in case of war since she was the less base and unscrupulous of the two robbers. The *Savannah Republican* condemned Prussia severely because she had "acted without reason and regardless of *right*, madly, passionately, unscrupulously appealed to *might*." The *Freeman's Journal* called Prussia a "prowling, stealing wolf," and claimed that she owed her origin to "perjury, perfidy, and plunder of the goods of others." Opinion was divided concerning King William's desire for war, but an almost unanimous belief existed that Bismarck was the moving spirit in the proposed aggression. "Bold" and "unscrupulous" were the most common adjectives applied to the renowned minister-president. The *New York Tribune* spoke of the "almost unparalleled insolence" of Bismarck's attitude, and the *New York World* thought that the moral reprobation of humanity would be insufficient to deter a man of Bismarck's character from making an unjust war. The *Nation* went so far as to say that war could only be averted by the death of either King William or Bismarck. In the early part of 1870, Samuel S. Conant, managing editor of *Harper's Magazine*, looking back at this war, called it "unquestionably the work of Bismarck alone."¹

¹ *New York Herald*: Feb. 2, March 8, March 21, April 21, July 13, 1866; *New York Times*: March 25, April 4, April 8, April 25, April 28, May 3, May 31, June 26, Sept. 16, 1866, July 7, 1869; *New York Tribune*: April 4, April 26, May 8, May 23, June 28, 1866; *New York World*: April 3, April 30, May 15, May 23, June 11, 1866; *Philadelphia Press*: April 15, April 28, 1866; *Richmond Enquirer*: March 22, 1866; *Cincinnati Gazette*: April 16, April 19, May 26, June 1, June 8, 1866; *San Francisco Bulletin*: July 7, 1866; *Detroit Free Press*: July 19, 1866; *Savannah Republican*: July 9, 1866; *Nation*: March 8, May 25, June 12, 1866; *Portland Tran-*

But although Prussia was generally held to be the aggressor, American sentiment was not at all unanimous in believing that she was interested primarily in the annexation of the Danish duchies. There was something more at stake than the duchies themselves, valuable as they might be in providing Prussia with a seacoast and in rendering her consequently a potential maritime power. Many newspapers, among them the *New York Tribune*, *New York Times*, *Cincinnati Gazette* and *Harper's Weekly*, saw that the duchies were only a pretext for Prussia's aggression, and that she was really interested in humiliating her rival for German supremacy. The *New York Times* traced the feud between the two powers back to Frederick the Great, and dwelt on the way in which Prussia had been humbled by Austria at Olmütz. To be the predominant power in Germany was Prussia's dream. It followed as a corollary that Austria must be humiliated and humiliated so effectually that Prussia's place as arbiter in German affairs would be settled once and for all. Prussia's desire was to make Austria a third-rate power, Austria's aim to put Prussia back in the same class with Bavaria and Saxony.¹

It was clear to many Americans that in case Prussia was successful over her rival, some far-reaching change in the political organization of Germany would accompany Austria's humiliation. The affair of the duchies was believed to have impaired greatly the prestige of the Germanic Confederation, and it was generally prophesied that a Prussian victory over

script: April 7, June 2, 1866; *Freeman's Journal*: June 2, June 30, July 7, 1866; *Irish American*: April 21, 1866; *Southern Review*: Jan., 1869; *Harper's Magazine*: April, 1870; *John Lothrop Motley and his Family*, p. 249 *et seq.*; Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. iii, p. 96 *et seq.*

¹ *New York Herald*: Jan. 2, April 21, 1866; *New York Tribune*: April 4, April 12, June 28, 1866; *New York Times*: April 28, May 18, June 6, June 24, June 26, July 6, 1866; *New York World*: April 3, May 23, 1866; *Cincinnati Gazette*: April 16, June 1, 1866; *San Francisco Bulletin*: May 26, June 30, 1866; *Harper's Weekly*: June 9, June 30, July 14, 1866.

Austria would most certainly mean the complete dissolution of the Diet. There was little regret felt for the probable fate of the Confederation, but since it was the legal representative of the German people, some fear was expressed that the prestige of Germany as a whole might greatly suffer. But the large majority of Americans saw that Prussia would undoubtedly create some new kind of union under her leadership to take the place of the discarded confederation. In fact it was often claimed that Prussia had precipitated trouble with Austria not primarily to secure the duchies, or to gain a hypothetical supremacy in German affairs, but rather to destroy the Confederation of which Austria was the defender, and to substitute in its place a strongly centralized German union under strictly Prussian auspices. Bismarck was said by the *New York World* to be attempting to make himself the Prussian Cavour. In short most Americans were able to see that the problem of German unity was closely connected with the affair of the Danish duchies. The *New York Herald* said that it was of little consequence who held the duchies, but that their chief importance lay in their intimate relation to the question of German union.¹

Varied was the sentiment in regard to the value of the creation of a unified Germany under Prussian auspices, which was thought of by some as including all of Germany except Austria, by others as the German states north of the Main, and by still others as the states which composed the Zollverein. Not that there was any lack of sympathy with the idea of German unity in itself, which the *New York Herald* called "the grand, rational idea of German politics." The same paper commended the desire of young Germany to

¹ *New York Herald*: March 21, May 8, May 28, 1866; *New York Tribune*: April 4, April 25, June 13, June 25, Aug. 27, 1866; *New York Times*: March 25, April 8, May 18, July 6, 1866; *New York World*: April 30, June 18, July 2, July 14, 1866; *Cincinnati Gazette*: April 19, June 1, July 23, 1866; *Nation*: March 8, June 26, 1866; *Harper's Weekly*: June 9, 1866; *Freeman's Journal*: June 30, 1866.

"write that German poem in the books of the law." But not all Americans were so sure that the creation of a German union under Prussian auspices would be a proper cause for popular rejoicing. On the one hand, it was pointed out by the *Herald* that Prussia was a purely German state, while Austria was not, and that consequently Bismarck possessed an excellent opportunity to make Prussia great by identifying her with the cause of German unity. The *New York Tribune* also felt that with each annexation of territory by the Prussian government, it must become clearer that Prussia was the only German state which could possibly effect a national union, and expressed its belief that the consolidation of Germany under Prussian leadership would proceed rapidly. But somewhat later the *Tribune* spoke with scorn of "the supposed mission of Prussia to swallow up the small states of Northern and Central Germany." The *New York Times* admitted that the idea of a Prussian union was attractive, but pointed out that Bismarck's plans to effect such a union smacked strongly of spoliation. Again the *Times* accused Bismarck of possessing no German patriotism, and of having as his sole aim the feeding of Prussia on Germany, and the absorption of the German states until the name Germany should become synonymous with that of Prussia. The *Cincinnati Gazette* took much the same view. The small states had the choice of joining Prussia voluntarily or of being devoured by Prussia. In neither case could the people of Germany benefit. However at a later time the *Gazette* was hopeful that the war might yet be turned to the advantage of the German people, and that thus the dynastic interests which had made the conflict might be foiled. The *New York Herald* and the *New York World* accused Bismarck of being willing to shed German blood and to precipitate a second Thirty Years' War in order to achieve a Prussian union.¹

¹ *New York Herald*: March 21, May 8, May 28, 1866; *New York Tribune*: April 4, May 17, 1866; *New York Times*: March 25, April 4.

Since France had had her finger in nearly every European complication since Napoleon III had become her emperor, it was only natural that almost every American newspaper credited him with being mixed up in the quarrel between Austria and Prussia. He was believed to be watching carefully the progress of events in Germany, and to be awaiting his opportunity to seize the left bank of the Rhine and perhaps Belgium. He was thought to be in alliance with Prussia and Italy, and Bismarck was often referred to as his tool. Prussia was intent on the duchies and Italy on Venetia; both were willing that France should be compensated for her benevolent neutrality. Some American papers, notably the *San Francisco Bulletin*, went further and claimed that the whole quarrel was merely the outcome of a Napoleonic plot to destroy the European map made at Vienna in 1815. Austria was thought to be a party to the scheme and was to be compensated for her losses in Italy and Germany by territory in the Ottoman Empire. When Napoleon III attempted to convoke a European congress to deal with the question, it was quite commonly believed that such a compromise, favorable to all parties, would be effected.¹

It must be quite clear that, in the period preceding the May 31, 1866; *New York World*: April 30, 1866; *Cincinnati Gazette*: April 19, May 26, June 12, 1866; *Richmond Enquirer*: Feb. 22, 1866; *Portland Transcript*: June 23, 1866; *Nation*: March 8, June 26, 1866. However, the *Freeman's Journal* was distinctly hostile to the idea of German unity. Cf. June 2, June 30, 1866.

¹ *New York Herald*: Jan. 14, April 17, April 21, April 28, May 24, June 4, June 5, June 6, June 29, July 8, July 10, 1866; *New York Tribune*: April 12, May 23, 1866; *New York Times*: March 22, March 25, May 18, June 5, June 30, 1866; *New York World*: May 23, May 28, June 18, 1866; *Philadelphia Press*: April 28, 1866; *Cincinnati Gazette*: April 12, May 26, 1866; *San Francisco Bulletin*: May 26, June 18, 1866; *Detroit Free Press*: July 19, 1866; *Nation*: May 25, June 15, 1866; *Portland Transcript*: May 26, 1866; *Harper's Weekly*: June 30, July 14, 1866; *Freeman's Journal*: June 2, 1866; *Irish American*: April 21, 1866; Bigelow, *Retro-spections*, vol. iii, p. 458 *et seq.*

declaration of war, the majority of American newspapers placed the ultimate responsibility upon the Prussian government and particularly upon her prime minister, Bismarck. But there was no unanimity among Americans as to which nation was to blame for the outbreak of hostilities. In many cases where Prussia was declared to be the aggressor, it is difficult to tell whether the writer meant that Prussia had created the tension which led to war, or whether she had committed certain overt acts which constituted the immediate occasion for the conflict. It was seldom, probably, that any such distinction was clear in the author's mind. However, the *New York Tribune* attacked Prussia for being unwilling to demobilize unless Austria would completely disarm even on her Italian border where trouble was constantly threatening. The *Nation* likewise felt that Prussia was the immediate aggressor when she invaded Holstein, and said, "Prussia, true to her whole line of behavior hitherto, has taken the first step towards a collision."¹ The *New York Herald* declared that Prussia had assumed a grave responsibility when she opposed herself to the united will of the German Confederation and joined herself to a non-German power to accomplish her purpose. But it is just as easy to point to statements in the American press that France was the power most to blame for the war. Both the *New York Herald* and *New York Tribune* said that war might have been averted if Prussia and Austria had been left to make a compromise, but that France was insistent upon war. The *New York World* felt that Napoleon had set his mind upon war, and that his decision was a larger factor in the situation than the original quarrel between Prussia and Austria. The *Cincinnati Gazette* accused Napoleon of having planned a greater aggrandizement than either Prussia or Italy, and the *San Francisco Bulletin* said that France was at the bottom of the difficulty, and that the decision as to war or peace rested with

¹ *Nation*: June 22, 1866; *New York Tribune*: April 26, May 8, 1866.

Napoleon. Not even Italy escaped from sharing the blame for precipitating the struggle. Her desire for aggression was repeatedly referred to. The *New York Tribune* said that a conflict was inevitable because Prussia and Italy desired war more than Austria desired peace. The *New York Times* thought that the final responsibility must rest with Italy because of her refusal to compromise on the question of Venetia.¹

But what of Austria? Mention has already been made of the fact that she was quite generally regarded as being opposed to the war, and as being non-aggressive in character. The *Portland Transcript* had hoped that she might voluntarily grant Venetia to Italy and thus put a check to Prussian arrogance. And yet, for a few days at least, she bore the brunt of the criticism for having actually taken the step which made war unavoidable. For a time there was considerable hope that a European conference convoked under French auspices might be able to avert war. But when Austria refused to attend such a conference unless she should be assured that the status of Venetia would in no way be changed, the hopes faded into thin air. The *New York Times*, the *New York Tribune*, the *New York World* and the *Portland Transcript* all said that Austria's obstinacy had made her the aggressor. The *Portland Transcript* regretted that Austria had put herself in the wrong and had given to Prussia an undeserved advantage. Very similar was the comment of the *World*: "No matter from what quarter the first gun of the war may now be heard, Austria stands accused before the conscience of Europe of precipitating the final catastrophe."²

¹ *New York Herald*: May 23, June 1, June 4, June 5, June 27, 1866; *New York Tribune*: May 17, May 23, 1866; *New York Times*: June 19, 1866; *New York World*: May 28, 1866; *Cincinnati Gazette*: June 8, June 15, 1866; *San Francisco Bulletin*: June 13, 1866.

² *New York World*: June 18, June 11, 1866; *New York Tribune*: June 18, 1866; *New York Times*: June 17, 1866; *Portland Transcript*: June 2, June 23, 1866.

Later the *Times* changed its opinion and joined with the New York *Herald* in exonerating Austria. Both papers held that the conference would have failed anyway, that it had definitely planned to deprive Austria of Venetia, and that she could hardly be blamed for refusing to take the position of "the sheep to be sacrificed to the council of wolves." The *Times* said, "Austria will indeed have responsibility to bear, but at least it must be shared to the fullest extent by Prussia."¹ Only the *Nation* seems to have taken a philosophical view of the causes of the war. Not Prussian greed or Austrian obstinacy was to blame, but the fact that Central Europe was not organized politically on the principle of nationality. Until such an organization was accomplished, all peace conferences must fail.²

AMERICAN SENTIMENT DURING THE WAR OF 1866

It has been noted above that the American newspapers devoted a large amount of space in their editorial columns to the events leading up to the war of 1866. All during the war and the following months they continued to print large quantities of news and many editorials on the events of the war and its momentous results. And yet it is true that the war of 1866 did not rivet American attention as the war of 1870 was to do, nor did it engross American thought as the revolutions of 1848 had done. It is easy to see why it failed to hold the center of the stage as did the Franco-German War or the revolutions of 1848. In the first place, it did not affect the American people directly. They had little to win or lose, regardless of whether Austria or Prussia was victorious. Neither party to the war had influenced the course of American national history as had England, France or

¹ New York *Times*: June 18, June 8, 1866; New York *Herald*: June 17, 1866.

² *Nation*: June 19, 1866.

Spain. The war indeed could not be used even to appeal to certain classes of the foreign-born voters. In the second place, the American people saw no idealistic issues in the war, nothing to arouse chivalric devotion. There was no tyrannical ruler to be overthrown, except in the case of Venetia. The political institutions of neither Prussia nor Austria could be said to resemble those of the United States. The war could not possibly be interpreted as a struggle between autocracy and democracy, or between republicanism and monarchy. It will be found that in the later part of the war and after the peace treaty had been signed, Americans began to see the war as the struggle of Prussia to achieve political unity for Germany. That was something about which they could and did become enthusiastic.

It is true that the conflict did not vitally affect American interests, either economic or political, but yet there was some speculation concerning the probable effect of the war upon American business conditions. Some papers felt optimistic, others pessimistic. Bigelow and Seward seem to have thought that the war would create a large demand for American securities in Europe. Most foreign securities would drop in value, whereas American bonds would be comparatively stable. Hence the demand. The *New York Herald* was uniformly optimistic, often in a rather callous manner. It felt that American securities would rise higher than ever, that a large amount of European capital would seek investment in the United States, and that the tide of European emigration would rise. It predicted that, should the war last five years, the American merchant marine would be equal to that of all Europe combined, and said, when predicting war as almost certain: "Upon this or any other result Americans may look with complacency, for our troubles are over and we shall certainly be benefitted by those in Europe."¹ At first

¹ *New York Herald*: June 19, May 28, June 4, June 20, July 11, 1866.

the New York *Times* was rather pessimistic; the war would create a tendency toward hoarding in Europe, patriotic Germans would seek to dispose of American securities in order to invest their savings in German bonds, and consequently large quantities of American securities would be thrown upon the market and would therefore decrease in value. Also it thought that immigration would largely cease. But later on the *Times* was more optimistic. The war might cause some temporary damage to American securities, but the warring nations would need American cotton and breadstuffs. Americans might be able to sell large quantities of machinery and even ammunition to the hostile nations. And sooner or later Europe would begin to demand safe securities and would then turn to American bonds which would soar in value. Early in August the *Times* said that its predictions had been verified, that bonds had appreciated in value, and that there had been large demands for American supplies. But the New York *World* was completely pessimistic. The war would destroy a commerce only second to that with England and France. German money would be withdrawn from the American market and securities would decrease in value. The occasion offered to the *World* another point of attack against Secretary Seward: "Its immediate effects will hardly be of the rosy character so benignantly anticipated for us by Secretary Seward."¹

Before describing American sympathies in the early part of the war previous to the battle of Sadowa, it will be interesting to note how the American people regarded the chances of the two opposing forces. Certain it is that the overwhelming and rapid victories of Prussia came as a great surprise to most Americans, not that they expected Austrian success, but that they considered the contestants as almost equal in

¹ New York *World*: June 19, 1866; New York *Times*: March 22, June 18, June 21, Aug. 2, 1866; Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. iii, p. 414.

strength. Probably most Americans considered Prussia and Italy as stronger than Austria and the minor German states, but only slightly stronger, and hardly capable of winning such a complete triumph in such a short time. Austria was quite generally considered to possess many elements of weakness which went far to explain her pacific temper. True, she had a greater potential man-power, but this apparent strength was more than offset by the lack of homogeneity in her population. It was asserted that her people would not unitedly support war. The *Richmond Enquirer* said that she was so embarrassed by her relations with Hungary as to be unable to go to war and would "probably eat humble pie." It was pointed out that Austria was not a purely German state and could never hope to be a rallying point for German unity. Above all, her financial condition was chaotic. A state would be mad to make war when she was sinking deeper and deeper into bankruptcy. The *New York Times* stated that Austria was comparatively weaker than she had been in the Seven Years' War.¹

On the other hand, Prussia was thought to possess certain elements of positive strength. Her administrative efficiency was contrasted with Austrian chaos. Her treasury was believed to be in a sound condition. She was the leading German state around which German patriots would naturally gather as a nucleus for German union. Her army was the embodiment of efficiency. The *New York Times* said that Prussia had a "perfect military organization," and the *Nation* remarked: "There is probably no army in the world

¹ *New York Herald*: Feb. 2, March 21, June 6, 1866; *New York Tribune*: April 4, May 14, May 23, 1866; *New York Times*: March 27, May 13, May 19, June 8, June 24, June 26, June 28, July 15, July 17, 1866; *Philadelphia Press*: April 15, July 7, 1866; *Richmond Enquirer*: March 22, 1866; *San Francisco Bulletin*: May 16, 1866; *Nation*: May 4, June 26, 1866; *Harper's Weekly*: June 9, 1866; *John Lothrop Motley and his Family*, p. 249 *et seq.*

. . . which can show in its ranks so many educated and intelligent men; and no army which has a more intelligent or better educated people to draw upon for recruits.”¹ And the American people did not change their opinion when they saw that military machine in action. They frankly admired the boldness, the rapidity and the efficiency with which Prussia conducted the campaigns of 1866.

Some people in the United States thought that Prussia possessed a decided advantage in the person of her chief minister, Bismarck. The *Times* felt that he expressed the desire of the Prussian people to match their strength with Austria, and was eulogistic in his praise: “Such a man may be the high priest of tyranny and illiberalism, but he is a statesman such as Germany has not seen for a generation.”² It is probable, however, that most Americans thought of Bismarck as a liability to Prussia rather than an asset. The Prussian people might be ready enough to try conclusions with Austria, to destroy the Bund, to set themselves up as a rallying point for German unity, but they were thought to hate Bismarck more than they did Austria or the Bund. Even the *Times* admitted that Bismarck was chiefly regarded by his countrymen as the tamer of the Prussian parliament. The common American opinion of Bismarck was well expressed by the *Nation* when it described him as “a statesman whose whole career has been an unbroken series of flagrant encroachments upon constitutional rights and popular freedom.” The *New York Herald* said that Bismarck behaved as if he were in the sixteenth rather than in the nineteenth century, and the *Philadelphia Press* said that King William

¹ *Nation*: June 26, 1866; *New York Herald*: March 21, 1866; *New York Tribune*: April 4, April 25, April 26, June 28, July 31, Aug. 27, 1866; *New York Times*: April 28, May 13, July 15, July 24, 1866; *New York World*: April 30, July 3, 1866; *Philadelphia Press*: July 7, 1866; *Catholic World*: Nov., 1866.

² *New York Times*: May 3, April 28, June 26, 1866.

believed "that he reigns as a sort of viceregent of the Almighty." Some Americans were convinced that Bismarck and his master were so unpopular in Prussia that a war against Austria would not have the support of the Prussian people. The New York *Herald*, New York *Tribune*, New York *World*, the *Nation*, the Cincinnati *Gazette* and *Harper's Weekly* all felt the same way. The Prussian people might possess a better army and a sounder treasury than the Austrians, but they were fatally divided over the constitutional struggle at home. The New York *World* said that Bismarck was trying at the same time to be a Richelieu and a Cavour. His failure in the rôle of Richelieu would make it impossible for him to be a successful Cavour. He was accused of desiring war to divert popular attention from domestic grievances. The common belief in the United States was that the Prussian people did not want war so long as Bismarck was at the head of their government. His refusal to grant them constitutional liberties made him impossible as a popular leader in the sacred cause of unity. The *Tribune* prophesied that in case Bismarck made war, thousands of young Germans, including Prussians, would enlist as volunteers in the ranks of the enemy. It was possible that the revolutionary elements in Germany might aid Prussia, but it was just as probable that they might overturn the Prussian monarchy. The Philadelphia *Press* made the additional point that in case of war the Prussian government would find it impossible to raise an international loan until such a loan should have been sanctioned by the Prussian parliament.¹

¹ *Ibid.*, March 25, May 3, May 31, June 28, July 6, 1866; New York *Herald*: Feb. 2, March 10, March 13, March 21, May 28, 1866; New York *Tribune*: Jan. 17, April 25, April 26, May 1, May 2, May 17, May 23, May 28, June 28, 1866; New York *World*: April 30, 1866; Philadelphia *Press*: April 15, 1866; Cincinnati *Gazette*: June 15, 1866; Richmond *Enquirer*: Feb. 22, 1866; *Nation*: March 1, March 15, May 4, June 26, 1866; *Harper's Weekly*: June 19, 1866; Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. iii, pp. 395-396.

In discussing American sympathies during the early part of the war of 1866, before the battle of Sadowa, it is necessary to keep in mind those opinions already analyzed, namely that Prussia was generally considered the aggressor, although Austria received some condemnation for precipitating the conflict. In the early part of the war it is probable that most Americans were indifferent to the outcome of the struggle, except in so far as they ardently desired that Venetia should be freed from Austrian rule. The *New York Times*, the *Cincinnati Gazette*, the *Savannah Republican* and *Harper's Weekly* expressed the feeling that Prussia was the aggressor and hence deserved less sympathy. The *New York Herald* said that Austria had the advantage of moderation, the *Times* held that she had been legally in the right, and the *Cincinnati Gazette* declared that she was defending the sanctity of treaties. But in general as between Austria and Prussia American opinion was pretty neutral. The *Cincinnati Gazette* said, "There is nothing to enlist any strong American feeling on either side in this threatened war as it now stands."¹ Very similar was the remark of the *New York World*: "With regard to this war, there is but one feeling in this country. . . . The whipping of Prussia by Austria, or Austria by Prussia, is a matter to us of profound indifference, as in neither case can we see any advantage to humanity."² Somewhat later the *Richmond Enquirer* said that the war had involved no friends of the United States, and expressed its sentiments thus: "We had no service to remember, no sympathy to reciprocate, no partiality to excite our solicitude."³

¹ *Cincinnati Gazette*: April 19, July 3, 1866; *New York Herald*: June 27, 1866; *New York Tribune*: June 25, June 28, 1866; *New York Times*: April 25, May 31, June 28, July 5, 1866; *Savannah Republican*: July 9, July 27, 1866; *Portland Transcript*: May 26, 1866; *Harper's Weekly*: July 14, 1866; *John Lothrop Motley and his Family*, p. 257 et seq.

² *New York World*: June 23, 1866.

³ *Richmond Enquirer*: Aug. 9, 1866.

Probably the *Times* and *Harper's Weekly* were slightly favorable to Austria, and at least one American, Asa Gray, was bitter in his denunciation of Prussia, although his feeling was not the result of love for Austria, but rather of sympathy for Denmark. He said: "I wish, but do not expect, Prussia to be crushed as one result. I wish all her coast could be annexed to Denmark!"¹ On the other hand the *Herald* showed itself quite favorable to Prussia because she represented progress as compared to Austria. The contrast between the two powers was clearly drawn by the *Herald* in the following:

Prussia today . . . is the type of modern progression, as far as Europe comprehends that term; while Austria is the embodiment of the old feudal idea, time-worn, church-ridden and almost effete. Prussia . . . is the great vital Power of Germany. Austria is the dry bones of German civilization.²

But if American feeling was generally indifferent in respect to the outcome of the war as between Austria and Prussia, it was ardently in sympathy with the Italian desire to annex Venetia. The New York *Tribune*, New York *World*, New York *Times*, Portland *Transcript*, Savannah *Republican*, *Harper's Weekly* and the San Francisco *Bulletin*, all expressed themselves warmly in favor of Italy. Most of the hostility against Austria was caused by her unwillingness to give up Venetia. The *Tribune* claimed that the emancipation of Venetia was the most interesting question of European politics for Americans, and favored the Prussian cause because Prussia was Italy's ally. The San Francisco *Bulletin* wrote: "That Venetia will soon be released from the oppressive foreign domination under which she has so long suffered,

¹ Gray, *Letters*, vol. ii, p. 549.

² New York *Herald*: July 10, 1866. Cf. also Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. iii, p. 105 *et seq.*; Savannah *Republican*: July 27, 1866.

must be the hope of every one whose sympathies are with united and independent nationalities.”¹ Perhaps the best summary of American sympathies before the battle of Sadowa can be discovered in the comment of *Harper's Weekly*: “Our sympathies cannot fail to be with Italy against Austria, even if they are with Austria against Prussia.”²

Of the papers examined, only the Catholic *Freeman's Journal* was frankly pro-Austrian, anti-Prussian and anti-Italian. In the early days of the war it exclaimed: “May God strengthen Austria in behalf of the liberty of Germanic and Italian Confederations, against the centralizing despotisms of Prussia and the Piedmontese abortion!”³

No sooner had the news of the overwhelming Austrian defeat at Sadowa reached the United States than the American press began speculating about the probable terms of peace. It was apparent that the decisive battle of the war had been fought, that Austria was completely beaten without hope of retrieving her fortunes, and that Prussia had won a victory greater in magnitude and effect than even her most ardent admirers had dared to expect.⁴ For a month and a half the American press was filled with prophecies regarding the peace.

But the battle of Sadowa was also a signal for a noticeable change in American sentiment toward Austria and Prussia. It is perhaps human to sympathize with the victor and to have few regrets for the vanquished, and certain it is that

¹ San Francisco *Bulletin*: June 27, 1866; New York *Tribune*: June 18, June 28, 1866; New York *Times*: June 28, 1866; New York *World*: June 23, 1866; Savannah *Republican*: July 27, 1866; Portland *Transcript*: May 26, 1866; *Harper's Weekly*: June 30, July 14, 1866.

² *Harper's Weekly*: June 30, 1866.

³ *Freeman's Journal*: July 14, Aug. 11, 1866.

⁴ New York *Tribune*: July 24, 1866; New York *Times*: Aug. 15, 1866; Cincinnati *Gazette*: July 17, 1866; Richmond *Enquirer*: Aug. 9, 1866; San Francisco *Bulletin*: Aug. 9, 1866.

Austria's defeat caused but few tears to Americans. It is true that the *Cincinnati Gazette* expressed its belief that Austria had seemed on the road to reform, that the *San Francisco Bulletin* and the *New York Herald* pitied the sudden fall of so venerable a power, and that the *Bulletin* owned to an admiration for the personal character of Francis Joseph. It is also true that the *New York Times* and the *Philadelphia Press* held out hopes to Austria that she might still retain her position as a great power if she liberalized her political institutions, gave a large measure of autonomy to Hungary, and definitely faced to the East. Probably the *New York Times* was one of the strongest pro-Austrian papers in the United States, but it was forced to admit that something must have been fundamentally lacking in Austria's political make-up, and felt called upon to make an apology for even seeming to defend her position. However, the *Freeman's Journal* explained Prussia's victory as the triumph of the more despotic and ruthless power, and praised Austria for her refusal to adopt the Prussian system of compulsory military service.¹

At first it was not Prussia's victory, but Austria's defeat, with her consequent retirement from German and Italian affairs, in which she had long been a force acting against the realization of national unity—it was this that aroused enthusiasm in America. Then, too, the upholder of feudalism and despotism, the chief support of Catholicism had at last been toppled over. All of the pent-up hatred of Austrian institutions which dated back at least to 1848 and the days of the ill-fated struggle for German union and Hungarian independence now burst forth in a flood of denunciation of

¹ *New York Herald*: Aug. 3, 1866; *New York Times*: March 27, July 29, Aug. 1, Aug. 6, Aug. 20, 1866; *Philadelphia Press*: Aug. 19, 1866; *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 18, July 28, 1866; *San Francisco Bulletin*: Aug. 15, 1866; *Freeman's Journal*: July 28, Aug. 11, 1866; *John Lothrop Motley and his Family*, p. 257 et seq.

everything Austrian. The mighty power of the Habsburgs which had long seemed to many Americans to concentrate in itself everything undesirable and un-American was at last crushed, and most Americans were jubilant. The *Times* stated that the traditional Austrian policy could have "few admirers on a republican continent," called the Habsburgs proverbially obstinate and stupid, and spoke of Austria as "the great supporter in Germany of priestcraft and tyranny." The *Cincinnati Gazette* felt little regret that the "star of Hapsburg" was "sinking toward the horizon," and called Austria the land of southern inertness. Even John Lothrop Motley, the American Minister at Vienna, was only lukewarm in his sympathy for Austria's sufferings: "I see much that is brave in this people, but I see more that is frivolous and insouciant."¹ The *Richmond Enquirer* traced the causes for Austria's defeat back to her treatment of Hungary during the past twenty years, and drew a characteristic moral: "In this example there is, we repeat, *hope* for the South, and warning for the North."² Very typical was the idea of Austria as expressed by the *San Francisco Bulletin*: "Tyranous, cruel, unscrupulous, grasping, grinding, ungrateful—such has been the traditional and the living character of her

¹ Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. iii, p. 127; *New York Herald*: Aug. 22, 1866; *New York Tribune*: June 28, 1866; *New York Times*: May 3, June 8, June 18, 1866; *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 17, July 18, 1866; *Portland Transcript*: Aug. 11, Aug. 18, Sept. 8, 1866; *Nation*: Aug. 16, 1866; *Harper's Weekly*: Aug. 18, 1866; *Harper's Magazine*: Sept., 1866; *Atlantic Monthly*: Nov., 1866 (art. by C. C. Hazewell). It is possible that an additional cause for dislike of Austria was the fear that Austrian troops might be substituted for French units in Mexico, in order to uphold Maximilian's empire. The *New York Times* wrote, "But Austria cannot afford to become an instrument for carrying out a policy on this continent distasteful to the United States." April 25, 1866. Cf. also *New York Herald*: Feb. 26, 1866; *Portland Transcript*: May 5, 1866; *The Diary of Gideon Welles* (Boston, 1911), vol. ii, p. 479.

² *Richmond Enquirer*: July 27, 1867.

long history.”¹ John Bigelow pointed to the check which had been administered to Austria as one of the positive gains of the war, and said, “There is no political influence in the world that I know of the loss of which should be less regretted.”² Even more bitter was the statement of the *Nation*: “Austria has not a single claim on the sympathy of any human being. . . . For six hundred years its sword has been a very present help to all forms of bigotry and tyranny.”³ In the *Atlantic Monthly*, Charles Creighton Hazewell of the *Boston Traveller* expressed his belief that Bismarck had been right in thinking that nothing could be done for Germany until Austria should have been ejected from German affairs. In a lecture at the Church of the Covenant on Germany as seen in 1866, the Rev. Henry Boynton Smith of Union Theological Seminary rejoiced that Austria was “ignominiously expelled from the German Confederation which it had so long hampered.”⁴

Naturally, those Americans who rejoiced most at Austria's defeat came to be the most jubilant over Prussia's victory. Not that Americans entirely forgot the unscrupulous steps by which Bismarck had prepared for war, nor his high-handed treatment of the Prussian constitution and legislature, but that they saw in Prussia's victory a decided gain for German unity. Mention has been made above of the frank admiration which most Americans, even those hostile to Prussia's aims, such as the *New York Times*, expressed for the skill, efficiency, rapidity and decisiveness with which Prussia had defeated her rival. After the battle of Sadowa the supremacy of Prussia was unquestioned. Many statements were made in recognition of Prussia's greatness. The star of

¹ *San Francisco Bulletin*: Aug. 9, 1866.

² Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. iii, p. 507.

³ *Nation*: July 19, 1866.

⁴ Henry Boynton Smith, *his Life and Work* (New York, 1881), p. 265; *Atlantic Monthly*: Nov., 1866.

Prussia and the Hohenzollerns seemed to be in the ascendant. Bismarck was master of the situation and could dispose of his enemies in any way he saw fit. The victory of Sadowa made Prussia the arbiter of Central Europe, the equal in strength and prestige of the other great powers, even the most powerful state in all Europe. The *Savannah Republican* thought that the rapidity of the Prussian movements would "undoubtedly gain for her the admiration of a people just emerged from a war." When the Rev. Richard S. Storrs, famous pastor of the Church of the Pilgrims, in a lecture before the Mercantile Library Association of Brooklyn said that the Prussians had won thirty-six victories in thirty days, he was greeted with applause.¹

However not all Americans could so easily overlook the internal or external policy of the Prussian government—its aggression in foreign affairs, its illiberalism at home. The *Cincinnati Gazette* said: "We know of no kingdom in the world that has grown up by a more unscrupulous course of conduct, a more unconscionable rapacity, and a more reckless disregard of the rights and interests of her neighbors than the Kingdom of Prussia."² The *New York Herald* wrote that Prussia had placed more reliance upon the sword than had any other European state, and in 1869 the *Southern Review* said of the war of 1866, "Seldom has a war more

¹ *New York Herald*: July 17, July 27, Aug. 6, Aug. 22, 1866; *New York Tribune*: July 24, Aug. 16, 1866, April 10, 1867; *New York Times*: June 28, July 24, 1866; *New York World*: July 19, July 23, July 25, Aug. 6, Aug. 23, 1866; *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 17, July 18, Aug. 1, Aug. 2, 1866; *Savannah Republican*: July 9, Sept. 26, 1866; *San Francisco Bulletin*: Aug. 9, 1866; Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. iii, pp. 117-121; Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. iii, pp. 490-491; Merriam, George S., *Life and Times of Samuel Bowles* (New York, 1885), vol. ii, p. 155.

² *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 19, July 17, 1866; *New York Herald*: July 17, 1866; *New York Times*: July 24, 1866; *Philadelphia Press*: Feb. 5, 1869; *Harper's Weekly*: Oct. 27, 1866; Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. iii, p. 105 *et seq.*

flagrantly unjust or unpopular been undertaken by any power." ¹ Even the *Nation*, almost offensively pro-Prussian at this time, admitted that Bismarck had acted illegally in bringing on the war, and explained Prussia's success by reference to the fact that Bismarck's demands had been so arrogant as to make war certain, and therefore he had been able to hand over all plans to his military men long before hostilities began.

American opinion was very much divided as to the immediate effect of the war on the constitutional struggle in Prussia. Shortly after the battle of Sadowa the *Cincinnati Gazette* hoped that the war would make Prussia more liberal in her internal policy, and that she would relax the severity of her military system. Even before the treaty of Prague had been signed, the king of Prussia had met the Prussian legislature, had acknowledged the past illegal course of the government, and had asked for an act of indemnity which was readily granted by the patriotic Chambers. The *San Francisco Bulletin* thought the king's speech moderate and predicted that most Germans would support him. The *Nation* took the same view, but the *New York World* distrusted the king's sincerity and thought he was using his popularity to keep down the demands of his subjects for more liberal government. Strangely enough, the *World* thought Bismarck might be willing to grant concessions, but that he would be prevented by the king, whose position relative to his minister had been greatly strengthened by the war. The *New York Times* attacked King William on the same grounds when he made an unfavorable reply to a deputation of his subjects, and predicted that the constitutional struggle would soon begin afresh. Even Motley, who was certainly not anti-Prussian and who believed that a united Germany would

¹ *Southern Review*: Jan., 1869; *New York Herald*: July 27, Aug. 6, 1866; *New York Tribune*: July 31, 1866; *Nation*: July 19, Aug. 16, 1866.

ultimately become free, thought that the first result of Prussian success would be "a bumptiousness without parallel." He said that Prussian Germany presented the appearance of "Charlemagnism with Americanized institutions." But the two were inconsistent, and one or the other must go under. Either there must result "a grand military despotism or a popular national government."¹

Nor was everyone in the United States convinced that the war had resulted in any permanent benefit for Germany. Some claimed that the only Prussian achievement had been the consolidation of her territory by the annexation of the surrounding states. Her treatment of Hanover was criticised, and the New York *Herald* charged Prussia with an attempt to destroy Frankfort's prosperity as the money center of Germany and to substitute Berlin in its place. The New York *World* believed that the treaty of Prague had made Prussia one of the most "securely aggressive" of states, and predicted that Bismarck would now proceed to extend his haughty policy throughout Germany. The Richmond *Enquirer* was still more hostile: "German unity . . . is gone. Prussia has dismembered Germany, and possesses the portion north of the Main as the spoils of her triumph."² The New York *Times*, although enthusiastic for German unity, was nevertheless very suspicious of Prussian leadership. Prussia was still in the hands of the Junkers, who possessed no

¹ New York *Herald*: July 18, 1866; New York *Tribune*: Aug. 13, 1866; New York *Times*: July 24, Aug. 3, Aug. 10, Aug. 28, 1866; New York *World*: Aug. 28, 1866; Cincinnati *Gazette*: July 17, Aug. 2, 1866; San Francisco *Bulletin*: Aug. 9, 1866; *Nation*: Aug. 16, 1866; Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. iii, pp. 110-111, 115, 131.

² Richmond *Enquirer*: Aug. 9, 1866; New York *Herald*: July 13, July 24, Aug. 16, Aug. 17, 1866; New York *Tribune*: July 30, 1866; New York *Times*: July 24, July 25, Aug. 3, Aug. 23, Aug. 24, 1866; New York *World*: July 14, July 23, Aug. 15, Aug. 24, 1866; Cincinnati *Gazette*: July 3, July 13, July 17, 1866; Savannah *Republican*: Sept. 26, 1866; *Nation*: July 5, 1866; Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. iii, pp. 490-491.

real German patriotism, and whose vision extended no farther than Prussia. Nothing really good for Germany could proceed from the spirit of "specific Prussianism," as the *Times* called it. No one in Germany was really satisfied with the results of the war, and confusion in that unhappy country was more prevalent than ever.

But if some Americans were unable to forget the past offenses of Bismarck and were sceptical as to the results of the war, the great majority were willing to forgive the Iron Chancellor if he had only advanced the cause of German unity. Certainly most Americans believed that Prussia, by her victory, and regardless of her motives and diplomacy, had served the best interests not only of Germany, but of Europe and even of humanity itself. Mention has already been made of the fact that the expulsion of Austria was considered advantageous for Germany. In the second place, the absorption of many small principalities was also thought to be a boon. The hitherto prevailing disunion had been the curse of Germany. If the "princely drones" who had opposed and prevented German unity, could be removed from their thrones, Germany would be saved much money as well as being politically benefited. The *Cincinnati Gazette* admitted that Prussia probably would not give liberty to Germany, but pointed out that one tyrant would be better than thirty. Finally, the war had also delivered Germany from a third encumbrance, the German Confederation of 1815. The *Nation* spoke of the disgraceful political condition of Germany under the Confederation, the *Tribune* said that the Federal Diet had "fulfilled no mission in the history of Germany except to impede its political progress," and the *Herald* thought the dissolution of the Confederation one of the most important and beneficial results of the war. By Prussia's victory, then, Germany was well rid of Austrian influence, several minor princes, and the old German Confederation.¹

¹ New York *Herald*: July 18, Aug. 3, 1866; New York *Tribune*: July

But it was commonly believed that Prussia had done something positive for Germany's welfare, for she had made provision in the treaty of Prague for the establishment of a German union, to include all those states north of the Main. The ideals of Americans for Germany were well expressed by the *Herald*:

It is desirable, in the interest of humanity, that Germany may be brought into a more united and compact state, and that a constitution be granted her consistent with the rights of a great and intelligent people, and Prussian ambition and selfishness will be forgiven and forgotten if they contribute to that important end.

The *World* spoke in a similar strain and said that if Bismarck effected the reconstruction of Germany under Prussian leadership his name would be linked in history with that of Cavour. The *Catholic World* was unable to sanction the recent changes in Germany from a moral point of view, "but regarded from the political point of view, as facts accomplished and irrevocable, perhaps they are not indefensible, nay, not unlikely under divine Providence to prove of lasting benefit to European society."¹

But the American attitude toward Prussia did not end with apologies, such as the foregoing. It rather took on the char-

16, July 17, Aug. 2, 1866; *New York Times*: July 6, Aug. 3, Sept. 19, 1866; *New York World*: July 10, July 19, July 23, 1866; *Cincinnati Gazette*: June 12, July 17, July 25, 1866; *Portland Transcript*: Aug. 25, 1866; *Nation*: Aug. 16, 1866; *Harper's Weekly*: Aug. 4, 1866; *Harper's Magazine*: Sept., 1866; *Catholic World*: Nov., 1866; Bigelow, *Retro-spections*, vol. iii, p. 507; Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. iii, p. 105 *et seq.*, pp. 110-117, 129-134.

¹ *New York Herald*: Aug. 3, July 27, Aug. 28, 1866; *New York Tribune*: Jan. 1, 1867; *New York World*: July 19, Aug. 23, 1866; *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 23, July 28, Aug. 1, 1866; *San Francisco Bulletin*: Aug. 15, 1866; *Harper's Weekly*: Oct. 27, 1866; *Harper's Magazine*: Sept., 1866; *Freeman's Journal*: Sept. 8, 1866; *Catholic World*: Nov., 1866; James, Henry, editor, *The Letters of William James* (Boston, 1920), vol. i, p. 95.

acter of eulogy of almost everything Prussian. Prussia had taken long steps in the direction of German unity, and so many Americans were inclined to regard Prussian institutions in a more favorable light. The Prussians were the best educated people in Europe, and Prussia the country where education rested upon a broad, democratic base. It was Prussian education which had won the war. Brains had played a larger part in the victory at Sadowa than had the needle-gun. The *Cincinnati Gazette* said, "Prussia is pre-eminently the land of popular education."¹ And there was believed to be a close connection between popular education in Prussia and the army which was only the nation in arms. The *Nation*, in explaining Prussian success, expressed American opinion more fully than it imagined:

A liberal share of the credit belongs to the two points of the programme which the American reader may have thought least worthy of notice—the principle of universal liability to military service on the one hand, and the guarantee of universal education, in every grade . . . on the other hand.²

Then too Prussia was a Protestant state. Some slight mention of the religious issue had been made in the period prior to the war, but after the battle of Sadowa it was brought out more clearly. Prussia's Protestantism meant freedom of thought, freedom from priestly rule and was another proof that Prussia was a progressive state. The *Portland Transcript* rejoiced that the war which had started as a quarrel between two robbers had "taken on the proportions of a great popular movement in which the might of Protestantism and the free tendencies of Germany have triumphed over the

¹ *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 17, 1866.

² *Nation*: Aug. 23, July 19, Aug. 16, Aug. 30, 1866; *New York Herald*: July 17, Aug. 22, 1866; *New York Times*: Aug. 10, 1866; *San Francisco Bulletin*: Aug. 15, 1866; *Harper's Magazine*: Sept., 1866; Bigelow, *Retro-spections*, vol. iii, p. 507.

forces of despotism and religious intolerance." Very similar was the comment of the *Cincinnati Gazette*: "We may see good in this erection of a powerful Protestant empire. . . . Such a balance should naturally result in a gain to both civil and religious liberty in all Europe." ¹

The *Nation* took the view that although Bismarck might have a record which was hardly acceptable to democrats, yet anyone who extended Prussian influence in Germany would be rendering great service to freedom and civilization. Whatever aided Prussia must aid Germany too. "There is no disaster in Germany's being Prussianized." The *Nation* summed up its attitude thus: "[It] is essentially the triumph of education and ideas over brute force, of free thought over priestcraft, of lay over sacerdotal government, of equality over privilege; and we may all of us thank God that we have lived to see it." ² Both the *Nation* and the *Herald* laid emphasis upon the non-aggressive character of the new state. There would be little to fear from the peaceful Germans. As the *Nation* said, "A united Germany will never engage in an offensive war." By April, 1867, the *Nation* had so far lost its sense of proportion as to exclaim, "The last great war . . . cannot in any sense of the phrase be called a war of ambition or of aggression." The *San Francisco Bulletin* reflected the thought of many Americans when it said that national unity was a necessary preliminary to liberty, and that progress toward republicanism lay more surely via the path of constitutional monarchy than along the road of ultra-democratic revolution. ³

¹ *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 17, 1866; *New York Times*: Sept. 19, 1866; *Philadelphia Press*: April 15, 1866; *Richmond Enquirer*: May 25, 1866; *San Francisco Bulletin*: Aug. 15, 1866; *Portland Transcript*: Aug. 18, 1866; *Nation*: Aug. 16, 1866; Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. iii, p. 507.

² *Nation*: Aug. 23, July 19, Aug. 16, 1866.

³ *Ibid.*, Aug. 16, 1866, April 18, Aug. 29, 1867; *New York Herald*: Aug. 24, 1866; *New York Tribune*: Jan. 1, 1868; *San Francisco Bulletin*: Aug. 15, Aug. 25, 1866.

Surely the change in sentiment since the outbreak of hostilities had been an astounding one. Before the war most Americans looked upon Prussia as the author of all the mischief, as the aggressor; before the battle of Sadowa they saw little to choose as between Austria and Prussia; but after the same battle Prussia was regarded as the hope of German progress, liberty and union, and sober judgment was largely lacking in the extravagant praise which was given to Prussian militarism, Prussian religion and Prussian education.

Many Americans were greatly disappointed when it became apparent that the Prussian union would extend no farther than the Main. The *Times* felt justified in its predictions that a real unification under Prussian auspices would not be established. It pointed out, as did the *World*, the hatred with which Prussia was regarded in South Germany, and said that the South Germans preferred republicanism to Prussianism, not because of love for republicanism, but because of hatred for Prussianism. Other papers, on the whole friendly to Prussia, were critical of the plans for the new union. The *Herald* regretted that the confederation would be in all essentials merely an enlargement of Prussia. Probably more indicative of American sentiment was the regret of the *Tribune* that the confederation did not include South Germany. It was only a partial union. But such papers were still optimistic. Certainly it would only be a short time before Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden and even Austria would be brought into the new union which would then fulfil the grand ideal of a single united Germany. To complete the new Germany would be the great aim of the German people.¹

¹ New York *Herald*: Aug. 10, Aug. 24, 1866; New York *Tribune*: Aug. 2, Aug. 3, Aug. 6, Aug. 27, Sept. 8, 1866; New York *Times*: Aug. 3, Aug. 8, Aug. 28, Aug. 31, Sept. 27, 1866; New York *World*: Aug. 24, 1866; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Aug. 1, Aug. 20, 1866; Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. iii, pp. 125-127, 129-134.

THE NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION

The treaty of Prague which ended the war and provided for the establishment of the North German Confederation really marks no clear-cut shift in American opinion, and is chiefly useful as an artificial dividing line. Many of the same sentiments which had been common during the early part of the war, and the greater share of those current after the battle of Sadowa, were frequently expressed in the latter part of 1866 as well as during the years 1867, 1868, 1869 and the first half of 1870. The justification for making such a division lies mainly in its artificial usefulness and in the appearance of many new ideas about Germany rather than in any definite change in American sentiment. But the founding of the North German Confederation, its constitution, its problems and particularly its relations with the still independent South German states, formed the subject of many speculations on the part of the American press. Nor can this chapter be concluded without some mention of American opinion of Bismarck and of the German people from 1866 to 1870. Finally there must be given a brief account of the direct relations of the North German Confederation with the United States.

Certainly American sentiment was divided over the value of the formation of the North German Confederation. If any generalization could be hazarded, it would be that most Americans sympathized with the Confederation because it fostered German unity, and yet were sceptical because they doubted whether German unity was accomplishing German political freedom. The war of 1866 had destroyed the old Bund, and had resulted in Prussian supremacy, which in its turn had brought about the Confederation, which was considered a necessary step in the right direction toward complete German unity. So far so good. Many were the references to the fact that Prussian victory had meant the es-

tablishment of North German unity, and nearly every reference was favorable to that achievement. Asa Gray hoped that the "present peace may last to consolidate a new Germany." On one occasion the *New York Times* said that a naturalization treaty with Prussia would "soon be tantamount to a treaty with the whole of Germany," and on another occasion gave vent to the following high-flown sentiment: "Prussia alone represents the great German ideal and aspiration — *the unity of the German race*. . . . Germany . . . is to be free and united. . . . Nothing can prevent this, and Prussia's triumph will hasten it."¹ The *Catholic World* thought that Prussian success and the whole trend of recent events in Germany "must be regarded . . . as really effecting German unity." Very similar was the remark of C. C. Hazewell in the *Atlantic Monthly*: "Prussia now means a united Germany, to be ruled by the house of Hohenzollern."² George Bancroft was "exceedingly" interested in the "present tendency of Germany to unity," and the *New York World* thought that the adoption of the constitution of the Confederation "must be reckoned as one of the great events of the nineteenth century." The *Nation* expressed the prevailing American sentiment: "In Germany there is now but one power, and that power is Prussia; and for any German not to see this argues wilful stubbornness to his best interests."³

Many Americans were not slow in noting the close parallel between the recent history of Germany and that of the United States. Both states had had the same goal in view, that of national unity and consolidation. Both had recently fought

¹ *New York Times*: Sept. 19, Sept. 21, Sept. 12, Sept. 22, 1866, Aug. 5, 1867, July 7, 1869; *New York Tribune*: Jan. 1, 1867; *Harper's Weekly*: Oct. 27, 1866; *Nation*: April 25, 1867; Gray, *Letters*, vol. ii, p. 552; *Letters of William James*, vol. i, p. 95.

² *Atlantic Monthly*: Dec., 1866; *Catholic World*: Nov., 1866.

³ *Nation*: Jan. 31, 1867; *New York World*: March 30, 1867; Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 165.

a civil war, and both had been successful in stilling the hateful boggy of states' rights. The *Nation* cited the union of North Germany as one of the ways in which the American Civil War had affected European politics, and compared German particularism with American states' rights. George Bancroft went so far as to say that the German union could not have been successful without the example of the United States. The *World* drew a parallel between the problems of the two states, and used the apparent success of the Prussian policy of mild reconstruction in her annexed provinces as an object lesson to the radical reconstructionists of the United States. The *New York Times* said: "National unity is intrinsically a noble idea, and, wherever you find it, it appeals to all generous sympathies—unity in America; unity in Italy; unity in Germany."¹ It is little wonder that American patriots of the late sixties should have sympathized with the struggles for German unity.

Many Americans ardently hoped, and quite generally believed, at least at times, that the establishment of the North German Confederation which was so long a step forward toward the very desirable goal of German unity might also prove to be a step in the direction of the almost equally desirable goal of German democracy. The proposal to the Prussian parliament by Bismarck of a bill of indemnity for his past illegal acts, seemed to presage a greater deference to constitutional forms. Perhaps the great minister and his royal master had not fundamentally altered their views of government, but they had come to think that German unity under Hohenzollern leadership was the all-important object, only to be achieved with popular aid. The passage of the bill of indemnity by a large majority was a sign of willingness to co-

¹ *New York Times*: Sept. 4, 1866, Sept. 28, 1869; *New York World*: March 30, 1867; *Nation*: Dec. 27, 1866, Aug. 29, 1867; Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 202.

operate with a repentant ministry. Much might be accomplished for political liberty by such mutual forbearance. To some Americans it seemed as though the constitutional struggle had ended with popular victory, and the *Times* went so far as to call Prussia the most democratic state in Germany. The grant of universal male suffrage for the elections to the lower house of the North German Parliament was regarded by most Americans as a distinct gain for popular government. The constitution might not be perfect, but many faults could be wiped out through the operation of a liberal suffrage. The *Tribune* spoke of the new electoral law as being "as democratic as that of any legislative body in the world," thought that the new parliament had been opened "under the most favorable auspices," and said when the Prussian House of Lords accepted the new suffrage act, "This is certainly one of the most remarkable instances of the progress of democratic institutions in Europe." The Rev. Dr. Storrs called Prussia democratic, and referred to the new electoral law which granted universal suffrage. President Andrew Johnson in his annual message to Congress in December, 1867, spoke of the reorganization of Germany "under a new and liberal constitution." The *Galaxy* took notice of the advancing liberality of the North German administration, and even William James thought of the Prussian political condition as "healthy."¹

It is probable that the similarity of the new government to

¹ New York *Tribune*: Oct. 13, Aug. 2, Aug. 13, Sept. 6, Oct. 3, 1866, Jan. 1, Jan. 13, Feb. 25, March 8, April 10, June 20, Nov. 22, 1867, Jan. 1, 1868; New York *Times*: July 6, Sept. 13, Sept. 16, Sept. 19, Sept. 22, Oct. 1, 1866, April 18, May 14, Sept. 12, 1867; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Dec. 26, 1867 (letter from Dr. O. N. Hartshorn of Mt. Union College); San Francisco *Bulletin*: Sept. 5, 1866; *Nation*: Sept. 20, Dec. 27, 1866, Sept. 5, 1867; *Harper's Weekly*: May 11, 1867; *Galaxy*: May, 1869; Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 185; *Letters of William James*, vol. i, p. 95; Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. ix, p. 3778.

that of the United States was a potent cause for American admiration. Certain it is that many Americans hoped or expected that Germany would adopt American political institutions when the day for the final reorganization came. As far back as January, 1866, the *Tribune* had stated that only the lack of freedom prevented the Germans from copying the United States, and in August of the same year the *Times* predicted that the Germans would soon observe the example of republican America and would desire a republic also. But it is much more difficult to prove that many Americans recognized the similarity between the constitutions of the United States and Germany. Of those papers examined, only the *Nation* pointed out that both governments were federal, and that the upper house of the North German Parliament was very similar in organization to the American Senate. It also praised the clause in the German document which gave to the federal government the right of military execution, that is, the right of the federal government to employ military measures against a recalcitrant state, and said that if the constitution of the United States had contained such a clause the American Civil War might have been averted.¹

But not all comments were so favorable to the progress of constitutional liberties in Germany. Most American observers hoped that the new constitution would mean a more democratic form of government, but there existed plenty of scepticism. The constitution gave too much power to the executive, there was no provision for ministerial responsibility, the legislature had but small control over military expenditure, and the scanty powers of parliament would make it, in the opinion of the *Times*, "little more than a debating club." Universal suffrage was seen to be merely a screen to

¹ New York *Herald*: July 11, 1866; New York *Tribune*: Jan. 17, 1866; New York *Times*: March 25, Aug. 3, Sept. 17, 1866; *Nation*: April 4, 1867.

hide the really undemocratic character of the government. Bismarck and King William might temporarily and necessarily make compromises with the people, but they had no intention of surrendering the real power into the people's hands. And as the constitution came into operation and the years passed, the gloved despotism became ever more apparent to the American press. The belief became more and more common that the constitutional struggle had been laid aside while Germany achieved partial unity, but that it was by no means decided. The *Nation* condemned the imprisonment of Deputy Twesten, who had dared to attack the government, and the *New York Times* had a special grievance in its belief that its circulation in Germany had been prevented by official action. The *Tribune* rejoiced when the deputies upheld Twesten, and said that liberal Germany might cooperate with Bismarck in achieving German unity, but not in destroying German liberty. The *Times* said that in a country where a possible heir to the throne could stand for election to the parliament constitutionalism was "but an experiment, and a very lame one at that." The same paper thought that German unity could not finally be gained unless the liberal party was successful over the administration. It summed up the issue by saying: "It will be of general interest for Americans to watch the development of this contest . . . which must end in one of two ways; either parliamentary life will there be completely extinguished, or else so firmly established that all attacks against it will prove fruitless."¹ At the time of the first election, the *Portland Transcript* rejoiced over the victory of the liberals, and expressed

¹ *New York Times*: Dec. 22, Sept. 22, Oct. 12, Dec. 21, 1866, Jan. 8, Jan. 30, Feb. 5, July 22, 1867; *New York Tribune*: Feb. 22, 1867, Jan. 9, Feb. 4, 1868; *New York World*: March 30, 1867; *Philadelphia Press*: Nov. 29, 1867; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Dec. 3, 1866, Dec. 26, 1867 (letter of Dr. O. N. Hartshorn); *Nation*: Sept. 13, Nov. 15, Dec. 27, 1866, Jan. 31, April 4, May 13, June 17, 1867; *San Francisco Bulletin*: Feb. 19, 1867.

its belief that the king and his advisers might yet find the people too strong for them. The *Nation* thought that Bismarck was still making use of German patriotism, knowing well that he might commit many tyrannies so long as he continued to gratify the popular desire for unity. The *Philadelphia Press* argued that the passage of the indemnity bill to cover ministerial illegalities had been in effect an abdication of all power on the part of the people, and said, "The idea that in Prussia the Constitution guarantees anything is absurd and ludicrous."¹

But there existed a much more fruitful source of unfriendly comment on the part of American newspapers. The harsh treatment which Prussia had accorded to the conquered German provinces, together with the iron military control by means of which she had consolidated the North German Confederation, aroused considerable hostility in the United States. To some the war appeared to have accomplished the aggrandizement of Prussia, and but little else. The *Portland Transcript* considered that Prussia had gained "another claim to the title of the Robber Nation," and said that Prussia was making "a hearty meal off the petty kingdoms and principalities." Although several prominent papers, among others the *New York Tribune*, *New York World* and *Cincinnati Gazette*, did not consider the disappearance of many minor principalities as an evil in itself, but on the contrary a decided blessing to Germany, the American press was almost unanimous in condemning the treatment of the territories so annexed. Bismarck had refused to carry out the clause of the treaty of Prague, providing for a plebiscite in North Schleswig. On the contrary, he was thought to be planning with Sweden a complete partition of Denmark. The alleged attempt of Prussia to transfer the

¹ *Philadelphia Press*: Nov. 29, 1867; *New York Times*: Sept. 12, 1867; *Portland Transcript*: March 2, 1867; *Nation*: Jan. 7, 1869.

financial center of Germany from Frankfort to Berlin was highly unpopular in the United States, for reasons which were not entirely disinterested.¹ Even the cause of an independent Hanover found adherents among the American people. Prussia had refused to allow any freedom of the press in the conquered regions, which would not have objected to becoming German, but strenuously opposed Bismarck's Prussianizing tendencies. The *World* blamed the Prussian authorities for doing nothing to allay the dissatisfaction,² and the *Nation* condemned the tactlessness of Prussian officialdom. The *Times* pointed out that Prussia ought to be doing everything in her power to make the transition period easier for provinces which were by no means yet "glued together," and speculated about another war between Prussia and Austria in which the sympathies of independent observers would all be in favor of Austria. The *Richmond Enquirer* sympathized with Hanover's resistance to Prussian "reconstruction." The *Press* was very bitter about the annexation of Hanover, which it denounced as a greater outrage than the partition of Poland, and about which it wrote, "A more profligate transaction has scarcely been recorded among the crimes of royalty."³

Hardly less unpopular in the United States was the treat-

¹ Cf. *infra*, pp. 330-334.

² The *World* was inconsistent however, cf. *supra*, p. 209.

³ Philadelphia *Press*: March 5, 1869, Sept. 4, 1866, Nov. 27, 1868; New York *Tribune*: Sept. 8, Oct. 3, 1866, Oct. 28, 1869; New York *Times*: Oct. 7, Oct. 14, Oct. 29, Oct. 30, Nov. 13, Dec. 5, 1866, Jan. 1, Feb. 22, July 7, Aug. 5, Aug. 18, 1867, Aug. 24, 1868; New York *World*: Aug. 28, 1866, Jan. 11, March 29, 1867; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Nov. 10, 1866, May 1, 1867; Richmond *Enquirer*: Feb. 24, Dec. 24, 1869; Portland *Transcript*: Sept. 2, Sept. 15, 1866; *Nation*: Jan. 31, Sept. 5, 1867; *Irish Citizen*: Oct. 26, Dec. 14, 1867; *Galaxy*: May, 1869; *Harper's Magazine*: April, 1870 (art. by S. S. Conant); Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. iii, pp. 490-491, 507.

ment meted out to the legally independent provinces of the North German Confederation. Almost every observer made note of the fact that the Confederation would be simply Prussia in everything but name. The control of military, naval and diplomatic affairs had been lodged in the hands of the Prussian executive. The dissatisfaction of Saxony was pointed to as typical of the sentiment of North Germany outside of narrowly Prussian circles. The minor states were believed to have lost a large amount of their liberty. The *New York Tribune* said that the parliament would "have more the appearance of a meeting of vassals of Prussia, than of peers." The *Irish Citizen* undoubtedly went farther than most Americans would have gone when it said that Germany would probably welcome an invading French army which would throw off the Prussian yoke and reestablish the old political order in Germany; at the same time such a statement is indicative of the trend of opinion. The *New York Times* was especially opposed to the way in which Prussia had fastened her military system on the neck of all North Germany. Even the friendly *Tribune* admitted that Prussia's chief aim in establishing the Confederation had been to consolidate the military power of North Germany in her hands. But the *Times* thought that the extension of the Prussian military system to all North Germany was a great mistake. It was the chief reason for popular dissatisfaction not only in Hanover but also in Saxony. It would cause multitudes of Germans to emigrate to the United States. All North Germany had now become more of a military camp than ever, a state of affairs decidedly unfortunate for all of Europe, since the other European states had felt obliged for their safety to adopt the same oppressive military system.¹

¹ *New York Herald*: Aug. 7, 1866; *New York Tribune*: Aug. 27, Sept. 8, Dec. 19, Dec. 24, 1866; *New York Times*: Aug. 28, Sept. 12, Sept. 27, Dec. 21, Dec. 26, Dec. 29, 1866, Jan. 1, Feb. 3, March 2, March 15, July 22, Aug. 18, 1867, Jan. 10, Jan. 19, Jan. 30, 1868, March 2, 1869; Cin-

It was very natural that Americans should connect the course of events in the South German states with the progress toward German unity. They saw clearly enough that German unity would be practically achieved when and only when the South German states should be consolidated with the North German Confederation, and there was even considerable talk about the probability in the near future of the German provinces of Austria breaking away from the Habsburg empire to join their German brothers. Mention has already been made of the disappointment which many Americans felt when they found that the South German states had not been made part of the North German Confederation. During the years 1867, 1868 and 1869, each action of the South German states was eagerly scanned and commented on as to its probable effect on the all-important question of German unity. Certain factors there were which seemed to stand in the way, blocking the road to a more complete consolidation. South Germany was considered by many Americans as more liberal than North Germany, more used to democratic institutions, and therefore naturally opposed to the more despotic government of Prussia. Bismarck was accused of purposely keeping the southern states out of the North German Confederation because he feared the effect of the entrance of so large a liberal population. The *New York World* thought that the widespread sympathy of South Germany with the unity movement had been chilled by the determination of Bismarck to make Germany Prussian, rather than to make Prussia German. The *Nation* attacked the radical democrats and ultramontane Catholics of South Germany for trying to foster the old hatred of Prussia, but at the same time held Bismarck's illiberal domestic policy

cinnati Gazette: Aug. 13, Nov. 10, 1866; *Nation*: Sept. 5, 1867; *Irish Citizen*: Oct. 26, 1867; *Southern Review*: April, 1867; Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. iii, pp. 129-134.

largely responsible for the continuance of the division of Germany into North and South. The *Times* thought the dislike of South Germany for Prussian militarism explained and justified the reluctance of Baden, Bavaria and Württemberg to enter a union which was dominated by Prussia.¹ In addition there was the belief that German unity was being prevented by French hostility, or by Austrian schemes fomented by the wily Emperor of the French.²

But the impression must not be given that the majority of Americans were pessimistic about the future of the unity movement in Germany. It was seen that the idea of a separate South German Confederation was utterly fantastic and impractical. The military treaties, offensive and defensive, between the North German Confederation and the various South German states were published in 1867 and were seen to make Germany a unit in time of war. In commenting on the military treaties, the *Portland Transcript* said: "All Germany . . . is thus virtually united, and the King of Prussia is, in all but name, Emperor of Germany."³ Far more important in the minds of most Americans was the entry of the various South German states into the Zollverein in 1868. Thus commercial unity would also be achieved, and only political consolidation would remain uncompleted. The *Times* said, "When commerce finds profit in union, unity of sentiment will not lag far behind."⁴ The *Tribune* was

¹ New York *Herald*: Aug. 19, 1866; New York *Tribune*: July 24, Sept. 8, Dec. 10, 1866, May 1, 1867, Aug. 5, 1868; New York *Times*: Aug. 20, Aug. 24, Sept. 27, Oct. 18, Oct. 30, Dec. 9, 1866, Jan. 8, Feb. 3, 1867, June 26, 1868, Dec. 25, 1869; New York *World*: Aug. 15, 1866, Jan. 11, 1867; *Nation*: Aug. 16, 1866, Jan. 31, 1867, Jan. 7, June 17, 1869.

² Cf. *infra*, pp. 313-317.

³ *Portland Transcript*: April 20, 1867; New York *Tribune*: June 24, Sept. 9, Dec. 30, 1867; New York *Times*: Oct. 30, 1866, Feb. 3, 1867, Oct. 15, 1869; *Nation*: April 4, April 25, 1867.

⁴ New York *Times*: May 20, 1868.

even more enthusiastic over the Zollverein treaties, which presented an occasion to that paper to emphasize the blessings of a protective tariff. The *Tribune* published several long articles tracing the commercial history of Germany in the nineteenth century, showing the poverty which existed before the Zollverein was formed and stating that it had established a protective tariff, hence had created economic prosperity and thus had played an important part in making possible the amount of unity which Germany had achieved in 1866 and 1867. The *Tribune* summed up its position in the following sentences :

It was the Zollverein which more than any other cause prepared the degree of political unity which was established in 1866; and there can be no doubt that it will now be instrumental in consummating the work of national union. . . . Both in a military and in a commercial point of view, Germany . . . is now a unit.¹

It was remarked by many Americans that the South German states desired political unity as much as did North Germany, and that the two divisions differed only in the matter of ways and means, and in respect of the form of government which should be founded. It is clear that most Americans in the years immediately preceding the Franco-German War were firm in their belief that the existing division of Germany was only temporary and that the union of the two parts in the near future was inevitable. The *Catholic World* predicted in November, 1866, that the South German states would soon enter the northern confederation, and said, "Ere long Germany will be united."² Very similar was the re-

¹ New York *Tribune*: Nov. 1, June 24, Aug. 23, Dec. 30, 1867, April 30, June 23, 1868, April 15, 1869.

² *Catholic World*: Nov., 1866; New York *Herald*: Aug. 9, 1866; New York *Tribune*: Dec. 11, 1866, Jan. 1, Jan. 17, May 1, Oct. 13, 1867, April

mark of *Leslie's Weekly* somewhat later: "The Southern German States are gravitating toward Prussia under the double impulse of interest and feeling, and their substantial coalition may be taken as already effected."¹ Even the *Times* said, "Prussia . . . is linked with all South Germany by hooks of steel."² When it was reported in 1869 that Bavaria had voted in favor of union, the Richmond *Enquirer* predicted the approaching consolidation of the German race. The *Nation* said at the same time, "The result of the Bavarian elections . . . will go far towards hastening the inevitable political unification of Germany."³ With such beliefs, it is not wonderful that Americans were not surprised to see all South Germany rush to the Prussian standard in 1870.

No study of American opinion of Germany in the period of the formation of the North German Confederation would be complete without noticing what estimate Americans made of the architect and builder of that union, Count Otto von Bismarck. It has been noted already that his unscrupulous diplomacy was regarded as responsible for the war of 1866, that he was considered by some Americans as an asset to Prussia because of his genius, but by a large number as a liability because of his despotic and illegal disregard of the Prussian constitution, and that his boldness and efficiency during the war had aroused considerable admiration in the

30, 1868, Oct. 28, 1869; New York *Times*: Aug. 18, Sept. 16, Sept. 27, 1866, March 22, Aug. 5, Sept. 1, Dec. 25, 1868, Oct. 15, 1869; New York *World*: March 30, 1867; Cincinnati *Gazette*: May 1, 1867; Richmond *Enquirer*: Nov. 4, Nov. 30, 1867; *Nation*: Aug. 30, 1866, Jan. 31, April 4, Sept. 26, Oct. 31, 1867; Portland *Transcript*: Oct. 5, 1867; *House Executive Documents*, 2nd Session, 40th Congress, vol. i, p. 578.

¹ *Leslie's Weekly*: Oct. 12, 1867. Cf. also New York *Times*: Nov. 18, 1868.

² New York *Times*: Nov. 18, 1868.

³ *Nation*: June 17, 1869; Richmond *Enquirer*: May 24, 1869.

American press. Taking the whole period under review, it can be said that the majority of Americans thought very highly of his ability, and recognized his qualities of statesmanship, but that they considered him an upholder of despotism, and refused to credit him with altruistic motives. He was constantly spoken of as possessing great political sagacity, and his audacity and skill as a diplomat were undoubtedly admired. The *Times* said that he had played his part "with a boldness and adroitness never equalled on the stage of European diplomacy," and called him the greatest German statesman since the time of vom Stein or Frederick the Great. The San Francisco *Bulletin* thought him the greatest minister in Europe, and George Bancroft described him as "the first man now living on the continent of Europe." The New York *World* called him the greatest minister, with the possible exception of Cavour, whom Europe had seen since the time of Richelieu. Dr. Storrs spoke with evident admiration of Bismarck, an "active, determined man, full of the old Prussian grit," and John Sherman tells us that when he visited Germany in 1867, Bismarck was the one man whom he desired to meet. When it was rumored late in 1866 that Bismarck was dangerously ill, the New York *Times*, New York *Tribune*, New York *World* and Philadelphia *Press* all hoped for his recovery. The *Tribune* thought that his loss would be irreparable, and the *Times* said it would prove even more unfortunate for Prussia than Cavour's death had been for Italy. The New York *Herald* summed up the comment favorable to Bismarck in the following: "He has proved himself a man of such rare sagacity, abilities, energies and heroism, that he will surely go down to history as one of the most brilliant lights of the nineteenth century."¹

¹ New York *Herald*: Aug. 7, July 17, Aug. 22, 1866; New York *Tribune*: Aug. 16, 1866, Feb. 22, Feb. 23, April 10, April 13, 1867; New York

On the other hand, Bismarck was widely accused of being illiberal and unscrupulous. The *Times* said there was little in Bismarck's career to call forth praise from any lover of liberty. The *World* characterized him as a man whose faith was in the sceptre and the sword. The *Nation* brought the charge against him that he had embraced universal suffrage for illiberal purposes, to blind the eyes of the people to the really despotic character of the government. The *Philadelphia Press* called Bismarck an "out-and-out Tory," and said it would believe he had become liberal when the leopard changed its spots, but not before. John Hay's strong expression probably accorded with the opinion of many Americans: "Bismarck is becoming appalled by the spirit of Freedom that he suckled with the blood of Sadowa."¹ He was attacked for being too narrowly a Prussian, and not enough of a German statesman. But he was considered as unscrupulous as illiberal in his policies. The *Herald* spoke of him as "crafty," and the *World* referred to his "unscrupulous audacity." His aggressive policy was attacked by the *Cincinnati Gazette*, which said that men like Bismarck were no more sated with conquest than a miser with gold, and by the *Nation* which spoke of Bismarck's "ravenous maw." Byron C. Smith, a young American student in Germany, was very

Times: June 26, June 30, July 6, Aug. 15, Sept. 22, Oct. 1, 1866, March 2, April 7, April 20, 1867, March 22, May 20, 1868; *New York World*: Oct. 1, 1866; *Richmond Enquirer*: Dec. 24, 1869, Jan. 1, 1870; *San Francisco Bulletin*: Aug. 15, Aug. 25, 1866; *Philadelphia Press*: April 23, 1868; *Harper's Weekly*: Aug. 4, 1866; *Harper's Magazine*: Sept., 1866, June, 1867; *Atlantic Monthly*: Nov., 1866 (art. by C. C. Hazewell); Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. iii, pp. 117-121; John Lothrop Motley and his Family, pp. 280-281; Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 185; John Sherman's *Recollections of Forty Years in the House, Senate and Cabinet* (Chicago, 1895), vol. i, p. 401.

¹ Thayer, William Roscoe, *The Life and Letters of John Hay* (Boston, 1915), vol. i, p. 313; *New York Times*: July 6, Aug. 15, 1866, Nov. 13, 1867; *New York World*: Jan. 11, 1867; *Philadelphia Press*: April 23, Nov. 27, 1868; *Nation*: July 19, 1866, Jan. 3, 1867, June 7, 1869.

bitter in his comment: "I hate these tyrants and their soulless meddling slaves,—such intellectual prostitutes as Bismarck."¹

Several long articles on Bismarck's character appeared in American periodicals in the period. The first in the *Galaxy* for August 15, 1866, characterized him as a "pushing" individual and said: "His portrait shows his character; a strong, rude, shameless man, with plenty of vitality and animal spirits . . . full of conceit . . . certainly has less sense of decency than any man in public life in Europe." In the same magazine for June, 1867, there appeared another article on Bismarck by Charles Wyllys Elliott, who summed up Bismarck's character thus: "The truth is, he is simply a daring, unscrupulous adventurer. . . . He will destroy constitutions and perjure himself freely, but he will permit no one to cast a doubt upon his courage, his horsemanship, or his pedigree."² An especially able account of Bismarck was written by S. S. Conant, in a book review of the translation of a German life of Bismarck, and came out in *Harper's Magazine* for April, 1870. Mr. Conant traced his political career, laid the responsibility for the Austrian war entirely at Bismarck's door, praised his personal life, but condemned his statesmanship severely:

As a statesman his career is open to the severest criticism. . . . His political ideas are those of a born feudalist. . . . He has never sympathized with modern ideas of popular rights. . . . He can not be regarded as a wise and far-seeing statesman. Ignoring the present as well as the future, he builds upon ideas

¹ Kellogg, D. O., editor, *A Young Scholar's Letters, Being a Memoir of Byron Caldwell Smith* (New York, 1897), p. 164; *New York Herald*: July 27, Aug. 26, 1866; *New York Tribune*: March 18, 1869; *New York Times*: Aug. 15, 1866; *New York World*: July 3, 1866; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Nov. 10, Dec. 3, 1866, Feb. 27, 1867; *Harper's Weekly*: Oct. 27, 1866; *Nation*: June 26, 1866; *Galaxy*: Aug. 15, 1866; *Harper's Magazine*: April, 1870.

² *Galaxy*: Aug. 15, 1866, June, 1867.

which half the world rejects and the other half is rapidly outgrowing.¹

Several chapters back an analysis was made of American opinion of German civilization for the period from 1853 to 1863. It is necessary to examine what Americans thought on the same subject in the years just preceding the outbreak of the Franco-German War. No very clear distinction is practicable, as in the earlier period, between German and Prussian civilization. Americans carefully differentiated between Prussian and Austrian, but not between Prussian and German institutions and character—a fact significant in itself as showing their conviction that Prussia and Germany had approximated closely to each other. Some mention has been made of the American attitude toward North German life in the comments upon the results of the war of 1866. Three institutions stood out as especially praiseworthy in German life—her religion, her army and her educational system. Prussia and the North German Confederation were predominantly Protestant, and hence were considered progressive. Among the papers which praised Prussia for her Protestantism and religious freedom were the *New York Times*, *Richmond Enquirer*, *Cincinnati Gazette*, *San Francisco Bulletin*, *Philadelphia Press*, *Portland Transcript* and the *Nation*. John Bigelow expressed similar sentiments, as did the Rev. Dr. Storrs. On the other hand, the *Irish Citizen* attacked Bancroft for his love of Prussia and her Protestantism, and made the claim that religious persecution had lasted longer in Prussia than in any other European state. George Fitzhugh made an attack in *De Bow's Review* upon the religious infidelity of Protestant Germany.²

¹ *Harper's Magazine*: April, 1870. The book referred to is Hesekeiel, John George Louis, *The Life of Bismarck, Private and Political; with Descriptive Notices of his Ancestry*. Translated by Kenneth R. H. Mackensie.

² *New York Tribune*: April 10, 1867; *New York Times*: Sept. 19, 1866;

It was but natural that in the period covered by this chapter much greater attention should have been devoted to Prussia's military system than to her religion. It is more remarkable that comment should have been favorable almost without exception. The principle of "universal duty of every citizen to serve in the army" seemed democratic. The Prussian military system was but the people in arms. One of the passages in Dr. Storrs' lecture which aroused applause was the following: "Every soldier is a civilian, and every civilian is a soldier. The army in time of peace is folded up in the nation. . . . It is like an elastic ring, contracted for the peace standard, and expanded for the war standard, until it takes in the whole of Germany."¹ In the second place, it was commonly believed that an army based upon universal service must be non-aggressive. The *Nation* pointed out that the military leaders must have a sufficient cause before they would dare to mobilize such an army. A people in arms would not be desirous to leave their home and business to fight a war of aggrandizement. The *Times* and the *Tribune* were sceptical, and thought that Prussia was perhaps militaristic, and the *Cincinnati Gazette* spoke of the terror which the system inspired in every Prussian family. But George Bancroft said, "The whole influence of this government is exerted to maintain the peace of Europe."² A third cause for

Philadelphia Press: Sept. 4, 1866; *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 17, 1866; *San Francisco Bulletin*: Aug. 15, 1866; *Portland Transcript*: Sept. 8, 1866; *Richmond Enquirer*: Feb. 17, 1869; *Nation*: Aug. 23, 1866; *Irish Citizen*: Jan. 4, 1868; *De Bow's Review*: Dec., 1866; Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. iii, p. 507.

¹ *New York Tribune*: April 10, 1867; *New York Times*: May 13, Aug. 10, 1866; *Richmond Enquirer*: Nov. 30, 1867; *Nation*: June 26, Aug. 16, Aug. 23, Dec. 27, 1866.

² *House Executive Documents*, 3rd Session, 40th Congress, vol. ii, p. 43; *New York Tribune*: Nov. 9, 1868; *New York Times*: Dec. 29, 1866, March 15, June 10, July 22, 1867, Jan. 10, Jan. 19, July 7, July 20, Aug. 5, 1868; *Cincinnati Gazette*: April 19, June 15, 1866; *Nation*: April 18, Sept. 5, 1867.

praise of the Prussian army was its high standard of education. The *Times* said, "The only army in the world which can compare with the Prussian in respect of education and intelligence is the late volunteer army of the United States."¹

The excellence of the Prussian school system, Americans felt, not only educated the army, but made for great enlightenment throughout the whole nation. The *Cincinnati Gazette*, the *Nation*, the *Portland Transcript*, *De Bow's Review*, John Bigelow and the Rev. Dr. Storrs all spoke in the same strain—that the German people were the most intelligent and best educated of any in Europe. *Harper's Weekly* said, "The Prussian schools are, without doubt, the best in the world."² Even more enthusiastic was the comment of the *Tribune*:

The reason of the superiority of the German people, particularly of the Prussian, to the other peoples of Europe in morals, in intelligence, in thrift, in all the qualities that make men fit for society, is owing, more than to all other causes combined, to the admirable system of public instruction established there.³

The *Times* made a significant statement in this connection: "Prussia stands in the Confederation much as New England stands in our Union. She is the brain of Germany."⁴ One of the chief explanations for American praise of German education can be found in the ever-increasing number of Amer-

¹ *New York Times*: Oct. 15, 1866; *Richmond Enquirer*: Nov. 30, 1867.

² *Harper's Weekly*: Jan. 15, 1870; *New York Herald*: July 27, Aug. 10, 1866; *New York Tribune*: April 10, 1867, April 15, 1869, June 25, 1870; *New York Times*: July 25, 1866; *Cincinnati Gazette*: June 15, 1866, Dec. 26, 1867 (letter from Dr. O. N. Hartshorn); *Nation*: June 26, July 19, Aug. 16, Aug. 23, Nov. 15, 1866; *Portland Transcript*: Sept. 8, 1866; *De Bow's Review*: June, 1868; Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. iii, p. 507; Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. iii, pp. 105-108.

³ *New York Tribune*: Feb. 20, 1868.

⁴ *New York Times*: Sept. 19, 1866.

icans who were studying in Germany. Early in 1870, the *Portland Transcript* estimated that no less than 1500 Americans, both men and women, were being educated in German schools and universities. Although most such American students were probably friendly to German education, and although the very number of them shows the confidence of Americans in German methods, yet many individual students seem to have been hostile. William James was himself one of these students, and it is interesting to note that he considered it hardly worth while for Americans to study in Germany because the spirit of Germany and her "fundamental qualities" were so akin to those of the United States. "To one of our race all that is *peculiar* in Germany is mental, and *that* Germany can be brought to us." Another most interesting student was Byron C. Smith of Ohio, who attacked the German educational system because it was under state control, and because it made so great a proficiency in science and language necessary to success that it had ended by "killing the thinking faculties." The *Irish Citizen* added its note of protest against prevailing American prejudices in regard to Prussia by referring to that country as "monstrously enlightened."¹

The popular educational system of Prussia was believed to make for a higher standard of morality. The *Tribune* spoke of the moral superiority of the Prussians over all other peoples of Europe. The *Nation* indignantly attacked the idea that Prussia was less moral than other nations because of the lax observance of Sunday. *Harper's Weekly* spoke with favor of the small amount of drunkenness in spite of the large quantity of beer which was consumed. The other traits of character commonly attributed to the German were

¹ *Letters of William James*, vol. i, p. 105; *New York Times*: Sept. 17, 1867; *Portland Transcript*: Jan. 8, 1870; *Irish Citizen*: Nov. 23, 1867; Smith, B. C., *Letters*, p. 40.

nearly as praiseworthy. To be sure he was slow, but he was at the same time thorough and persevering. He was industrious, sober, thrifty, honest. He was self-respecting and he respected the law. Lydia Maria Child said that the German character was so honest and childlike that it was no wonder that they were the best toymakers. The *Times* spoke of Germany as the "cradle" and "home" of music. Even the comment of William James, though not meant to be complimentary, is perhaps indicative of the cause of American admiration for the German character: "Germany is, I find . . . very nearly related to our country. . . . There is a general colorlessness and bleakness about the outside look of life, and in artistic matters a wide-spread manifestation of the very same creative spirit that designs our kerosene-lamp models, for instance, at home."¹ More flattering was the declaration of Byron C. Smith: "I have learned to love Germany nearly as well as my . . . native Republic."² One of the most Germanophile papers in the United States was the *Nation*, which admired almost everything which was German or Prussian. It described the Germans as "the most learned, patient, industrious, civilized people on the face of the globe, which has attained the highest distinction in arts, in science, in arms, in literature, in everything, in short, but in politics." Senator James W. Grimes of Iowa was in Germany in the early part of 1870 and wrote back a most enthusiastic report of conditions, which so fascinated him that he purchased four hundred German books for the library in

¹ *Letters of William James*, vol. i, p. 105; *New York Herald*: May 24, July 27, Aug. 10, Aug. 16, 1866; *New York Tribune*: Feb. 20, 1868, June 25, 1870; *New York Times*: July 25, Aug. 15, Oct. 14, 1866, July 21, 1867; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Dec. 26, 1867 (letter from Dr. O. N. Hartshorn); *Nation*: Aug. 16, Nov. 15, 1866; *Harper's Weekly*: Jan. 15, 1870; Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. iii, pp. 105-108, 117-121; *Letters of Lydia Maria Child* (Boston, 1883), p. 191.

² Smith, B. C., *Letters*, pp. 163-164.

Burlington, Iowa. He wrote: "I am filled with admiration of the German people. Such industry, such order, such sobriety, such neatness, such cultivation of everything that is beautiful and aesthetic, such schools, such freedom from poverty and misery, is [*sic*] to be found nowhere else in the world."¹

Before concluding the chapter, some brief mention must be made of the direct relations between Germany and the United States, relations which were always friendly and were measurably improved by the negotiation of the Bancroft treaty on the ever thorny subject of naturalization. On August 9, 1866, the New York *Herald* published a savage attack upon Prussia for the seizure of a naturalized American sailor. The *Herald* demanded that Seward take quick, decisive action, and said: "The Power for us to grapple with is Prussia, elated with success and full of arrogance and presumption. Let us deal with the great bully first of all."² In September, 1866, the *Times* printed an editorial on the naturalization question, in which it warned Prussia that she must be a naval power if she desired to be a first class power, and called to her attention that ships could be purchased to her best advantage only in the United States. She would, then, be foolish to antagonize the United States on the naturalization question. The *Times* advocated a treaty to deal with the situation. As early as May, 1867, Seward wrote to Bancroft urging him to take up the naturalization question, and President Johnson made the announcement in his annual message for that year that he was making renewed attempts

¹ Salter, William, *The Life of James W. Grimes* (New York, 1876), p. 380; *Nation*: June 26, July 19, 1866.

² New York *Herald*: Aug. 9, 1866; New York *Times*: Sept. 4, Sept. 21, 1866, Sept. 17, 1867; Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. ix, p. 3778; *House Executive Documents*, 2nd Session, 40th Congress, vol. i, pp. 582-583.

to dispose satisfactorily of the one point at issue between the United States and Germany.

The first news of the Bancroft treaty reached the American press late in February, 1868, and from that time on through the rest of the year many comments appeared, some favorable, and many unfavorable. It is strange that the *Times* was at first very hostile and later very friendly to the treaty, while the *Tribune*, which was favorable at first, came to be quite critical. On the first receipt of the news, the *Times* said it doubted whether the treaty would solve the problem and presumed that Bancroft had acted without instructions. But later on it became most laudatory and thought that the treaty had settled the whole question. *Leslie's Weekly* and *Putnam's Magazine* were likewise friendly to the treaty. Both the *Times* and *Leslie's* said that the treaty was another sign of Bismarck's statemanship. The *Tribune*, enthusiastic when it first heard of the treaty, became more critical on closer examination of its provisions. It feared that the treaty left the door open for the Prussian government to arrest naturalized Americans who had failed to carry out their military obligations before emigration to the United States. *Harper's Weekly* praised the commendable zeal of Bancroft but made the same objection as had the *Tribune*. It considered the treaty vague on what it thought the most important point. However it saw in the treaty a sign of progress and later on, early in 1870, gave unstinted praise. Only the *Irish Citizen* was completely dissatisfied with the treaty. As might have been expected from its general hostility to everything German, its condemnation was bitter:

Well, then, by this booby Bancroft 'Treaty' the United States acknowledge and ratify, for the first time, the authority of the King of Prussia to prevent the emigration of men who are of an age to be of any service in war or peace. By this blockhead Treaty, we acknowledge for the first time, that hundreds of

thousands of our citizens . . . are liable to be seized and punished as deserters if they venture to visit their native land on business or pleasure.¹

It is important to note that the American government, through its minister, George Bancroft, almost immediately recognized the North German Confederation. Mr. Bancroft attended officially the first session of the North German parliament as well as the Zollverein parliament, and his action was approved by the State Department. Bancroft's letters back to his government were filled with general praise of the trend of affairs in Germany. One of them is worth quoting at some length, not only because it embodies the opinion of Bancroft himself, one of America's most distinguished historians and American minister to Prussia and North Germany during the momentous years 1870 and 1871, but also because it expresses so many sentiments characteristic of the American people :

The present union of German States is the ripened fruit of nineteen generations of continued sufferings and struggles, and is so completely in harmony with natural laws, and so thoroughly the concurrent act of government and people, that it is certain to endure. . . . A population of thirty millions, of whom more than two-thirds are Protestants, and all are instructed to read and write, and all trained to the use of arms, rises up in the center of Europe, equal in culture, courage, and prospective if not immediate influence, to any government on the continent. . . . This wonderful result has a special interest for America, because it has sprung from the application of the principles which guided the framers of the Constitution of our United States. The constitution of North Germany corresponds in so

¹ *Irish Citizen*: April 4, Sept. 26, 1868; *New York Tribune*: Feb. 26, March 16, 1868; *New York Times*: Feb. 27, March 13, March 27, 1868; *Leslie's Weekly*: March 21, March 28, 1868; *Harper's Weekly*: Aug. 1, 1868, Jan. 15, 1870; *Putnam's Magazine*: April, 1868.

many things with ours, that it must have been formed after the closest study of our system.¹

In conclusion it must be repeated that American opinion was badly confused in 1866 and 1867. And yet there were certain points upon which most Americans were pretty much agreed. They considered Prussia the aggressor in the quarrel, and blamed her for assuming the offensive, but it was impossible for them to feel any real sympathy with an Austria which several generations of Americans had learned to hate. They sympathized with the desire of the German people for German unity and they praised every effort in that direction and welcomed every indication of success. Therefore they rejoiced at the establishment of the North German Confederation and hoped for the inclusion of the South German states within its boundaries. But they also desired for Germany a liberal government and they had been brought up to regard Prussia as a despotism. Nor were they entirely convinced that unification under Prussian auspices meant the establishment of liberal institutions in Germany. Their reservations in respect to the results of the war of 1866 sprang, to a great extent, from their fear that a Prussianized Germany might not be a liberal one. Under the circumstances their confusion was perhaps not unnatural.

¹ *Senate Executive Documents*, 2nd Session, 40th Congress, vol. i, no. 9, p. 13.

CHAPTER VII

AMERICAN OPINION OF FRANCE. 1848-1870

BEFORE considering American opinion of German affairs during the Franco-German War, it has seemed necessary to make a study of the sentiment in the United States concerning France during the period covered in the preceding chapters. The justification for making such an apparent digression lies in the fact that the opinion of Germany in 1870 was very largely conditioned by the feeling toward France. It was as much hatred for France as love for Prussia which caused the pro-Prussian sentiment during the early part of that war. But hostility toward France was no new thing in 1870. Its roots can surely be traced at least as far back as the *coup d'état* carried out by Louis Napoleon in 1851. It is the purpose of the present chapter to trace American sentiment toward France from the outbreak of the revolution of 1848 to the outbreak of the Franco-German War. The chapter will be divided into three chief parts, first the Second French Republic, second internal affairs during the Second French Empire, and third foreign affairs during the Second French Empire. In the first division, a study must be made of American opinion in respect to the overthrow of Louis Philippe, the establishment of the Second Republic, the terrible June Days, the formation of a constitution, the election of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte as president, his *coup d'état* in 1851, and the resulting foundation of the Second Empire in 1852. In the second part of the chapter, the American attitude toward the constitution of the Second Empire, its eco-

nomic and political policies and achievements, and its gradual liberalization must come under review. In the same section will be found an analysis of what Americans felt about Napoleon III as a man and a statesman, as well as a study of American feeling toward the French people. In the third division, the American reaction toward Napoleon's foreign policy will be examined: his activities in the New World, especially in connection with his attitude toward the American Civil War and his ill-fated Mexican expedition; his policy in the Old World, culminating in his repeated and unsuccessful attempts to gain territorial compensation for the rapid growth of Prussian power under the North German Confederation.

THE SECOND FRENCH REPUBLIC

As has been mentioned in an earlier chapter, Americans were far more interested in the revolution of 1848 in France than in the movements which were going on at the same time in the Germanies.¹ Official notice of the momentous events in France was taken almost immediately by the American government. The newspapers devoted a much greater amount of space to French than to German affairs. Small provincial newspapers which made almost no mention of the events in Germany gave attention to the French revolution. References to the establishment of a republic in France in 1848 can be found in the writings of many American statesmen and private individuals who were silent on the contemporary happenings in Central Europe.² The explanation probably lies partially in the fact that the movement began in

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 20.

² E. g., *Scioto Gazette*, *Cincinnati Chronicle*, *Warsaw Signal*, Margaret Fuller, James W. Alexander, John J. Crittenden, Henry W. Hilliard, Henry W. Longfellow, George P. Marsh, Josiah Quincy, Donald G. Mitchell.

France, took a more dramatic form there and a form more calculated to arouse American sympathies, and partially in the fact that the American people were more closely bound to France by ties of commerce and sentiment than to any other part of the continent.

But few tears were shed over the downfall of Louis Philippe. George Bancroft said that there was "no sympathy, and no respect" for him, and the *New York Evening Post* thought that an authority constituted like that of Louis Philippe deserved no obedience. The *New York Herald*, which had highly praised Louis Philippe's statesmanship as late as January 26, 1848, had no sympathy for the fallen monarch.¹ Among the papers and periodicals examined, only the *Washington National Intelligencer* and the *North American Review* praised Louis Philippe's government in retrospection. Harrison Gray Otis of Boston was warmly sympathetic with the dethroned king.² But these were exceptions and not characteristic of American opinion.

The official attitude of the United States was decidedly friendly to the new republic. Richard Rush, American Minister to France, broke with his colleagues in the diplomatic corps, when he made his recognition of the republic conspicuous by going personally to the Hotel de Ville, the seat of the provisional government, only four days after its formation.³ This rather rash action, which Rush himself

¹ *New York Herald*: Jan. 26, March 19, 1848; *New York Evening Post*: April 6, 1848; Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 32. Cf. also later attack upon Louis Philippe's regime, *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 29, 1857.

² *Washington National Intelligencer*: March 21, March 27, 1848; *North American Review*: July, 1848, Jan., 1849; Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 91. In 1850 James W. Alexander spoke of the death of Louis Philippe, and called him "the greatest monarch of our day." Cf. Alexander, *Familiar Letters*, vol. ii, p. 125.

³ For American opinion of the French revolution of 1848, the author is much indebted to Professor Eugene N. Curtis. He has borrowed

mistrusted, was enthusiastically ratified by the Polk administration. The President's attitude was unmistakeable. In his *Diary* he called the French revolution "the most remarkable, as well as the most important event of modern times." On April 3, 1848, he despatched a special message to Congress apropos of the events in France, in which he said that Rush's generous act met with his "full and unqualified approbation." If possible, Buchanan's letter of approval to Rush showed the President's views even more strongly: "Indeed, had the representative of any other nation preceded you in this good work, it would have been regretted by the President." ¹

Congress showed itself nearly as friendly. A joint resolution of congratulation and recognition to the people of France and their new government was presented in the Senate on March 28 by William Allen, a Democratic senator from Ohio. After some changes in phraseology, some discussion of alternative resolutions, and considerable wrangling over amendments which congratulated the French on the abolition of slavery in their colonies, thus precipitating several heated slavery debates, the joint resolution was passed in the Senate on April 6, 1848, and in the House on April 10. The Democrats were for the most part friendly and desirous of upholding the administration and the Whigs were therefore contrary-minded. The only person in Congress who showed himself really opposed to the recognition of the Second Republic was John C. Calhoun who thought that the French

freely from Chapter III of Professor Curtis' scholarly monograph, *The French Assembly of 1848 and American Constitutional Doctrines* (New York, 1918), and especially from his able article, "American Opinion of French Nineteenth Century Revolutions," which appeared in the *American Historical Review* for January, 1924. Cf. *French Assembly of 1848*, pp. 69-78.

¹ Buchanan, *Works*, vol. viii, pp. 32-33; Polk, *Diary*, vol. iii, p. 413; Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi, p. 2429.

were not ready for republicanism and that the action of Congress was premature. He said, "They have decreed a republic, but it remains for them to establish a republic."¹ On the other hand the resolution was strongly supported in the Senate by Stephen A. Douglas and Senator Edward A. Hannegan from Indiana. John J. Crittenden of Kentucky remarked: "This is one of the great events of the world, full of mighty consequences to mankind. . . . It is the greatest movement in civilized and social life which has occurred within our knowledge, one of the signs, and marks, and wonders of the times."² In the House the chief sponsors were Representatives Cummins from Ohio, McClernand from Illinois and Ingersoll from Pennsylvania. Almost the only scepticism in the House was expressed by Henry W. Hilliard from Alabama, who deprecated many actions of the young republic, maintaining that "every kingless government is not of necessity a republican government," and yet said: "It may be premature — it may even be rash; but I should think myself unworthy of a seat in an American Congress if I could refuse to cheer a people engaged in such a work."³ Professor E. N. Curtis in his monograph on *The French Assembly of 1848 and American Constitutional Doctrines* admirably sums up the feeling of Congress when he says, "Everybody wanted to congratulate France, the only question was as to the form of the congratulations."⁴

¹ *Works of John C. Calhoun* (New York, 1853), vol. iv, p. 451.

² Coleman, Mrs. Chapman, editor, *Life of John J. Crittenden* (Philadelphia, 1871), vol. i, p. 297.

³ *Speeches and Addresses of Henry W. Hilliard* (New York, 1855), pp. 150-153.

⁴ Curtis, *French Assembly of 1848*, p. 87; *Congressional Globe*, 1st Session, 30th Congress, pp. 549, 572-581, 590-592, 598-604. The *Richmond Enquirer* (April 7, 1848), and the *New York Herald* (April 3, 1848) attacked the Senate for its tardiness in passing the resolutions.

In addition, resolutions of congratulation were passed by bodies which ranged in importance and dignity from the Boston typographers and a group of New York Fourierists to the Board of Aldermen in New York City, the Pennsylvania legislature and the Democratic National Convention. Meetings were held on every hand—meetings of Franco-Americans, and of Irish-Americans who saw in the movement the beginning of a general upheaval in Europe which would afford Ireland an opportunity to revolt from Great Britain—meetings in practically every important city in the country, among others, Boston, New York, Washington, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, New Orleans, Richmond and Baltimore. Five separate meetings were held in New York on the single night of April 1, 1848, and on April 3 a monster mass meeting was held in City Hall Park, which was described by Bayard Taylor in a private letter in the following words:

We had one of the most sublime meetings I ever beheld, on Monday. One hundred thousand people . . . all united in one grand national congress, as it were, to rejoice over the freedom of France. I was on the stand with the French and Italian speakers. . . . I never beheld such enthusiasm as was manifested on the occasion.

At the New York meetings speeches were made by Major M. M. Noah, Albert Brisbane, Horace Greeley and Fernando Wood; at New Orleans, Mayor Crossman presided; at Philadelphia, letters were read from Martin Van Buren and John A. Dix; at a meeting of Washington journalists speeches were delivered by W. W. Seaton, Amos Kendall and Thomas Ritchie.¹

¹ Hansen-Taylor, Marie and Scudder, Horace E., editors, *Life and Letters of Bayard Taylor* (Boston, 1884), vol. i, pp. 123-124; New York *Tribune*: March 23, March 28, March 29, April 1, April 3, April 11, April 26, 1848 (The *Tribune* charged that several of the meetings were

Newspaper evidence also shows conclusively the popular sympathy in the United States with the French revolution of 1848. Nearly all of the newspapers examined were enthusiastic in their praise of the new government. The *Scioto Gazette* said that "that American would be recreant to his birthright" who did not sympathize with the events in Europe. The Richmond *Enquirer* spoke of the "enthusiastic joy which has everywhere welcomed the intelligence of the continued firmness and good order of the new Republic of France." The New York *Evening Post* spoke in a similar way: "The popular feeling in this country is, as might be expected, warmly in favor of the French revolution; the voice of the press agrees with the popular feeling."¹ The New York *Herald* graphically described the excitement which was produced in New York as soon as the news of the revolution became known:

The new revolution in France, the flight of Louis Philippe, and the establishment of a Republic, are on every tongue and palpitating in every bosom of this great metropolis. The excitement during the last two days has been tremendous, and the public feeling has expressed itself in every possible way—

held to make political capital for the Democratic party out of the immediate recognition of the new republic by the Democratic Minister to France); New York *Herald*: March 22, 1848; New York *Evening Post*: April 4, 1848; Washington *National Intelligencer*: March 27, April 7, 1848; New Orleans *Picayune*: April 12, 1848; Philadelphia *Public Ledger*: March 23, 1848; Richmond *Enquirer*: March 24, March 31, April 14, April 24, 1848; Stanwood, *History of the Presidency*, vol. ii, p. 235; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. i, p. 518 *et seq.*; Curtis, *French Assembly of 1848*, pp. 93-96. Mordecai M. Noah had long been famous in New York as a journalist, and was highly regarded as a man of letters and public-spirited citizen. Fernando Wood later became one of New York's most noted mayors and had a long term in Congress ahead of him.

¹ New York *Evening Post*: April 6, March 29, April 10, 1848; Richmond *Enquirer*: March 31, March 21, April 7, 1848; *Scioto Gazette*: April 5, 1848.

celebrations, the hanging out of flags, speeches and congratulations of all kinds, have occupied the people for the last forty hours.¹

The same enthusiasm can be discovered in the writings and speeches of prominent Americans. Nearly all were warmly sympathetic with the course of events in France. The popular interest was well expressed by George P. Marsh who said that the American people had forgotten the Mexican War, and all domestic matters, except of course the coming presidential election, "which an American never loses sight of." Little John Davis Long recorded in his diary, "The people [*sic*] in France have opened a Republic."² George Bancroft wrote to Edward Everett, "The drama has been one, where the people have acted sublimely."³ Henry W. Longfellow was even more enthusiastic: "All conversation now turns on the French revolution. '*Vive la République!*' Thus far singular wisdom seems to have guided the counsels of the Provisional Government."⁴ At least one American, Charles G. Leland, later prominent as an author, fought on the side of the republicans in France. His motive seems to have been chiefly adventure, and he must have made a picturesque figure from the picture drawn by his biographer,

¹ New York *Herald*: March 20, April 3, 1848; New York *Daily Globe*: March 21, 1848; New York *Tribune*: March 21, 1848; Albany *Argus*: March 28, 1848; New Orleans *Picayune*: March 26, 1848; Charleston *Courier*: March 29, 1848; Savannah *Republican*: March 27, 1848; *American Messenger*: May, July, 1848. Many of these references have been taken from Curtis, "American Opinion of French Revolutions," p. 256.

² Long, *Journal*, p. 16; Marsh, *Life and Letters*, vol. i, p. 117.

³ Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 31. Cf. also pp. 85-92.

⁴ Longfellow, *Life*, vol. ii, p. 112. Cf. *supra*, p. 19 for poem by Thomas Buchanan Read; *Nineteenth Century*: 1848, vol. ii (art. by Theophilus Fisk).

"with his rakish student cap set on one side of his long hair, a monocle in one eye, a red sash about his waist, a dirk and pistol for arms, so tall that he towered high above the mob."¹ The judgment of James Buchanan in a letter to Richard Rush seems to be a pretty accurate description of American sentiment during the early days of the revolution: "It was, therefore, with one universal burst of enthusiasm that the American people hailed the late glorious revolution in France in favor of liberty and republican Government."²

In examining the causes for American sympathy with the French revolution, one is constantly struck by the surprise and pleasure with which Americans noted the moderation and comparative bloodlessness of the change. The fact that it had met with so little opposition seemed convincing proof that it would be permanent. George Bancroft said: "The French government is making the transition with the least possible confusion. . . . The moderation of people is marvelous."³ James W. Alexander's remark was very similar: "That the Republic should slip on the rails, as by a mere turning of the switch, with no friction and loss of life, is wonderful."⁴ Charles G. Leland thought the moderation exhibited was "almost unprecedented," and said, "In short, *this* revolution is doing its best to be honest and decent."⁵ Ref-

¹ Pennell, Elizabeth Robins, *Charles Godfrey Leland—a Biography* (Boston, 1906), vol. i, p. 135.

² Buchanan, *Works*, vol. viii, p. 33. In the same letter Buchanan took the opportunity to suggest that the change in government in France might effect a relaxation of burdensome restrictions upon American imports to France, and in a later letter he specifically mentioned tobacco as one American export which had been discriminated against. Cf. *ibid.*, vol. viii, p. 53.

³ Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, pp. 91-92. Cf. also Longfellow, *Life*, vol. ii, pp. 111-112.

⁴ Alexander, *Familiar Letters*, vol. ii, p. 81.

⁵ Pennell, *Charles Godfrey Leland*, vol. i, pp. 194-195.

erences could be multiplied on this point from representative newspapers.¹

A second cause for American sympathy was the remembrance of the aid given to the United States during the American revolution. We should be showing only common gratitude by sympathizing with our traditional friend. The *American Messenger*, the organ of the American Tract Society, said there would now be a new bond which would strengthen "all the cords that have hitherto bound the two nations." President Polk in his message to Congress said that Americans could never forget French aid in the past. The *Savannah Republican* and the *Richmond Enquirer* expressed the same view. As the latter paper said: "That gallant nation gave us mighty aid in our early struggle for free government, and it peculiarly becomes the people of the United States to cheer on, with their encouragement and sympathy, the noble deeds of our Transatlantic Republican brethren."²

But probably the most important cause for American sympathy was the fact that France was establishing a republic, and was thus approximating American political institutions. Republicanism was sure to be cheered by Americans wherever it might be found, and certainly it evoked their praise when established in France. American pride could not fail to be flattered at what was rightly believed to be the copying of American ideas. George Bancroft spoke of "the echo of American Democracy" which was being heard in France.

¹ New York *Tribune*: March 20, 1848; New York *Evening Post*: March 20, March 29, April 26, 1848; New Orleans *Picayune*: March 26, 1848; *Richmond Enquirer*: March 21, March 24, March 31, April 7, April 11, 1848; *Washington National Intelligencer*: April 7, 1848 (description of meeting of the press in Washington); *New Englander*: July, 1848; *Nineteenth Century*: 1848, vol. ii (art. by Theophilus Fisk).

² *Richmond Enquirer*: April 14, March 21, 1848; *Savannah Republican*: March 27, 1848; *American Messenger*: May, 1848.

The Richmond *Enquirer* said it would be most happy to see France "establish a Republic on the model of our own." President Polk thought that the French people were "imitating our example." Gustave Koerner bears witness to the fact that the Americans felt "proud and elated that a great nation should have adopted a Republican form of government like their own."¹

But not all American opinion was so favorable to the course of the revolution even in its early stages. The outstanding example of hostility toward the changes in France was the Washington *National Intelligencer*, one of the leading Whig papers in the country. It attacked the revolution as the work of a mob and as an usurpation of power. Chaos and eventually a despotism, much worse than the rule of the Citizen King, would be the inevitable result of such an outbreak. The Cincinnati *Chronicle* from the beginning took much the same view, and soon many other papers swung over to the same side—the New York *Express*, New York *Courier and Enquirer*, Savannah *Republican*, North American *Review* and *Brownson's Quarterly Review*. The North American *Review* expressed the shift well: "After the first insensate shout of joy had been uttered on the reception of the news from France, there was hardly a reflecting person in this country who did not feel his spirit sink within him, as he waited with anxiety, and almost with consternation, for further intelligence from Europe."² Among the private in-

¹ Richmond *Enquirer*: March 21, April 7, 1848; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. i, p. 515 *et seq.*; Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 33; Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. vi, pp. 2429-2430. Later Bancroft said: "I am not prepared to say, that they are certainly wrong, because they do not in all things imitate us"—vol. ii, p. 86.

² North American *Review*: July, 1848, Jan., 1849; Washington *National Intelligencer*: March 21, March 27, 1848; Cincinnati *Chronicle*: April 3, April 5, 1848; Savannah *Republican*: April 4, 1848; *Scioto Gazette*: April 5, 1848; *Brownson's Quarterly Review*: July, 1848; Curtis,

dividuals who took the same stand were John C. Calhoun, Daniel Webster, Josiah Quincy, Thomas Robbins, James Fenimore Cooper and W. Gilmore Simms. Webster thought that the provisional government was composed of idealists and poets, and not practical statesmen. Conservative Thomas Robbins, founder and librarian of the Connecticut Historical Society, was alarmed, and wrote in his diary: "There is much rejoicing over the new French Republic. I have no confidence in it."¹ James Fenimore Cooper probably expressed his own viewpoint rather than that of his countrymen when he wrote, "No one seems to have much confidence in the immortality of the French republic."² Josiah Quincy saw no ray of light in the situation: "The attempt to establish a republic in France will end like all her other attempts: first, in the despotism of the many; next, in that of the few; and, lastly, in that of an individual. France has not one element of a republic."³

There can be no doubt that the feeling of pessimism increased in the United States as the revolution went on, and that by the time Napoleon executed his *coup d'état* in December, 1851, there had developed a pretty complete scepticism

"American Opinion of French Revolutions," pp. 259-260. The *Richmond Enquirer* made a severe attack on the *Intelligencer*, saying that if its viewpoint was correct, all memories of the American Revolution must be blotted out, March 31, 1848.

¹ Robbins, *Diary*, vol. ii, p. 898, pp. 896, 899, 903-904; Calhoun, *Works*, vol. iv, pp. 450-454; Webster, *Writings and Speeches*, vol. xviii, p. 280; Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 91; Trent, W. P., *W. G. Simms*, pp. 190, 340 (quoted by Curtis, "American Opinion of French Revolutions," p. 262).

² Cooper, *Correspondence*, vol. ii, p. 748. Cooper expected and preferred to see the Duke of Bordeaux on the French throne.

³ Quincy, *Life*, p. 494. Cf. also *Godcy's Lady's Book*: July, 1848 (art. by W. Gilmore Simms, a Southerner prominent as a fiction writer, who thought that France needed most some limitations on her suffrage).

toward it. Several events and causes helped to explain the ever-increasing distrust. In the first place, the revolution was believed to be the work of idealists, socialists and radicals, whose impracticable ideas very naturally culminated in the bloody June uprising in Paris. Another proof of their radicalism, at least to the pro-slavery element in the United States, lay in the abolition of slavery in the French colonies. In the second place, it came to be thought that the French people were unfit for republican institutions. They were fickle, unstable, impractical—not that it was entirely their own fault, for they had had little political education, and were enamored of a unified, centralized government. Centralization was incompatible with republicanism, which must be federal if it was to succeed. In the third place, they were said to have proved their incapacity for self-government by electing as their president Prince Louis Napoleon Bonaparte. His character, his policies as president, and the people who had elected him were all held in contempt if not in hatred by the American people.

Most of the early reforms of the provisional government—liberty of the press, universal suffrage and abolition of capital punishment—found a ready approval in the American press which regarded such reforms as signs of enlightenment.¹ But almost from the beginning the prevailing optimism was tempered with forebodings that many difficulties would have to be overcome. It was commonly feared that a foreign war would be the result, either one against France on the part of the absolute rulers of the old Holy Alliance, or else one of propagandism begun by the French republicans themselves. It was pointed out that the French people did not have perhaps a high enough political education to enable

¹ New York *Tribune*: March 29, 1848; New York *Herald*: March 29, 1848; New *Englander*: July, 1848.

them to establish a democratic republic without some severe struggles. Where could intelligent leaders be found, capable of directing the people through such a crisis and at the same time honest enough not to seize the power for their own selfish ends? The *Tribune* thought that the disorganized state of the finances might present a serious obstacle to immediate success. Buchanan warned the French against an aggressive foreign policy, a successful general, and a strongly centralized government. But Buchanan was hopeful in spite of the dangers, as were William Cullen Bryant, Samuel G. Howe, Henry Hilliard and Henry Wikoff. The *Portland Transcript* said: "But 'make or break,' it is a sublime enterprise, and well worth what it may cost."¹

But there were two policies of the provisional government which aroused real hostility from the very start. In the first place, many Southerners and pro-slavery Northerners attacked the decree abolishing slavery in the French colonies. The *National Intelligencer*, *Savannah Republican*, *Albany Argus* and *Charleston Courier* were all hostile.² Of course the Northern anti-slavery papers were all the more keenly

¹ *Portland Transcript*: April 1, 1848; *New York Tribune*: March 29, 1848; *New York Evening Post*: March 29, April 1, April 10, May 4, 1848; *New York Herald*: March 22, March 27, 1848 (On March 22, the *Herald* urged that the United States take an active part on the side of France should a general war break out. But two days later it advocated a strict neutrality in such a contingency); *Washington National Intelligencer*: March 21, 1848; *Scioto Gazette*: April 5, 1848; *American Review*: April, 1849; *Brownson's Quarterly Review*: July, 1848; *New Englander*: July, 1848; *North American Review*: July, 1848; Emerson, *Journals*, vol. vii, pp. 409-411; Buchanan, *Works*, vol. viii, p. 32; Godwin, *Biography of William Cullen Bryant*, vol. ii, p. 35; Howe, *Letters and Journals*, vol. ii, pp. 319-320; Hilliard, *Speeches and Addresses*, pp. 150-153.

² *Washington National Intelligencer*: April 3, 1848; *Savannah Republican*: April 4, 1848; *Albany Argus*: April 8, 1848; Curtis, "American Opinion of French Revolutions," pp. 258-259.

in favor of the revolution because it had abolished slavery in the French colonies.¹

A much greater cause of opposition, however, was the socialistic policy of the government embodied in the decrees shortening the hours of labor and establishing national workshops. Only the radical papers such as the *New York Tribune* and the *New York Globe* expressed any sympathy for these signs of socialism. True enough, William H. Channing, Fourierist and Christian Socialist, thought that Blanc's national workshops seemed reasonable.² But on the other hand the *New York Courier and Enquirer*, *Cincinnati Chronicle*, *Washington National Intelligencer*, *American Review*, *Democratic Review* and *Richmond Times* all condemned the socialistic theories. Webster attacked the attempt to guarantee employment to all people as impractical, and George Bancroft spoke of "Blanc's nonsense." Henry Hilliard called the socialistic measures the dreams of idealists and said, "Every one accustomed to the order of well-regulated liberty must see the danger of such legislation."³ The *New York Herald* made fun of Wall Street's fear of socialism, and George Bancroft and Henry W. Longfellow bore witness to the fright of conservative Boston. The former wrote: "At home Boston is frightened out of its wits. Mr. H. G. Otis

¹ *New York Tribune*: April 12, 1848; *New York Globe*: April 6, 1848; Curtis, "American Opinion of French Revolutions," pp. 259-260.

² *New York Tribune*: April 15, 1848; Curtis, "American Opinion of French Revolutions," p. 259; Frothingham, Octavius Brooks, *Memoir of William Henry Channing* (Boston, 1886), p. 469.

³ Hilliard, *Speeches and Addresses*, pp. 150-153; *New York Herald*: March 29, 1848 (quotation from *New York Courier and Enquirer*); *Cincinnati Chronicle*: April 17, 1848; *Washington National Intelligencer*: April 3, April 6, 1848 (quotation from *Richmond Times*); *Democratic Review*: April, July, 1848; *American Review*: July, 1848; Webster, *Writings and Speeches*, vol. xviii, p. 280; Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 92.

thinks Louis Philippe a deeply injured man; Mr. Webster condemns the revolution in toto, as the work of communists and anarchists. The *Daily Advertiser* is alarmed." ¹

But whatever diversity of opinion had existed in regard to the tendencies of French socialism gave way to a complete unanimity when the violent insurrection of the Parisian masses, crazed by unemployment and hunger, broke out in June, 1848, only to be subdued with the utmost ferocity by the National Guard under the leadership of General Cavaignac. Everywhere there was a feeling of satisfaction and relief that the rebels had been defeated. The *Tribune*, which might have been expected from its socialistic leanings to have sympathized with the Parisians, characterized the rebellion as a struggle between men representing law and order, who had at heart the best interests of the republic, and men devoid of political principles, whose success would have meant a period of anarchy. The liberal New York *Evening Post* said: "The conspiracy which has just been suppressed was simply a conspiracy against the French nation, contemplating the restrictions of tyranny in a new form." ² The *Herald* spoke of it as "the most violent, dangerous and fanatical insurrection which any country has ever exhibited," and called the issue one between order and republicanism on the one hand, and socialism on the other. The *Picayune* rejoiced in the triumph of "good order and freedom," declared that it felt no sympathy for the insurrectionists who had lost their lives, and blamed the whole affair on socialism. Both the

¹ Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 91; New York *Herald*: March 29, 1848; Longfellow, *Life*, vol. ii, pp. 111-112. Cf. Curtis, "American Opinion of French Revolutions," pp. 261-262. In 1854 George Sumner blamed the visionary schemes of 1848 for the *coup d'état* of 1851 (lecture reported in *Cincinnati Gazette*: May 9, 1854).

² New York *Evening Post*: July 13, 1848; New York *Tribune*: July 14, 1848.

Herald and the *Picayune* thought there had been foreign gold behind the movement, and that its leaders had been in reality the paid agents of the European monarchies which were anxious to destroy the republic. Characteristic of the American business man was the remark of the *New York Journal of Commerce*: "The feeling is general that no sacrifice less dreadful could have secured the permanent triumph of order and law."¹ Many Americans believed that the republic had been greatly strengthened by the defeat of the rebels and that henceforth its chances for success were vastly improved.²

A second reason why Americans were pessimistic over French affairs was their belief that the people of France lacked the essential qualities of character and of political education to make good republicans. In the first place they were wanting in common sense and were too impractical, as evidenced by taking up with such radicals as Blanc. The *North American Review* said: "Nowhere but in Paris could crack-brained theorists like Cabet, Louis Blanc, and Proudhon, have obtained even a hearing."³ The *Cincinnati Gazette* said that the French revolution had failed because of too much "social geometry." They were too willing to follow any despot, provided only that he would give them

¹ Quoted in *Washington National Intelligencer*: July 21, 1848; *New York Herald*: July 13, 1848; *New Orleans Picayune*: July 20, Aug. 25, 1848; *Niles' National Register*: July 19, 1848. It is interesting to note that Theophilus Fisk in the *Nineteenth Century*, 1848, vol. ii, ascribed the pessimism and hostility in the United States toward the course of events in France to the fact that American opinion was largely derived from English Tory sources.

² *New York Herald*: July 13, 1848; *Niles' National Register*: July 26, 1848. But the *New York Evening Post*: Sept. 27, 1848, thought the result of the June Days had been the establishment of an almost complete military despotism. Cf. also *Washington National Intelligencer*: Sept. 20, 1848.

³ *North American Review*: Oct., 1849.

military glory. They were believed to be vain, impulsive and fickle. Ralph W. Emerson expressed his belief in this French fickleness by saying, "The French change their Constitution as their shirt," and his conviction in their vanity thus: "If I had a barn-yard fowl that wanted a name, I should call him *France*. Never was national symbol so comically fit."¹ The *North American Review* went so far as to speak of the "violent, excitable, and utterly demoralized character" of the French population. At the beginning of the revolution the *American Messenger* had said that France must adopt the American secrets of success—"the gospel, the school, the press, and the pulpit." Donald G. Mitchell, better known as Ik Marvel, in his letters from Paris to the *New York Courier and Enquirer* was very bitter. He attacked the French for lack of morality, education, common sense and religion, and expressed his "firm conviction that the French are at present unfit for a republic."²

But French character was not believed to be so much at fault in causing the failure of French republicanism as the traditional French political practice of centralization. France was centralized rather than federal. She lacked vigorous local self-government and hence could not hope to achieve a strong national self-governing republic. Paris had too much power over the provinces. At the very beginning of the revolution the *Richmond Enquirer* had said that the vital

¹ Emerson, *Journals*, vol. viii, pp. 38, 43; *New York Tribune*: Aug. 4, Aug. 16, 1851; *Cincinnati Gazette*: March 22, April 15, 1851; *Washington National Intelligencer*: Sept. 20, 1848; *Portland Transcript*: Jan. 13, 1849; *North American Review*: July, 1848; Irving, *Life and Letters*, vol. iv, pp. 105-106.

² *Washington National Intelligencer*: July 21, 1848 (cites article from *Georgia Telegraph*); *American Messenger*: May, 1848; *North American Review*: July, 1848; Dunn, Waldo H., *The Life of Donald G. Mitchell* (New York, 1922), pp. 192, 183, 191.

question was whether the republic should be unified or federal. Very similar was the remark of the *Portland Transcript*: "France cannot take the United States as a model unless she changes her Departments into Independent sovereignties like our States. . . . If she undertakes a Republic, with a consolidated government, *she will fail*." ¹ The *New York Evening Post*, *New York Tribune*, *North American Review*, *Brownson's Quarterly Review*, *American Review*, all felt the same way. *Brownson's Quarterly Review* said: "The French may fancy that they are adopting, in substance, the American system; but they are mistaken. They do not adopt it at all. Their system is democratic centralism." ² The *New York Express* attacked the French for not copying American institutions, and said it was no wonder that they had failed. "Frenchmen have never consented once to study our system of government or our history. . . . A republic in France is utterly impossible, the way the leading men . . . are going on." ³ The *Cincinnati Gazette* summed up the feeling that the French people had very little political knowledge or ability, appropriately enough on the very day when Napoleon was making his *coup d'état* in France: "It seems very clear to us that the French people as a body know very little of Free Government limited by a written Constitution—of the practical operation of a Representative Democracy." ⁴

¹ *Portland Transcript*: April 1, 1848; *Richmond Enquirer*: March 21, 1848.

² *Brownson's Quarterly Review*: July, 1848; *New York Evening Post*: May 4, Nov. 29, 1848; *New York Tribune*: July 26, Dec. 27, 1851; *North American Review*: July, 1848, Oct., 1849; *American Review*: March and April, 1849.

³ Quoted in *Washington National Intelligencer*: July 15, 1848.

⁴ *Cincinnati Gazette*: Dec. 2, 1851.

An additional proof of the political incapacity of the French people was the election of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte as President of the Second French Republic. In the first days of the revolution the American press had taken little notice of the possibilities of a Napoleonic restoration. The *Herald* had mentioned it as a possibility, but dismissed it with a word of hope—which was almost confidence—that such a thing would not occur. Nor was very much attention paid to his election to the National Assembly in June. But more interest was displayed when he was elected president in December, 1848. This event had been foretold by the *Picayune* as early as July in an editorial which stated that although his election as president was probable, his lack of ability would prevent him from holding the office for any length of time. The *Portland Transcript* and the *New York Evening Post* both prophesied his election, but neither was enthusiastic over the prospect, and both saw that if he were elected the chief cause would be the magic of his name. The *Evening Post* said shortly before the election: "The persons principally spoken of for the office . . . are Cavaignac, Lamartine, and Louis Napoleon—a soldier, a poet, and a coxcomb. We are sorry to say that, from all we can learn, it appears that the coxcomb has rather the best chance of an election."¹ Later American opinion was rather sharply divided over the effect which his election might have upon the permanence of the republic. The *New York Express*, the *New York Courier and Enquirer*, the *Portland Transcript*, the *Richmond Enquirer* and the *North American Review* saw in it a deathblow to the republic. George Bancroft feared a *coup d'état* and was very doubtful of the future: "All parties are in the wrong; everybody is in the wrong. Common sense has dis-

¹ *New York Evening Post*: Nov. 16, 1848; *New York Herald*: March 19, 1848; *New Orleans Picayune*: July 16, 1848; *Portland Transcript*: Nov. 4, 1848.

appeared.”¹ The Richmond *Enquirer* was most pessimistic: “Our worst fears are realized. Louis Napoleon is elected President of France. . . . The French Revolution, we fear, has indeed ended in a nullity.”² The New York *Herald* stated that no American journal could see any way in which Napoleon’s election could possibly promote the advancement of democracy or republicanism in France.

The New York *Tribune* however, although it recognized the possibility of a *coup d’état*, was willing to impute good motives to the new French president so long as he committed no overt act against the republic. Charles A. Dana, who was in Paris at the time, credited him with only base aims, but ridiculed the idea that he possessed the capacity to effect a *coup d’état*. A rather favorable estimate which was at the same time a remarkable prophecy was given by John M. Mackie, a fairly prominent student of German affairs, in the *American Review*:

That Louis Napoleon is ambitious, we take for granted. . . . Still, there appears to be no sufficient reasons [*sic*] for doubting that he is a man of honor, and that he designs to keep his word. . . . But his partisans will be ready enough to strike down the Constitution for him, should it become necessary to do so; and the people will ratify the act by a stronger vote than was ever cast to increase the powers of Napoleon himself.³

The following selections from an anonymous poem which

¹ Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, pp. 95-96; New York *Herald*: Jan. 5, 1849 (quotations from New York *Courier and Enquirer* and New York *Express*); Richmond *Enquirer*: Jan. 2, 1849; Portland *Transcript*: Jan. 13, 1849; North American *Review*: Oct., 1849.

² Richmond *Enquirer*: Jan. 2, 1849; New York *Herald*: Jan. 5, 1849. For opposite view *cf.* *Herald*: Jan. 4, 1849.

³ *American Review*: April, 1849; New York *Tribune*: Jan. 2, Jan. 4, 1849.

appeared in the *Democratic Review* also express rather well, though in doggerel verse, the hopes and fears which were aroused by the election of Napoleon as president of the republic:

Scion of the brave and great,
Who can mark thy coming fate?
Who may tell the destiny
That henceforth awaiteth thee?
Napoleon's spirit yet may shed
A bright halo around thy head!

France and Frenchmen now rejoice
Thou'rt proclaimed her people's choice!
Seek thy greatness in her own—
Dream not of a despot's throne—
Thou must battle for the free,
Or a curse will light on thee!

Like an eagle thou may'st soar;
With her legioned hosts in war,
But it must be freedom's fight,
For she now with giant might,
Proclaimeth kings of little worth—
Earth-born and but the sons of earth.

Be thou great in doing good,
Ambitious be of honest fame;
Seek not to win the multitude
With ideal pomp;—a mighty name
Hath placed thee on the pedestal—
It can as soon proclaim your fall.¹

Comparatively little opinion was expressed regarding

¹ *Democratic Review*: March, 1849.

Napoleon from the time of his election as president until the months immediately preceding the *coup d'état*, but even that little was distinctly unfavorable. It is true that the *Portland Transcript* in 1849 expressed its opinion that the republic seemed to be increasing in power, and admitted that Napoleon possessed ability. Both the *Transcript* and the *Richmond Enquirer* were favorably impressed by his inaugural speech. The *New York Herald* and the *New Orleans Picayune* expressed some admiration for his ability, and the *American Messenger* hoped that he might possess all of the virtues of Louis Philippe and Napoleon I combined and none of their vices. The *Cincinnati Gazette* praised his tact, but thought he had only mediocre abilities, and on another occasion spoke of him as "the mountebank Napoleon." Thomas G. Appleton, a well-known figure in Boston society, who visited France in 1850, applied the tests of phrenology to the president and came to the conclusion that he possessed "fine courage, good firmness, small self-esteem, fair frontal width, and reasoning powers, with large observing organs, and an eye strong, concentrated, and thoughtful. These things are well, and people till lately have not done him justice."¹ But Charles A. Dana felt that no confidence could be placed in Napoleon's promises; Samuel G. Howe spoke of "the poor thing" whom fate had put in charge of France; and Henry W. Longfellow regretted that so many young Americans seemed to have praise for Napoleon. The *Tribune* described him as "mentally and morally deficient," while the *Herald* stigmatized him as the "degenerate Napoleon."

¹ Hale, Susan, editor, *Life and Letters of Thomas Gold Appleton* (New York, 1885), p. 276; *New York Tribune*: Sept. 15, 1851, Jan. 4, 1849; *New York Herald*: Aug. 4, Jan. 4, July 1, 1849; *New Orleans Picayune*: Dec. 19, 1851; *Richmond Enquirer*: Jan. 19, 1849; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Feb. 1, 1850, April 15, 1851; *Portland Transcript*: Jan. 13, March 31, April 28, June 30, 1849; *American Messenger*: Feb., 1849; Howe, *Letters and Journals*, vol. ii, p. 319; Longfellow, *Life*, vol. ii, p. 204.

Whatever Americans may have thought of Napoleon the man during his presidency of France, it is certain neither his domestic nor his foreign policy was popular in the United States. The support given to Pope Pius IX to crush the Roman republic and to reestablish his temporal authority, was attacked severely by the American press and by private individuals. The Richmond *Enquirer* rejoiced in the early French defeats, and the Portland *Transcript* considered the expedition as calculated to alienate from France "the confidence of the friends of liberty." Margaret Fuller Ossoli, who was in Rome with her husband actively supporting the city's resistance, called the action a perfidy, and blamed the National Assembly and the French people for acquiescing in it. William Wetmore Story characterized the French action as "the most unjustifiable invasion and aggression," and John Forney said, "False France betrayed heroic Rome into the arms of sacerdotal tyranny." Longfellow was characteristically indignant: "Shame, eternal shame to the French Republic! An everlasting blot on the escutcheon of France."¹

In domestic affairs Napoleon was believed to be trying to seize power for himself. He had muzzled the press, very naturally the worst of crimes to the mind of an editor. William Cullen Bryant said there was no liberty of the press or of assemblage. It was a republic only in name. The expulsion from France by Louis Napoleon of Albert Brisbane because of his socialistic utterances was severely condemned by the *Tribune*, and by at least one socialist organization in the United States, the *Club de l'Union Socialiste*.

¹ Longfellow, *Life*, vol. ii, p. 143; Richmond *Enquirer*: Aug. 28 (art. by John Forney), June 1, Sept. 11, 1849; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Oct. 21, 1851; Portland *Transcript*: May 12, 1849; Irish *American*: Aug. 19, 1849; American *Messenger*: Sept., 1849; Greeley, Horace, *Recollections of a Busy Life* (New York, 1868), pp. 184-185; James, *Story and his Friends*, vol. i, p. 154; Fisher, *Life of Benjamin Silliman*, vol. ii, p. 113.

The *Portland Transcript* accused Napoleon of trying to consolidate his power at the time when he moved into the Tuileries, and thought that he was aiming at the assumption of his uncle's crown, but said that "no counterfeit hero can now make the presidency a stepping stone to imperial power." The *Richmond Enquirer* called him "at heart a contemner of popular rights, a hypocritical agent in putting down the Republican cause, and a guilty aspirant after absolute, imperial power," but said that if he was trying to overthrow the French Republic it would be "the vainest and rashest enterprise ever conceived by mortal." The *Irish American* was far more pessimistic when it wrote in 1849: "France, imbecile, mad, weak, vain, dishonest France—who has deceived the world—is drifting fast into the usurpation of an idiot."¹

In 1851 it became apparent that a crisis was at hand. According to the constitution Napoleon could not be reelected, and his term was due to expire early in 1852. If he could not get the Assembly to change the constitution, he must pass from power unless he should seize control by force of arms. All this was sensed by the American press, which also saw the point of Napoleon's desire to restore universal suffrage, which had been seriously curtailed by the National Assembly. Such a manoeuvre could only make him more popular with the masses, and at the same time tend to make the National Assembly odious in the people's estimation. The *International Magazine* saw through Napoleon's plots and attacked him as an "unscrupulous ruler." The *Tribune* was quite confident that the "desperate ambition" of Napoleon would come to naught, and that the republic was daily growing in strength.

¹ *Irish American*: Aug. 26, 1849; *New York Tribune*: April 28, May 2, 1849; *Richmond Enquirer*: Sept. 21, Nov. 23, Aug. 31, Nov. 20, 1849; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Oct. 21, 1851; *Portland Transcript*: May 25, 1850, Dec. 15, 1849, April 13, April 20, June 15, Aug. 17, Nov. 20, 1850; Godwin, *Biography of William Cullen Bryant*, vol. ii, p. 49 *et seq.*

The *Cincinnati Gazette* feared that he might gain power through a *coup d'état*, and on December 22, 1851, prophesied that a revolution would come within three weeks. The New Orleans *Picayune* was able to speak with complacency of an empire, and said that if it came it would be "a political necessity, for the occurrence of which its adversaries will have to share the responsibility, inasmuch as they do everything they can to demonstrate that no other government is possible." But the *Picayune* was not consistent in holding to the above expressed sentiments, and the prevalent American opinion during the summer and fall of 1851 seemed to be that Napoleon was playing a desperate game for the continuance of power in his own hands, but that he would not be successful.¹

It is true that many Americans were very much disillusioned about the ability of the French people to establish really republican institutions on the American model, but it is also true that the violent overthrow of the Second French Republic, unpopular as it had become in the United States, was received by most Americans with an outburst of indignation. The author of the *coup d'état* was attacked severely in most quarters, and the American people chalked up the first count in the indictment which they presented against him in the fateful year 1870.

Some favorable opinion did exist in the United States. The New York *Herald* frankly confessed that the act of Louis Napoleon was an usurpation of power, that he had established an absolute military despotism, dependent in the last resort upon the support of the army. But at the same time

¹ New York *Tribune*: Aug. 4, April 24, July 3, July 7, Sept. 12, 1851; New York *Herald*: Nov. 25, Dec. 15, Dec. 24, 1851; New Orleans *Picayune*: April 9, July 23, Sept. 28, Dec. 19, 1851; *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 29, Oct. 31, Dec. 2, Dec. 22, 1851; *International Magazine*: Dec., March, June, 1851. In 1854, in an analysis of the causes for the *coup d'état*, George Sumner laid emphasis upon Napoleon's promises of universal suffrage (lecture reported in *Cincinnati Gazette*: May 9, 1854).

it was maintained that the French people had shown themselves unfit for a conservative republic. They were frivolous, vain, impractical, unable to rule themselves, and therefore deserved a tyrannical government. Nor did the *Herald* believe that the government of Napoleon, despotic as it might be, would be without its compensations. It would at least promote order and material prosperity. The argument of the illegality of the *coup d'état* failed to move the *Herald*. Had not the revolution of 1848, and in fact all revolutions, in so far as they overturned the established legal order, been just as illegal? Finally, the *Herald* evinced a sort of admiration for the man who possessed the courage, skill and nerve necessary to carry through such a daring scheme. The New Orleans *Picayune* likewise found something to admire, or at least to respect, in the boldness of the *coup d'état*. Certainly it proved that Napoleon possessed great talents hitherto unsuspected and that such a man could be treated with neither contempt nor disregard. The fact that Napoleon was to base his power upon universal suffrage seemed to the *Picayune* to prove that his government must be progressive. "It will compel a policy in harmony with the sympathies of the masses of the French people."¹ The Cincinnati *Gazette* praised the abilities of Napoleon and thought that France might prosper under his rule if he gave her internal quiet, a strong government, and a wise commercial and industrial policy. Several prominent individuals also were favorable. James T. Fields thought him "a man for the time," and believed he would show himself "competent to carry out all his designs." James W. Alexander thought that Napoleon would increase the

¹ New Orleans *Picayune*: Dec. 25, Dec. 19, 1851; New York *Herald*: Dec. 21, Dec. 22, Dec. 24, 1851, Jan. 3, Jan. 20, May 6, 1852. But the *Picayune* was not at all uniformly favorable: cf. Dec. 4, 1851, Jan. 7, Jan. 13, Jan. 17, 1852.

power of Catholicism in France, and that any religion, even Catholicism, was better than atheism. He said, "One can't help feeling an admiration for Louis Napoleon's quiet force in his *coup d'état*." ¹ Washington Irving, who had entertained Napoleon while he was in the United States, was probably the most prominent American favorable to the *coup d'état*. When he first heard of the news he exclaimed, "It is one of the most complete things of the kind I have ever heard or read of, and quite Napoleonic." He believed that Napoleon would know how to flatter and humor the French people, that he would give France tranquillity, that he would beautify Paris, and make it "the centre of everything splendid and delightful." ²

It has been noticed that the *Herald* considered that a tyrannical government was just what a people deserved, who had shown themselves so unfit for republicanism as had the French. The *coup d'état* strengthened the feeling among many Americans that the French people were incapable of democracy. The *Cincinnati Gazette* thought that they were sacrificing their liberties to a name, and said:

For to us it seems a miracle, that a man can tread upon the necks of the people, and then secure their free will sanction for him to remain there; and, until the whole act is played out, it seems almost impossible to tell whether Louis Napoleon is mad, or the French people, or all of them together. ³

The *Portland Transcript* made a similar attack upon a people

¹ Alexander, *Familiar Letters*, vol. ii, p. 168; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Jan. 1, 1852; Fields, James T., *Biographical Notes and Personal Sketches* (Boston, 1882), pp. 42-43.

² Irving, *Life and Letters*, vol. iv, pp. 106, 99-101.

³ *Cincinnati Gazette*: Jan. 6, 1852, Dec. 23, Dec. 25, 1851, Nov. 5, 1852.

"whose only deity is a name and who lick with servility the hand that has robbed them of their liberties . . . a people who know not what freedom is, and hail with equal delight a republic or a despotism." The *Tribune* blamed for Napoleon's success not the French people, but the old system of centralization—centralization in politics, in education and in religion—and the fact that the whole country took its orders from Paris. John Tyler said, "The idea generally, nay universally, prevails that France is unsuited to free government." Tyler agreed with the universal opinion, but added that the cause was not any inherent defect in French character, but rather the system of centralization.¹

Although many Americans believed that the French people had received only their just deserts, the feeling in the United States was none the less bitter against the author of the *coup d'état*. Thurlow Weed thought that the plebiscite would be a sham, and expected the *coup d'état* to "roll back the wheels of revolution." Benjamin Silliman, the noted geologist, spoke of "the late usurpation," and Samuel G. Howe of "Louis Napoleon's treason." Longfellow was himself violently opposed, but at the same time believed that Boston was apathetic. He said: "It is strange how coolly and complacently people here take the Napoleon usurpation. They seem rather to like it, that this man should violate his oath and trample upon the constitution of his country. I have hardly heard a word of reprobation."² The *International Magazine* for February, 1852, in its monthly summary said, "In

¹ *Letters and Times of the Tylers*, vol. ii, p. 496; *New York Tribune*: Dec. 27, 1851; *Portland Transcript*: Feb. 7, Oct. 16, 1852.

² Longfellow, *Life*, vol. ii, p. 211; Weed, Harriet A., editor, *Autobiography of Thurlow Weed* (Boston, 1884), vol. ii, pp. 205, 203-204; Fisher, *Life of Benjamin Silliman*, vol. ii, p. 113; Howe, *Letters and Journals*, vol. ii, p. 354.

France the march of despotism continues with rapidity.”¹ The *Portland Transcript* was highly indignant, declaring that the “treason of Louis Napoleon will take its place among the darkest deeds of history,” and at a later time saying that the report of Napoleon’s assassination was “too good to be true.” The *Cincinnati Gazette*, although admiring Napoleon’s abilities and blaming the French people for their acquiescence, made a severe attack upon the usurper: “By treachery, by fraud and by perjury, Louis Napoleon has thus far succeeded in his plans . . . with the blood of unoffending men and women on his hands, Louis Napoleon mounts the throne.”² Perhaps the most hostile paper in the country was the *New York Tribune*. It was not usually half-hearted either in its sympathies or its antipathies, and it attacked Napoleon unreservedly—his ability as well as his character. “Perjured villain,” “knave,” “bankrupt profligate living in open adultery,” were some of the epithets leveled at the man responsible for the fall of the republic. The massacres in Paris which accompanied the *coup d’état* were greatly exaggerated in extent and especially aroused the ire of the *Tribune*, which advocated that the government of the United States should refuse to recognize Napoleon’s government. One quotation will show the temper of the *Tribune*:

If anything could add to the horror and detestation generally felt in this country for the enormous treason of Louis Napoleon, it would be the details of the Parisian massacres. . . . Of all the miscreants who have waded through blood to thrones, none was ever guilty of a blacker crime than he.³

¹ *International Magazine*: March, Feb., 1852.

² *Cincinnati Gazette*: Nov. 5, 1852; *Portland Transcript*: Jan. 3, March 13, Jan. 10, Oct. 16, Dec. 11, 1852; *Irish American*: Jan. 17, 1852.

³ *New York Tribune*: Jan. 3, 1852, Dec. 22, Dec. 27, 1851, Jan. 6, 1852.

That the *Tribune* was not alone in desiring that the United States should refuse to recognize the new government is evident from a letter of Daniel Webster, Secretary of State, to the American Minister to France, William Cabell Rives. Mr. Rives had desired to refuse recognition, and Webster wrote in reply: "You sympathize, in this respect, with the great body of your countrymen . . . if the French people have now, substantially, made another change, we have no choice but to acknowledge that also."¹

That the *coup d'état* made an indelible impression upon the people of the United States is very evident from the numerous references which were made to it during the course of the Second Empire. A very few were laudatory. In 1853 the *North American Review* said, "The *coup d'état* of Louis Napoleon should have been a matter of congratulation to good citizens everywhere."² Perhaps even more favorable was the comment of the Rev. John S. C. Abbott in his apologetic biography of Napoleon which was published in 1869: "The *coup d'état* of Louis Napoleon will be pronounced by history to be the most brilliant and meritorious act of his life."³ But most of those papers and individuals who were quite favorable to Napoleon's policies as emperor, took care to state their abhorrence of the crime by which he had seized power. In 1858 the *Portland Transcript* referred to Napoleon as a man who had "usurped power by the aid of the sword," and who had "reached the throne through wholesale murder." *Harper's Weekly* in January, 1870, spoke of him as one who had "risen to

Webster, *Writings and Speeches*, vol. xiv, pp. 451-452; Weed, *Autobiography*, vol. i, pp. 628-629.

² *North American Review*: July, 1853, April, 1855.

³ Abbott, John S. C., *The History of Napoleon III. Emperor of the French* (Boston, 1869), p. 431; *De Bow's Review*: April, 1854.

power by the most flagrant falsehood and disregard of oaths." In 1854 *Putnam's Magazine* called him a "fellow who violated the most solemn oath before it was cold upon his lips, and imbrued his hands in the blood of his innocent countrymen." In 1866 the *San Francisco Bulletin* remarked: "Americans who remember the *coup d'état* will see in this utter defeat of his plan, and in the loss of prestige that must follow it, the first instalment of retributive justice."¹ In February, 1870, the *New York Tribune* made reference to the time of the *coup d'état* as "the day when fraud reared its throne upon massacre," and said: "It is impossible to forget at this time that Napoleon perpetrated one of the cruelest, most sweeping slaughters of a people and its liberties on record."² In 1865 John Hay gave utterance to similar sentiments in poetic or at least metrical form:

As Freedom with eyes aglow
Smiled glad through her childbirth pain,
How was the mother to know
That her woe and travail were vain?
A smirking servant smiled
When she gave him her child to keep;
Did she know he would strangle the child
As it lay in his arms asleep?

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The treasure of 'Forty-Eight
A lurking jail-bird stole,
She can but watch and wait
As the swift sure seasons roll.

¹ *San Francisco Bulletin*: Aug. 17, 1866; *Portland Transcript*: March 6, 1858; *Harper's Weekly*: Jan. 22, 1870; *Putnam's Magazine*: May, 1854.

² *New York Tribune*: Feb. 9, 1870, Feb. 15, 1856, April 23, 1858, Nov. 7, 1867.

And when in God's good hour
 Comes the time of the brave and true,
 Freedom again shall rise
 With a blaze in her awful eyes
 That shall wither this robber-power
 As the sun now dries the dew.

Afraid to fight and afraid to fly,
 He cowers in an abject shiver;
 The people will come to their own at last,—
 God is not mocked forever.¹

THE SECOND FRENCH EMPIRE—INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Internal affairs of the Second Empire can be logically treated under the heads of Napoleon III's economic and political policies. Before describing any part of Napoleon's domestic achievements it will be well, however, to find out what Americans thought of Napoleon the man. And after an analysis of American opinion of his economic and political policies has been made, it will be necessary to discuss briefly American sentiment toward the people who had sanctioned the Second Empire.

It has been noted earlier in this chapter that most Americans thought very unfavorably both of Napoleon's character and of his abilities. It is difficult to sum up the feeling during the Second Empire toward the Emperor, but it can be said that the great majority of Americans changed

¹ Hay, *Life and Letters*, vol. i, pp. 228-229; *New York World*: July 30, 1864; *Cincinnati Gazette*: May 6, 1865, Sept. 7, 1866; *Leslie's Weekly*: April 12, 1856; *Galaxy*: Dec. 15, 1866 (art. by H. A. Delille); *Knickerbocker*: July, 1853, April, 1855, July, 1858; *National Quarterly Review*: Sept., 1866; *North American Review*: April, 1870; Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, pp. 229-230; Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. ii, p. 65 *et seq.*; James, *Story and his Friends*, vol. ii, p. 42; White, *Autobiography*, vol. i, p. 96.

very little in their attitude toward his private character, although their opinion of his abilities was greatly modified. They continued to regard him as an essentially evil influence in European politics, with little right feeling, purity of motive or scruple in action. But many did become convinced of his wisdom, his intellectual capacity and his great executive ability.

The adjectives most often applied to the character of the Emperor of the French were "unscrupulous," "faithless," "insincere," "crafty," "treacherous" and "selfish." The three epithets which he had gained at the time of the *coup d'état*—"murderer," "perjurer" and "traitor"—stuck to him throughout a large part of his career. He was quite commonly, although not universally, regarded as being sexually immoral, a roué and a rake. Ralph Waldo Emerson accused him of violating even the common decencies of life, and the *Cincinnati Gazette* called him "an infamous creature, who came reeking from the stews of New York and London . . . more familiar with the brothels of Europe and America than with the principles of free government." Nearly every newspaper and magazine indulged itself in calling the Emperor names. The New Orleans *Picayune* described him as "a crowned accident of an accident," the Portland *Transcript* "an unprincipled usurper," the New York *Herald* "a political Tartuffe of the most unblushing kind," and the New York *Tribune* "Napoleon III, by the grace of unmeasurable perfidy and scoundrelism, Emperor of the French." No more complimentary were the terms applied to him by prominent individuals. Julia Ward Howe spoke of him as "a born despot of the meaner order," Daniel S. Dickenson, a prominent Democrat of New York, as "that frog-eating knave," Henry Ward Beecher as "this weak and wicked potentate," and John Murray Forbes, one of America's most noted financiers, as "that shrewd old

fox." John Lothrop Motley called him "the most dangerous malefactor who ever usurped supreme power," and "a quack who never did anything great or good in his life." Theodore Parker said, "I hold Louis Napoleon in loathing, and count him a Beelzebub," and William W. Story was even more emphatic: "My detestation of that man is unutterable; I never can forgive him his crimes."¹ James Russell Lowell wrote: "But what an impudent scoundrel Louis Napoleon is, to be sure!"²

The very sight of the man seemed to fill many Americans with distrust if not hatred. Several American travelers who were in France wrote back distinctly unfavorable descriptions of his features and the general aspect of his countenance and figure. John Bigelow thought that his

¹ Parker, *Life and Correspondence*, vol. ii, p. 315; James, *Story and his Friends*, vol. ii, p. 125; *New York Tribune*: Nov. 13, 1854, Feb. 9, May 1, Oct. 4, 1852, Jan. 11, Feb. 2, 1855, Feb. 15, April 5, 1856, Feb. 3, 1858, May 7, 1859, Nov. 7, 1867, Jan. 28, 1868, July 14, 1869; *New York Herald*: March 17, 1859, July 27, 1854, March 29, 1855, Jan. 7, 1857, March 31, 1858; *New York Times*: May 14, 1868, March 4, 1869; *New Orleans Picayune*: May 13, 1855, May 16, Oct. 16, Dec. 4, 1852, April 5, 1856, March 3, Sept. 10, 1859, Feb. 7, 1860; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Aug. 3, Feb. 18, 1853, July 26, 1859, Aug. 14, 1860, June 19, 1862, April 25, Aug. 27, Sept. 7, 1866, April 9, 1867; *Philadelphia Press*: Dec. 30, 1862; *Richmond Enquirer*: May 9, 1855, July 10, 1857, Aug. 1, 1859; *San Francisco Bulletin*: June 13, 1866; *Portland Transcript*: April 26, 1856, June 4, 1859, June 2, 1866; *Leslie's Weekly*: March 1, May 24, Dec. 13, 1862, Dec. 29, 1866, Nov. 30, 1867; *Harper's Weekly*: April 30, 1870; *Galaxy*: Dec. 15, 1866 (art. by H. A. Delille); *Atlantic Monthly*: Aug., 1859; *Knickerbocker*: July, 1858 (art. by E. L. Godkin); *New Englander*: Aug., 1859; *Harvard Magazine*: March, 1864; *Brownson's Quarterly Review*: July, 1859; *North American Review*: April, 1866; *Southern Quarterly Review*: July, 1854; *Dickenson, Speeches and Correspondence*, vol. ii, pp. 592, 631; *Emerson, Journals*, vol. viii, p. 347; *Howe, Reminiscences*, p. 194; *Motley, Correspondence*, vol. ii, p. 70, vol. iii, p. 132; *Biography of Rev. Henry Ward Beecher*, p. 399; *Hughes, Sarah Forbes, editor, Letters and Recollections of John Murray Forbes* (Boston, 1899), vol. ii, p. 107.

² Lowell, *Letters*, vol. ii, p. 59.

smile was "very sweet," but that it stopped so abruptly as to be an "unmistakable evidence of insincerity." To Mark Twain it was his eyes which inspired distrust—"half closed, and *such* a deep, crafty, scheming expression about them!" John Hay thought that his facial machinery for smiling seemed out of order and described his "eyes sleepily watchful—furtive—stealthy, rather ignoble; like servants looking out of dirty windows and saying 'nobody at home,' and lying as they say it." So deep was the hatred that the idea of assassination occurred to at least two highly respectable American citizens. William J. Stillman, who was in France in 1860, wrote: "I thought how easily I could change the course of European politics, for I could have hit any button on the Emperor's clothes, and I hated him enough to have killed him cheerfully, as an enemy of mankind."¹ The other American who had similar impulses was to become president of Cornell University—Andrew D. White. White declares in his *Autobiography*: "There was not at that time any human being whom I so hated and abhorred as Napoleon III . . . as I looked up and distinctly saw him so near me, there flashed through my mind an understanding of some of the great crimes of political history."²

In striking contrast to such violent expressions of hatred for Napoleon are the many evidences of American belief in his wisdom and ability. It is true that early in his career he had been looked on as the possessor of very few talents. But very gradually American opinion of his powers was almost completely reversed. Individuals and newspapers

¹ Stillman, *Autobiography*, vol. i, p. 325; *New York Tribune*: Nov. 30, 1855; *Portland Transcript*: Aug. 20, 1859; *Overland Monthly*: Aug., 1868 (art. by Mark Twain); Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. i, p. 247; Hay, *Life and Letters*, vol. i, p. 236.

² White, *Autobiography*, vol. i, p. 96.

which continued to speak slightly of his personal character and public policy gave a grudging recognition to his capability. His courage and boldness, firmness and wisdom in administration, tact in dealing with men, keen insight in predicting and handling events, untiring activity and watchfulness, all combined to force an admission of a certain measure of greatness.¹

The charm and power of his political writings and speeches evoked much praise from American sources. Even as keen a critic as Charles Sumner was compelled to remark, after a perusal of Napoleon's works: "Much as I dislike him I confess to having risen from them with a higher idea of his intelligence and of his character. . . . Two or three of his speeches seem to me masterpieces."² Every new address was eagerly scanned by American readers, and his life of Julius Caesar was reviewed, usually with favor, by many newspapers and magazines. Although it was quite generally recognized that the work held a very obvious brief for imperialism, the *National Quarterly Review* had praise for the evidences of research, and John

¹ New York *Tribune*: May 21, 1855, Jan. 15, Feb. 18, 1867; New York *Herald*: Dec. 14, 1853, July 27, 1854, Feb. 5, Nov. 7, 1855, Dec. 9, 1856, July 9, July 22, 1859, Aug. 12, 1860; New York *Times*: July 5, July 23, Sept. 30, 1866, Nov. 22, 1867, Jan. 26, Oct. 17, 1868; New Orleans *Picayune*: Sept. 24, Dec. 4, Dec. 9, 1852, April 5, 1856, July 27, Sept. 21, 1859, Sept. 21, 1860; Philadelphia *Press*: Dec. 30, 1862, April 16, 1864; Richmond *Enquirer*: July 10, 1857, Oct. 22, 1859, June 14, 1860, March 28 (speech of Col. L. Q. C. Lamar), July 2, 1863, Nov. 25, 1865; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Feb. 11, 1853, May 18, June 26, 1859; San Francisco *Bulletin*: Nov. 22, 1864; Portland *Transcript*: Jan. 21, 1854; *Leslie's Weekly*: April 12, 1856, March 19, 1870; *Galaxy*: Dec. 15, 1866 (art. by H. A. Delille); *De Bow's Review*: April, 1869 (art. by J. E. Nagle); *Overland Monthly*: April, 1870; *Brownson's Quarterly Review*: April, 1859; *Southern Quarterly Review*: July, 1854; *National Quarterly Review*: June, 1870; Appleton, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 203.

² James, *Story and his Friends*, vol. ii, p. 42.

Bigelow thought it possessed "sufficient literary merit." Even more favorable were the *Portland Transcript*, *Philadelphia Press* and *DeBow's Review*. The last named magazine declared that Napoleon had displayed "many fine qualities as a composer of history; deep research into the ancient classics; care and precision in weighing testimony, and a style terse, nervous, condensed, and never ambiguous." ¹

Many references could be cited to prove the belief of the American people in Napoleon's ability. The *New York Tribune* regretted that so many Americans who visited France forgot his many crimes and became enthusiastic over his greatness. *Harper's Weekly*, which was unfriendly to Napoleon in general, said, "We must admit that few rulers have ever displayed greater capacity for governing." ² Very similar was the remark of the *Philadelphia Press*: "View him as we may, there is no denying that Louis Napoleon is one of the master-minds of the world." ³ If papers which were usually quite hostile to Napoleon made such admissions, it is not wonderful that the few pro-Napoleonic papers should have praised him extravagantly. *Brownson's Quarterly Review* said, "That he is the ablest sovereign in Europe no man can doubt," while the *New York World* called him "by far the ablest monarch that had filled a throne for the last hundred years," and the

¹ *New York Times*: March 14, 1865; *Philadelphia Press*: May 11, 1865; *Richmond Enquirer*: Nov. 11, 1865; *Portland Transcript*: May 6, 1865; *De Bow's Review*: June, 1866; *National Quarterly Review*: Sept., 1866, June, 1870; Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. ii, p. 363.

² *Harper's Weekly*: Feb. 12, 1870; *New York Tribune*: Dec. 23, Sept. 7, 1869.

³ *Philadelphia Press*: Aug. 26, 1868, July 30, 1862, April 26, 1865, Aug. 17, 1868.

Atlantic Monthly described him as "one of the greatest statesmen that ever lived."¹

No less important is the evidence of prominent individuals. Napoleon seems to have cast his spell even over the editor of the *New York Tribune*, Horace Greeley. While in Paris in 1855 he was forced to admit that Napoleon was "probably the most active, untiring ruler now living," and certainly "no blockhead." Edwin L. Godkin, who as editor of the *Nation* was bitter in his denunciation of everything Napoleonic in 1870, wrote in 1862, "Louis Napoleon is really a great man, wise as well as shrewd."² When Henry Cabot Lodge as a boy in his teens visited Paris in 1866 he saw the Emperor with much interest, "supposed him to be a very great man," and said that in that supposition he "merely reflected the popular idea." John Mitchel, one of the best known Irish-Americans, said in a lecture in Cincinnati: "The central figure in European politics today is no other than Louis Napoleon."³ In describing an interview with Napoleon in 1859, William H. Seward wrote: "It seemed difficult to find a subject on which we could differ, or which he did not discuss wisely."⁴ Toward the end of his term in 1860, President Buchanan wrote: "I have viewed with admiration the gigantic and successful struggles of . . . Louis Napoleon. . . . He is undoubtedly

¹ *Brownson's Quarterly Review*: July, 1859; *New York World*: Dec. 22, 1864; *Atlantic Monthly*: Aug., 1859; *New York Herald*: July 22, 1859; *De Bow's Review*: April, 1854, June, 1860, April, 1869 (art. by J. E. Nagle); *Irish Citizen*: Sept. 25, 1869; *National Quarterly Review*: Sept., 1866.

² Ogden, Rollo, editor, *Life and Letters of Edwin Lawrence Godkin* (New York, 1907), vol. i, p. 254; *New York Tribune*: May 21, 1855 (letter from Horace Greeley).

³ *Cincinnati Gazette*: June 19, 1860 (lecture by John Mitchel); Lodge, Henry Cabot, *Early Memories* (New York, 1920), pp. 156, 157.

⁴ Seward, Frederick, *Reminiscences*, pp. 130, 424-426.

the man of the age. I am truly gratified that he thinks kindly of me.”¹ In 1861, Francis P. Blair, at that time in the cabinet, wrote to Bigelow that he looked to Napoleon to give support to American nationalism as he had but recently aided the cause of Italian nationalism: “The American as well as the Italian people will hail him as the saviour of popular sovereignty in the two hemispheres.”² And as late as 1865 Salmon P. Chase wrote to Bigelow: “Now looking over the world I see only one ruler who seems to me to merit the title of Great. That ruler is Napoleon.”³

American opinion, then, was divided in respect to Napoleon. Americans almost universally attacked his motives and private character. But there was a growing recognition, at least before the Civil War, of his very great intellectual and administrative abilities. Perhaps it might be fair to say that before 1862 most Americans hated and yet respected Napoleon III.

It is impossible in this place to make an extended study of American opinion in regard to the internal policies and problems of the Second French Empire. The material is voluminous, and a monograph could be written on this point alone. Probably there was as much comment in the United States on the domestic affairs of the Second Empire as on the whole subject of German unification. It is obvious that only a topical summary can be attempted here. Certain it is that American opinion was by no means of one mind in its attitude toward Napoleon's internal policies. Every newspaper made some favorable and some unfavorable comment. Probably most of New England with her satellites in the Middle West, a majority of the more radical Repub-

¹ Buchanan, *Works*, vol. x, p. 390.

² Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. i, p. 377.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 425. Cf. also Sherman, *Recollections*, vol. i, p. 405.

licans and of the strongest and most bigoted Protestants, were more hostile than were most Southerners, a majority of the Democrats, of the liberal Protestants and of all Catholics. But of the papers examined only the *Irish Citizen*, violently pro-Irish and pro-Catholic, was consistently enthusiastic.

One question which always interested Americans was the probable duration and stability of the Empire. At first it seemed as if such a government could not be lasting and must disappear very quickly. In 1852 the *Democratic Review* said of its probable duration, "It ought to be short, and it will be short," while in 1853 George W. Kendall prophesied: "My own opinion is, that if he retains the throne three years . . . he will be fortunate."¹ But as time passed and the Napoleonic régime seemed to grow in strength, these opinions changed, although the problem did not lose its interest. One very common belief was that it would last as long as Napoleon lived, but that it would never be handed on to his son. Closely connected with this idea was the feeling that a government in France usually lasted about a generation, and it was predicted therefore that the Empire would endure until a new generation had arisen which would be desirous of trying its hand at republicanism. Whenever Napoleon started a new foreign venture it was thought that its possible failure might accomplish his ruin, although when it proved to be successful the prophets were just as sure that it would strengthen his power. His attempted intervention in the Civil War made *Leslie's Weekly* declare: "His tenure of power is most uncertain. A breath has made him and a breath may un-

¹ New Orleans *Picayune*: Feb. 18, 1853, April 1, July 21, 1852; *Democratic Review*: May, 1852; New York *Tribune*: Jan. 3, 1852; New York *Herald*: Jan. 24, 1859; New York *Times*: Jan. 1, 1867; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Jan. 7, Jan. 14, 1859; *Land We Love*: Feb., 1868.

make.”¹ About the same time it was believed that the distress in France which arose from the difficulty in obtaining American cotton might seriously imperil his throne. And later in the sixties, after the failure of the Mexican expedition and the disappointment which Napoleon experienced in 1866 in attempting to get compensation from Prussia, it was thought that his power was surely weakening. The *Irish Citizen* complained that many American journalists had been prophesying for twelve or fourteen years that “the empire and dynasty, and life itself, of Napoleon the Third, have been trembling on the very brink of perdition.”²

One of the chief reasons why those Americans hostile to Napoleon thought that the Empire would be of short duration was the seeming economic rottenness of the régime. There were several years of poor crops, at each one of which George W. Kendall declared that Napoleon would not be able to last out the winter, and that should he be able to do so, he must be a very great man. It was known that taxes were exorbitantly high, and that little attempt was

¹ *Leslie's Weekly*: Dec. 13, 1862, Jan. 26, April 12, 1856; *New York Tribune*: Oct. 4, 1852, May 21, 1855, Oct. 2, 1856, June 16, 1860, Dec. 11, Dec. 20, 1866, Feb. 18, March 30, Nov. 7, 1867; *New York Herald*: Feb. 27, 1852, July 21, 1857, Feb. 24, 1858, July 31, 1859, March 17, 1860, Feb. 17, March 1, 1863; *New York Times*: Jan. 5, April 10, Nov. 27, 1864, Sept. 28, 1866, Jan. 13, 1867, April 6, April 12, 1868; *New Orleans Picayune*: April 4, 1855; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Jan. 1, 1852, April 9, 1858, Aug. 10, 1859, Aug. 27, 1866; *Richmond Enquirer*: April 8, April 23, 1856; *Philadelphia Press*: April 26, 1865; *Portland Transcript*: Dec. 11, 1852, April 12, Nov. 29, 1856; *Nation*: April 21, 1870; *Harper's Magazine*: July, 1863 (Easy Chair); Appleton, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 283.

² *Irish Citizen*: July 17, Nov. 6, 1869; *New York Tribune*: July 25, Nov. 22, 1867, Jan. 28, April 2, 1868, May 5, Oct. 15, 1869; *New York Herald*: May 19, July 28, Aug. 21, 1862, Sept. 11, 1863, Jan. 12, 1864; *New York Times*: Aug. 1, 1865, May 28, Aug. 15, 1866, April 12, 1868, April 11, 1869; *Philadelphia Press*: Dec. 18, 1868, May 27, 1869; *Portland Transcript*: Dec. 19, 1868; *Leslie's Weekly*: July 1, 1865, Nov. 30, 1867; *Nation*: Dec. 26, 1867, Jan. 7, 1869; Hay, *Life and Letters*, vol. i, p. 313.

being made to reduce them. On the contrary, it seemed as if they were being spent lavishly on public improvements, wasted in the extravagance and luxury of court life, or squandered on the upkeep of a huge military machine. It appeared unfair to make the peasants pay heavy taxes in order to keep the masses of Paris contented by the sale of bread at a lower price than that at which it could be produced. Lastly there was the belief that the period was one of stock gambling, in which all classes were interested and which had its focus in the operations of the *Crédit Mobilier*, a company formed, it was thought, of Napoleon's corrupt advisers and friends, and out of which they reaped huge profits. The *Herald* summed up the feeling on the financial condition of France when it said: "There is a financial sore at the bottom of the present French régime."¹

In contrast, indeed almost in contradiction, to the rather common American belief that the Empire was financially unsound was the quite general recognition of the commercial, industrial and agricultural prosperity of France. The Empire meant emphatically law and order, almost indispensable props to material well-being. The peasants were well off, and had been aided by the construction of canals

¹ New York *Herald*: July 21, 1857, June 27, Oct. 1, Oct. 5, 1856, Jan. 7 (lecture of George Sumner), Jan. 16, March 7, 1857, June 23, 1858, Feb. 16, 1859, May 21, 1862, March 2, 1863; New York *Tribune*: May 1, July 9, 1852, Jan. 1, April 14, Nov. 22, 1856, May 23, 1870; New York *Times*: Feb. 1, 1868; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Oct. 15, Oct. 28, 1857, Sept. 7, 1866; Richmond *Enquirer*: March 14, 1856, Feb. 22, 1866; New Orleans *Picayune*: April 1, July 21, 1852, Feb. 18, March 6, 1853, Nov. 20, 1855, Jan. 30, Oct. 24, 1856, Jan. 5, 1857, April 1, 1858; Portland *Transcript*: July 8, 1854, Jan. 24, 1863; *Leslie's Weekly*: Dec. 21, 1861, Nov. 30, 1867; *Nation*: Nov. 15, 1866, April 15, 1869; *Knickerbocker*: July, 1858 (art. by E. L. Godkin); *Putnam's Magazine*: Dec., 1856; *Harper's Magazine*: Feb., 1864 (Easy Chair); *Godey's Lady's Book*: March, 1870; *National Quarterly Review*: March, 1870; Ticknor, *Life, Letters and Journals*, vol. ii, p. 348.

and roads. Work was plentiful for the laborers in the cities, largely as a result of the far-reaching and systematic program of public improvements. The liberal association law which had allowed laborers to combine for their own protection was instanced as evidence of the beneficence of the government. Business was given nearly every possible encouragement—subsidies to a merchant marine, an ambitious colonial policy which would furnish both markets and cheap raw materials, and freedom of trade. Napoleon was even accused of truckling to bourgeois interests, and referred to as “the shopkeepers’ emperor.”¹

But to the hostile group of Americans, the very beneficence of Napoleon’s government—his public improvements, beautification of Paris, the Great Exposition of 1867—seemed merely to prove that the whole régime was one of crass materialism, and that the people had completely surrendered themselves to the pursuit of wealth and pleasure. They had chosen to follow Mammon rather than God, wealth rather than liberty, pleasure rather than virtue. Whereas on the one hand Paris was declared to have been made the most beautiful city in the world by Napoleon’s improvements, the same changes were bitterly attacked by John Lothrop Motley, who said:

¹ *New York Tribune*: Jan. 2, 1854, May 21, 1855, April 3, 1856, March 21, 1867; *New York Herald*: Nov. 23, 1852, March 8, 1856, July 21, Dec. 30, 1857, Jan. 14, Sept. 5, 1859, Aug. 22, Dec. 1, 1860; *New York Times*: July 23, Sept. 23, 1866, Jan. 4, July 2, 1867, Jan. 26, Jan. 27, Dec. 27, 1868, March 28, April 26, May 21, June 29, Oct. 27, Dec. 1, Dec. 31, 1869; *New Orleans Picayune*: May 22, Sept. 21, 1859; *Cincinnati Gazette*: April 11, 1861; *Philadelphia Press*: July 8, 1867 (art. by John Forney); *Richmond Enquirer*: Sept. 21, 1864; *Leslie’s Weekly*: Nov. 30, 1867; *Irish Citizen*: May 28, 1870; *De Bow’s Review*: April, 1854, March, 1866 (art. by W. B. Burwell), April, 1869 (art. by J. E. Nagle); *Galaxy*: May, 1866; *De La Salle Monthly*: March, 1870; *Penn Monthly*: July, 1870; *North American Review*: April, 1855; *National Quarterly Review*: March, 1870; Parker, *Life and Correspondence*, vol. ii, pp. 337, 358.

I suppose if the Massachusetts Legislature and the Boston city government should create a debt of forty million dollars in order to build a palace reaching from the old State House to Roxbury Line, . . . it would be considered an act of great wisdom and benevolence, considering the number of Irish hodmen and other laborers who would be sure to get employment; and yet that is pretty much what is going on in Paris.¹

Napoleon was directly accused of attempting not only to divert the mind of France from political reform by such magnificent spectacles as the Exposition, but also of trying to corrupt public morality by allowing immoral and indecent carnivals and theatres. France was claimed to be in a state of licentiousness comparable to the worst days of the decadent Roman Empire or of ancient Babylon, prosperous and wealthy but hopelessly corrupt.

By those Americans who were distinctly hostile to the Empire, the economic and social policies of Napoleon—whether the erection of a new public building in Paris, the opening of a railroad, or the Paris Exposition—all had the same purpose, to make the people of France forget the despotism under which they were governed. In the first place, the government of the Empire was absolutely irresponsible. In practice the entire power rested in the control of one man, whatever the checks to his absolutism might seem to be on paper. The Senate was entirely his creature, appointed by him and dependent upon his good will. The Corps Législatif was nearly as much in his power, because

¹ Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. i, p. 233; *New York Tribune*: March 20, Aug. 4, 1868; *New York Herald*: Jan. 7, 1857 (lecture by George Sumner); *New York Times*: April 8, 1866, March 24, July 2, July 4, 1867, July 20, 1868; *New York World*: Jan. 3, 1867; *Richmond Enquirer*: March 17, 1868; *Philadelphia Press*: July 4, 1867 (art. by John Forney); *Harper's Weekly*: Jan. 3, 1857; *Nation*: Nov. 23, 1865, June 13, 1867; *Brownson's Quarterly Review*: July, 1856; Alexander, *Familiar Letters*, vol. ii, p. 25; Welles, *Diary*, vol. ii, pp. 462-463.

the elections were very largely a sham. Intimidation and bribery were believed to be rampant, to say nothing of the immense influence which the Emperor exercised over elections by means of the extensive imperial patronage. Universal suffrage and the plebiscite were but ready instruments by which Napoleon could consolidate his power. Americans distrusted the use of the plebiscite because it seemed to be a weapon which Napoleon was directing at the power of the Corps Législatif. To them it seemed as if the principle of representative government might thus be endangered by a combined attack of people and executive on the legislative branch.¹

In the second place, there was little, if any, local self-government. Everything was centralized. The prefects were but so many of Napoleon's agents in the provinces, dependent absolutely upon him and obedient to his will. It was idle to talk of any real democracy so long as the prefectures remained.²

In the third place, and perhaps most important in American eyes, France under the Second Empire was believed to have been deprived of the essential political liberties. The apparent liberty of voting was not a reality. The courts

¹ *New York Tribune*: May 1, 1852, Jan. 29, 1855, Jan. 1, 1856, Feb. 9, April 23, 1858, Dec. 29, 1869, April 9, May 5, 1870; *New York Herald*: Feb. 8, 1852, Jan. 11, 1855, June 23, 1857, Feb. 9, 1858, March 8, 1859; *New York Times*: Jan. 5, 1864, Jan. 1, March 26, 1865, Aug. 3, 1866, Jan. 26, Aug. 29, Oct. 30, 1868, June 10, Nov. 14, Dec. 31, 1869; *New York World*: Sept. 1, 1864; *New Orleans Picayune*: Jan. 1, Feb. 6, May 16, Oct. 16, 1852; *Richmond Enquirer*: May 9, 1855, July 10, 1857, Nov. 4, 1867; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Feb. 18, Aug. 3, 1853; *Philadelphia Press*: Nov. 26, 1862, Dec. 31, 1864, Aug. 17, Aug. 26, 1868, May 27, 1869, April 25, 1870; *Nation*: July 6, 1865, Feb. 15, March 1, 1866, May 5, 1870; *Today*: March 27, 1852; *Brownson's Quarterly Review*: July, 1859; *Sherman Letters*, pp. 74-75.

² *New York Tribune*: Nov. 30, Dec. 29, 1869, Feb. 19, 1870; *New York Times*: Dec. 18, 1864. Cf. *infra*, p. 284.

were subservient to the imperial will, and showed favoritism, as in the murder trial of Prince Pierre Bonaparte. Arrests were summary in nature, and imprisonments for long periods without trial were common. Liberty of speech, of association, and of the press were lacking. Napoleon was probably attacked a greater number of times for his treatment of the press than for any other act of despotism. It was often asserted that the French newspapers were his most persistent enemy, and that by his treatment of them he was certainly preparing the path for his own downfall.¹

Probably the great majority of Americans were convinced that the form of the government of the Second Empire was autocratic, but there existed a large and intelligent minority who believed that the essence of the régime was democratic. It was based on the vote of the French people, a vote so overwhelming that it could not have been effected by any amount of intimidation or bribery. Surely there was a very great difference between an autocracy thus founded on the suffrages of the people, and an autocracy based on tradition or divine right. John Sherman praised it for giving a greater amount of substantial equality than any other government in the world, even that of the United

¹ *New York Tribune*: Jan. 1, May 1, 1852, Jan. 1, 1856, April 23, 1858, Dec. 11, 1866, March 21, 1867, Nov. 17, Dec. 10, 1868, Feb. 1, March 28, April 15, 1870; *New York Herald*: March 9, 1852, Aug. 28, 1855, March 7, 1857, March 9, 1858, Aug. 11, 1859; *New York Times*: Jan. 5, Jan. 10, March 6, Aug. 28, 1864, Jan. 1, March 26, Oct. 20, 1865, Aug. 17, 1866, July 4, 1867, Aug. 26, Aug. 29, 1868, April 11, May 18, 1869; *New York World*: Sept. 1, 1864, March 23, 1870; *New Orleans Picayune*: Oct. 16, 1852, May 13, 1855, Dec. 7, 1856, Oct. 28, 1859; *Philadelphia Press*: Nov. 29, 1867, Aug. 26, Dec. 18, 1868, May 27, 1869; *Richmond Enquirer*: July 10, 1857, Oct. 22, 1859; *Harper's Weekly*: Jan. 3, 1857; *Nation*: July 6, 1865, Feb. 15, 1866, Feb. 18, 1869; *Portland Transcript*: March 6, June 26, 1858; *Knickerbocker*: July, 1858 (art. by E. L. Godkin); *Harper's Magazine*: July, 1863 (Easy Chair), Nov., 1868; *Catholic World*: Nov., 1866; *Beecher's Magazine*: May, 1870.

States. To some Americans it seemed that Napoleon's régime was the necessary transition type of government which must bridge the gap between the old type of autocracy and the American type of democratic republic. It was pointed out that the French government was just as truly a product of popular sovereignty as that of the United States, and that if France desired to delegate all power to a monarch, no other people had any right to complain. The Rev. John S. C. Abbott called it bad manners on the part of the United States or any other nation to "assume that it is the celestial empire, and that all others are outside barbarians."¹

This group, which was tolerant of the French government, if not friendly to it, hailed with joy the increasing liberalization of the sixties. Not very much notice was taken of the changes in 1860, for the American people were too busy with other matters. But the reforms of 1867 and 1869 and the plebiscite of May, 1870, aroused considerable comment in the United States. The hostile group saw only a confession of weakness on the part of Napoleon, and distrusted both his sincerity and the effectiveness of the changes. These were but sops thrown to the public to disarm the ever-increasing opposition to the really despotic character of his government. No confidence could be placed in the promises of the author of the *coup d'état*. But even

¹ New York *Tribune*: Jan. 28, 1863, Jan. 23, 1867, April 2, 1868; New York *Herald*: Feb. 27, May 13, 1852, Feb. 22, Dec. 5, 1854, Sept. 23, Nov. 20, 1855, Dec. 9, 1856, Jan. 24, May 27, Sept. 21, 1859, Dec. 1, 1860; New York *Times*: June 29, 1866, April 26, 1869; New Orleans *Picayune*: Jan. 13, Feb. 6, Dec. 4, 1852, Feb. 18, 1853; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Feb. 10, 1853, May 9, 1854 (lecture by George Sumner), Sept. 28, 1855; Philadelphia *Press*: Aug. 26, 1868; *Harper's Magazine*: April, 1853, Nov., 1861; New Englander: Aug., 1859; Catholic World: Nov., 1866; De La Salle Monthly: March, 1870; North American Review: Oct., 1852; National Quarterly Review: March, 1870; Abbott, *Napoleon III*, p. 7; Sherman Letters, pp. 74-75.

the papers most unfriendly to the Napoleonic régime, such as the New York *Tribune* and the Cincinnati *Gazette*, were forced to admit at times that the French government seemed to be increasingly liberal. And those papers which had earlier been quite favorable, such as the New York *Times*, New York *World* and Richmond *Enquirer*, were now enthusiastic. The grant of a larger measure of freedom to the press, the passage of a really liberal law of association, the spectacle of a monarch allowing his people to ratify constitutional changes, and the appointment of a prime minister who had formerly been a republican, all seemed to point unmistakably toward the establishment of a liberal constitutional monarchy with a responsible ministry.¹

Thus American opinion was more favorable to the Second Empire just before its downfall than at any other time during its existence. In the early months of 1870 it is possible to find favorable expressions of opinion on the part of nearly every important paper examined. As late as May, 1870, the Portland *Transcript* said that the choice in the plebiscite lay between Napoleon and the radicals, and showed clearly its preference for the former. In April the New

¹ The following comments are unfavorable: New York *Tribune*: April 5, 1856, April 14, 1866, Jan. 23, Feb. 6, 1867, May 5, July 14, Sept. 18, 1869, Jan. 14, Jan. 18, April 26, May 23, 1870; New York *Times*: Sept. 22, 1867, Aug. 26, Nov. 18, 1868, July 14, July 19, Oct. 17, Nov. 30, 1869; New York *World*: May 17, 1870; Richmond *Enquirer*: July 30, 1869; Portland *Transcript*: Feb. 16, 1867; *Nation*: Feb. 11, 1869; *Appleton's Journal*: March 5, 1870. The following comments are however favorable: New York *Herald*: Aug. 22, Sept. 25, Dec. 15, 1860, Jan. 7, April 6, 1861; New York *Times*: Jan. 21, Feb. 6, Feb. 22, 1867, Aug. 1, Aug. 4, Aug. 6, Aug. 16, Nov. 19, 1869; New York *Tribune*: Aug. 2, Sept. 8, Dec. 29, 1869; New York *World*: Jan. 21, Feb. 19, 1867; New Orleans *Picayune*: Sept. 21, 1859; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Jan. 21, 1867; *Nation*: Jan. 24, March 28, Sept. 12, 1867, July 22, 1869; Portland *Transcript*: July 31, Aug. 14, Dec. 18, 1869; *National Quarterly Review*: March, 1870; Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, pp. 229-230.

York *World* said that the Emperor was crowning the edifice "with quite as much rapidity of late as could well be desired by anyone who has regard to the maintenance of the social order." In the same month the *Overland Monthly* remarked, "In France, the experiment of doing away with the personal government goes on."¹ In March *Leslie's Weekly* praised Napoleon's wisdom in yielding to the demand for a liberal government, and the *New York Tribune* said, although with many misgivings: "If conceived in good faith and fairly administered, it is the greatest [reform] yet proposed to France."²

But the comparative favor with which many Americans greeted the reforms of the last years of the Empire, was not conclusive proof that the majority had been converted to friendship for Napoleon. On the contrary, it will be seen that these reforms were almost entirely forgotten when the Franco-German War broke out. Indeed the expressions of approval they had called forth were not typical of American sentiment toward the Empire as a whole, and voiced hopes rather than deeply-founded convictions. And the deeply-founded convictions of most Americans toward the Empire were unfavorable. It will be interesting to cite a few brief quotations which sum up the varying attitudes of representative newspapers and magazines toward the Second French Empire. The quotations will be arranged with the most favorable first.

¹ *Overland Monthly*: April, 1870; *New York World*: April 6, Jan. 11, Feb. 10, March 14, March 23, April 12, May 10, 1870; *Portland Transcript*: Jan. 1, Jan. 8, April 2, 1870.

² *New York Tribune*: March 29, Jan. 4, Jan. 10, April 4, 1870; *Richmond Enquirer*: Jan. 1, March 26, 1870; *Leslie's Weekly*: March 19, 1870; *Nation*: Jan. 20, 1870; *Harper's Weekly*: Jan. 22, 1870; *De La Salle Monthly*: March, 1870; *National Quarterly Review*, March, 1870.

The *Irish Citizen*: France—a country which is the most free, the most safe, the best-governed, and, in all respects, the best, now to be seen on earth.¹

The *Richmond Enquirer*: France is the best governed country in Europe.²

The *Catholic World*: I cannot defend the *coup d'état* of Napoleon, . . . but I believe that the elevation of Louis Napoleon to the French throne has turned out for the benefit of France and of Europe.³

Atlantic Monthly: His rule has not been a perfect one, but it has been the best that France has known for fifty years.⁴

The *New York Times*: We hail every sign that goes to indicate that this Imperial stage is but a temporary or chrysalis condition from which may ultimately spring something brighter and better.⁵

Wisconsin State Journal: He must be a hopeful man, who expects that Napoleon will surrender any of his power to the Legislative Chamber.⁶

Harper's Weekly: As things stand now, brilliant, gorgeous, prosperous as it looks, his government is, after all, nothing but a base, tawdry, groveling despotism.⁷

The *New York Tribune*: He has been twenty years ruler of France, and Liberty is no nearer than when he became Emperor.⁸

¹ *Irish Citizen*: July 17, 1869, March 5, May 28, 1870.

² *Richmond Enquirer*: July 25, Aug. 1, 1863. It is perhaps significant that these editorials appeared during the Civil War when the South hoped to procure French intervention.

³ *Catholic World*: Nov., 1866.

⁴ *Atlantic Monthly*: June, 1861.

⁵ *New York Times*: Aug. 16, Jan. 22, April 26, Oct. 28, Dec. 1, 1869.

⁶ *Wisconsin State Journal*: July 6, 1869.

⁷ *Harper's Weekly*: Jan. 3, 1857.

⁸ *New York Tribune*: Nov. 25, 1868. Cf. also *ibid.*, Nov. 17, 1868; *New York Herald*: Nov. 20, 1855, May 2, May 8, July 10, 1866; *New York World*: Feb. 19, 1867; *New Orleans Picayune*: May 13, 1855;

It would have been perhaps natural to expect that American love for the French people would have been proportionate to American dislike of the Emperor. It might have been imagined that Americans would have felt great pity for a nation which had been so shamefully oppressed by an unprincipled usurper, but such was not the case. On the contrary, favorable opinions of the French people were few and far between. It is true that they were praised for their cultured taste, imagination, genius, heroism, sagacity, scientific achievements, intelligence, piety and efficiency in matters of detail. Thurlow Weed said that the French were unrivaled "in everything ornamental." The *Cincinnati Gazette* praised their scientific research and religious toleration. John Sherman was delighted with Paris, with the politeness of its people, and said, "If I was not an American I certainly would be a Frenchman." But most of the praise of France and Frenchmen was defensive in character, and not very convincing.¹

On the other hand, attacks upon the French nation were frequent, witty and spirited. The occasion for an attack was often furnished by the desire to find the causes for the

Nation: Feb. 18, 1869; *Harper's Magazine*: April, 1853, July, 1863 (Easy Chair); Abbott, *Napoleon III*, p. 678; Parker, *Life and Correspondence*, vol. ii, p. 337. The above are representative estimates of the Second Empire.

¹ Sherman, *Recollections*, vol. i, p. 406; *New York Tribune*: Jan. 29, 1852; *New York Herald*: Feb. 12, March 7, 1856, Jan. 7, 1857 (lecture by George Sumner); *New Orleans Picayune*: Dec. 22, 1852, April 4, 1855; *Richmond Enquirer*: Dec. 27, 1855; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Feb. 11, 1858, April 9, 1859; *Nation*: Nov. 23, 1865; *Today*: March 27, 1852; *National Magazine*: Oct., 1855; *Atlantic Monthly*: March, 1860; *Democratic Review*: May, Nov., 1852; *North American Review*: Oct., 1849, April, 1861; *Brownson's Quarterly Review*: July, 1859; Alexander, *Familiar Letters*, vol. ii, p. 251; Nicolay and Hay, *Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln*, vol. viii, introduction, pp. xxxiii-xxxvi (memorial address by Bancroft before Congress); Weed, *Autobiography*, vol. ii, p. 204.

subjection of the French people to the despotic rule of Napoleon III. Here was a spectacle which demanded explanation: a people with great political traditions of liberty and freedom, and with great intellectual traditions of wisdom and culture, a people which had now surrendered itself to a degrading autocracy. When in charitable mood, Americans explained the phenomenon by reference to the lack of real democratic education. It was repeatedly pointed out that France was highly centralized, and had been so for many generations; Paris had always governed France and had given almost no power to the provinces. John Tyler said that liberty must have a retreat in local government to which it could repair when the national citadel was attacked. How could France be expected to be able suddenly to take up successfully the reins of government when her people had had so little experience? In addition, the union of church and state, and the control of education which was vested in the church, were held to be institutions subversive of popular liberty, and democratic representative government. Theodore Parker said of the Church: "It has greatly demoralized France, which has 40,000 priests, who steal in everywhere and spread their slime over the baby, the child, the maiden, and the man."¹

But more often the French people were blamed for allowing such a régime to exist. They had sanctioned the usurpation by an overwhelming majority in the plebiscite. Some of the people might have been bribed, but surely not a whole

¹ Parker, *Life and Correspondence*, vol. ii, p. 337; *New York Tribune*: Dec. 27, 1851, Jan. 29, 1852, April 11, Sept. 2, 1861; *New York Herald*: March 29, 1858; *New Orleans Picayune*: Oct. 11, Dec. 24, 1852; *Cincinnati Gazette*: April 9, 1859; *Appleton's Journal*: Dec. 18, 1869 (art. by George M. Towle, prominent as a Boston journalist and writer of popular history); *Penn Monthly*: July, 1870; *Brownson's Quarterly Review*: April, 1861; *North American Review*: July, 1848; Emerson, *Journals*, vol. viii, p. 420; *Letters and Times of the Tylers*, vol. ii, p. 496.

nation. It was seriously questioned whether such a people were fit for anything but a despotism. Theodore Parker was surprised that such a highly cultured nation should possess "so little *civil* or *political* courage." The New York *World* said, "A Frenchman has no more conception of a constitutional government than a frog has of a steam engine."¹ Henry I. Bowditch thought France "totally unfit" for a republican form of government. The *National Quarterly Review* expressed the popular impression rather neatly: "Liberty has never truly existed in France. No people have talked more about it, or done worse in its name, or have less understood it than the French."² The New York *Tribune* thought that the French people were more responsible for Napoleon than was Napoleon for the French people, and Henry Adams said that the Harvard world in the fifties was "agreed that the Second Empire was a disgrace to France."

Three national traits were pointed to as helping to explain, in addition to their traditional political and religious institutions, the inability of the French people to practise really democratic government. In the first place, they were believed to be frivolous, unstable, impatient, fickle and shallow. They merely scratched the surface of things, were easily deceived by external appearances and were incapable

¹ New York *World*: Jan. 11, Oct. 26, 1864; Parker, *Life and Correspondence*, vol. ii, p. 358.

² *National Quarterly Review*: March, 1870; New York *Tribune*: Jan. 29, 1857, Jan. 23, Nov. 7, 1867, April 25, 1870; New York *Times*: March 26, 1865, Nov. 18, 1868; New York *Herald*: March 7, Nov. 3, 1852; New Orleans *Picayune*: Oct. 16, 1862; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Aug. 3, 1853; *Today*: March 27, 1852; *De Bow's Review*: April, 1869 (art. by J. E. Nagle); *Putnam's Magazine*: April, 1855; *Harper's Magazine*: July, 1863 (Easy Chair); *De La Salle Monthly*: March, 1870; *Education of Henry Adams*, p. 61; Bowditch, *Life and Correspondence*, vol. ii, p. 144; Buchanan, *Works*, vol. ix, pp. 291-292.

of carrying to a completion any sustained policy. Their very politeness and culture were thought to be conclusive proof of their superficiality. It was their lack of seriousness which made the French repulsive to Henry Adams, who said of himself: "He disapproved of France in the lump. . . . He disliked the Empire and the Emperor particularly, but this was a trifle; he disliked most the French mind . . . he disapproved of the whole, once for all."¹ The *New York Times* spoke of the French as being "excited by a name, aroused by a sentiment, convulsed by a song, and revolutionized by a cry." They were believed to be showy and theatrical, and were compared by *Leslie's Weekly* and George William Curtis writing in *Harper's Magazine* to an audience which must be pleased and flattered and given something novel to tickle its fancy. *Leslie's Weekly* said: "France . . . has the restless couch of a beauty ill at ease in reputation and conscience; . . . she is a nation of amateur actors, who waste their lives in striking attitudes."²

In the second place, there was a widespread conviction that the French were sexually immoral. The French home

¹ *Education of Henry Adams*, p. 96; *New York Herald*: March 7, Nov. 3, 1852, Feb. 12, 1856, Jan. 4, 1858, Feb. 17, Aug. 21, 1863, March 4, 1866; *New York Times*: Sept. 28, 1866, April 8, 1867; *New Orleans Picayune*: June 2, 1858; *Richmond Enquirer*: March 17, 1868; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Oct. 17, 1857, Aug. 27, 1866; *Philadelphia Press*: July 8, 1867 (art. by John Forney); *Wisconsin State Journal*: Aug. 18, 1869; *Leslie's Weekly*: July 3, 1858, April 27, 1861; *Atlantic Monthly*: March, 1860; *Knickerbocker*: Nov., 1859 (art. by E. L. Godkin); *Democratic Review*: Nov., 1852; *National Magazine*: Oct., 1855, Jan., 1856; *North American Review*: July, 1848, Oct., 1849, April, 1861; Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 228; Child, *Letters*, p. 191. Cf. also *supra*, p. 142 for comparison with German character.

² *Leslie's Weekly*: April 27, 1861, Oct. 5, 1867; *New York Times*: Dec. 25, 1868; *Harper's Magazine*: June, 1867 (Easy Chair).

was but a mockery with no real family life or domestic virtue. The *Cincinnati Gazette* said that the decreasing birth rate was caused by "moral depravity," and that there existed in Paris a "state of licensed concubinage." John Forney said that "a people addicted to pleasure as the chief end of man, can never accommodate themselves to the prose of representative liberty." Horace Mann diagnosed the ills of France thus: "Frivolity, sensuality, and the Catholic religion,—what will they not do for the debasement of mankind?"¹ Both Edwin Lee Leon, writing in *Appleton's Journal*, and James B. Angell attacked severely the common American belief in French immorality and stoutly maintained that there was no more moral nation in the world. But that they were exceptions is clearly borne out by Leon's statement that the general feeling in the United States was "that there is no home, properly speaking, in France; and that their social life is rotten to the core, marriage being with them only the convenient cloak for license." Perhaps even more convincing proof of the typical belief was a statement, in an article very favorable to French domestic life, which appeared in the *Penn Monthly* for July, 1870: "We remember, as a small boy of ten or twelve years of age, our Geography lesson on France—somewhat thus: 'The inhabitants (of France) are very polite and fashionable, are lax in the conjugal relation, and much given to dancing.'"²

But the most common ground for attack upon French character was their incurable national vanity, as expressed in their love of war and military glory. To Americans that trait seemed the great cardinal sin of the French. For

¹ Mann, *Life*, p. 446; *Cincinnati Gazette*: June 10, 1857; *Philadelphia Press*: July 8, 1867 (art. by John Forney); *Nation*: Nov. 23, 1865; *Appleton's Journal*: Dec. 18, 1869 (art. by George M. Towle).

² *Penn Monthly*: July, 1870; *Appleton's Journal*: April 24, 1869 (art. by Edwin Lee Leon); Angell, *Reminiscences*, p. 93.

military glory they were believed to be willing to barter their liberties. Here was the national weakness which might be played upon by any adventurer who, if he could produce a successful military exploit, could govern France as he chose. Here was the explanation for Louis Napoleon Bonaparte. It is true that in the late sixties several papers in the United States, among others the *New York Times*, the *Nation* and *Appleton's Journal* were convinced that the French had ceased to love glory and had become really pacific, a result caused partially by certain French novels which deprecated war, and partially by the growing interest of the people in material comfort. Wealth instead of glory had become the national passion. But the attitude of the above-mentioned papers was not common in the United States. John Forney spoke of "their inordinate passion for military glory," and the *Cincinnati Gazette* of the "in-corrigible vanity of the Gaul when he talks of the glory of *La Belle France*." *Leslie's Weekly* was more severe when it said: "France is becoming a nuisance, a sort of vain-glorious fellow, half brigand, half rowdy, who has regular attacks of delirium-tremens, the natural result of his former inordinate indulgence in war and glory."¹

¹ *Leslie's Weekly*: Oct. 5, 1867; *New York Tribune*: Aug. 16, Dec. 27, 1851, Feb. 19, 1856, April 10, 1867; *New York Herald*: Dec. 18, 1852, March 7, 1856, March 30, May 10, 1858, Feb. 27, 1859, Oct. 24, 1863, March 4, Aug. 16, 1866; *New York Times*: Jan. 4, Jan. 13, July 20, 1867; *Cincinnati Gazette*: March 4, 1863, Sept. 7, 1866, July 2, 1867; *New Orleans Picayune*: April 4, 1855, June 2, 1858, April 7, Sept. 21, 1859; *Richmond Enquirer*: Dec. 27, 1855, March 14, April 8, 1856; *Philadelphia Press*: Dec. 30, 1862, July 17, 1863, July 8, 1867 (art. by John Forney); *Portland Transcript*: April 26, 1856; *Nation*: June 20, 1866, June 13, 1867, March 25, 1869; *Appleton's Journal*: June 5, 1869; *National Magazine*: Feb., 1856; *Knickerbocker*: Nov., 1859 (art. by E. L. Godkin); *Graham's Magazine*: March, 1853; *North American Review*: July, 1848, Jan., 1860; *National Quarterly Review*: March, 1870; *John Lothrop Motley and his Family*, pp. 135-137, 249 et seq.

THE SECOND FRENCH EMPIRE—FOREIGN POLICIES AND PROBLEMS

Napoleon's dictum "L'Empire c'est le paix" was not taken very seriously by most Americans. France might be willing to barter her liberties for military glory, but only for military glory, which Napoleon must therefore produce if he would retain his crown. And military glory was not the concomitant of peace. True enough it was pointed out that whereas Napoleon I had carried on war for its own sake, Napoleon III only utilized it when he felt that his rule was becoming tiresome and the French people bored. To that extent the Empire might mean peace, but no farther. The *Nation* attacked the French war minister for glorifying war, but said that it was hopeless to expect any diminution in the army under the Empire. The *Portland Transcript* presumably expressed the general feeling when it wrote: "His people are beginning to cry for bread, and to divert their attention from evils at home, it is highly probable he will send them to wars abroad."¹ George William Curtis, writing in *Harper's Magazine*, summed up the popular sentiment: "The Empire is peace, but it begins and has continued with war."² Very similar was the remark of the *New York Times*: "Napoleon's 'Empire' may be termed 'peace'—and a chassepot."³ To many Americans the Second Empire seemed as complete a military despotism as Rome under the sway of the Pretorian Guards. The *New York World* said: "The empire is not only a government by the bayonet, but it is emphatically a government for the bayonet."⁴

¹ *Portland Transcript*: Jan. 21, 1854, June 26, 1858, Feb. 15, 1862.

² *Harper's Magazine*: July, 1863 (Easy Chair).

³ *New York Times*: May 28, 1868, Aug. 28, 1864, Aug. 17, Aug. 31, Oct. 18, 1866, Jan. 4, 1867, March 27, 1868, April 29, 1869.

⁴ *New York World*: Jan. 20, 1870; *New York Tribune*: Jan. 1, July 9, 1852, May 21, 1855, April 3, 1856, April 23, 1858, June 11, 1867, May 25,

The foreign policies of Napoleon III may conveniently be divided between the Old World and the New. American opinion of certain of his activities in the Old World has already been examined. It will be found that most Americans were bitterly hostile to his Roman and German policies, but that some few were favorable. But his American policy usually encountered almost solid opposition at least in the North. From the time that Napoleon entered into an alliance with England, American imperialists feared a combined attempt to prevent the further expansion of the United States upon the American continent. The objectives of American imperialism were the West Indies, Mexico and Central America, and every time that any French activity took place in any of these regions a cry of protest was raised. In the fifties American imperialism was rampant; it was the decade of the Ostend Manifesto and the Walker filibustering expedition; many Americans confidently believed that "manifest destiny" had decreed that the whole of North America, including Canada and Central America, should come under the American eagle. No wonder that American imperialists were alarmed at the idea of British and French imperialism in America. In 1851 there was talk of a triple alliance composed of England, Spain and

1869, Jan. 18, 1870; *New York Herald*: Jan. 3, May 6, 1852, Feb. 16, 1856, Feb. 23, June 10, June 23, 1858, Jan. 14, Jan. 20, Feb. 16, 1859, Feb. 24, Aug. 21, 1862, Aug. 21, 1863, May 28, 1866; *New Orleans Picayune*: Jan. 7, 1852, March 13, 1853, April 1, 1858, Sept. 20, 1860; *Richmond Enquirer*: May 9, 1855, Sept. 21, Oct. 22, 1859, Aug. 17, 1868; *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 26, 1859, Sept. 2, 1861, July 3, July 25, 1866; *Wisconsin State Journal*: Aug. 18, 1869; *Nation*: Dec. 26, 1867, Jan. 7, March 25, April 15, 1869; *Appleton's Journal*: June 5, 1869; *Irish American*: Aug. 6, 1859; *Graham's Magazine*: March, 1853; *Southern Review*: April, 1867; *Brownson's Quarterly Review*: April, 1859; *North American Review*: Jan., 1860; Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. ii, p. 9, vol. iii, pp. 395-396; Alexander, *Familiar Letters*, vol. ii, p. 251; Ticknor, *Life, Letters and Journals*, vol. ii, p. 293.

France to protect Cuba, in 1852 the French were rumored to be active in Santo Domingo and the Sonora province of Mexico, in 1854 there was a story of a meddlesome French consul in San Francisco, and in the same year Napoleon insulted the American Minister to Spain, while in 1855 it was said that the French were interfering in the Galapagos Islands. In 1858 and 1859 the French were accused of having entered into a conspiracy to prevent American expansion in Central America and Mexico, and it was declared that the French in particular were attempting to monopolize the best routes across the Isthmus of Panama.¹

The hostility of most Americans to French policies in North America came to a head during the Civil War when an open break between the two nations appeared as a distinct and threatening possibility. Strained relations between the ancient allies resulted from Napoleon's friendliness to the South and his invasion of Mexico, which culminated in the establishment of a Mexican empire under Maximilian of Austria, supported by French bayonets. It must be kept in mind that the treatment of neither of these events can be complete or authoritative. It is not the author's intention to examine in any detail the diplomatic relations between the two countries during the years of tension, or to write a history of Maximilian's Mexican empire. But it will be found

¹ New York *Herald*: Dec. 26, 1852, Dec. 4, 1858, Jan. 7, Jan. 14, April 14, 1859; New Orleans *Picayune*: June 2, July 2, 1858, Jan. 15, 1859; Richmond *Enquirer*: March 28, 1856, June 6, June 25, 1857, June 8, 1858, Feb. 4, 1859; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Oct. 7, 1851, May 9, 1853, Jan. 14, Jan. 24, 1859. Cf. *supra*, pp. 90-92. It is interesting to note that the *Herald* several times mentioned the desirability of an alliance between France and the United States, even suggesting at one time that France might be given Hayti in return for her consent to American annexation of Cuba. Cf. Feb. 19, 1855, Jan. 4, Jan. 9, May 28, May 31, 1856, July 11, 1857, July 5, July 9, 1858, Feb. 6, Feb. 10, Feb. 16, 1860, May 24, Nov. 28, 1863.

that in 1870 an important cause for American hostility to France lay in the remembrance of French hostility to the United States in her time of trouble. It was believed that Napoleon had proved himself an enemy to the United States when she most needed friends, and that he had done everything in his power short of making open war to destroy American prestige and to prevent the victory of the North. Such an insult could not be forgotten. Therefore a brief and necessarily incomplete account must be given of contemporary American opinion of Napoleon's aid to the South and of his Mexican venture.

The almost universal belief that Napoleon was hostile to the cause of the North and distinctly favorable to that of the South was based upon several acts. He had recognized the South as a belligerent power, and consequent upon that he had allowed Southern ships to be repaired and refitted in French ports. He had cordially received the Southern emissaries, Mason and Slidell. He had attempted to mediate between the North and South and to that end had proposed a six months' armistice. He had tried to gain British consent to complete recognition of Southern independence by the two powers jointly.¹

Several explanations were offered for Napoleon's hostile attitude. Those Northerners most friendly to him claimed that he believed that the North would never be able to conquer the South, that the war would be a long-drawn-out agony, and that intervention or any other action which could assist in bringing the conflict to a close would be in

¹ New York *Herald*: July 3, Aug. 8, 1861, Jan. 23, Dec. 4, 1862, Jan. 1, Feb. 14, Aug. 20, 1863; Philadelphia *Press*: April 16, 1864; *Leslie's Weekly*: Dec. 13, 1862, Jan. 28, 1865; *Danville Review*: June, 1863 (art. by Rev. R. J. Breckenbridge, editor of *Danville Review*, and uncle of John Breckenbridge); Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. i, p. 477; Sumner, *Works*, vol. vii, p. 367 *et seq.*

the common interests of humanity. A second explanation was that he needed American cotton to keep the French workingmen employed. The blockade had created much unemployment in France, the workingmen were becoming discontented, and Napoleon desired intervention to strengthen himself against the demands of his people for work. More typical was the belief that Napoleon was himself a tyrant, and consequently very naturally sympathized with the tyrannous Southern slaveholders. Napoleon hated all republics and saw in the Civil War a chance to destroy the greatest republic in the world. Charles Sumner expressed this viewpoint with burning sarcasm in his famous Cooper Union speech in 1863: "France, always standing for an 'idea,' stands, under the Second Napoleon, for the 'idea' of welcome to a new evangel of slavery, with Mason and Slidell as the evangelists. Thus is imperial influence exerted for Rebel Slavemongers."¹

That the North appreciated the danger of French aid to the South is very clear. Late in 1860 George Ticknor claimed that the Confederates already had an alliance with Napoleon, by which he would give them military support in return for certain commercial concessions. John Murray Forbes, special American agent in England to prevent that country from aiding the South, had no doubts that Napoleon "secretly gave the rebels hopes of aid." That the American Minister to Great Britain, Charles Francis Adams, felt very much the same is evident from his reference to Napoleon as the "buckler" and "shield" of those in England who desired war with the United States. Motley wrote in 1862: "I suppose there is no doubt whatever that

¹ Sumner, *Works*, vol. vii, p. 372; *New York Tribune*: Jan. 28, 1863; *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 3, July 14, 1862, Feb. 6, Feb. 23, 1863; *Atlantic Monthly*: Aug., 1864; Seward, Frederick, *Reminiscences*, p. 215; Welles, *Diary*, vol. i, pp. 494-495; Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. i, p. 589.

L. N. has been perpetually, during the last six months, provoking, soliciting, or teasing the English Cabinet to unite with him in some kind of intervention.”¹ John Bigelow thought that Napoleon would compel the United States either “to make peace or fight him,” rather than give up his idea of intervention, and in September, 1863, predicted war between France and the United States within six months as “very probable.” Henry Ward Beecher believed that “Napoleon was disposed by every art and intrigue to persuade the government of Great Britain to interpose, to break the blockade, and to give moral support to the rebellion of the South.” George William Curtis called Napoleon the worst enemy to the United States, and voiced the quite general belief that he only hesitated to give armed aid to the South because he feared either Northern success or English opposition.²

It is no less clear that most Northerners were bitterly hostile to the proposed intervention in whatever form it might appear. The proposal for a six months’ armistice found almost no support in the North. Such an armistice would entirely destroy the effects of the blockade and allow the South to regain all her economic strength. It would

¹ *John Lothrop Motley and his Family*, p. 136; *New York Tribune*: Oct. 2, 1862; *New York Herald*: Oct. 26, Nov. 28, 1862; *Philadelphia Press*: May 1, 1863 (sermon by Daniel C. Eddy, author and prominent Baptist clergyman); *Leslie's Weekly*: March 1, 1862; *Harper's Weekly*: Nov. 7, 1863, Dec. 9, 1865; *Freeman's Journal*: March 14, 1864; Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. i, p. 589; *Adams Letters*, vol. i, p. 88, vol. ii, pp. 87-88; Forbes, *Letters and Recollections*, vol. i, p. 256; Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. ii, pp. 241, 294; Ticknor, *Life, Letters and Journals*, vol. ii, p. 432; Weed, *Autobiography*, vol. i, pp. 628-629, 642.

² *New York Tribune*: Dec. 20, 1862, Nov. 7, 1867; *Philadelphia Press*: Sept. 16, 1863; *Harper's Magazine*: Feb., 1864 (Easy Chair); Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. i, p. 574, vol. ii, p. 53; *Biography of Henry Ward Beecher*, p. 399.

mean a sacrifice on the part of the North of everything which she had gained. The *Portland Transcript* wrote: "In opposition to any such mediation we apprehend the North will be found a unite [*sic*]." ¹ George Bancroft and William Cullen Bryant thought there would have been no dignity in submitting to foreign intervention. Henry Cabot Lodge in his *Early Memories* said: "Nothing, indeed, could have been worse than the conduct of France to the United States during the Civil War." ² The *Philadelphia Press* minced no words and suggested no compromise: "As for intervention—it means war between the United States and the foreign Power that may attempt to force it upon us." ³

The South of course took the opposite view. It also expected French intervention and was thankful for Napoleon's efforts in that direction. In January, 1862, "Mann reported to Jefferson Davis that he regarded it as certain that the Emperor was to raise the blockade." ⁴ Napoleon was praised as the South's best friend in Europe, and France as the only European state which had taken any action directed towards a cessation of hostilities in America. Of course there was disappointment when the promised intervention failed to materialize, but the blame was thrown upon England. Napoleon was nearly as popular as formerly. The *Richmond Enquirer* said: "But the friendly animus was made plain; and it will not be forgotten."

¹ *Portland Transcript*: Dec. 6, 1862.

² Lodge, *Early Memories*, p. 154; Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 149; Godwin, *Biography of William Cullen Bryant*, vol. ii, p. 182.

³ *Philadelphia Press*: June 17, 1863, April 16, 1864; Bancroft, *Life of Seward*, vol. ii, p. 396; White, *Autobiography*, vol. i, p. 96.

⁴ Bancroft, *Life of Seward*, vol. ii, pp. 282-283. The reference here is to A. Dudley Mann.

Later the *Enquirer* blamed the Confederate government for having failed to offer France the most favorable kind of a commercial treaty, and Robert L. Dabney blamed it for not meeting French abolitionist sentiment by a measure for the gradual emancipation of the slaves. The South had expected French aid, and blamed its government as much as it did Napoleon when no help came.¹

Far more important as a cause for American hostility to France was Napoleon's Mexican adventure. Late in 1861 France, Spain and England united in sending expeditions to Mexico to force the payment of certain debts owed to them and their nationals. The English and Spanish forces were withdrawn in March, 1862, but France remained, sent over large numbers of troops, made a successful invasion of the country, and set up an empire, supported by French bayonets and presided over by Maximilian, brother of the Emperor Francis Joseph of Austria. But the republican chiefs of Mexico were never captured, resistance to the empire never died out, the enterprise became increasingly unpopular in France, Napoleon felt that his hands were tied in Mexico so that he could not adopt as strong a continental policy as he desired, and after the end of the American Civil War the government of the United States made such earnest representations against any future French support to Maximilian that French troops were withdrawn from Mexico in February, 1867. So intrinsically weak was the Mexican Empire that Maximilian was captured in May and executed in June while Juarez was elected President of the Mexican Republic in October, 1867. Such was Napoleon's Mexican adventure.

¹ Richmond *Enquirer*: March 4, 1863, Dec. 6, 1862, Jan. 27, Feb. 16, Feb. 18, June 4, July 2, Aug. 1, Sept. 26, Oct. 6, 1863, Sept. 21, 1864; Johnson, Thomas Cary, *The Life and Letters of Robert Lewis Dabney* (Richmond, 1903), pp. 282-283.

From the very beginning, some doubts were raised in the United States about the expedition, but most Americans suspected nothing until England and Spain withdrew. Then a great wave of animosity sprang up against Napoleon. In whatever light the expedition was viewed, it could not but be unpopular in the United States. In the first place, it was an attack upon a sister republic, an attempt to substitute a monarchy for a republic upon the American continent, and a cowardly attempt at that, made at a time when Mexico's natural protector was engaged in a life-and-death struggle. Time and again it was brought out by Americans that Napoleon would never have dared to attack Mexico if the United States had not been at war. In the second place, the expedition was made for the purpose of creating what amounted to a French colony in America. It was an assault upon the Monroe Doctrine. It was an attempt on the part of France to encroach upon the private preserves of the United States. American imperialists were therefore as much incensed as were American republicans. It was brought out that France had smaller financial claims upon Mexico than either England or Spain, that she had not even a good pretext for being there. It was asserted that France had her eyes not only on Mexico but also on Texas and even on Louisiana. American imperialists were aroused to fury when Napoleon wrote in a letter to his commander in Mexico that one of his aims was to erect a strong Latin empire in the New World to arrest the ever-forward march of Anglo-Saxon institutions as exemplified in the United States.¹

¹ *New York Tribune*: July 19, Oct. 2, Dec. 20, 1862, April 20, July 6, 1863, March 21, May 27, 1864, Nov. 22, 1865; *New York Herald*: March 8, 1859, Nov. 30, 1861, Feb. 24, May 19, July 23, 1862, July 24, Sept. 11, 1863; *New York Times*: April 5, Oct. 31, 1864, Jan. 28, Feb. 21, June 8, Dec. 4, 1865; *New York World*: Feb. 7, 1866; *Cincinnati Gazette*:

Of all the papers and personal records which have been examined, hardly a single Northern one has been found which looked with pleasure or composure or even indifference on Napoleon's invasion of Mexico. Henry Ward Beecher, when asked by the King of Belgium what the American people thought, answered "that but one feeling existed in the United States as to the French invasion; it was a cowardly thing—a masked battery aimed at us." The *Philadelphia Press* expressed its opinion of what Napoleon would do for Mexico very bluntly: "If the Imperial system is tyranny in France, it will be double tyranny in Mexico. . . . Louis Napoleon is to protect Mexico as the panther protects the lamb."¹ The *Cincinnati Gazette* stigmatized Napoleon's action as "a perfidy and a base hypocrisy unparalleled in the conduct of any great power." The *San Francisco Bulletin* summed up the extreme unpopularity of Napoleon:

Probably the Emperor of the French sustains an unrivaled unpopularity in the United States. The Union men dislike him because he wished to interfere in our civil strife. The rebels

May 8, Nov. 26, Nov. 28, 1862, Feb. 6, Feb. 23, March 4, Oct. 11, 1863, July 25, 1866, Jan. 26, May 28, 1867; *Philadelphia Press*: July 21, Dec. 30, 1862, Jan. 19, Feb. 3, June 17, 1863; *New Orleans Picayune*: Sept. 20, 1860; *Portland Transcript*: June 20, 1863; *Leslie's Weekly*: May 24, June 28, July 5, 1862, July 1, 1865, Dec. 29, 1866, April 6, 1867; *Harper's Weekly*: Sept. 12, Nov. 7, 1863, Aug. 26, 1865; *Atlantic Monthly*: Nov., 1863, July, 1864 (art. by G. Reynolds); *Harper's Magazine*: July, 1863 (Easy Chair); *North American Review*: April, 1866; *Adams Letters*, vol. ii, p. 124; *Biography of Henry Ward Beecher*, p. 399; Forbes, *Letters and Recollections*, vol. ii, p. 56; Fisher, *Life of Benjamin Silliman*, vol. ii, pp. 289-290; Salter, *Life of Grimes*, pp. 299-300; Welles, *Diary*, vol. i, p. 305; Sumner, *Works*, vol. vii, p. 368 *et seq.*

¹ *Philadelphia Press*: July 4, Feb. 3, 1863; *Cincinnati Gazette*: May 6, 1865; *Harper's Weekly*: Sept. 12, 1863; *Atlantic Monthly*: July, 1864 (art. by G. Reynolds); *New Englander*: Oct., 1863 (art. by Rev. Joshua Leavitt); *Biography of Henry Ward Beecher*, p. 405; Raymond, *Life and Letters*, p. 491; Fisher, *Life of Benjamin Silliman*, vol. ii, pp. 289-290.

dislike him because he did not interfere. All parties resent his intervention in Mexico. On the whole, his well wishers in the United States are few and far between; everybody seems disposed to depreciate his successes, and is ready to rejoice at his reverses.¹

Judah P. Benjamin, a member of the Confederate cabinet, thought that there existed "a feeling in the United States perfectly unanimous in the determination to overthrow the schemes of the French Government in Mexico."

But Americans did not content themselves with an academic hostility; they proceeded to threats. It was quite generally realized in 1862 and 1863 that nothing could be done until the Civil War was ended. It would be madness to provoke a war with France while the issue was uncertain in the struggle with the South. However it was suggested by the *New York Herald* and *Leslie's Weekly* that perhaps the easiest way to heal the breach between the North and South might be a declaration of war against France. Thus both sections might forget domestic squabbles in a common patriotism. But such action was advocated only by the most ardent of Northern imperialists and had no real popular backing. But even during the war many prophecies were made as to what the United States would do once the South had been conquered. The *Philadelphia Press* wrote: "When we have disposed of the rebellion . . . we shall be prepared to listen to any pretension that Napoleon may care

¹ *San Francisco Bulletin*: Aug. 20, 1866; *New York Tribune*: July 1, 1867; *New York Herald*: July 25, 1866; *New York Times*: July 10, 1865; *Cincinnati Gazette*: April 13, 1864, May 8, Nov. 28, 1862, Feb. 6, July 30, 1863, Jan. 12, 1866; *Nation*: Oct. 19, 1865, April 25, 1866; *Leslie's Weekly*: Oct. 13, 1866, April 6, 1867; *Galaxy*: Dec. 15, 1866 (art. by H. A. Delille); Dix, Morgan, *Memoirs of John Adams Dix* (New York, 1883), vol. ii, pp. 145-147; Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. ii, p. 196.

to make."¹ More hostile still was the remark of the New York *Herald*:

As for Mexico, we will, at the close of the rebellion, if the French have not left there before, send fifty thousand Northern and fifty thousand Southern troops, forming together a grand army to drive the invaders into the Gulf. That is the way we shall tolerate a French monarchy in Mexico.²

Henry Lee Higginson probably expressed much of the talk that was common in Union camps when he wrote half in jest: "I mean to go to Mexico and fight the French after this war is done. It . . . would certainly be good fun to cut off those little red-legged sinners, who have been swelling about their fighting and victory."³

It was very natural that as the prospects of the North became brighter, the temptation should have become very great to use the magnificent Northern army in Mexico. A larger and larger number of newspapers and individuals became converted to the idea of a punitive expedition against the French. And many more felt that at least now the American government was in a position to command the French to go. A French empire in Mexico was bad for that country and prejudicial to the best interests of the United States. The American government must now reassert the Monroe Doctrine which as the *Herald* expressed

¹ Philadelphia *Press*: Aug. 7, Feb. 3, 1863; New York *Tribune*: May 27, 1864, Jan. 27, 1865; New York *Herald*: July 24, 1863, April 22, 1864; New York *Times*: Jan. 9, 1865 (quotation from Albany *Atlas and Argus*); Leslie's *Weekly*: Jan. 28, 1862, Jan. 18, 1865.

² New York *Herald*: Jan. 21, Jan. 14, 1864; Cincinnati *Gazette*: June 19, 1862; Portland *Transcript*: March 1, 1862, Sept. 12, 1863; Adams *Letters*, vol. ii, p. 124; Gray, *Letters*, vol. ii, p. 528.

³ Perry, Bliss, *Life and Letters of Henry Lee Higginson* (Boston, 1921), p. 177. Cf. also New York *Times*: March 27, 1865.

it, had been "tied up in red tape and laid on one of the shelves of the State Department in Washington." A firm policy which would be capable of backing up its threats by force would be the best possible way to get the French out of Mexico. It was very probable that force would not actually have to be used, but if war did come, the United States had nothing to fear.¹

It must be kept in mind that there was no division of opinion in regard to the main point, namely, that the French were undesirable neighbors and that the American people would rejoice when they were out of Mexico once and for all. But a split did occur in regard to tactics. One group believed in a policy of threats to be backed up in case of need by force. The other group followed the lead of Secretary of State Seward who took the ground that force must be used only as the last resort, that the United States could not afford and did not desire war, that nothing discourteous or blustering or threatening must be done to antagonize the French people, who if once insulted would make it impossible for Napoleon to make a graceful exit. The American government must, of course, refuse to recognize the empire in Mexico so long as a single French soldier should remain on Mexican soil. Courteous, friendly, and yet firm diplomatic notes could accomplish more than threats, and would cost very little as compared with an expensive war. Seward's attitude was well expressed in a letter to Bigelow, the American Minister to France, in May, 1864:

¹ *New York Tribune*: Jan. 8, 1866 (report of meeting sponsored by W. C. Bryant, Peter Cooper, James A. Garfield, Manton Marble and Horace Greeley); *New York Herald*: May 19, June 10, Oct. 3, Dec. 10, 1862, Jan. 22, 1863, April 22, July 17, 1864; *New York World*: Dec. 31, 1864; *San Francisco Bulletin*: May 18, 1864; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Jan. 12, 1866; *Philadelphia Press*: Sept. 6, 1866; *Leslie's Weekly*: Feb. 11, May 27, Dec. 2, 1865; *Nation*: Aug. 10, 1865.

I regret that you think my course towards the French Government is too conciliatory and courteous. . . . We have compromised nothing, surrendered nothing, and I do not propose to surrender anything. But why should we gasconade about Mexico when we are in a struggle for our own life? ¹

That Seward's policy was disliked by many Americans in high official position is evident from the opposition which he encountered in diplomatic circles, in the Cabinet, among army officers and in Congress. Letters had to be dispatched to his too zealous diplomatic aids. Although Bigelow was on the whole sympathetic with Seward's view, at one time he wrote Seward that he considered the latter's methods too easy-going, and Gustave Koerner, Minister to Spain, was so indiscreet that he had to be told to retract certain of his remarks regarding the French in Mexico or to state them as his personal opinion and not that of his government. President Johnson supported Seward loyally, but in the Cabinet he encountered an almost solid opposition. Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, and Postmaster General Dennison favored war, and Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, thought Seward's policy weak and spineless, although Welles was also hostile to the extreme measures advocated by Stanton. Many of the high army officers were opposed to Seward, including Generals Grant and Sheridan. Sheridan's conduct as commander of the American forces on the Rio Grande was anything but neutral, and he had repeatedly to be called to account. His dissatisfaction with Seward's policy can best be told in his own words. He speaks of Mexican republican troops, "largely supplied

¹ Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. ii, pp. 188-189, 185, 360, 420 *et seq.*, vol. iii, pp. 68, 89, 428, 464; Seward, Frederick, *Reminiscences*, pp. 424-426; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, p. 381; Welles, *Diary*, vol. ii, pp. 317, 332-333, vol. iii, pp. 254, 377.

with arms and ammunition, which we left at convenient places on our side of the river to fall into their hands," and goes on to say:

But in the midst of what bade fair to cause a final withdrawal of the foreigners, we were again checked by our Government, as a result of representations of the French Minister at Washington . . . this letter of the French Minister was transmitted to me, accompanied by directions to preserve a strict neutrality; so, of course, we were again debarred from anything like active sympathy. After this, it required the patience of Job to abide the slow and pokey methods of our State Department.¹

But what bothered Seward most was the fear that Congress might take action which would compel the government to assume a more threatening attitude. In January, 1864, Senator James H. McDougall of California introduced resolutions into the Senate to the effect that it was the duty of the government to require France to remove her troops from Mexico. Fortunately for Seward's policy this motion was tabled, but in April of the same year the House passed unanimously a set of resolutions introduced by Henry Winter Davis from Maryland to the effect that the American government would not recognize any monarchical government in America which was under the protection of any European power. Again the administration was able to muster sufficient strength in the Senate to prevent the resolutions from being passed. In a violent speech in the Senate, McDougall asked whether Seward was "in

¹ *Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan* (New York, 1888), vol. ii, pp. 216-217, 210; Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. ii, pp. 188-189, vol. iii, pp. 151 *et seq.*, 287, 600; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, pp. 235, 308-309; Welles, *Diary*, vol. ii, pp. 317, 332-333, 348, 367, 479, 622-626, 648-649; Foulke, William Dudley, *Life of Oliver P. Morton* (Indianapolis, 1899), vol. i, pp. 457-458; Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. viii, pp. 3653-3655.

league with Napoleon III, his wife Eugenie, and Pius IX," and said: "I think that a good, honest war with France would be to us a present advantage and would prove a blessing to the world."¹ As late as May, 1866, Seward was still apprehensive, and wrote that "it would not be a subject of surprise to the President if Congress should adopt some proceeding which might entirely change the attitude of this government in regard to the war between France and Mexico."²

It was perhaps inevitable that Seward's Mexican policy should become mixed up in the political struggles of the day. Seward was loyal to Johnson, and Johnson was the butt of both Democrats and Radical Republicans. As Seward himself expressed it: "Party politicians think that the Mexican question affords them a fulcrum, and they seem willing to work their lever reckless of dangers to the country."³ Certain it is that the Democrats and especially the Radical Republicans sought to embarrass the administration by bitter attacks on its Mexican policy. Both parties had a Mexican plank in their platforms for 1864, but neither plank was strong enough to cause much trouble. The New York *World*, Democratic, accused the administration "of pusillanimous truckling to France and double

¹ *Congressional Globe*, 1st Session, 38th Congress, pp. 3500, 145, 1227, 1408, 1409, 1426, 1427, 2427, 2521, 2522, 3339, 3496, 3499.

² Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. iii, p. 428, vol. ii, pp. 182-183, 333, vol. iii, pp. 121, 151 *et seq.*, 287, 462; New York *Tribune*: July 1, 1867; New York *Herald*: Jan. 14, 1864; New York *Times*: April 5, 1864, July 31, 1866; New York *World*: Dec. 20, 1864; Bancroft, *Life of Seward*, vol. ii, p. 428 *et seq.*; Davis, Henry Winter, *Speeches and Addresses* (New York, 1867), pp. 470-479.

³ Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. ii, p. 191, vol. iii, pp. 88, 121, 151 *et seq.*; New York *Times*: Nov. 17, 1865; Nicolay and Hay, *Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln*, vol. x, p. 121.

dealing with the American people." In May, 1865, the *Cincinnati Gazette*, at that time administration Republican, condemned the Democrats severely for advocating a crusade to drive the French out of Mexico, and urged peaceful persuasion. However in June, 1867, when it had become anti-administration, the same paper said:

And so from beginning to end Mr. Seward cooperated with the French Emperor in the destruction of the Mexican Republic. What the steadfast sympathy of the people of the United States has done for the liberation of Mexico, has been done in spite of Mr. Seward's persistent, improper and illegal efforts to turn our national influence in favor of the French invader.¹

The New York *Herald*, which was very much opposed to Johnson, and a rabidly imperialistic sheet, said: "It is clear that our foreign relations need to be taken up in a new and vigorous spirit, and our dispatches to France to be written in quite another than the sweetened water style that now flavors them through and through."² On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the administration also played politics. The New York *Times*, which was the administration organ in New York, praised Seward's diplomacy highly, and said: "By diplomacy we have effected more for Mexican liberty than could be done by fifty military expeditions."³

It has been seen that imperialism as well as party politics played an important part in the attitude of those Americans

¹ *Cincinnati Gazette*: June 6, 1867, May 22, July 31, 1865, July 25, Nov. 16, Dec. 10, 1866; *New York World*: May 26, March 23, March 28, Dec. 20, 1864; *Philadelphia Press*: Sept. 6, 1866; *Leslie's Weekly*: Dec. 15, 1866; Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. iii, p. 209.

² *New York Herald*: Jan. 28, July 25, 1866.

³ *New York Times*: July 31, 1866, July 1, Nov. 17, 1865; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Dec. 10, 1866; Welles, *Diary*, vol. ii, pp. 624-626.

who advocated a more belligerent policy toward France than that of the Secretary of State. It was but natural that the anti-imperialists should have been found in the ranks of Seward's supporters. The *Nation* warned against American intervention in Mexico, and said that the very arguments which applied to French intervention applied with equal force to the United States. Although entirely opposed to French occupation, John Sherman was quite worried about a possible American annexation of Mexico, and rejoiced when his brother, General William T. Sherman, replaced Sheridan on the Rio Grande. That General Sherman held views similar to those of his brother is clear from a letter written shortly after his appointment to the Mexican mission: "I should deplore anything that would make us assume Mexico in any shape—its territory, its government, or its people."¹

Among other prominent supporters of the Seward policy were the *New York Times*, *Portland Transcript*, *San Francisco Bulletin*, *Harper's Weekly*, *Harvard Magazine*, S. P. Chase and Charles Sumner. The *Times* supported the administration in all points and requires no further comment. The attitude of the *Portland Transcript* is interesting. It believed in a policy of hands-off, and said: "Our policy is non-intervention. If Maximilian can sustain himself without the aid of foreign bayonets, well and good; if not he must fall. Mexico must be left to decide her own destiny." But the *Transcript* grew weary of waiting for French evacuation and said later in an impatient mood, "If he doesn't make a move soon Uncle Sam will be after him with a sharp stick."² The *San Francisco Bulletin* was

¹ *Sherman Letters*, pp. 283-285; *Nation*: Aug. 10, 1865, Nov. 29, 1866; *North American Review*: April, 1866; Welles, *Diary*, vol. ii, pp. 332-333.

² *Portland Transcript*: May 5, Dec. 8, 1866, Nov. 25, 1865; *New York Times*: Dec. 20, 1864, Jan. 24, March 9, May 20, June 8, June 29, July 4,

strong in its support of the policy of moral suasion and rejoiced in the outcome: "The Monroe Doctrine will soon be vindicated, and without war—a consummation that will be glorious in the annals of American diplomacy."¹ The strongly Catholic *Freeman's Journal* did not dare to favor the presence of French troops in Mexico, but it strenuously opposed all talk of war or intervention and advised the recognition of Maximilian's pro-Catholic administration, particularly after Napoleon had promised to withdraw his army. The *Harvard Magazine* probably represented the attitude of the least excited portion of American opinion when it even went to the length of attacking the Monroe Doctrine: "We hope that the American nation will not be so infatuated as to engage in a needless war, for which the only excuse would be to uphold an antiquated and exploded doctrine."²

The final evacuation of Mexico by the French and the overthrow of Maximilian's empire were causes for American rejoicing, although Americans did not fail to sympathize with the young emperor. Much sympathy was exhibited for his personal character, and his death furnished another occasion for attack upon Napoleon. He had encouraged Maximilian to take the throne and then when difficulties began to arise had treacherously deserted his young protégé. *Leslie's Weekly* said: "His conduct toward

July 10, Aug. 26, Sept. 2, Nov. 14, Dec. 4, Dec. 7, 1865, Jan. 14, Feb. 7, July 31, 1866, Oct. 30, 1867; *Leslie's Weekly*: July 1, 1865; *North American Review*: April, 1866; Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. iii, p. 209; Schuckers, J. W., *The Life and Public Services of Salmon Portland Chase* (New York, 1874), p. 399; Sumner, *Works*, vol. vii, pp. 258-261.

¹ San Francisco *Bulletin*: Feb. 9, Sept. 27, 1866.

² *Harvard Magazine*: March, 1864; New York *Tribune*: April 4, 1866; *Harper's Weekly*: July 29, Aug. 26, Dec. 9, 1865; *Freeman's Journal*: March 11, Aug. 5, Sept. 9, 1865, Jan. 13, March 10, May 19, Sept. 22, Dec. 29, 1866.

Maximilian was all that is necessary to prove him as ungrateful as unscrupulous.”¹ The *Cincinnati Gazette* declared that Napoleon’s act was “base perfidy, and has placed upon his head the blood of Maximilian.” The *Portland Transcript* remarked: “If any body deserves to be shot it is Louis Napoleon. He is the chief criminal in this great national crime.”²

It was widely prophesied that the Mexican fiasco would be a severe blow to Napoleon’s prestige, and little care was taken to hide the fact that Americans rejoiced in his embarrassment. That the Mexican expedition and its author were not forgotten or forgiven is clear from several references between the time of the evacuation and the outbreak of the Franco-German War. In July, 1868, the *New York Times* said: “Whether the renewal of the kindly feeling of the olden time between us and France . . . will ever take place, is uncertain; but probably it will not during the reign of the present Emperor.”³ Very similar was the remark of John William Draper in *Harper’s Magazine* for September, 1868: “But the Republic of the West was forever alienated from the dynasty of Napoleon.”⁴

¹ *Leslie’s Weekly*: Jan. 26, 1867.

² *Portland Transcript*: June 8, 1867; *New York Times*: July 2, 1867; *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 22, Jan. 26, July 2, 1867; *Richmond Enquirer*: June 12, 1867; Conway, *Autobiography*, vol. ii, pp. 172-175.

³ *New York Times*: July 30, 1868; *New York Herald*: Sept. 11, 1863; *Leslie’s Weekly*: July 1, 1865.

⁴ *Harper’s Magazine*: Sept., 1868 (art. by John William Draper—from second edition of Draper’s *History of the Civil War*); *New York Tribune*: Dec. 11, 1866; *New York Times*: Dec. 4, 1865, Aug. 15, 1866, Jan. 1, July 23, 1867; *Philadelphia Press*: June 2, 1865, Sept. 6, 1866; *Cincinnati Gazette*: May 28, 1867; *Richmond Enquirer*: June 12, 1867; *Detroit Free Press*: Aug. 20, 1866; *Portland Transcript*: June 8, Sept. 7, 1867; *Nation*: Dec. 27, 1866, March 28, 1867; *Leslie’s Weekly*: April 6, 1867, March 6, 1869; *Freeman’s Journal*: Sept. 22, 1866; Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. iii, p. 586; Conway, *Autobiography*, vol. ii, pp. 172-175.

American opinion of the Mexican enterprise could not be considered complete without the Southern view. During the course of the war the South was probably favorable. The Confederacy was angling for French aid and would hardly care to antagonize her possible ally by hostility to his designs on Mexico. The Richmond *Enquirer* was very friendly, and said:

We have no objection: we prefer the French as neighbors on our southern boundary rather than the Mexicans; and, it is needless to say, infinitely before the Yankees. . . . As to Mexico, we make the French exceedingly welcome to establish something like a government of white men in that country.

The *Enquirer* also quoted Colonel L. Q. C. Lamar, a prominent Confederate officer and politician, to the effect that a Mexican Empire would be a much more valuable ally to the South than a Mexican Republic. But in 1866, after the end of the war, the *Enquirer* offered its unswerving loyalty to the United States government in driving out the French, provided that the North would be lenient in her terms of reconstruction. And when the empire in Mexico fell the *Enquirer* was jubilant, and said: "Napoleon and Maximilian both played us treacherously. It was fitting that the one should betray the other. The survivor may find his punisher also."¹ But the *Southern Review* in October, 1867, took the opposite view, ridiculed Northern hostility to the Mexican Empire, praised the imperial régime, and declared Mexico unfit for republicanism.

In connection with Napoleon's foreign policies in Europe, American opinion of the Crimean War and of the Italian

¹ Richmond *Enquirer*: March 2, 1863, Dec. 2, 1862, Feb. 28, March 28 (speech of Col. L. Q. C. Lamar), June 18, July 2, July 25, 1863, March 25, 1864, Feb. 22, 1866, May 29, June 12, 1867; *Southern Review*: Oct., 1867.

War of 1859 has been treated at some length in a former chapter, and can only be summarized here.¹ In the Crimean War, Americans were either neutral or anti-French, the anti-French feeling being chiefly caused by alleged French interference in Spanish America. In the Italian War, Americans were certainly pro-Italian and anti-Austrian, and were at least fairly friendly to Napoleon and to the French. There remain to be considered Napoleon's later Italian difficulties, chiefly in relation to Savoy and Rome, and his various attempts to gain territorial compensation for the large gains of Prussia in the war with Austria in 1866.

It has already been stated that most Americans were sceptical of Napoleon's assurances that his empire meant peace. To many, their belief that Napoleon's empire was not peaceful was an additional reason for hatred of everything Napoleonic. But to a certain group of Americans, Napoleon appeared as a figure whose mission it was to overthrow the old despotisms, and to make constant warfare against the principles of the Congress of Vienna. To those Americans he seemed to be the protector of the rights of the struggling nationalities of Poland, Hungary, Italy and Germany. The *New York Herald*, which was the chief exponent of these ideas, expressed them thus: "Today Louis Napoleon confronts the old dynasties of Europe, as the autocratic ally of the European democracy. He bases his power on the principle of 'satisfied nationalities,' expressed by universal suffrage. And this is a direct menace to the theories and practices of all the old dynasties." ²

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 89-96, 104-109.

² *New York Herald*: April 11, 1860, Dec. 14, 1853, Jan. 30, 1854, July 27, 1856, May 9, 1857, March 4, May 18, 1859, Feb. 16, March 17, March 21, 1860, Feb. 23, March 19, May 7, Nov. 24, Nov. 28, 1863, Jan. 1, 1864; *New York Times*: May 24, 1866, May 15, 1868; *Richmond Enquirer*: Nov. 18, 1859, July 2, 1863, March 25, 1864; *Cincinnati Gazette*: June 19, 1860 (lecture by John Mitchel); *Freeman's Journal*: April 4, 1863; Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. ii, p. 317.

The settlement of the Neufchatel question in favor of Switzerland, and the aid given to Italy in 1859 were two outstanding applications of his principle. Those who saw in him a champion of oppressed nations pleaded with him to take up the cudgels against Russia and in behalf of Poland in 1863, and were greatly disappointed when he failed to do more than utter a formal diplomatic protest.

Napoleon's aid to Italy in 1859 was regarded favorably by most Americans. He had not been altruistic, but he had given indispensable help to Italian nationality. Also there could be no real hostility to his course in 1860. He had allowed central and southern Italy to be united with the north. But his attitude on the Roman question did arouse bitter hostility at all times. His original aid to the Pope in 1849 was the cause of perhaps the first real antagonism on the part of Americans to his foreign policy. The fact that the Pope continued to be protected by a French garrison was a constant source of adverse comment. Napoleon was especially criticized for the part which French troops played in the defeat of Garibaldi's attempt to seize Rome in 1867. *Leslie's Weekly* called his action at that time "the latest but by no means the least of the series of blunders and crimes that has revealed his true character and capacity." More severe still was the statement of the *New York Tribune*: "Three times now has this man, acting from his own selfish desires to be thought the controller of events, and driven by his own fears of liberty, prevented Italy from ordering her Government as she thinks best."¹ His atti-

¹ *New York Tribune*: Sept. 26, Nov. 4, Nov. 7, 1867; *New York Herald*: June 23, Oct. 12, Nov. 16, 1862, June 5, 1863, March 19, 1864; *New York Times*: June 13, Aug. 3, Aug. 8, Sept. 28, 1866, Oct. 9, Oct. 12, Oct. 18, Dec. 30, 1867; *Cincinnati Gazette*: April 3, June 8, 1860, April 11, 1861, July 10, July 13, 1866, Nov. 1, 1867; *Richmond Enquirer*: Oct. 12, 1867; *New Orleans Picayune*: Feb. 7, 1855, April 7, June 11, 1859; *Leslie's Weekly*: Oct. 27, 1866, Nov. 30, 1867; *Portland*

tude toward Rome was hardly in accordance with the principle of self-determination of oppressed nationalities, although the *Irish Citizen* did say that Napoleon was giving aid to the weak Pope and was thus upholding his principles. Catholics in the United States praised him for his Italian policy in 1849 and 1867, but attacked him for allowing part of the Papal States to be seized in 1860.¹

The annexation of Savoy and Nice to France in 1860 did not arouse much comment, but yet was not passed over in complete silence. To many the use of the plebiscite was clear proof that Napoleon was proceeding according to his avowed principles. But to many others the plebiscite was a sham, "a shallow affair, the voting being a mockery." It was merely a proof that he had not been disinterested in the Italian War, and that he had really fought for territorial compensation. And to still others it was the beginning of a policy on the part of Napoleon which aimed at gaining for France the old "natural frontiers." The Alps were secured by Savoy. The next drive would be toward the Rhine. Prussia, Holland and Belgium were no longer safe.²

As early as 1860 it was rumored that Napoleon would offer to aid Prussia in accomplishing a Prussian union for

Transcript: March 4, 1860; *Nation*: Oct. 10, Oct. 31, Dec. 26, 1867; *Atlantic Monthly*: Aug., 1859, Nov., 1866 (art. by C. C. Hazewell); *Graham's Magazine*: March, 1853; *National Quarterly Review*: March, 1870; James, *Story and his Friends*, vol. ii, p. 125; Welles, *Diary*, vol. ii, p. 622; White, *Autobiography*, vol. i, p. 96.

¹ *New York Herald*: July 2, 1860 (speech by Archbishop Hughes); *Irish Citizen*: Nov. 23, 1867; *Freeman's Journal*: Jan. 24, 1863, June 2, July 14, Aug. 11, 1866; *Brownson's Quarterly Review*: April, 1852, April, 1859.

² *New York Herald*: March 17, March 21, 1860; *New Orleans Picayune*: Feb. 23, 1860; *Cincinnati Gazette*: April 3, 1860; *Richmond Enquirer*: March 10, 1860; *Portland Transcript*: March 24, April 21, 1860, Feb. 18, 1865; *Nation*: Oct. 19, 1865; Stillman, *Autobiography*, vol. i, pp. 324-325.

Germany, and in return would be rewarded by the cession to France of the left bank of the Rhine. In 1864 it was hinted that France might ask for the Rhenish provinces in case the Allies were given the Danish duchies. Rumors of French intervention and compensation became more and more common in 1865, as it became more and more apparent that a war between Austria and Prussia for German supremacy was inevitable. And in the first half of 1866 almost every American newspaper accused Napoleon of attempting to foment war, and of having made an alliance with Prussia by which, in return for his neutrality or active aid, France would be compensated for the expected Prussian gains by the gift of the left bank of the Rhine.¹

The battle of Sadowa was almost universally believed to have upset the balance of power in Europe, and to have created a power in Prussia which threatened French supremacy in European affairs. From that time down to the outbreak of the Franco-German War, the American press commented almost daily upon the strained relations between France and Prussia. Surely the war when it came could not have been a surprise to any American who read the newspapers at all. Immediately after the close of the war of 1866 it became known that Napoleon had made demands on Prussia for her Rhenish provinces as a compensation for gains greater than he had expected Prussia to receive. It was also known that Bismarck had met the demand with a curt refusal. By that act the leadership of Europe was believed to have passed from Napoleon's hands into those

¹ New York *Herald*: March 21, 1861, Feb. 2, 1864, Jan. 14, 1866; New York *Times*: Sept. 27, 1865; Richmond *Enquirer*: May 25, Nov. 20, 1860, April 21, 1864, Nov. 16, 1865; San Francisco *Bulletin*: Nov. 22, 1864; *Leslie's Weekly*: July 21, 1860; *Nation*: Oct. 19, 1865; *Irish American*: July 21, 1866; *Freeman's Journal*: June 2, 1866; Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. ii, p. 9; Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. ii, p. 331.

of Bismarck. The French Emperor had been snubbed by the Prussian Premier. In return it was known that Napoleon had made strong representations to Bismarck that France could not allow the South German states to be absorbed into a Prussian union. By taking such a stand Napoleon placed himself squarely in opposition to the completion of German unity. Determined to prevent France from becoming a second-rate power, Napoleon was known to be strengthening his army, introducing conscription, and arming his men with breech-loading rifles. All during the period American journalists commented on the race of armaments on either side of the Rhine, and fully believed that Napoleon was only waiting to complete military preparations before he made a decisive trial of strength. The Luxemburg affair was quite commonly looked upon in the United States as a preliminary testing of power on the part of Napoleon, in which it was generally thought that Bismarck came out ahead, gave Napoleon a second snubbing, and demonstrated for a second time that the Prussian Premier was "cock of the walk."¹

There can be no question that Americans fully believed in the inevitability of war. In the first place, France would

¹ *New York Tribune*: Aug. 3, Aug. 13, Aug. 16, Dec. 24, 1866, Jan. 1, 1868; *New York Herald*: Aug. 7, Aug. 10, Aug. 19, 1866; *New York Times*: Sept. 27, Oct. 5, Nov. 9, Nov. 26, Dec. 9, 1866, July 2, Aug. 5, Oct. 9, 1867, July 17, 1868; *New York World*: Jan. 3, 1867; *San Francisco Bulletin*: Aug. 9, Sept. 12, 1866; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Aug. 17, Aug. 20, 1866, April 29, 1867; *Richmond Enquirer*: Feb. 17, 1869; *Detroit Free Press*: July 24, Aug. 20, 1866; *Portland Transcript*: Aug. 18, 1866, April 20, 1867; *Nation*: Aug. 23, Aug. 30, Dec. 27, 1866, Aug. 15, Dec. 26, 1867; *Harper's Weekly*: Oct. 20, 1866; *Leslie's Weekly*: May 4, 1867; *Freeman's Journal*: Sept. 15, 1866; *Galaxy*: June, 1867 (art. by C. W. Elliott); *Atlantic Monthly*: Nov., 1866 (art. by C. C. Hazewell); *Harper's Magazine*: Nov., 1868; *Land We Love*: Feb., 1868; Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. iii, pp. 559-560; Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. iii, pp. 117-121.

not allow the leadership in Europe to pass out of her hands without a resort to arms. Napoleon personally might desire to keep the peace, but the French put great emphasis upon national prestige, and were believed to be more chauvinistic than Napoleon. Moreover, since his power rested upon the sword he must be able to demonstrate that the French sword ruled Europe. No monarch whose power was based on militarism could afford to sit still and be repeatedly snubbed. To make successful war upon Prussia was Napoleon's best guarantee of his son's succession to the throne. In the second place, Prussia would refuse to abide by any French veto upon German unity. No patriotic German would permit French interference in purely German affairs, and if Bismarck suffered it, he would be driven from office. As a matter of fact, the demand of Napoleon for German territory and for the limitation of the German union to the country north of the Main, had done far more to cement the German sentiment of union than had Prussia's victories over Austria. Napoleon and Bismarck might wear themselves out in making pacific protestations, but they could not be believed. French vanity had not yet been appeased, nor German unity completed. To talk of peace until the issue had been met by a trial of arms was folly. It is interesting to note that most Americans prophesied a French defeat when war should come, that many expected that a defeat would mean the overthrow of Napoleon's dynasty, and that a few even hinted that in case of a victory over France, Prussia would be satisfied with nothing less than Alsace and Lorraine.¹

¹ *New York Tribune*: April 10, July 23, Aug. 14, Sept. 8, 1866, May 6, May 8, July 23, Aug. 30, 1867, Aug. 27, 1868; *New York Herald*: Aug. 14, Aug. 15, Aug. 16, Aug. 18, Aug. 24, 1866; *New York Times*: Aug. 13, Aug. 15, Aug. 16, Aug. 31, Sept. 23, 1866, April 23, April 27, Aug. 18, Aug. 23, Aug. 27, Sept. 22, Oct. 12, 1867, Jan. 6, Aug. 20, 1868,

The great majority of Americans showed themselves to be keenly in sympathy with Prussia throughout the diplomatic duel between 1866 and 1870. They rejoiced at the rebuff which Napoleon had received from Bismarck when the former made the demand for Prussian territory. The *Nation* was glad that Napoleon had been forced to eat humble pie. The *Cincinnati Gazette* had hoped that Napoleon might use force and then be beaten: "If Louis Napoleon interferes and gets a good drubbing from Prussia, it will be a good thing on general principles."¹ Very similar was the remark of the *San Francisco Bulletin*: "Americans at least will rejoice that the independent triumph of Prussia and Italy . . . has broken the spell of Caesarism, substituting popular for dynastic and imperial ideas."² *Harper's Weekly* was no more friendly when it said: "But should Louis Napoleon take up arms it will be for conquest and dominion—a war with no reasonable pretense, and without the sympathy or approval of any other power."³ *Leslie's Weekly* was jubilant over the way in which Bismarck had shown "all Latinity that power is with the fair hair and blue eyes of Northern Europe."⁴ The *Milwaukee Sentinel* ridiculed Napoleon's "wonderful lack of back-bone in his late course with Prussia." John Bigelow remarked that the

March 2, April 11, 1869; *New York World*: July 25, 1866; *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 23, Aug. 20, Aug. 24, 1866, April 10, April 19, April 27, May 6, 1867; *Richmond Enquirer*: Oct. 12, 1867; *Portland Transcript*: Aug. 25, 1866; *Nation*: Aug. 30, 1866, Jan. 3, April 11, Sept. 5, 1867; *Irish American*: Aug. 25, 1866; *Atlantic Monthly*: Nov., 1866 (art. by C. C. Hazewell); *Detroit Free Press*: Aug. 15, 1866; Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. iii, p. 138.

¹ *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 28, 1866, Jan. 26, 1867; *Nation*: Aug. 23, 1866.

² *San Francisco Bulletin*: Aug. 15, Aug. 17, 1866.

³ *Harper's Weekly*: Sept. 15, 1866.

⁴ *Leslie's Weekly*: Oct. 27, 1866.

war of 1866 had "diminished the relative influence of Bonapartism, which can do no harm." John Lothrop Motley crowed over Napoleon's diplomatic defeat in an almost indecent way: "The most consoling thing in the whole history is to see how delightfully poor L. N. has been jockeyed. . . . Alas, poor Louis Napoleon! Where be your Sardinias and your Genoas now? Your Rhenish provinces and your Belgiums? Quite chap-fallen. Go to Vichy."¹

Napoleon's Prussian policy was bound to be unpopular in the United States, because it attempted to put a veto on the completion of German unity. Enough has been said in earlier chapters to prove that most Americans were keenly in favor of German unity. It was very natural that any attempt on the part of Napoleon to hinder such a desirable consummation would be hotly resented by the American people. The *New York Times* thought that Prussia had "right on her side, in objecting to French interference in settling affairs purely Germanic." The *New York Tribune* stated that the South Germans were kept out of the German union "solely" by French influence, and asked: "What nation . . . situated like the German, would not have repelled such an intervention with unanimous indignation!"²

However, not all Americans were of one mind about the Luxemburg affair. The *New York Times*, *Philadelphia Press* and *Leslie's Weekly* felt that France had most of the right on her side, but William James and the *New York Tribune* regretted that her defeat had not been more decisive. James wrote: "I think the French tone in the last

¹ Motley, *Correspondence*, vol. iii, pp. 129-134; *New York Herald*: Aug. 22, 1866; *Detroit Free Press*: July 24, Aug. 20, 1866; *Milwaukee Sentinel*: Aug. 18, 1866; Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. iii, p. 507.

² *New York Tribune*: Aug. 30, 1867, Aug. 14, 1866; *New York Times*: Aug. 27, 1867, Aug. 14, 1866, Oct. 12, 1867; *Richmond Enquirer*: Aug. 15, 1866; *Detroit Free Press*: July 24, 1866.

quarrel deserved a degrading and stinging humiliation as much as anything in history ever did, and I'm very sorry they did not get it." ¹ The New York *Tribune* probably expressed the opinion of a large number of Americans, and it summed up the whole attitude toward Napoleon's defeat very neatly:

[Bismarck] plays his part so well, and sends his arrow to its mark with such magnificent directness, that for the life of us we cannot bring ourselves to hope that he will show a Christian temperance. We own remorsefully to an unregenerate mind, and every time he lets fly a shaft at poor Nap., we cry, "Hurrah! hit him again. He hasn't any friends." ²

And yet Napoleon was not entirely without friends in the United States. The *Catholic World*, an important Catholic monthly, the *Freeman's Journal*, the leading Catholic weekly, the *Irish Citizen* and the *Irish American*, prominent Irish weeklies, and the New York *World*, probably the most powerful Northern Democratic daily, were all sympathetic with Napoleon in his quarrel with Bismarck. The *Catholic World* denied that Napoleon had anything to fear from a Prussian Germany. An Austrian Germany would have been much more populous and hence more dangerous. In case Prussia should make war against France, the result would be that France would gain the longed-for boundary of the Rhine. The New York *World* claimed that the Rhine had belonged to the French for centuries in the mind of the French people, that they had a better claim to it than

¹ *Letters of William James*, vol. i, p. 95; New York *Tribune*: April 10, 1867, Jan. 1, 1868; New York *Times*: May 13, May 14, 1867; Philadelphia *Press*: May 14, 1867; *Leslie's Weekly*: May 11, 1867.

² New York *Tribune*: Jan. 28, 1868, Aug. 16, Sept. 20, 1866, March 20, Aug. 23, Sept. 26, Oct. 4, Nov. 4, Nov. 7, 1867; *Harper's Weekly*: Sept. 15, 1866.

the Germans, and advocated a cession of Luxemburg and the Rhenish Palatinate to France. The *Irish American*, although it thought Napoleon the master of Bismarck, admitted that its sympathies with France were largely the result of English partiality to Prussia. Most rabidly pro-French was the *Irish Citizen*, which summed up its views thus: "We have no doubt now ourselves that a general European war is approaching; and no doubt of the result—the break-up of the North German Confederation, and the Rhine frontiers for France."¹

¹ *Irish Citizen*: Sept. 5, 1868, Oct. 26, Nov. 9, 1867, May 30, Sept. 12, 1868, April 17, 1869; *New York World*: Aug. 6, Aug. 15, Aug. 17, Aug. 23, 1866; *Irish American*: Aug. 25, 1866, April 27, 1867; *Freeman's Journal*: July 21, July 28, Sept. 15, 1866; *Catholic World*: Nov., 1866.

CHAPTER VIII

AMERICAN OPINION OF THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR

THE prophecies of war between France and Germany which had been appearing in the American press with astounding frequency since 1866, were finally fulfilled in July, 1870. The war which followed was almost unexampled up to that time in the number of troops engaged and in far-reaching effects. During its course one empire collapsed, giving place to a republic, and a new federal empire appeared in central Europe. It is not wonderful that such a war, so long awaited by the American press, so full of dramatic incidents, and so absorbing in interest to the great body of German-Americans, should have riveted American attention from its very inception. No event in European history during the period covered by this study, with the possible exception of the Hungarian revolution of 1849, aroused such interest in the United States. The cable was at last working satisfactorily so that Americans could read the news of a battle on the morning after it had occurred, reconstruction issues were becoming tiresome, there was no presidential election for two years, the war began just as Congress adjourned, and consequently the public devoured the exciting details of the momentous struggle across the Atlantic. Each of the prominent papers had its European correspondent; large headlines, prejudiced and often false, appeared with regularity; the metropolitan

press devoted pages of news and columns of editorials to the war. Provincial newspapers, and weeklies, monthlies, even quarterlies, printed articles on the European struggle. Individual sentiment alone is more difficult to ascertain than in the earlier period.

In a certain sense, the present chapter is the climax of the study. Nearly all of the earlier opinions, prejudices, likes and dislikes, can be found echoed during the Franco-German War. At last the Second French Empire had come to grips with its rival, the North German Confederation. On the one side was an empire built upon the ruins of a republic, an empire but recently and decisively accepted by the fickle, vain, shallow mass of the French people, who had thus again shown their incapacity for self-government, an empire which had its cornerstone in militarism and martial glory, an empire which had mortally offended the United States by its attempted aid to the rebellious South and by its overthrow of a sister republic. On the other side was a government which had but recently fought a great and successful war for the partial unification of the Protestant, highly educated, democratically trained German peoples. To be sure, the government was not itself democratic, but it represented the most progressive people in Europe, thousands of whom were believed to form the best element in the tide of American immigration, a people moreover which had shown itself friendly to the United States in her time of need. And here in a tremendous struggle the Second French Empire was suddenly to fall and disappear, while the North German Confederation was to grow into a German Empire which seemed the realization of German aspirations for political unity.

The Franco-German War very naturally divides into two parts, with the battle of Sedan, the fall of the Second French Empire and the rise of the Third French Republic

marking the division. During the first period of the contest, from its beginning to the battle of Sedan, American opinion was overwhelmingly pro-German and anti-French. But even in the early part of the war there was a fairly considerable pro-French sentiment in the United States. After the battle of Sedan there occurred a noticeable though temporary shift in American favor away from Germany and towards France. A detailed analysis must be made of the causes for both the pro-German and pro-French sentiment, as well as a study of the reasons for the shift in opinion after Sedan, together with the extent of the change which occurred at that time.

PRO-GERMAN SENTIMENT BEFORE THE BATTLE OF SEDAN

That American opinion was strongly pro-Prussian during the early part of the Franco-German War is unquestionable. Most Northerners, most Westerners, most Protestants, most Republicans, most American patriots sympathized with the Prussian cause. The *New York Times*, which was itself fairly neutral in the early part of the war, admitted that most Americans had given their sympathies to Prussia and had withdrawn them from France. The *San Francisco Bulletin* said, "It is probably true that a larger portion of the American press and people sympathize with Prussia."¹ The *Carthage (Ill.) Gazette* felt much the same: "A large majority of Americans, we think, have their sympathies interested in the side of Bismarck. Especially is this so in the country."² The anti-Prussian Southern *Richmond Enquirer* said that the Northern papers were "generally in sympathy with Prussia." Gustave Koerner

¹ *San Francisco Bulletin*: July 30, 1870; *New York Times*: July 19, Aug. 9, 1870.

² *Carthage Gazette*: July 21, 1870.

when protesting against the later shift in American opinion said, "Hitherto all the leading papers of the Union . . . had heartily espoused the German cause."¹ *Harper's Weekly* thought that there was only one party in the United States: "It is a war in which Louis Napoleon is on one side and the rest of the world upon the other."² The *Detroit Free Press*, which made a decided shift itself to the French side after Sedan, remarked: "No one denies that the popular feeling in . . . America was with Prussia at the start, and supported her cause up to a few days since."³ The Catholic *De La Salle Monthly*, strongly pro-French, admitted that "a great part of our people, represented by the Press, affect to believe that the cause of Prussia is identified with that of liberty." The *New York World*, one of the most anti-Prussian papers in the East, confessed: "When the war broke out, the current of American sympathy ran strongly in favor of the Prussians."⁴ John Sherman remarked in the Senate: "Certainly, at the beginning of this war the universal sympathy throughout this country was with the German people. Until Sedan, I suppose there was very little division of opinion."⁵ Perhaps the clearest recognition of the preponderance of pro-Prussian feeling in the United States, however, is to be found in a statement by the *New York Tribune*:

In looking over several hundred exchanges every day, we cannot help seeing how largely the American press sympathizes with

¹ Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, p. 514; *Richmond Enquirer*: Aug. 13, 1870.

² *Harper's Weekly*: Aug. 27, Aug. 6, Sept. 24, Dec. 31, 1870.

³ *Detroit Free Press*: Oct. 7, 1870.

⁴ *New York World*: Aug. 23, Dec. 30, 1870; *De La Salle Monthly*: Aug., Sept., 1870.

⁵ *Congressional Globe*, 3rd Session, 41st Congress, p. 869.

the Germans in their struggle against the French Emperor. Nearly all the leading journals of the country—those which control public opinion and express themselves according to their convictions—have taken ground against the pretensions of Napoleon.¹

The first and one of the most important reasons for American sympathy with Prussia was the belief that the war was one of aggression on the part of France. The projected elevation of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern to the Spanish throne was thought to be a matter of concern only to Spain and Prussia. France had no right to interfere, for the affair was none of her business. Charles Sumner remarked: "When I say it was none of her business, I give it the mildest condemnation."² Certainly after Leopold had withdrawn because of French protest, the further demand on the part of Napoleon that no Hohenzollern prince should ever sit on the throne of Spain was but insult added to injury, an insolent gesture that any self-respecting people would resent. The *New York Tribune* said that Napoleon's position was that of a man "who having first threatened war for an inadequate cause finds even that weak cause taken away from him, and then exclaims, 'Never mind; I will fight anyhow.'" Quite similar was the comment of George William Curtis in which he compared Napoleon to "the Irishman at the fair who carried a chip upon his shoulder and jostled his neighbor, then accused him of

¹ *New York Tribune*: July 25, 1870; *New York World*: Sept. 13, 1870 (cites *Independent*); *Milwaukee Sentinel*: July 26, 1870; *Leslie's Weekly*: April 15, 1871; *Lakeside Monthly*: Sept., 1870; Allen, Alexander V. G., *Phillips Brooks* (New York, c. 1907), vol. i, p. 245; Frothingham, *Memoir of William Henry Channing*, p. 382; Lowell, *Letters*, vol. ii, p. 71; Smith, B. C., *Letters*, pp. 119 *et seq.*, 351.

² Sumner, *Works*, vol. xiv, p. 30; *New York Tribune*: April 28, July 11, 1870; *Harper's Weekly*: July 23, 1870; *Nation*: July 14, 1870.

knocking the chip off, and proceeded to fight him." But the Hohenzollern candidacy was not generally believed to be the true cause for Napoleon's action. It was only a pretext to hide his real aim. As the *Wisconsin State Journal* said: "Something besides the accession of Leopold to the throne of Spain instigated Napoleon. The Hohenzollern lamb was too far down the stream to roil the brook where the thirsty French wolf drank."¹ Napoleon was quite generally charged with having precipitated a conflict with Prussia in order to bolster up his declining empire. The Mexican affair and the repeated snubs of Bismarck had weakened his prestige to such an extent that a foreign war was necessary. A successful war would greatly strengthen the chances of the Prince Imperial peacefully to ascend the throne at Napoleon's death. A war fought for such purposes would be purely dynastic, and as such could not command any support from the American people. The *Cincinnati Gazette* spoke of the pretext as "absurd," "frivolous," and "trifling." The *Philadelphia Press* referred to "this unholy crusade" and called its author "a notorious bully whose insolence has become insufferable." The *New York Tribune* called the action "his greatest crime and his greatest folly." The *Milwaukee Sentinel* summed up American sentiment by saying: "Never was a war waged by a despot for more purely selfish and personal ends than this."²

¹ *Wisconsin State Journal*: July 16, July 12, 1870; *New York Tribune*: July 15, July 12, 1870; *Richmond Enquirer*: July 14, 1870; *Milwaukee Sentinel*: July 15, July 16, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 29, 1870; *San Francisco Bulletin*: July 13, 1870; *Carthage Gazette*: July 21, 1870; *Nation*: July 14, July 21, 1870; *Portland Transcript*: July 16, July 23, 1870; *Harper's Weekly*: July 30, 1870; *Harper's Magazine*: Sept., 1870 (Easy Chair), Jan., 1871 (art. by C. C. Hazewell); Sumner, *Works*, vol. xiv, pp. 15-25.

² *Milwaukee Sentinel*: July 26, July 15, July 19, July 28, Aug. 3, 1870; *New York Tribune*: Nov. 29, July 9, July 13, July 19, July 23, Aug. 3,

But when referring to the responsibility for the outbreak of the Franco-German War, Americans often failed to distinguish between Napoleon and the French people. Usually the confusion was unintentional, but not always so. Had not the French people sanctioned Napoleon's government by an overwhelming majority in May, 1870, and could they not logically therefore be included in the condemnation of their ruler? Had not the Corps Legislatif voted war almost unanimously? As a matter of fact, had not Napoleon been at the height of his popularity when he asked for a declaration of war? The *New York Times* went so far as to say, "Impartial history will probably record that the French people forced the war on Napoleon." Such were the sentiments often expressed in the early phase of the war, and which became much more common in the pro-German papers after the fall of Napoleon. The French people were believed to have desired to secure the Rhine frontier for centuries and to have thought they saw a good opportunity to do so in 1870. They were jealous of the consolidation of Germany and feared to see a united nation on their eastern boundary. A successful war against Prussia would de-

1870; *New York Herald*: July 11, July 12, 1870; *New York Times*: Sept. 5, Sept. 11, Sept. 12, 1870 (Illinois Republican Platform); *New York World*: July 20, Sept. 8, 1870 (speech at New York Republican Convention); *Philadelphia Press*: Aug. 8, Aug. 20, Aug. 5, Sept. 5, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 16, July 18, July 20, July 11, July 13, July 25, Aug. 9, 1870; *Richmond Enquirer*: July 14, Aug. 10, 1870; *Detroit Free Press*: July 17, July 24, 1870; *Wisconsin State Journal*: July 18, 1870; *San Francisco Bulletin*: July 15, July 30, 1870; *Carthage Gazette*: July 21, 1870; *Portland Transcript*: Aug. 27, Sept. 3, 1870; *Warsaw Bulletin*: Aug. 13, 1870; *Harper's Weekly*: July 30, Aug. 13, Aug. 27, 1870; *Leslie's Weekly*: July 30, Aug. 27, 1870; *Nation*: July 21, 1870; *Beecher's Magazine*: Aug., 1870; *Lakeside Monthly*: Sept., 1870; *National Quarterly Review*: Sept., 1870; Allen, Alexander V. G., *Life and Letters of Phillips Brooks* (New York, 1901), vol. ii, p. 43; Ticknor, *Life, Letters and Journals*, vol. ii, p. 49; Sumner, *Works*, vol. xiv, pp. 14-35.

stroy all hopes of German unity and put Germany back where she had been in 1815.¹

Whatever might be the real cause for the French aggression—an attempt to prop up a tottering dynasty, the ambition for territorial aggrandizement or a desire to put a veto on German unity—it could not hope to gain much sympathy in the United States. Again and again, not only in the early part of the war, but also after the battle of Sedan, the belief in French aggression was stated as the chief reason why Americans sympathized with Prussia. Gustave Koerner said: "The war was considered so iniquitous on the part of France that the moral feeling of the great mass of the American people was necessarily against France."² Similar was a remark of the *San Francisco Bulletin*: "A large majority of Americans believed, and still believe, that France made this war without just cause and in a spirit of arrogance and aggression."³ Very much the same was the evidence of the *New York Tribune*: "Our sympathies are with

¹ *New York Times*: Aug. 11, July 8, July 9, July 15, Aug. 9, 1870; *New York Tribune*: July 12, July 15, July 16, Oct. 11, Oct. 12, Nov. 14, Nov. 29, 1870, March 2, March 21, April 11, 1871 (speech of W. C. Bryant at German celebration); *New York World*: July 24, 1870; *Philadelphia Press*: Aug. 20, Oct. 12, 1870; *Richmond Enquirer*: July 14, July 16, Sept. 29, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 18, July 21, July 25, July 30, Aug. 16, Aug. 29, Sept. 5, 1870; *San Francisco Bulletin*: July 13, July 15, 1870; *Milwaukee Sentinel*: July 15, July 16, 1870; *Wisconsin State Journal*: July 16, 1870; *Charleston Courier*: July 16, July 18, 1870; *Detroit Free Press*: July 17, 1870; *Nation*: July 21, Aug. 4, Aug. 25, Sept. 15, Nov. 3, Dec. 5, 1870; *Workingman's Advocate*: Oct. 8, 1870; *Harper's Weekly*: July 30, Aug. 6, Aug. 27, Oct. 29, 1870; *Carthage Gazette*: July 21, 1870; *Leslie's Weekly*: Oct. 1, 1870; *Scribner's Magazine*: Dec., 1870; *Harper's Magazine*: Jan., 1871 (art. by C. C. Hazewell); *North American Review*: Oct., 1871 (art. by C. K. Adams); Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 235 *et seq.*; Lowell, *Letters*, vol. ii, pp. 62-63.

² Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, p. 514.

³ *San Francisco Bulletin*: Oct. 6, Aug. 31, 1870.

Germany rather than France, because France . . . made a war of spoliation upon Germany without necessity or reason."¹ If anything, the *Milwaukee Sentinel* was even more outspoken: "In this struggle inaugurated for such purposes by France, there can be no doubt that the sympathies of the American people will be heartily with Prussia. . . . We only hope that France will be terribly chastised for precipitating a conflict in every way deplorable."² Samuel Hopkins, a prominent Massachusetts clergyman and author, summed up the American feeling in *Scribner's Magazine*: "The Gallican cock crowed, ruffled his feathers, and assaulted the Prussian eagle."³

On the contrary, Prussia's attitude was considered "calm and dignified." She had been forced into war by the extravagant demands of France. The French terms could scarcely have been "accepted without humiliation." The *Nation* thought that "Prussia had . . . conceded every-

¹ *New York Tribune*: March 21, 1871, Sept. 7, Sept. 10, Nov. 14, Nov. 15, 1870, March 2, March 8, 1871.

² *Milwaukee Sentinel*: July 19, July 16, July 26, Oct. 24, 1870.

³ *Scribner's Magazine*: Dec., 1870; *New York Times*: Sept. 12 (Republican platforms of Illinois and Missouri), Sept. 16, Sept. 28, 1870, Jan. 21, 1871; *New York World*: Sept. 8 (speech at New York Republican Convention), Sept. 13 (citation from *Providence Journal*), Nov. 13, 1870; *Philadelphia Press*: May 15, 1871; *Richmond Enquirer*: Sept. 29, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 21, 1870; *Milwaukee Sentinel*: July 19, 1870 (letter of B. Gratz Brown); *Detroit Free Press*: July 28, Sept. 5, Sept. 15, Oct. 7, 1870; *Wisconsin State Journal*: Sept. 14, 1870; *Harper's Weekly*: Aug. 27, Sept. 10, Sept. 24, 1870, Jan. 21, 1871; *Leslie's Weekly*: Nov. 5, 1870; *Harper's Magazine*: Nov., 1870 (Easy Chair); *North American Review*: Oct., 1870 (art. by H. W. Hemans); *Congressional Globe*, 3rd session, 41st Congress, p. 954 (speech by Oliver P. Morton); Schieber, Clara Eve, *The Transformation of American Sentiment toward Germany, 1870-1914* (Boston, 1923), pp. 16, 17 (citations to same effect from *Philadelphia Enquirer*, *Boston Herald*, *Springfield Republican* and *Chicago Tribune*).

thing which self-respect permitted or usage required.”¹ The *New York Times* considered Prussia the injured party, and George William Curtis went so far as to say: “The King of Prussia said, with truth, ‘I am compelled to draw the sword to ward off a wanton attack.’”²

A second great cause for American, or at least Northern, sympathy with Prussia can be discovered in the contrast which many Americans found between the French and German attitudes toward the Civil War. Enough has been said in the last chapter to show that Americans believed Napoleon’s Mexican adventure to be the result of his conviction of the ultimate failure of the Northern cause, and also to show that his Mexican scheme, together with his encouragement to the South, was the most important reason for American dislike for him before 1870.³ When he became involved in war in 1870, it was very natural that American sympathies should be enlisted on the side of his enemies. Many newspapers in 1870 mentioned his treatment of the United States in her time of need. The *San Francisco Bulletin* said that Americans could not sympathize with a man “who sought to persuade England into a recognition of the Southern Confederacy, who tried to implant Imperialism in our sister republic of Mexico as another menace to the United States.” The *Cincinnati Gazette*

¹ *Nation*: July 21, 1870.

² *Harper’s Magazine*: Oct., 1870 (Easy Chair); *New York Tribune*: July 11, 1870; *New York Herald*: July 11, 1870; *New York Times*: July 12, July 15, Sept. 5, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 11, 1870; *Richmond Enquirer*: July 16, 1870; *San Francisco Bulletin*: Aug. 31, 1870; *Nation*: July 14, July 21, 1870; *Harper’s Weekly*: Aug. 13, 1870; *Portland Transcript*: July 16, 1870; *Leslie’s Weekly*: Oct. 1, 1870; Ticknor, *Life, Letters and Journals*, vol. ii, p. 490; Sumner, *Works*, vol. xiv, pp. 25, 28.

³ Cf. *supra*, pp. 291-309.

cited his unfriendly acts and said, "For this we owe him hostile feelings."¹ *Leslie's Weekly* accused Napoleon of prolonging the Civil War "for two years," and said that his actions had cost the United States a hundred thousand lives and a thousand million dollars.²

On the other hand the Germans, both in the United States and in Germany, had given inestimable aid to the Northern cause in the Civil War. The Germans in the United States had been extremely hostile to negro slavery, had hated everything which savored of states' rights, and had consequently volunteered in thousands on the Northern side. Estimates vary as to the exact number who actually served, but it is probable that one hundred and seventy-five thousand Germans were enlisted in the Federal army.³ Even more important was the fact that the Germans of the Fatherland had bought American bonds in large quantities. Here again it is difficult to make a definite statement, but the New York *Tribune* thought they were held "to the

¹ *Cincinnati Gazette*: Aug. 29, Aug. 31, 1870; *San Francisco Bulletin*: July 30, 1870.

² *Leslie's Weekly*: Feb. 18, 1871, Nov. 19, 1870; *New York Tribune*: Sept. 23, 1870; *Milwaukee Sentinel*: July 16, 1870; *Philadelphia Press*: Aug. 20, 1870; *Detroit Free Press*: Sept. 6, 1870; *Workingman's Advocate*: Nov. 5, 1870; *De La Salle Monthly*: Aug., 1870; *Harper's Magazine*: Jan., 1871 (art. by C. C. Hazewell); Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, pp. 246-247; Sumner, *Works*, vol. xiv, pp. 44-45.

³ *New York Tribune*: July 22, Aug. 11, 1870; *New York Times*: Aug. 26, Sept. 11 (meeting of Soldiers' and Sailors' Central Club in New York), Sept. 12, 1870 (Missouri Republican Platform); *New York World*: Aug. 5, 1870; *Leslie's Weekly*: Aug. 6, 1870; *Galaxy*: Sept., 1870 (art. by Philip Quilibet, pen name for George Edward Pond, author and journalist); Sumner, *Works*, vol. xiv, pp. 151-152; *Congressional Globe*, 3rd Session, 41st Congress, p. 954 (speech by Senator Samuel C. Pomeroy of Kansas); Schieber, *American Sentiment toward Germany*, p. 4; Faust, Albert Bernhardt, *The German Element in the United States* (Boston, 1909), vol. i, p. 523 *et seq.*

extent of seven or eight hundred million dollars," and Senator Stewart of Nevada put the sum at five or six hundred millions. Certain it is that Frankfort-am-Main was an important center of distribution of American bonds, and that Americans felt that the German people had rendered the North an invaluable service by the purchase of American war securities. They had shared the risk with the people of the United States. They had proved true friends in time of need. Schuyler Colfax, Vice-President of the United States in 1870, in a speech at South Bend, Indiana, spoke of the "German people who alone of all the other nations in Europe, purchased our bonds, and joined with us in the risk as to their ultimate value." The *Milwaukee Sentinel* said that "we should naturally favor the country which gave us material aid during the rebellion, by purchase of our bonds." Very similar was the comment in *Scribner's Magazine*: "The Germans have had faith in us and in our bonds, and they fully deserve the widespread sympathy manifested for them throughout the land."¹ Quite typical of American opinion was the characteristic statement of Louisa May Alcott, certainly a person who could not have been playing politics for the German vote:

¹ *Scribner's Magazine*: Dec., 1870 (art. by William Wells); *New York Tribune*: Sept. 12 (speech of Schuyler Colfax), Sept. 29, 1870; *New York Times*: Aug. 11, Aug. 19, Aug. 26, 1870; *Philadelphia Press*: Sept. 5, Sept. 6, 1870; *Milwaukee Sentinel*: Aug. 3, 1870; *Galaxy*: Sept., 1870 (art. by George E. Pond); *Congressional Globe*, 3rd Session, 41st Congress, p. 955 (speech of Senator William M. Stewart of Nevada); Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, pp. 246-247; Faust, *The German Element*, vol. i, pp. 567-568; Schieber, *American Sentiment toward Germany*, p. 4. It is probable that the Germans bought American bonds not solely because of sympathy with the Union cause. As a matter of fact many of them made handsome profits. They bought depreciated greenbacks with their gold and received bonds in exchange for the greenbacks, which were accepted at face value when so exchanged. Later of course the bonds were redeemed in gold.

"I side with the Prussians, for they sympathized with us in our war. Hooray for old Pruss!"¹

The contrast between the German and the French attitude during the Civil War was brought forward many times during the summer and autumn of 1870 as a reason why all good Americans should support Germany. Party politicians such as Roscoe Conkling, Schuyler Colfax and B. Gratz Brown, party platforms such as those drawn up by Republican State Conventions in Ohio and Iowa, and the Union Republican General Committee of New York, all placed emphasis on the same point. The *Milwaukee Sentinel*, *Cincinnati Gazette*, *New York Times* and *Leslie's Weekly* brought out the issue clearly. George E. Pond, for ten years author of the "Driftwood" column in the *Galaxy*, wrote to the same effect. The *Savannah Republican*, pro-French and Southern Democratic, complained that Northern papers were hostile to Napoleon because "*he was a friend to the South in her recent struggle for independence*," and went on to say, "No doubt the entire Radical press of the North will take the same ground and throw up their hats for Prussia on every success."² The following editorial from the *Cincinnati Gazette* admirably sums up the feeling:

. . . the German people . . . were our friends because they love liberty. . . . [They bought bonds] and thus, as we cannot forget, sustained the credit of our Government when it most needed support. . . . They took all the risks, because their sympathies were on the side of freedom and national unity. . . . Of course the Republicans of the United States have not forgotten, nor will they ever forget, the sympathy and the assistance that Germany extended to this government in our dark

¹ Cheney, Ednah D., editor, *Louisa May Alcott, Her Life, Letters and Journals* (Boston, 1907), p. 244.

² *Savannah Republican*: July 21, 1870.

days; nor can they soon forget the treachery of which Louis Napoleon was guilty.¹

It is possible, although very difficult to prove, that Americans may have been influenced in their sympathy with Germany by their fear that a German defeat might throw a large quantity of American bonds on the market, and thus prevent a refunding process at a lower rate of interest. Such a refunding process was ardently desired by many Americans because it would mean a lower rate of taxation and a consequent reduction in the general cost of living. Certain it is that many Americans feared that a long war might throw American bonds on the market in large numbers and thus prevent refunding. The *San Francisco Bulletin*, *Carthage Gazette*, *Milwaukee Sentinel* and *Charleston Courier* all voiced the same fear. Since Germany held a much larger amount of American bonds than France it would have been natural to wish for a short war, with a decisive victory for Prussia which would not materially derange the general financial situation. Perhaps the *Philadelphia Press* recognized the possible connection between American bonds and Prussian success when it said: "The quick sympathy of our people with Germany will be as quickly responded to in more liberal contributions to our

¹ *Cincinnati Gazette*: Sept. 5, 1870; *New York Tribune*: July 22 (Union Republican General Committee of New York), Aug. 11 (11th District Republican Association of New York), Sept. 12, 1870 (speech by Schuyler Colfax); *New York Times*: Aug. 11 (Ohio Republican platform), Aug. 19 (Iowa Republican platform), Aug. 26 (Republican General Committee of New York); *New York World*: Aug. 5, 1870 (speech by Conkling); *Milwaukee Sentinel*: July 19 (speech by B. Gratz Brown), Aug. 3, Sept. 1, 1870; *Leslie's Weekly*: Aug. 6, Nov. 19, 1870; *Galaxy*: Sept., 1870 (art. by George E. Pond); Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, pp. 246-247; Schieber, *American Sentiment toward Germany*, pp. 5, 6, 24, 25 (citations from *Chicago Tribune* and *Cincinnati Enquirer*).

population, and in more liberal purchases of our bonds."¹ But only the *Milwaukee Sentinel* expressed the connection clearly:

If Prussia wins in a short war, the resources of her people will not be severely taxed, and the Frankfort market for our bonds will be as good if not better than ever. If the war is long, or if Prussia is beaten, the call upon the people for money for war purposes will be great, and they will be prompted by patriotism to dispose of American securities. . . . [Then gold would rise] our credit would fall correspondingly, and funding at lower rates of interest would be indefinitely postponed. This may be *one* reason why Americans in general sympathize with the Germans in this struggle, but it would be an insufficient one if the cause of France were just. As it is, our interests and our sense of justice coincide, and we cannot do otherwise than wish for the speedy triumph of the Prussian arms.²

¹ *Philadelphia Press*: Sept. 5, 1870.

² *Milwaukee Sentinel*: Aug. 9, July 15, 1870; *San Francisco Bulletin*: July 15, 1870; *Charleston Courier*: July 22, 1870; *Carthage Gazette*: July 21, 1870. It was also quite generally hoped that the war might increase the demand for American foodstuffs and give an opportunity for the United States to rebuild its merchant marine. On this point *cf.* *New York Herald*: July 8, 1870; *New York Times*: Oct. 16, 1870; *San Francisco Bulletin*: July 15, 1870; *Richmond Enquirer*: July 14, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 16, 1870; *Milwaukee Sentinel*: July 15, 1870; *Detroit Free Press*: July 17, 1870; *Portland Transcript*: Aug. 20, 1870 (speech of N. P. Banks before Reunion of the Society of the Army and Navy of the Gulf at Boston); *De La Salle Monthly*: Sept., 1870. On the other hand it was feared that cotton interests would suffer from a reduced demand and consequent lower prices. *Cf.* *New York Tribune*: Sept. 30, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 16, 1870. The war surely did benefit certain speculators who bought large quantities of arms and munitions from the American government and resold them to the French government. It is difficult to estimate the amount of such transactions, but it is clear that several ships laden with arms which had been taken from American arsenals and sold to American speculators left American ports bound for France. In addition there was the less objectionable sale of arms to France by private American manufacturers. The *New York*

A third great cause for pro-German sentiment in the United States during the early part of the Franco-German War lay in the desire of certain Republican politicians to capture the German vote, of the value of which there can be little doubt. From 1850 to 1870 the German-Americans born outside of the United States had increased from two and one-half to four per cent of the total population. The total number of German-Americans amounted to 1,690,000, out of a total population of somewhat over 38,000,000. New York had over three hundred thousand, Illinois over two hundred thousand, while Missouri, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin had between one and two hundred thousand each. In the next chapter it will be shown that the opinion of this vast body of Germans supported the cause of the Fatherland in the Franco-German War almost unanimously. Here was an opportunity to play for the German vote which no politician could fail to see. On the other hand, the French vote was not an important factor, for the number

World stated that the total trade did not amount to more than twelve million dollars, and the *New York Times* told of one ship which carried over seven thousand cases of cartridges, and over two thousand cases of rifles. This trade was defended by most Americans on the ground that it was allowable under international law and under the provisions of treaties with Prussia. It was pointed out by defenders of the practice, such as the *New York World*, *New York Tribune* and *Cincinnati Gazette*, that had Germany needed the arms they would have been sold to her on similar terms, and that consequently no discrimination had been shown. Only the *Times* and the *San Francisco Bulletin* objected on the ground of humanity. As the *Bulletin* said: "Such acts are not the less flagrantly wrong than formerly, and ours should be the very last nation to permit them. If the commercial conscience tolerates such a traffic as this, it badly needs a healthy correction." Cf. *San Francisco Bulletin*: Oct. 6, 1870; *New York Times*: Sept. 21, Oct. 2, Oct. 4, Oct. 5, Oct. 16, Oct. 21, Oct. 24, 1870, Jan. 23, 1871; *New York Tribune*: Sept. 26, Oct. 5, Oct. 10, Oct. 25, 1870; *New York World*: Sept. 21, Oct. 4, Oct. 31, Nov. 16, 1870, Jan. 24, 1871; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Oct. 5, Oct. 22, 1870, Jan. 9, Jan. 27, 1871; *Nation*: Dec. 29, 1870, Feb. 2, 1871.

of people of French birth living in the United States in 1870 only amounted to a little more than one hundred thousand.¹

Prior to the Civil War, the German vote had generally been cast in favor of the Democratic party. But the German hatred for negro slavery had caused an important shift to the Republican party which had been organized largely to combat the spread of that institution. In 1870, however, the slavery issue was not uppermost, and there were several reasons why the Republicans feared the loss of the German vote. Many influential Republican leaders, of whom Horace Greeley was a good example, had long favored a protective tariff, prohibition of the use of spirituous liquors, and the enforcement of a rigorous Sabbath law. But many Germans were theoretical free-traders, and nearly all loved lager beer and believed in an open Sunday. Such was the situation when the Franco-German War broke out and offered the Republican party a golden opportunity. To praise the German cause upon all occasions and in every respect would be a cheap way to gain German favor. The temptation was particularly alluring since most of the Democratic leaders were strongly pro-French, for reasons which will be examined later. What a providential opportunity for Republican politicians!²

Newspapers, party platforms and party politicians all joined in the chorus — glorification of everything German and vilification of everything French. Napoleon had begun the war, France had backed him up, France under Napoleon had given aid to the South and had destroyed the Mexican

¹ Walker, Francis A., *A Compendium of the Ninth Census* (Washington, 1872), pp. 8, 392-394, 448-449; Curtis, "American Opinion of French Revolutions," p. 264.

² New York *World*: Aug. 13, Sept. 3, Sept. 22, 1870 (speech of W. C. DeWitt at Democratic Convention of New York). Cf. *infra*, pp. 359, 365-370.

Republic. Germany was fighting a defensive war, a war to complete her national unity, as the Republican party had fought the Civil War to maintain American unity. Germans had bought American bonds and Germans had served in American armies. Among the Republican organizations which came out for Germany were the Republican State Conventions of New York, Ohio, Nebraska, Iowa, Michigan, Illinois, Missouri, Tennessee and Kansas, the Union Republican General Committee of New York and California, and the National Executive Committee of the Union League of America. Planks were written into the Republican platforms of all the above named states favorable to Prussia and hostile to France. Speeches were made by Vice-President Schuyler Colfax, Senator Roscoe Conkling of New York and ex-Senator B. Gratz Brown of Missouri. Sigismund Kaufman, a prominent German-American, was nominated and elected Lieutenant-Governor of New York, partly because he was a man "who brought by his influence thousands of Germans into the Republican ranks."¹ Prominent Republican newspapers took up the good cause, among them the *New York Tribune*, *New York Times*, *Philadelphia Press*, *Cincinnati Gazette*, *Milwaukee Sentinel*, *Wisconsin State Journal*, *Detroit Post* and *Harper's Weekly*.

The character of the attempt to gain German-American votes by espousing the German cause in the war of 1870 can be judged by the actual words of the papers, orators or party platforms. The Civil War Veterans of New York Republicans who met at Saratoga passed a resolution: "That we recognize in the spontaneous and cordial sympathy expressed by the Republican Party for the cause of liberal and united Germany a fitting response to a movement which promises to result in the ultimate establishment of free in-

¹ *New York Tribune*: Sept. 9, 1870; *New York Times*: Sept. 21, 1870.

stitutions on both sides of the Rhine.”¹ The *Philadelphia Press* flattered the Germans by saying that the voice of the American press “during the present struggle has been that of the great Republican party, and through it of the country, for human rights and the liberty and unity of all peoples against the betrayer of the French Republic and his despotic policy. . . . ‘Vivat Germania.’” The Republican platform of Illinois had as one of its resolutions that “we hereby sympathize with the brave efforts of the German people to protect themselves against invasion and spoliation by the imperial despot who . . . has signalized his career by plunging two great nations into a causeless and needless war;” while the Republican platform in Missouri declared that “we cannot forget that in our late war the sympathies and material aid of the German states were freely given us, and we do not hesitate to declare our unqualified sympathy with the earnest efforts of the Germans to maintain and defend their national unity.”²

¹ *New York Times*: Sept. 7, 1870.

² *Ibid.*, Sept. 12 (Republican platforms of Illinois and Missouri), July 22 (21st District Republican Association of New York and Union Republican Committee of New York), July 26 (17th District Republican Association of New York), Aug. 11 (Republican platform of Ohio), Aug. 12 (Republican Central Committee of California), Aug. 19 (Republican platform of Iowa), Aug. 23 (National Executive Committee of Union League of America), Aug. 26 (Republican General Committee of New York City), Sept. 2 (Republican Convention of Richmond County, N. Y., and Republican platform of Michigan), Sept. 7 (Civil War Veterans of New York Republicans), Sept. 8 (New York Republican platform), Sept. 11 (Soldiers' and Sailors' Central Club of New York and Republican platform of Kansas), Sept. 17, 1870 (7th District Republican Association of New York); *New York Tribune*: July 22 (Union Republican General Committee of New York), Aug. 11 (11th District Republican Association of New York), Aug. 15 (Republican platform of Nebraska), Sept. 12 (speech by Colfax), Sept. 23, 1870 (Republican platform of Tennessee); *New York World*: Aug. 5 (speech by Conkling), Aug. 25,

But the Republican leaders did not limit their efforts to praise of everything German and disparagement of everything French. They went on to attack the Democratic papers for their pro-French attitude, and did their best to point out to the Germans the contrast between the Republican and Democratic positions. An example may be taken from the *New York Times*: "We hear on every side, that the German-Americans . . . have become disgusted with the course of the Democratic leaders and journals on the Franco-German question and are coming over in large numbers to the Republican side."¹ The *Milwaukee Sentinel* went to the length of stating that the course of the Democratic party in general had been so pro-French "that we may well doubt the sincerity of the few journals which, like the *Milwaukee News*, have professed sympathy with the German cause."² One of the speakers at the New York State Republican Convention asked, "Will the Germans . . . remember that the Democratic leaders sympathize with the enemies of the land of their birth?"³ The last admonition of the *Cincinnati Gazette* to the German voters on election day was: "In casting their votes today, Germans will hardly forget how they and their brethren in Germany have been maligned and abused by the Democratic press of the country."⁴ In a German mass meeting in New York,

1870 (King's County Republican General Committee); *Philadelphia Press*: Sept. 6, Aug. 20, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Feb. 6, 1871 (speech of Hon. Bellamy Storer); *Milwaukee Sentinel*: July 19, 1870 (speech of B. Gratz Brown).

¹ *New York Times*: Sept. 19, Aug. 10, Aug. 24, Sept. 1, Sept. 2, Sept. 8, Sept. 17, Oct. 26, 1870.

² *Milwaukee Sentinel*: Oct. 13, July 26, Aug. 3, Aug. 24, Sept. 1, 1870.

³ *New York World*: Sept. 8, 1870; *New York Times*: Sept. 12, 1870 (Republican platform of Missouri).

⁴ *Cincinnati Gazette*: Oct. 11, 1870, Jan. 28, 1871.

the Hon. Edward Salomon, a prominent German-American Republican politician, made the same appeal: "We Germans ought to oppose the Democratic party also for its sympathy with France. . . . We Germans, for this reason alone, if for no other, ought to oppose the Democratic party as one man."¹

It is perfectly clear that the Democratic party realized what their opponents were doing and made attempts to undo the mischief by attributing a large part of the expressed public sympathy with Germany to the selfish desires of Republican politicians, and by pointing to the stand of many prominent Republicans on the tariff, prohibition and Sabbath legislation. The causes for the pro-French attitude of the Democrats will be examined in detail later.² Briefly, the party derived its power very largely from the South and from the Irish population of certain Northern cities. The South had but a very few German inhabitants, and was still grateful to the friendly attitude of France in the Civil War. The Irish hoped that England might join Prussia and give France the chance to aid in securing Irish independence. The result was the sympathy for France exhibited by many Democratic papers and party platforms.

The attacks upon the Republicans by the Democratic and neutral newspapers furnish additional evidence of the game which the Republican party was playing. The *Irish Citizen* sarcastically remarked: "Of course we admit the urgent necessity, in view of coming elections, of flattering the Prussian monarchy, Prussian people, Prussian arts and arms and

¹ New York *Tribune*: Nov. 5, Sept. 4, Sept. 14, Oct. 14, 1870; New York *Times*: Sept. 7, 1870 (meeting of Civil War Veterans of New York Republicans at Saratoga); Philadelphia *Press*: Aug. 20, Sept. 7, 1870; Wisconsin *State Journal*: Sept. 1, Sept. 29, 1870; *Nation*: Sept. 8, 1870; *Harper's Weekly*: Sept. 24, 1870.

² Cf. *infra*, pp. 359, 365-370.

institutions—so precious and highly-desirable a thing is the German vote.”¹ The *Detroit Free Press* accused the Republican party of “constantly trying to convert the European war into a question of party politics,” declared the attempt to be “maliciously absurd,” and said that as a party issue the war was “without one solitary item of significance.” The Richmond *Enquirer* called the Republican move “simply a political dodge,” and the New York *World* said that the Republicans were more pro-German than the German-Americans themselves. The *World* pointed out to the Germans the way in which the Democrats had opposed all Republican attempts at puritanical legislation, and attacked the New York Republican platform for inconsistency in having “a Prussian glorification plank and a prohibitory liquor plank, the former intended to procure German favor by propitiating German patriotism, and the latter meant to render possible the closing of all lager beer saloons.”²

A fourth cause for American support of Prussia was the conviction that she represented a higher type of civilization than her antagonist. France in July, 1870, was the Second French Empire, American sentiment toward which has been analyzed in the preceding chapter. It is interesting and im-

¹ *Irish Citizen*: Sept. 10, Sept. 3, Oct. 1, Nov. 5, 1870.

² New York *World*: Sept. 12, Sept. 13, Aug. 2, Aug. 5, Aug. 6, Aug. 8, Aug. 13, Aug. 17, Aug. 23, Sept. 7, Sept. 9, Sept. 21, Sept. 22 (speech of W. C. DeWitt at New York Democratic Convention), Sept. 24, Nov. 7, Nov. 9, 1870; New York *Times*: July 22, July 23, 1870; *Detroit Free Press*: Sept. 3, Aug. 16, Aug. 20, Sept. 15, Sept. 19, Sept. 26, Oct. 12, Oct. 14, Nov. 4, Nov. 18, 1870; Richmond *Enquirer*: Sept. 5, 1870; Savannah *Republican*: July 24, 1870; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Oct. 11, 1870 (citation from Hillsboro, Ohio, *Gazette*); Milwaukee *Sentinel*: Sept. 1, 1870 (citation from Chicago *Times*); Wisconsin *State Journal*: July 27, 1870 (citation from Chicago *Times* of July 19, 1870); San Francisco *Bulletin*: Aug. 31, Sept. 15, 1870; Warsaw *Bulletin*: July 21, 1870; *Irish American*: July 30, 1870; *De La Salle Monthly*: Aug., Sept., 1870; *National Quarterly Review*: March, 1871.

portant to note that every cause for pro-German sentiment in the United States was reenforced by the very common belief that the French government was an unmitigated despotism, and was strengthened by many references to Napoleon's crimes, his bloody usurpation and despotic government. Both the Emperor and his régime were decidedly unpopular with the American people. The *San Francisco Bulletin* felt itself unable to sympathize with the man who had engineered the *coup d'état*, "that *fanfaron* Napoleon," as James Russell Lowell called him. When President Grant asked General Sheridan whether he preferred to accompany the French or German armies, Sheridan replied that he wished to go with the Germans. Sheridan adds in his memoirs: "My choice evidently pleased him greatly as he had the utmost contempt for Louis Napoleon, and had always denounced him as a usurper and a charlatan."¹

Even the respect which had formerly been accorded Napoleon began to disappear with the defeats of the French armies. He was branded in the headlines of the *New York Tribune* as the "Imperial Incompetent." His loss of prestige in America can be clearly seen in the ridicule cast upon a certain despatch which he sent to the Empress. In the despatch, which was very evidently meant for public consumption, he had played to the galleries by praising the gallantry of his fourteen-year-old son, whom he had taken with him to the field of battle. Among the various satires which appeared in the American press, the following verses published by the *New York Tribune* put the Emperor very clearly in the class of the exposed trickster:

¹ Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs*, vol. ii, pp. 358-359; *New York Tribune*: Aug. 11 (11th District Republican Association of New York), Sept. 4, 1870; *Philadelphia Press*: Aug. 20, Sept. 6, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 20, Aug. 29, 1870; *Wisconsin State Journal*: July 18, 1870; *San Francisco Bulletin*: July 30, 1870; *Nation*: July 28, 1870; Lowell, *Letters*, vol. ii, p. 63; Sumner, *Works*, vol. xiv, pp. 37-38, 40-47.

A TELEGRAM FROM METZ

Louis and I went out today
 To see the soldiers fighting :
 The balls came showering all about,
 And round our Louis lighting.

I wish you'd seen how brave he was,
 How cool and unimpressed,
 He didn't mind the smell of smoke
 Nor need to be undressed.

He caught the bullets in his hand
 And put them in his pocket,
 He says he'll have a nice one fixed
 For Mamma in a locket.

The Prussian cannon thundered loud
 And wildly surged the battle
 But Louis proudly viewed the storm
 And then—called for his rattle.

Full many a vieux moustache I saw—
 Half hid by bullets flying—
 Cast one astonished glance at Lou
 And then burst out a-crying!

Like fire through grass the infection spread
 Till spite the Dutchmen's pelting,
 I found ten thousand grenadiers
 In bitter tears were melting.

The minor features of the fray
 Are hardly worth repeating,
 So just get out the usual tale
 How we that Fritz are beating.¹

¹ New York *Tribune*: Aug. 11, Aug. 12, Aug. 13, 1870; Philadelphia *Press*: Aug. 5, 1870; Cincinnati *Gazette*: July 20, 1870; Milwaukee *Sentinel*: Aug. 3, Aug. 8, 1870; Wisconsin *State Journal*: Aug. 11, 1870; Leslie's *Weekly*: Aug. 27, Sept. 3, 1870 (comic poem with accompanying cartoons); Beecher's *Magazine*: Sept., 1870; Alcott, *Life, Letters and Journals*, pp. 244-245.

When it became more evident that the French were being seriously defeated, the belief in the United States became general that a decisive Prussian victory would mean the downfall of the Napoleonic dynasty. The eagerness with which such a result was heralded offers impressive evidence of the unpopularity of the French Empire. The comment of the *New York Tribune* foreshadowed the event as early as August 11: "Whatever the immediate result of the present battle . . . the dynasty founded on the Second of December is already nearly overthrown. God be praised for it."¹ The *Portland Transcript* remarked on August 27: "Satan owed France a grudge and paid it in Bonapartes. The debt is now nearly cancelled with interest."² The pro-Napoleonic *Savannah Republican* satirized the views of many Northerners: "To them he is a Gorgon, and with pious exultation they gloat, with prophetic ken, upon the picture of his downfall."³ If anything, Edwin L. Godkin outdid the *Republican's* satire when he wrote: "The old rascal's cup must surely be nearly full. . . . If it were not for Louis Napoleon's fate, however, I would say that all those cups of the wicked have holes in them. What a splendid Special 'Providence' he now seems! The Lord is evidently not dead yet."⁴

With such views being expressed before the battle of Sedan, the pleasure with which Napoleon's capture and downfall were greeted can easily be imagined. Moncure D.

¹ *New York Tribune*: Aug. 11, 1870.

² *Portland Transcript*: Aug. 27, Sept. 3, 1870.

³ *Savannah Republican*: Aug. 19, 1870.

⁴ Godkin, *Life and Letters*, vol. i, p. 254; *New York Tribune*: Aug. 1, Aug. 5, 1870; *Charleston Courier*: Sept. 3, 1870; *Philadelphia Press*: Aug. 8, 1870; *Milwaukee Sentinel*: Aug. 1, 1870; *Harper's Weekly*: Aug. 13, Sept. 3, 1870; *Leslie's Weekly*: Aug. 27, 1870; *Beecher's Magazine*: Aug., 1870; Brooks, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 43; Martin, *Life of Joseph Hodges Choate*, vol. i, p. 292.

Conway wrote in his *Autobiography*, "I was in joy that the Napoleonic nightshade had perished."¹ Walt Whitman felt much the same: "Louis Napoleon fully deserves his fate—I consider him by far the meanest scoundrel . . . that ever sat on a throne."² Charles Sumner remarked: "Had he remained successful to the end, and died peacefully on the throne, his name would have been a perpetual encouragement to dishonesty and crime."³ John Fiske wrote: "The downfall of Napoleon pleases me much. He has been a fearful curse to France, killing her morally, while cheating her with an appearance of material prosperity."⁴ To some Americans the hand of God seemed to be evident in Napoleon's punishment. Asa Gray spoke of "judgment overtaking Louis Napoleon here on the spot," and George Bancroft felt that his defeat and captivity "came like a thunderbolt from Heaven."⁵ The *Philadelphia Press* wrote graphically of the tumultuous joy in Philadelphia on the reception of the news of Sedan, the "extras" which were sold and read so eagerly, the rejoicing over "the triumph of the good cause, and the downfall of the bugbear of the continent."⁶

¹ Conway, *Autobiography*, vol. ii, p. 245.

² Bucke, Richard Maurice, editor, *Calamus. A series of letters written during the years 1868-1880 by Walt Whitman to a young friend (Peter Doyle)* (New York, 1897), p. 73.

³ Sumner, *Works*, vol. xiv, pp. 40-41.

⁴ Clark, John Spencer, *The Life and Letters of John Fiske* (New York, 1917), vol. i, p. 379.

⁵ Gray, *Letters*, vol. ii, p. 608; Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, pp. 241-242; *Savannah Republican*: Sept. 11, 1870.

⁶ *Philadelphia Press*: Sept. 5, 1870; *New York Tribune*: Sept. 4, 1870; *New York Times*: Sept. 5, Sept. 12, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Sept. 5, 1870; *Detroit Free Press*: Sept. 5, Sept. 6, 1870; *Milwaukee Sentinel*: Sept. 5, 1870; *Leslie's Weekly*: Nov. 5, 1870; *Harper's Weekly*: Sept. 17, 1870; Frothingham, *Memoir of William Henry Channing*, p. 382; *Letters of William James*, vol. i, p. 159; Taylor, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 531.

The weeks and months following the destruction of the Second Empire gave rise to many judgments upon it and its author. Nearly all were unfavorable. A few praised its feeble attempts at liberalization or its materialistic prosperity.¹ But the great majority attacked the régime unreservedly. *Harper's Weekly* characterized it as "a kind of Circean revel, . . . very splendid, . . . utterly demoralizing and fatal." The *Nation* was thankful that the year 1870 had "delivered the world from one great anxiety by the overthrow and discredit of French imperialism." Possibly the New York *Tribune* thought it was being lenient to the fallen emperor when it said: "Maugre our intense detestation of the treacherous, perjured, bloody villain who stole her liberties from France, . . . we can feel for even *his* degradation, and mercifully decline to expose and parade his driveling imbecilities before an already disgusted, loathing public."² As late as 1873, Moncure D. Conway, who attended Napoleon's funeral in the capacity of a journalist, admitted that "it was with reluctance that I incurred such risk of being mentioned by some reporter as paying homage to Napoleon III . . . the man whose perjured, blood-stained throne had appeared to me in youth a seat of the real Satan." But at the same time Conway was more relenting in his final judgment: "As he lay there dead, while the victims of his oppression breathed freer, I could now look upon him with a certain compassion as himself a victim."³

¹ New York *World*: Sept. 4, Sept. 5, 1870; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Aug. 29, 1870; *Leslie's Weekly*: Sept. 24, 1870; *Appleton's Journal*: April 8, April 15, 1871; *Scribner's Magazine*: Dec., 1870.

² New York *Tribune*: Dec. 27, Oct. 4, Nov. 5, Nov. 21, Dec. 7, 1870, March 4, 1871; Philadelphia *Press*: Dec. 31, 1870; *Harper's Weekly*: Oct. 8, 1870; *Nation*: Jan. 5, 1871.

³ Conway, *Autobiography*, vol. ii, p. 270; New York *Times*: Aug. 26, Oct. 10, 1870 (sermon of George H. Hepsworth, pastor of the Church

Although some Americans who were pro-Prussian and distinctly hostile to the Second French Empire refused to include the French people in their condemnation, the majority, as in earlier periods,¹ felt that something must be wrong with a nation which had endured Louis Napoleon for twenty years. Louis Agassiz declined to believe all that was said of the French people, and Walt Whitman expressly excluded them from his attack on the empire. But most Americans continued to speak of the love of military glory, the vanity, the fickleness, the immorality, the lack of true religion, the superficiality of the French nation. Lydia Maria Child referred to "that false, corrupted France." The *New York Times* called the French "a people destitute of practical ideas of freedom," and said, "Her leadership in Europe has been a hindrance to true progress and civilization."² The *Cincinnati Gazette* thought that the war had exhibited France as "rotten to the very core," and said, "It was as if a moral contagion pervaded all ranks and classes."³ *Leslie's Weekly* thought the French people "profoundly ignorant and profoundly selfish," and spoke of "France, the arrogant, aggressive and unscrupulous." The *National Quarterly Review* declared that the typical Frenchman was

of the Messiah in New York City); *Richmond Enquirer*: Sept. 29, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Nov. 17, 1870; *Wisconsin State Journal*: Sept. 14, 1870; *Appleton's Journal*: Dec. 10, 1870; *Irish American*: Sept. 10, 1870; *Old and New*: Nov., 1870 (poem by Julia Ward Howe); *North American Review*: Oct., 1870 (art. by H. W. Hemans).

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 284-288.

² *New York Times*: Aug. 16, Aug. 26, July 9, Sept. 5, Dec. 9, 1870; Marcou, Jules, *Life, Letters and Works of Louis Agassiz* (New York, 1896), vol. ii, p. 179; Whitman, *Calamus*, pp. 72-73; Child, *Letters*, p. 205.

³ *Cincinnati Gazette*: Nov. 16, July 30, 1870; *Appleton's Journal*: Jan. 21, 1871.

regarded by most Americans as "an irreligious sort of foreigner; a frog-eater ranked by many as but a few degrees above the best of brutes." Byron C. Smith, usually fair-minded, said, "The country is so worthless in every sense that . . . I could almost wish to see it reduced to a second-rate power."¹ Most severe of all was the *Nation*, which spoke of "the property-loving, ease-loving, unadventurous, materialistic, undisciplined, and unloyal Frenchman of to-day," and said:

But it is not the Bonapartes, after all, who are most to blame, but the French people, whose want of political sense produces Bonapartes just as our foreign vote in New York produces Tweeds and Sweeneys. Tyrants and demagogues must have a suitable soil to grow on, just like fungi or weeds.²

In striking contrast to the belief that France represented despotism, decadence and reaction, was the common conviction among Americans that Germany's success meant the triumph of progress, liberty and civilization. The New York *Tribune* spoke of the Prussian cause "with which is bound up so much of hope, progress and the possibility of freedom and national growth," and the Philadelphia *Press* thought that Prussia might well "claim to 'move at the

¹ Smith, B. C., *Letters*, pp. 239, 245 *et seq.*; *Leslie's Weekly*: Nov. 19, 1870, Feb. 18, 1871, Dec. 3, 1870, April 8, 1871; *Appleton's Journal*: Feb. 11, 1871; *National Quarterly Review*: March, 1871.

² *Nation*: July 21, 1870, Jan. 12, 1871, Aug. 18, Aug. 25, Sept. 15, Oct. 27, Nov. 3, Dec. 29, 1870; New York *Tribune*: Aug. 2, Aug. 12, Aug. 18, Nov. 9, Nov. 14, Dec. 7, 1870; New York *World*: Feb. 7, 1871; Philadelphia *Press*: Aug. 5, Oct. 12, 1870; *Appleton's Journal*: Dec. 3, Dec. 10, 1870; Portland *Transcript*: Feb. 4, 1871; *Irish Citizen*: Sept. 10, 1870; *Scribner's Magazine*: Jan., 1871 (art. by John Bigelow), Feb., 1871; *North American Review*: Jan., 1871 (art. by H. W. Hemans); Allen, *Phillips Brooks*, vol. i, p. 245; Emerson, *Journals*, vol. x, p. 329; Cortissoz, Royal, *The Life of Whitelaw Reid* (New York, 1921), vol. i, p. 182 (letter from John Bigelow).

head of civilization.' " The *New York Times* partially explained American sympathy for Germany by saying: "Germany embodied, to our minds, the freer ideas of the age; freedom of thought and constitutional progress."¹ George William Curtis spoke of "the inevitable battle between political progress and reaction, typified by Germany and by imperialized France." The *Milwaukee Sentinel* rejoiced in the victory of Prussia "because we believe her triumph will eventually advance the interests and promote the happiness of mankind." The *New York World* and the *National Quarterly Review* did not accept the current ideas concerning Prussian progress, but the former admitted "the now prevalent fashion of elevating Prussia as a paragon of individual and national goodness," and the latter complained that "we are called upon, in a hundred forms, to regard German civilization as the great model of our time." James Russell Lowell probably expressed the common belief when he said: "Moreover, as against the Gaul I believe in the Teuton. And just now I *wish* to believe in him, for he represents civilization."²

In analyzing the elements which were believed to constitute German civilization one comes upon nothing new, nothing which has not been treated at length in previous chapters. The Germans were thought to be the best educated

¹ *New York Times*: Sept. 19, Aug. 23, 1870; *New York Tribune*: July 22, Sept. 12, 1870; *Philadelphia Press*: Aug. 20, Sept. 5, 1870.

² Lowell, *Letters*, vol. ii, p. 63; *New York Herald*: July 11, 1870; *New York Times*: Sept. 7 (Civil War Veterans of New York Republicans), Sept. 17, 1870 (7th District Republican Association of New York); *New York World*: Dec. 16, Aug. 25, 1870 (King's County, N. Y., Republican General Committee); *Milwaukee Sentinel*: Sept. 5, July 16, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Aug. 9, 1870; *Nation*: July 21, 1870; *Harper's Magazine*: Nov., 1870 (Easy Chair); *De La Salle Monthly*: Aug., 1870; *Old and New*: Sept., 1870; Allen, *Phillips Brooks*, vol. i, p. 247; Foulke, *Life of Oliver P. Morton*, vol. ii, pp. 208-209.

people in Europe, and to have been trained in a citizen army, efficient in action and democratic in composition. They were commonly thought of as Protestants, a belief evidently arrived at by leaving out of consideration southern and a large part of western Germany. Finally, they were believed to be on the point of achieving national unification, which it was thought could not fail to bring political liberty and democracy in its train.

In explaining American admiration for the Prussian educational system, mention has already been made in an earlier chapter of the fact that Americans had copied Prussian methods to a large extent.¹ The admiration continued to be felt in the period under review. Among the resolutions which were passed by the King's County (New York) Republican General Committee was one which read: "That as citizens of the land of free schools we tender to the land of universal education our most cordial sympathies."² The *Nation* rejoiced that German habits of thought would now become dominant, and *Harper's Weekly* said: "It is thought that emancipates, and Germany has done a great deal of thinking for the modern world."³ A writer in the *North American Review* praised the "Teutonic intellect, . . . serious, profound, truth-loving, and reverential," and the *Southern Review* thought that "the success and efficiency of the public school system of Prussia would alone entitle" that country to a position in the first rank. When Senator Grimes of Iowa rhapsodized over the "greatest people on the face of the earth," he called them "the best educated in the mass," and the Milwaukee *Sentinel* praised Prussia for

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 40, 41.

² *New York World*: Aug. 24, 1870.

³ *Harper's Weekly*: Oct. 22, 1870, April 29, 1871; *Nation*: Sept. 29, July 28, 1870, Sept. 14, 1871.

having "the most perfect system of popular education in the world." In one of his speeches to catch German votes Senator Roscoe Conkling of New York declared, "Prussia believes as we do in education for all."¹

The general American admiration for the Prussian educational system was often linked up with the praise lavished on her citizen army, which was composed of educated soldiers. The Prussian victory was often explained by the employment of the phrase "thinking bayonets." When the *New York Times* named over the "salient features" of Prussian progress it mentioned "enforced education for all, strict discipline, a limited military service for every able-bodied man." The *San Francisco Bulletin* pointed out that no other army had ever been educated up to the same standard, and remarked, "From first to last it has been a battle of brains."² The *Lakeside Monthly* saw behind the military power of Germany a "thinking" nation, and the *New York Tribune* said, "The Germans conquered because they were . . . better educated and better organized."³ *Leslie's Weekly* thought that education added to the "faith" and the "valor" of the Prussian soldier, and the Rev. Charles Caverno, Congregational minister at Lake Mills, Wisconsin, explained the German success by saying that the "army from its presiding genius downward throughout is an organ-

¹ *New York World*: Aug. 5, 1870 (speech by Conkling); *New York Times*: Aug. 23, Sept. 19, Nov. 5, 1870, Jan. 8, 1871; *Philadelphia Press*: Aug. 20, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Feb. 6, 1871 (speech by Hon. Bellamy Storer at German celebration); *Milwaukee Sentinel*: Aug. 3, 1870; *Portland Transcript*: Sept. 24, 1870; *Leslie's Weekly*: Nov. 5, 1870, June 24, 1871; *Scribner's Magazine*: Feb., 1871; *Southern Review*: April, 1871; *North American Review*: Jan., 1871 (art. by H. W. Hemans); *National Quarterly Review*: March, 1871; Salter, *Life of Grimes*, p. 385.

² *San Francisco Bulletin*: Sept. 23, 1870; *New York Times*: Aug. 23, Aug. 16, Sept. 10, Sept. 19, Nov. 5, 1870; Smith, B. C., *Letters*, p. 206.

³ *New York Tribune*: Dec. 8, 1870; *Lakeside Monthly*: Nov., 1870.

ized body of thought." *Scribner's Magazine* described the Prussian troops as having "good bodies well trained, and good brains well informed." William Cullen Bryant thought Prussia "a nation educated, thoughtful . . . possessing a population trained under the most perfect military system which the world has ever seen," and Charles Sumner said: "In Prussia every man is obliged to serve, and still further, every man is educated. Discipline and education are two potent adjuncts."¹

It seemed impossible to most Americans that a people possessing such an excellent system of education could long endure a really despotic government, or that an army so democratically chosen from the whole nation and of such a generally high standard of education could ever become an engine of despotism or the tool of an aggressive militarism. The *Cincinnati Gazette* remarked: "General education, common aspirations for freedom, and a system which makes every citizen a soldier, are incompatible with absolutism in government."² Similar was the statement of George William Curtis: "But while the political form remains absolute and despotic the substantial intelligence of the people gradually makes absolutism impossible."³ The *New York Times* thought the Prussian military system implied "a non-aggressive policy," and the *New York Tribune* felt that educated Americans or Prussians might go to war when they

¹ Sumner, *Works*, vol. xiv, p. 27; *New York Tribune*: April 11, 1871 (speech by W. C. Bryant at German celebration in New York), Dec. 8, 1870; *Philadelphia Press*: Oct. 12, 1870; *Wisconsin State Journal*: Jan. 14, 1871 (sermon by Caverno), Nov. 2, 1870; *Leslie's Weekly*: Dec. 24, 1870; *Nation*: July 21, July 28, Sept. 8, Oct. 27, 1870, Jan. 5, 1871; *Harper's Weekly*: April 29, 1871; *Scribner's Magazine*: Feb., 1871; Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 235 *et seq.*; Bowditch, *Life and Correspondence*, vol. ii, pp. 188-189; Salter, *Life of Grimes*, p. 383.

² *Cincinnati Gazette*: Feb. 22, 1871, Sept. 1, 1870.

³ *Harper's Magazine*: Nov., 1870 (Easy Chair).

were convinced that the motives were just, but said: "The days of unreasoning masses of red cloth and pipe-clay, moving steadily to death with no idea of the why or wherefore, . . . are well nigh over."¹ The *Portland Transcript* felt much the same: "The whole people are compelled to perform military duty, and the army is therefore the nation in arms. . . . Where the burdens of war are so generally distributed, and the people are intelligent, it will not always be easy to plunge the nation into conflict."²

It is certain that Prussia appeared to be the champion of progress to many Americans because she was a Protestant state and because she was opposed by the strongest Roman Catholic power in Europe. There is good reason to believe that the religious issue seemed the most important to many ardent American Protestants, who saw in the defeat of France a blow to the Pope. Many devout Americans saw in the decree of papal infallibility of 1870 a dangerous increase in the Pope's power. Democratic and Catholic papers such as the *National Quarterly Review*, *De La Salle Monthly* and the *Savannah Republican* protested against the introduction of a religious issue into a nationalistic war of the nineteenth century, as also did the *Cincinnati Gazette* and Charles A. Bristed, the well-known traveller and author. The *Savannah Republican* attacked the "fanatical 'Evangelical Alliance' and its Puritan sympathizers in the pulpits of the North" for having created such a sentiment. The *De La Salle Monthly* said that the struggle was carried over into American politics to such an extent that "Democracy is dubbed Catholicity forsooth; Republicanism in like man-

¹ *New York Tribune*: Sept. 29, 1870; *New York Times*: Sept. 5, 1870.

² *Portland Transcript*: Dec. 3, 1870; *New York Tribune*: June 10, 1871; *New York Times*: July 24, 1870; *Nation*: March 2, 1871; Schieber, *American Sentiment toward Germany*, pp. 27, 28.

ner becomes the cognomen of Protestantism.”¹ The *National Quarterly Review* bore witness to the same idea: “The cause of protestantism, too, which somehow is supposed to be involved in that of Prussia, has enlisted a stalwart well-wishing for the success of that state on the part of worthy Calvinistic church-folk.”²

But it is not necessary to base the evidence for the existence of a group of Americans who were trying to convert the war into one of religion on the hostile statements of Catholic and Democratic papers only. George Bancroft, writing to the American Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, urged as one reason for the maintenance of close relations between Germany and the United States that “Germany like America is adverse to ultramontane usurpations; it was the French Republic which destroyed the Roman republic.”³ The *Boston Journal* declared in one of its editorials: “Prussia is a Protestant nation—France is Catholic. . . . So far as that fact goes, the sympathies of the American people, of course, must be given to Prussia.”⁴ Samuel Hopkins wrote in an article which appeared in *Scribner's Magazine*: “Close upon the heels of the Papal *faux pas* was the attack of France upon Prussia; of Papal France, be it noted, upon Protestant Prussia. . . . And as the one or the other was to be humbled, would the Apostolic See (this by courtesy) be elevated or depressed.”⁵ An unsigned article of the same

¹ *De La Salle Monthly*: Sept., Aug., 1870, Feb., 1871; *Savannah Republican*: Aug. 20, 1870.

² *National Quarterly Review*: March, 1871; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Aug. 30, 1870; *Irish Citizen*: July 16, 1870; *Galaxy*: Nov., 1870 (art. by C. A. Bristed).

³ Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 246.

⁴ Quoted in *Irish Citizen*: Aug. 6, 1870.

⁵ *Scribner's Magazine*: Dec., 1870.

general tenor appeared in *Old and New*, of which Edward Everett Hale was editor:

Simply speaking, then, the German system, in peace and in war, rests on the recognition of the worth of the individual man; of God's child, because he is God's child. . . . It was war between the Emperor, who had throughout sustained the Pope in his temporal supremacy, and his claim to infallibility, and the chief Protestant sovereign of Europe.¹

To what an extent the contrast between Catholic France and Protestant Prussia might be carried can be seen in the report of a sermon by the Rev. Charles Caverno, which was copied approvingly by the *Wisconsin State Journal*:

France is suffering to-day from the wrong choice she made in the age of the Reformation. What is the significance of that event in history, which we call Reformation? It is this: God came out and precipitated upon the peoples of christendom whether they wanted to think—upon the governments of the nations, whether they would allow and encourage their subjects to think. To these questions Germany answered, Yes; and France answered, No. . . . The German people said we will do our own thinking, and the French said, let the Pope and the Priest think for us.²

Hardly less bigoted were the resolutions adopted by the Presbyterian Reformed Synod: "That the present condition of France in general, as desolated by storm of war, and of the city of Paris in particular, as now drenched by the blood of her own citizens, is a righteous retribution for the martyrdoms of St. Bartholomew's Day."³

¹ *Old and New*: Oct., 1870.

² *Wisconsin State Journal*: Jan. 14, 1871.

³ Quoted in Perry, Thomas Sergeant, editor, *The Life and Letters of Francis Lieber* (Boston, 1882), pp. 411-412 (Lieber takes it from New

Even more potent than American admiration of German civilization as a cause for American sympathy with Germany was the belief that the war was the final step in the completion of German unification. The American Civil War had been waged partly on the issue of national unity, and it was but natural that the people of the North should sympathize with any nation struggling for unification. It was believed that Napoleon's attack upon Prussia had been made partly to split asunder even the incomplete unity achieved under the North German Confederation. The conviction was almost universal that by his very aggression Napoleon had done more to complete the process of German unity than Bismarck could have done in a long time by peaceful methods. The minor German states might be jealous of Prussian supremacy, but they would never tolerate an attack by France upon the leading German state.¹

That German unity was popular in the United States is clearly evident. The Republican Convention of Ohio resolved that "we cannot refrain from declaring our sympathy with the present heroic efforts of the Germans to establish, maintain and defend their national unity." Very similar was the resolution of the Republican Convention of Iowa: "We do not hesitate to declare our unqualified sym-

York Evening Post: May 22, 1871; *New York Tribune*: June 10, 1871; *New York Times*: Aug. 16, Nov. 24, 1870; *Milwaukee Sentinel*: July 28, Aug. 3, Oct. 13, 1870; *Beecher's Magazine*: Oct., 1870; *Scribner's Magazine*: Feb., May, 1871; *Southern Review*: April, 1871; *North American Review*: Jan., 1871 (art. by H. W. Hemans).

¹ *New York Tribune*: Aug. 6, Aug. 19, Sept. 8, Oct. 3, 1870; *New York Times*: Sept. 5, 1870; *New York Herald*: July 13, 1870; *Philadelphia Press*: Aug. 8, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: July 21, Aug. 17, 1870; *Charleston Courier*: July 16, Aug. 23, 1870; *Wisconsin State Journal*: July 18, 1870; *San Francisco Bulletin*: July 15, July 17, 1870; *Portland Transcript*: Sept. 3, 1870; *Nation*: July 14, 1870; *Harper's Weekly*: Aug. 6, Aug. 27, 1870; Schieber, *American Sentiment toward Germany*, pp. 19, 20.

pathy with the earnest efforts of the Germans to maintain and defend their national unity.”¹ The American correspondent in Germany of the *Wisconsin State Journal* wrote to that paper: “I am confident that the great mass of patriotic Americans, who have so recently known what it is to struggle for the unity of their own country, will heartily sympathize with the great German people.”² Byron C. Smith regretted that the task of German unity should have fallen to a man whom he so distrusted as he did Bismarck—a task “in itself one of the noblest fruits of the science of politics and of a ripening national sentiment.” The *New York Tribune* joined “in the peans of victory that chant all hail to United Germany.” The *Charleston Courier* rejoiced that the German people had accomplished their national unity, which even the anti-German *Savannah Republican* admitted “is naturally enough the passion and glory of the German people.”³

That Americans even before the battle of Sedan saw in the completion of German unity a step in the direction of greater German liberty and self-government is almost as evident. The very number of jealous, struggling states was thought to have been a constant cause for foreign interference, and to have made possible the tolerance of standing armies which had served as tools of royal absolutism. In

¹ *New York Times*: Aug. 11, Aug. 19, July 22, 1870 (Union Republican Committee of New York); *New York Tribune*: Aug. 11, 1870 (11th District Republican Association of New York); *New York World*: Sept. 17, 1870 (Illinois Democratic platform).

² *Wisconsin State Journal*: Aug. 27, 1870.

³ *New York Tribune*: Sept. 4, Aug. 6, Aug. 19, 1870; *New York Times*: July 24, 1870; *Philadelphia Press*: Aug. 20, 1870; *Charleston Courier*: Aug. 23, Sept. 3, 1870; *Savannah Republican*: Sept. 13, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Feb. 4, 1871; *Detroit Free Press*: Aug. 23, 1870; *Harper's Weekly*: Aug. 13, 1870; Smith, B. C., *Letters*, p. 210; Schieber, *American Sentiment toward Germany*, pp. 19, 20.

the consolidation of the various states into a single federal government Americans believed they saw the dawn of a happier day for Germany. The *Philadelphia Press* attacked Napoleon for trying to prevent "the final union of all the States both of North and South Germany into one grand nationality, with a representative government analogous to our own." *Leslie's Weekly* spoke of the unanimity with which all Germany had worked together against France as "the harbinger of brighter days for the people of United Germany." B. Gratz Brown believed that German unity would "work out a great German republicanism and the federation of all that great brotherhood of people in the heart of Europe." The *San Francisco Bulletin* thought that Americans felt "that the Germans were right in consolidating twenty or thirty little states, speaking the same language and having substantially the same interests, into one nation. They [the Americans] see that German unity has been a popular impulse in the direction of greater freedom."¹

PRO-FRENCH SENTIMENT BEFORE THE BATTLE OF SEDAN

Although there can be little doubt that the great majority of Americans sympathized with Germany in the early part of the war, because of one or more of the reasons discussed above, there is ample evidence to prove that a minority, not to be despised because of its small numbers, decidedly favored France. The pro-French element in the United States before the battle of Sedan was composed almost entirely of members of the Democratic party, although to some

¹ *San Francisco Bulletin*: July 30, July 18, 1870; *New York Times*: Aug. 16, Aug. 23, Aug. 25, Aug. 26, Sept. 5, Sept. 8, Oct. 9, 1870; *Philadelphia Press*: Aug. 20, Sept. 6, 1870; *Milwaukee Sentinel*: July 19 (speech by B. Gratz Brown), Aug. 10, 1870; *Leslie's Weekly*: Sept. 3, 1870; *Nation*: July 21, 1870.

extent pro-French sentiment was like an undercurrent which ran in subterranean fashion through the minds even of those who on the whole favored Germany. Southern Democrats had no question of German votes to influence them, and they remembered that Napoleon had been friendly to the Confederacy. The North evidently was rabidly pro-Prussian, so why should not the South espouse the opposite side? Fairly representative of the Southern Democrats were the *Richmond Enquirer* and the *Savannah Republican*. The Northern Democrats based their strength upon the large Irish populations in the metropolitan centers. The Irish were pro-French and Catholic. In consequence, the Northern Democratic papers were strongly pro-French, like the *New York World*, *Boston Post* and *Chicago Times*, or strictly neutral like the *Detroit Free Press*. In addition, papers like the *Irish Citizen* and the Catholic *De La Salle Monthly* supported France against Prussia. As the Republicans made a strong bid for German-American votes, so the Democrats made a determined effort for Irish-American votes. As the Republican leaders had rationalized their politics, so did the Democrats, giving as causes for their support of France the direct opposites of the explanations offered by the Republicans for their friendliness to Prussia. The Republicans had blamed Napoleon for the outbreak of the war; the Democrats blamed the Prussians. The Republicans contrasted German and French attitudes in the Civil War; the Democrats contrasted German and French attitudes during the Revolution, when the Hessians aided England and the French aided the Americans. The Republicans exalted German civilization and disparaged French civilization; the Democrats pointed to German militarism and aggrandizement as contrasted with the gradual liberalization of the French Empire.

In the first place, then, in answer to the allegation of most

Americans that France and Napoleon had begun the war, the pro-French group claimed that Prussia and Bismarck had been the aggressors. The Hohenzollern candidacy was a clever ruse on the part of Prussia to continue her career of conquest. It would place a Hohenzollern prince upon the throne of Spain and hence hem France in on both sides. The foreign policies of Spain and Prussia would henceforth be identical and France would consequently be placed in a most dangerous position. The San Francisco *Bulletin* which was certainly not pro-French thought that the attitude of Prussia in putting forward Prince Leopold was "one that might well cause a great deal of uneasiness in France." The Richmond *Enquirer* considered that nothing in the reign of Napoleon had so "seriously threatened the integrity of France as a first-class power." Byron C. Smith who was decidedly anti-French believed that Bismarck's "moral responsibility" was as great as that of Napoleon and that Bismarck had deliberately made of the Hohenzollern candidature an opportunity to throw "the responsibility of the initiative on the French government." The *Irish Citizen* accused King William and Bismarck of purposely creating a *casus belli*, and declared that if Napoleon had not made war in the face of such an insult from Prussia he would have been dethroned by the French people. The New York *World* thought it preposterous to expect anyone to believe that Prince Leopold had been offered the crown of Spain without the knowledge of Bismarck. The *World* compared the position of France to the attitude of the United States toward Maximilian's empire. If the American government had had a right to protest against a Habsburg in Mexico, did not Napoleon possess an equal right to protest against a Hohenzollern in Spain? Even the New York *Times* was willing to concede that France had a case for war in general rivalry with Prussia, and put forward the argument, as did

the *Penn Monthly*, of the offensive defensive—that a nation had a right to make war upon another nation which was conspiring against her.¹

That Prussia was not averse to war seemed clear to many papers from the ready way in which she had taken up the French challenge, and from the fact that she had been the first to take the field with a magnificently equipped army. Was such a condition of preparedness consistent with the perfect innocence which the majority of Americans attributed to Prussia? *Harper's Weekly* thought that the eagerness of King William "to accept the challenge which his own conduct has been the means of provoking," made him as guilty as Napoleon. The *National Quarterly Review* admitted that Napoleon was technically the aggressor, but added that "it has since become evident to the most casual observer that Prussia had long been preparing for this war." The *New York World* declared that the fact that Prussia had taken the field before France "indicates a war of attack premeditated and desired, rather than a war of defense upon an unwilling and reluctant government."²

In the second place, to counterbalance the belief that France had shown herself unfriendly to the United States during the Civil War and in Mexico, the pro-French Americans revived memories of the American Revolution and the

¹ *New York Times*: Aug. 5, Sept. 30, 1870; *New York World*: July 10, 1870; *San Francisco Bulletin*: July 9, 1870; *Richmond Enquirer*: July 8, Sept. 5, 1870; *Irish Citizen*: July 23, Aug. 20, July 16, Sept. 10, 1870; *Penn Monthly*: Aug., 1870; Smith, B. C., pp. 200, 209, 195 *et seq.*

² *New York World*: July 17, July 6, July 7, July 10, July 12, July 18, July 20, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Sept. 5, Sept. 15, Sept. 26, Oct. 28, 1870, Jan. 27, 1871; *Charleston Courier*: July 14, 1870; *Milwaukee Sentinel*: Aug. 24, 1870 (citation from *Chicago Times*); *Harper's Weekly*: July 30, 1870; *Harper's Magazine*: Jan., 1871 (art. by C. C. Hazewell); *National Quarterly Review*: Sept., Dec., 1870; Schieber, *American Sentiment toward Germany*, p. 18 (citation from *Boston Post*).

aid which France had given the young republic at that time. France had been the earliest friend of the United States, without whose help national independence could hardly have been achieved. The American people owed a debt of gratitude to the French people, and should extend at least their moral sympathy in her hour of need. The New York *World* spoke of "the traditionary feelings which native Americans have always cherished toward the country of Rochambeau and Lafayette," and the Savannah *Republican* referred to France as "the ancient friend and ally of our country." One of the speakers at an Irish meeting in St. Louis exclaimed that "the French had redeemed America, and Americans would be cowards and dastards if they were to forget what the French had done for them." The references to French aid during the Revolution increased after the declaration of the French Republic. *Leslie's Weekly* thought that one of the chief explanations for the shift in American opinion after the battle of Sedan lay "in a renewal of the natural or traditional sympathy with France, arising out of the support which she gave us in our Revolutionary war." The New York *Times* explained the attitude of many Americans thus: "The France that aided us in the Revolution is stricken down and bleeding, and the foot of the conqueror is on her breast. Should not we all . . . remonstrate against her further punishment and degradation." ¹ Sen-

¹ New York *Times*: Oct. 30, Sept. 12, 1870 (Democratic county convention in Chicago); New York *Tribune*: Sept. 23 (Irish meeting in St. Louis), Sept. 9, Oct. 12 (French meeting in Boston), Dec. 30, 1870 (speech by John S. Thayer at French meeting in New York); New York *World*: Sept. 7, Aug. 3, Aug. 27, Sept. 1, Sept. 17, 1870 (Democratic convention in Illinois); Savannah *Republican*: Sept. 29, Oct. 25, 1870; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Jan. 12, Jan. 27, 1871; *Leslie's Weekly*: Nov. 19, 1870; *Irish Citizen*: July 30, Aug. 13, 1870, Feb. 4, 1871; *Harper's Weekly*: Aug. 13, 1870, Jan. 14, 1871; *Irish American*: July 30, 1870; *Galaxy*: Sept., 1870; *National Quarterly Review*: Sept., 1870.

ator Pomeroy of Kansas introduced resolutions of sympathy for France into the Senate early in February, 1871, "gratefully remembering the practical sympathy of Frenchmen to us in the days of our early weakness and extremity." In the course of the debate on them, Charles Sumner remarked: "Through France was independence assured; without France it must have been postponed. Such, Sir, is our obligation to France, infinite in extent, which, ever paying, we must ever owe."¹

Nor did the pro-French element neglect to make capital out of the fact that the Hessians had fought in the ranks of the British. The contrast was plain: France had given aid to the United States in her struggle for independence, while Germany had sent men to serve as mercenaries against the young republic. The *Chicago Times* referred to the German-American meetings in 1870 as "very cheap patriotism—worthy, however, of the descendants of the Hireling Hessians who fought against American independence in 1776." The *Irish Citizen*, when giving its reasons for supporting France, brought out very clearly the attitude of the pro-French group in the United States:

Second: France made a free country, and a Republic of the United States of America, which without France, would never have been free nor a Republic. . . .

Third: It was mercenary bands of North Germans, called Hessians . . . that were the most savage and brutal enemies of the American colonists.²

¹ Sumner, *Works*, vol. xiv, p. 151; *Leslie's Weekly*: Feb. 18, 1871; *Harper's Weekly*: Feb. 18, 1871; *Congressional Globe*, 3rd Session, 41st Congress, p. 847.

² *Irish Citizen*: Aug. 13, 1870; *New York World*: Sept. 1, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Oct. 11, 1870 (citation from *Chicago Times*); *Wisconsin State Journal*: July 27, 1870 (citation from *Chicago Times*:

In answer to the argument of the pro-French Americans that the United States could not have achieved independence without French aid in 1776, and that it was consequently incumbent upon all good Americans to support France in 1870, the pro-German group, always in the majority, admitted frankly that France had given inestimable help in the Revolutionary War, but questioned her motives in doing so. France had helped the Americans in order to have revenge upon England. The motive, according to *Harper's Weekly*, was not "chivalry or magnanimity—it was sheer selfishness." Nor had the support come from the Bonapartes or the Republic, but from the Bourbons. The *New York Tribune* lost all patience with the references to the Revolutionary War and exclaimed petulantly, "for how many centuries longer are we to have the assistance given us by Bourbon monarchs thrown in our teeth."¹ True enough, the Hessians had fought for the British, but they had not been at all representative of German feeling toward the struggling colonies. De Kalb and Steuben were referred to in order to balance Lafayette and Rochambeau, and in order to prove that not all Germans had been unfriendly. Even Frederick the Great was declared to have been in sympathy with the American cause.²

The South had a further reason for friendship with France. It was France which had sympathized the most

July 19, 1870); *Irish American*: Aug. 13, 1870; *National Quarterly Review*: Sept., 1870; *Congressional Globe*, 3rd Session, 41st Congress, pp. 953-955 (speech by Joseph S. Fowler, Senator from Tennessee).

¹ *New York Tribune*: Oct. 12, Sept. 23, 1870, March 21, 1871; *New York World*: Aug. 3, 1870; *Harper's Weekly*: Aug. 13, 1870, Jan. 14, 1871; *Leslie's Weekly*: Nov. 19, 1870, Feb. 18, 1871.

² *New York World*: Aug. 3, Aug. 25, 1870; *Galaxy*: Sept., 1870 (art. by George E. Pond).

strongly with the cause of secession, and common gratitude demanded that the South should reciprocate the feeling. The very cause which made the North hostile to France had the opposite effect on the South. The *Savannah Republican* openly affirmed its sympathy with France because "France has been the friend of America, and especially of the South." One of President Grant's letters to Elihu Washburne, American Minister at Paris, implied his realization of the fact that the attitude of Americans toward France was influenced by memories of the Civil War: "The war has developed the fact here that every unreconstructed rebel sympathizes with France, without exception, while the loyal element is almost as universally the other way."¹

The Democratic party sympathized with the French, not only because Southern Democrats still felt grateful to Napoleon for his attempt at intervention in the Civil War, but also because the Irish-Americans who had largely settled in the great Northern cities were strongly pro-French in their sentiments. That the Democratic party, as represented by its great newspapers, favored the French cause, requires no further proof. Sympathy for France is evident also in the Democratic party platforms for 1870. Most of the Republican state conventions in 1870 had met in August and the early part of September, but the Democrats waited until late in September or until October. The delay was fortunate, for their sympathies by that time could be extended to the new French Republic instead of to the much more

¹ Quoted in Curtis, "American Opinion of French Revolutions," p. 265, from *General Grant's Letters to a Friend* (New York, 1897), p. 68; *Savannah Republican*: Oct. 25, 1870; *Milwaukee Sentinel*: Sept. 1, 1870; Schieber, *American Sentiment toward Germany*, p. 25, "The Democrats, who were especially strong in the South, favored France, largely due to the assistance which France had rendered the Confederacy in the Civil War."

unpopular Second French Empire. In examining the platforms drawn up by the Democratic state conventions of New York, Illinois and Massachusetts, one finds in each case warm sympathy with the new republic. In Illinois the Democrats declared, "The republic of France receives our hearty welcome into the family of free nations."¹ In New York it was resolved: "That we rejoice at the downfall of the Imperial dynasty of France, and trust that on its ruins a republic will be firmly established."² In Massachusetts the wording was: "Resolved, That the French Republic, now rising in its strength from the ruins of an effete and corrupt Empire . . . deserves and receives our earnest and cordial sympathy and support."³ It will be noticed that the party platforms were able to condemn the unpopular empire in spite of the fact that most Democratic papers had sung its praises in the days before Sedan.

The Democrats dared not condemn the popular cause of Germany as the Republicans had condemned the unpopular French Empire, but the planks in regard to Germany seem perfunctory. In New York the platform expressed "the earnest hope that the people of Germany . . . will establish on an enduring basis, their own unity under one nationality," and in Illinois the Germans were congratulated "on their valiant conduct in the pending war," while the wish was voiced that "a grand German Republic be the glorious results [*sic*] of their efforts."⁴

¹ *New York World*: Sept. 17, 1870.

² *New York Times*: Sept. 22, 1870.

³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 13, Sept. 12, 1870 (Democratic county convention of Chicago); *New York World*: Dec. 24, 1870 (call for meeting of French Democratic Club at Cooper Union).

⁴ *New York World*: Sept. 17, 1870; *New York Times*: Sept. 22, Sept. 12, 1870 (Democratic county convention of Chicago).

Of the various groups in the United States who were pro-French in 1870, the Irish-Americans were the most rabid. It is probable that they supported the French cause almost as strongly as the German-Americans did that of the land of their birth. The *Irish Citizen* bore witness to the feeling of Irish-Americans when it said: "It is certainly true that the Irish, both in Ireland and all over the world, have at once, and with great unanimity, expressed their good-will to France in this quarrel."¹ At a meeting of Irish-Americans in New York late in August a resolution was passed: "That the Irish race in New York and America, unqualifiedly and unreservedly declares for France. . . . Vive la France! . . . America, France and Ireland forever!"² In the various meetings held for the purpose of expressing approval of the new French republic Irish-Americans played an important part. It was reported of a Franco-Irish celebration at Jones' Wood, a popular resort near New York, that three-fourths of the participants were Irish and the remainder French. A combined Irish and French parade in St. Louis was able to muster ten thousand marchers, although the census report for 1870 states that there were less than three thousand French in St. Louis. At a meeting to celebrate the new republic in Williamsburg, New York, the chief speaker was John Savage, President of the Fenian Brotherhood, and at a similar meeting in Boston the chairman was Patrick Donahue. At the great pro-French meeting at Cooper Union near the end of December some of the speakers were John Mullahy, John Mitchel and A. S. Sullivan. The *Irish American* expressed well the almost universal sentiment: "The Irish-born Democrats, almost to a man, sympathize with France, and they have a right to do

¹ *Irish Citizen*: Aug. 13, July 23, July 30, Aug. 27, 1870.

² *New York World*: Aug. 27, 1870.

so, allied as they are with that nation by old ties of blood, and glorious struggles well sustained in common by both nations.”¹

What was the cause for such a strong pro-French feeling among the Irish-Americans? Of course both peoples were believed to be Celtic and both adhered to the Roman Catholic Church. France was thought to be the historic friend of Ireland. But much more important as a cause for pro-French feeling among the Irish was the hope that the strong pro-German feeling in England might lead the latter country to espouse the German cause. In such a contingency Ireland might be able to gain French help in a struggle for independence. In 1870 Irish patriotism was centered in the Fenian movement, which carried on much of its active work in the United States, and which desired not home rule but complete independence. The Fenians were willing to accept any aid in the sacred cause, and would have welcomed even that of Germany. But they recognized the impossibility of receiving German help in 1870, while they thought the chances for French aid at least fairly good. So strong were Irish-American sympathies with France that the Fenians at times felt it necessary to restrain the enthusiasm of their followers, partly because of a desire not to offend needlessly the German-Americans, but chiefly for fear lest England should jump the wrong way and join herself with France. In that case, the Irish-Americans might

¹ *Irish American*: July 30, 1870; *New York Times*: July 18, Sept. 7 (report of Irish meeting, letter of Father O'Leary), Sept. 13 (report of Irish meeting at Cooper Union), Sept. 14, Sept. 19, Sept. 26 (Williamsburg celebration), Oct. 9 (Boston meeting), Dec. 30, 1870; *New York Tribune*: Aug. 3, Dec. 30, 1870 (French meeting at Cooper Union); *New York World*: July 19, July 20, Aug. 18, Sept. 26 (Williamsburg celebration), Sept. 28 (Franco-Irish meeting), Dec. 29, 1870; *Lakeside Monthly*: Sept., 1870; Walker, *A Compendium of the Ninth Census*, p. 448.

be embarrassed at finding themselves on the same side as their hereditary enemy. The Fenian Manifesto in New York said: "All our movements must depend on and follow those of England. . . . Wherever she shall be found, we shall be on the side of her antagonists." ¹

It is more difficult to prove that the Democrats were frankly making a bid for Irish support than to show definite angling on the part of the Republicans for the German vote. As a matter of fact the Democratic leaders were not attempting to catch the Irish vote or to divert it from the Republican party. The Democratic party in the North already possessed the Irish-American vote, and many of its most prominent leaders were Irish by birth or descent. The difference between the influence of politics on the Republican and Democratic campaigns of 1870 was the difference between bribery and an interlocking directorate: the Republicans were trying to bribe the German-Americans with sympathy, while the leaders of the Democrats and of the Irish-Americans were often the same men. The fact that the New York *World*, Chicago *Times* and Boston *Post* were all very important Democratic papers, were all extremely pro-French and that each was published in a city which possessed a large Irish population, is without doubt significant. New York, with over two hundred thousand Irish, had the *World*, which the Milwaukee *Sentinel* called "the leading organ of the Democratic party;" Boston, with somewhat less than sixty thousand Irish, had the *Post*; Chicago, with forty-three thousand Irish, had the *Times*, which the *Sentinel* referred to as "the leading organ of

¹ New York *Tribune*: Aug. 9 (Fenian Manifesto), Aug. 3, 1870; New York *Times*: Sept. 10, 1870 (report of Irish-French meeting); New York *World*: Aug. 18, 1870 (speech of John Savage); Warsaw *Bulletin*: July 21, 1870; Irish *Citizen*: July 30, Aug. 13, Aug. 27, Sept. 24, 1870; Irish *American*: July 23, Sept. 24, 1870.

Democracy in the Northwest." There is a striking similarity between the platforms of certain Democratic state conventions and the resolutions passed by some of the Irish-French celebrations of the new republic in France.¹

As the Democratic leaders criticized the Republicans for endorsing the German cause in order to win German-American votes, the Republicans retaliated with the charge that the Democrats had been influenced in siding with France by the Irish-American vote. *Harper's Weekly* accused the Democrats of attempting to make "some Irish capital" out of their attitude on the war, Gustave Koerner spoke of some papers which had supported France as being "under the influence of the Irish vote," the *New York Times* charged that the Democratic press "for weeks . . . had been conciliating the Irish vote," and the *New York Tribune* thought that the Democrats had "hoped to control the Irish vote by upholding a rotten and falling cause, and belittling a nation of gallant soldiers." The same paper drew a comparison between Napoleon and Boss Sweeney of New York, and said: "The fact that kindred spirits consort with each other as naturally as birds of a feather flock together, is sufficient to account for the hearty sympathy of our Democracy with the cause of Napoleon."²

The pro-French minority of American opinion made a comparison, as the pro-German majority had done, between the French and German civilizations, but the pro-French group praised France and condemned Prussia. But even sympathizers with France could find little good to say of the

¹ *Milwaukee Sentinel*: Sept. 1, 1870; Walker, *A Compendium of the Ninth Census*, p. 407 et seq.

² *New York Tribune*: Aug. 10, Sept. 4, Aug. 12, 1870 (meeting in Boston); *New York Times*: Sept. 11, Aug. 24, 1870; *Harper's Weekly*: Sept. 24, 1870; *De La Salle Monthly*: Sept., 1870; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, p. 514.

Second French Empire, and devoted most of their energies to a fierce condemnation of everything Prussian. A very few Americans praised Napoleon III, and a slightly larger number found something to approve in French civilization under the Empire. General Joseph E. Johnston of Confederate fame described Napoleon as "a wise and sagacious ruler," and *Appleton's Journal*, although admitting that Caesarism was "a bad thing in itself," maintained that "Louis Napoleon was by no means a bad Caesar." Even after his fall the *Charleston Courier* said that he had been "the greatest ruler, both as politician at home and diplomatist abroad, that ever sat upon the throne of France, except, perhaps, his uncle." But, as has been shown above, such praise for the third Napoleon was not the general attitude of Americans.¹

There were a few expressions of approval for the government of France under the Second Empire. *Appleton's Journal* repeatedly spoke of the undoubted material prosperity of France during the period. The *Cincinnati Gazette* praised the gradual liberalization of the Empire, and said that Napoleon's government was "about as free as the French people are capable of," a somewhat doubtful compliment. The *Charleston Courier* called the Emperor "more than half a Republican," and claimed that his domestic policy seemed to have for its purpose the education of the French to self-government. The *Savannah Republican's* remark was really enthusiastic: "France will, in coming generations, point to his administration as a golden era in the annals of true progress."² As might be expected, the

¹ *New York World*: Aug. 4, 1870 (citation from Johnston); *Charleston Courier*: Sept. 7, 1870; *Detroit Free Press*: Sept. 6, 1870; *Appleton's Journal*: May 6, 1871, Oct. 29, 1870.

² *Savannah Republican*: Aug. 19, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Aug. 29, 1870; *Charleston Courier*: Sept. 7, 1870; *Appleton's Journal*: Feb. 11, April 8, 1871.

Irish Citizen was extravagant in its praise: France under the Empire was "the country of universal suffrage . . . of perfect equality of all religions . . . of plebiscites . . . of perfect social and political equality . . . France is the realized ideal of Democracy."¹ But such high-flown language as that of the *Savannah Republican* and the *Irish Citizen* represented the opinion of a small number of Americans compared with those who considered the Second Empire the embodiment of everything reactionary.

The attacks of the pro-French Americans upon Prussia were more spirited and apparently more spontaneous than their defense of France. It is true that the criticisms of Prussia were not confined strictly to the sympathizers with France. Many Americans who in general favored the German cause were unwilling to endorse everything Prussian. The explanation lies, of course, in the fact that some Americans did make a distinction between things German and things Prussian. Attacks were made upon the Prussian leaders, King William and Bismarck. The Prussian political system was described as despotic, and as being based upon the divine right absolutism of the Hohenzollerns and the feudal oligarchy of the Junkers. The other prop of the Prussian monarchy was said to be militarism, a depressing system which made of every citizen a slave of the state. With such an army it was but natural that Prussia should have been the most aggressive of European powers. Even German unity was criticized as being but another term for Prussian aggrandizement. It is easy to see in the points of attack upon Prussia the same ideas which had been prevalent regarding that state throughout the whole period since

¹ *Irish Citizen*: July 30, Nov. 5, Nov. 12, Dec. 3, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Oct. 11, 1870 (citation from Hillsboro, Ohio, *Gazette*); *De La Salle Monthly*: Aug., 1870; *Scribner's Magazine*: Dec., 1870; *National Quarterly Review*: Sept., 1870, March, 1871.

1848.¹ Not even the enthusiasm engendered by a remarkable war for German unity against French imperialism could destroy in a day the quite common belief that the Prussian monarchy was despotic, militaristic and aggressive.

Very often the criticisms were leveled at King William and his redoubtable minister, Bismarck. It is probable that more hostile than favorable comment was made regarding the two. It is true that General Sheridan, who accompanied the Prussian General Staff on the campaign, and George Bancroft, American Minister to Prussia, were most laudatory both of William and of Bismarck. Some Americans admired the bluff, hearty old monarch, with his simple manners and his remarkable physical vigor. The *New York Times* reported from a sermon by the Rev. George H. Hepsworth the statement: "In William we had the type of the hard-headed Puritan, and from his sturdiness of character and determination in the prosecution of his designs, we must respect the man."² George E. Pond considered Bismarck's diplomacy "keen," "audacious" and "brilliant;" the *Charleston Courier* referred to his "genius;" the *New York World* admitted that he was "an enlightened and efficient administrator." More enthusiastic were the *New York Times*, which thought him "the most remarkable statesman of the nineteenth century;" the *Portland Transcript*, which called him "the one great man of the age;" *Harper's Weekly*, which spoke of him as "the most sagacious statesman that Germany has seen since Stein."³

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 39-43, 73-74, 128-139, 159-166, 179-181, 191-192, 199-201.

² *New York Times*: Oct. 20, Dec. 20, 1870; *Appleton's Journal*: Oct. 15, 1870 (art. by George M. Towle); Sheridan, *Personal Memoirs*, vol. ii, pp. 444-445; Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, pp. 248-250. It is an interesting fact that many American papers insisted upon calling the Prussian king "Frederick William," or "Frederic."

³ *New York Tribune*: Jan. 19, Feb. 22, 1871; *New York Times*: Oct. 9, 1870; *New York World*: Feb. 16, 1871; *Charleston Courier*: Aug. 23,

But the common American judgment of William was that he was a stubborn, pig-headed old monarch, intent upon upholding the divine right of kings, insensible to modern ideas of progress and in opposition to all forms of popular liberty. The New York *World* compared him to Attila and called him, in reference to his part in the revolution of 1848, "the grapeshot prince." The New York *Times* thought there was "no more thorough representative of arbitrary government left in Europe than the King of Prussia." The Portland *Transcript* spoke of the "dull-witted old gentleman," George William Curtis referred to "the same tough old Tory," and the *Irish Citizen* attacked bitterly "the old Gothic Divine righter."¹

The epithets most commonly hurled at Bismarck were hardly more complimentary. The New York *Tribune*, which was itself an ardent admirer of Bismarck, was forced to make admissions highly significant of popular feeling. At one time the *Tribune* said, "Bismarck is not half as black as he has lately been painted," and at another time declared, "It is common at this distance to rail at Bismarck as crafty."² The most frequent charges against

Sept. 3, 1870; *Detroit Free Press*: Aug. 23, 1870; *Philadelphia Press*: May 16, 1871 (speech by John Forney at German celebration); *Portland Transcript*: Feb. 4, 1871; *Appleton's Journal*: Oct. 15, 1870 (art. by George M. Towle); *Harper's Weekly*: Feb. 25, 1871; *Galaxy*: Oct., Nov., 1870 (articles by George E. Pond); *Southern Review*: April, 1871.

¹ New York *Tribune*: Sept. 13, 1870; New York *Times*: Sept. 13, July 22, Sept. 11, Sept. 12, Oct. 24, 1870 (meeting of American positivists); New York *World*: Aug. 9, Aug. 15, Aug. 27, Sept. 13 (citation from *Commercial Advertiser*), Sept. 22 (speech by W. C. DeWitt before Democratic Convention of New York), Dec. 4, 1870, Jan. 20, Feb. 9, 1871; *Portland Transcript*: Dec. 24, 1870; *Irish Citizen*: Dec. 3, July 23, Sept. 24, 1870; *Harper's Weekly*: July 30, 1870; *Irish American*: July 23, 1870; *Harper's Magazine*: Nov., 1870 (Easy Chair); *Galaxy*: Nov., 1870 (art. by C. A. Bristed); Sumner, *Works*, vol. xiv, pp. 61-62.

² New York *Tribune*: Feb. 22, March 23, 1871; New York *Times*: Oct. 6, 1870.

Bismarck were his absolutist beliefs in government, his lack of scruple in the means to an end and a fundamental hardness of character. The *New York World* called him a remorseless absolutist, and the *Detroit Free Press* said that he was no lover of republican institutions. The *World* accused him of caring more for immediate success than for permanent reputation, Charles A. Bristed called him "as unscrupulous an intriguer as Louis Napoleon," and the *De La Salle Monthly* referred to the "unscrupulous Bismarck." The *Irish Citizen* remarked: "He is a great man, Bismarck; and we cannot deny it: that is, a very superior fiend."¹ Wendell Phillips said Bismarck possessed "no breadth, no foresight, no large instincts of humanity." Charles Sumner complained that he was "naturally hard, and little affected by human sympathy," while Byron C. Smith called him "a powerful man, not a great man," and went on to say, "He lacks that insight which comes of universal love."² In general it can be said that in 1870 as in the earlier period most Americans were willing to grant him a large measure of ability, but were keenly suspicious and distrustful of his purposes and methods. In addition it can be said that those Americans who opposed Prussia found a further cause for dislike in the character and ideas of her leaders.

¹ *Irish Citizen*: April 15, 1871, July 16, July 23, 1870; *New York Tribune*: Dec. 30, 1870 (pro-French meeting at Cooper Union, speech by John Mitchel); *New York World*: Nov. 27, 1870, Jan. 20, 1871, Aug. 27, Dec. 4, Dec. 17, 1870, Feb. 9, Feb. 16, 1871; *Detroit Free Press*: Nov. 23, 1870; *Galaxy*: Nov., 1870 (art. by C. A. Bristed); *De La Salle Monthly*: Aug., 1870.

² Smith, B. C., *Letters*, pp. 245 *et seq.*, 199 *et seq.*; *New York Tribune*: May 8, 1871; *New York Times*: July 7, Sept. 30, Oct. 11, Dec. 1, Dec. 19, 1870; *New York World*: Sept. 23, 1870 (copied from *Anti-Slavery Standard*, article by Wendell Phillips); *Appleton's Journal*: Oct. 15, 1870 (art. by George M. Towle); Sumner, *Works*, vol. xiv, p. 63; Fuess, Claude M., *The Life of Caleb Cushing* (New York, 1923), vol. ii, p. 305.

Since King William was commonly regarded in the United States as a believer in the divine right of kings, it is not strange that many Americans thought of the political structure of Prussia as despotic, a feudal monarchy resting upon a caste of hereditary land-owning nobles, the Junkers. Popular liberty was incompatible with such a government, which, although it might employ universal suffrage, could have no conception of true democracy in the sense of self-government. References were often made to the treatment which Bismarck and William had meted out to the Prussian parliament and constitution, as showing to what extent the Prussian leaders believed in political democracy. It was in accord with American ideas of a feudal monarch that he should refuse to recognize any individual liberties, and there was little surprise therefore that liberty of the press and of speech were not inviolable rights in Prussia. The *Portland Transcript* said: "Free speech is a myth in Germany. Nobody is allowed to speak against the war."¹ Byron C. Smith was pretty pessimistic about the conditions of political life in Germany when he wrote, "The Germans have not yet dreamed of what free government means."² The *Chicago Times* said despotism was "traditional, hereditary, inherent, and deep-rooted in the Prussian nature;" and even the pro-German *Nation* admitted: "Politically and socially, all Germany (and even Prussia) is still shackled by feudal customs and distinctions."³ The *Milwaukee Sentinel* was certainly not pro-French, but yet it thought that Prussia had always acted on the principle "that the individual is the property of the State; that man exists for the State, not

¹ *Portland Transcript*: Jan. 14, 1871.

² Smith, B. C., *Letters*, pp. 238-239.

³ *Nation*: Oct. 27, 1870; *Wisconsin State Journal*: Sept. 29, 1870 (citation from *Chicago Times*).

the State for man; that the governed were made for government, not government for the governed.”¹

Although most Americans considered that the Prussian military system, based upon the principle of compulsory service for all, was both truly democratic and non-aggressive, such views were not accepted without at least some protest. A minority, composed mainly but not wholly of Americans who were partial to the French cause, believed that Prussia was a military despotism. The *National Quarterly Review* scoffed at the conception of the “thinking bayonets,” and maintained that good soldiers never thought, but only obeyed. Wendell Phillips denied that Prussia was a nation, and called her “only an overgrown army.” The *New York World* attacked the Prussian military system “which regarded each man . . . as always first and foremost a soldier, and in case of war lifted up the whole male population out of civil life and let it down in the ranks.” The *Cincinnati Gazette* spoke of the “terrible Prussian military system,” which the *New York Times* thought was not an institution “suitable for a free people.”²

To those Americans who believed that Prussia was a military despotism it was but a step to the conviction that she was an aggressive military despotism bent upon extend-

¹ *New York Tribune*: Dec. 30, 1870 (pro-French meeting at Cooper Union); *New York Times*: July 21, July 22, Sept. 13, Sept. 27, Oct. 21, 1870; *New York World*: July 16, Aug. 9, Nov. 18, Nov. 19, 1870, Jan. 8, 1871; *Milwaukee Sentinel*: Oct. 12, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Sept. 1, 1870; *Richmond Enquirer*: Sept. 5, 1870; *Irish Citizen*: Aug. 20, Sept. 10, 1870; *Harper's Weekly*: July 30, Aug. 13, 1870; *Irish American*: July 23, 1870; *De La Salle Monthly*: Aug., 1870.

² *New York Times*: Oct. 8, Aug. 9, Aug. 20, 1870; *New York World*: Sept. 4, Sept. 23 (art. by Wendell Phillips from *Anti-Slavery Standard*), July 13, Aug. 9, Aug. 16, Aug. 25, Aug. 27, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Aug. 31, 1870; *Irish Citizen*: July 23, Sept. 10, 1870; *Galaxy*: Nov., 1870 (art. by C. A. Bristed); *Harper's Magazine*: Jan., 1871 (art. by C. C. Hazewell); *National Quarterly Review*: Sept., 1870.

ing her frontiers by fair means or foul at the expense of her neighbors. Her ambitious policy was traced from the time of Frederick the Great, and her seizure of the Danish duchies, Hanover, Frankfort and Hesse-Cassel was evidenced to prove her policy of aggrandizement. The *Boston Traveller* declared Prussia to be "the robber nation of Europe," and the *Irish Citizen* stigmatized her dynasty as a family of professional burglars. The *Portland Transcript* stated that the people of Holland, Belgium and Denmark feared Prussian aggression quite as much as they did French schemes of conquest. The *Penn Monthly* said that the new Prussian empire in Germany had "had its birth in rapine and violence," while the *Chicago Times* called Prussia "the most grasping and rapacious power in Europe." The *Cincinnati Gazette* was even more vehement in its declaration: "If there has been a nation more aggressive than Prussia, history has somehow neglected to record it."¹ Charles A. Bristed wrote a letter to the *New York Times* under his pen name, Carl Benson, in which he was very fearful of the results of the Prussian successes: "I see no earthly reason why Prussia, in the supreme position, will not be as dishonest, as dictatorial and as dangerous as France ever was; more dangerous on some accounts, because less magnanimous. The French sometimes hit a man when he is down; the Prussians generally."²

¹ *Cincinnati Gazette*: Sept. 26, July 16, July 20, July 30, 1870, Jan. 21, 1871; *New York World*: Aug. 25, 1870 (citation from *Boston Traveller*); *Wisconsin State Journal*: July 27, 1870 (citation from *Chicago Times*: July 19, 1870); *Irish Citizen*: July 23, July 16, Sept. 10, 1870; *Portland Transcript*: Aug. 13, 1870; *Penn Monthly*: Aug., 1870.

² *New York Times*: Sept. 8, July 9, July 19, Sept. 10, 1870; *New York World*: July 13, July 16, July 24, Aug. 25, 1870; *Milwaukee Sentinel*: Aug. 24, 1870 (citation from *Chicago Times*); *Portland Transcript*: Aug. 20, 1870 (speech by N. P. Banks before Reunion of the Society of the Army and Navy of the Gulf at Boston); *Galaxy*: Sept., Nov., 1870 (art. by C. A. Bristed); *National Quarterly Review*: Dec., 1870.

Not even the sacred cause of German unity was safe from the attacks of the pro-French element in the United States. German unity in itself might be a desirable goal, but a Prussian unity was another matter. Was the gain of a German union achieved under the auspices of Hohenzollern absolutism and militarism worth the cost of such an outpouring of money and human blood? Was not German unity rather but a cloak to hide Hohenzollern aggrandizement? The *New York World* said that the desire for German unity did not justify the tremendous loss of human life, and remarked that Germany might be united without being a whit the more free. The *De La Salle Monthly* thought the cry of German unity was a "mere sham," on the part of Prussia, who was using German patriotism in her attempts to construct "a strong combined despotism." The *Irish Citizen* said that German unification was but "the unification of the shark with its prey." Byron C. Smith wondered if German independence was really worth fighting for "only to see it abused by Bismarck." Probably one of the strongest American opponents to a Prussian unification of Germany was the *Cincinnati Gazette*, which thought the whole plan a huge humbug on the part of Prussia. The *Gazette* sarcastically remarked:

Inasmuch as the German people were entirely free to form a national union before the war, and did not, it seems to us that their passionate desire was not demonstrative. Or perhaps this passionate desire assumed a feminine coyness, and waited to be coerced, as Hanover and some other German sisters were in 1866.¹

¹ *Cincinnati Gazette*: Sept. 27, Aug. 17, 1870; *New York Times*: July 26, 1870; *New York World*: Aug. 23, July 22, Aug. 13, Aug. 27, Aug. 31, 1870; *Richmond Enquirer*: Sept. 5, 1870; *Irish Citizen*: Sept. 10, 1870; *De La Salle Monthly*: Aug., 1870; Smith, B. C., *Letters*, pp. 197, 208 et seq.; Schieber, *American Sentiment toward Germany*, p. 19 (citation from *Boston Post*).

MODERATING INFLUENCES UPON AMERICAN OPINION AFTER
THE BATTLE OF SEDAN

In the foregoing sections an attempt has been made to show that the preponderant sentiment in the United States before the battle of Sedan was in favor of Germany and opposed to France, but that there existed a strong minority opinion very hostile to Germany and friendly to France. The great majority of Americans believed that France had begun the war, while the minority thought that France had been driven to war by Prussian provocation. The majority contrasted Napoleon's aid to the South with the German purchase of American bonds in the Civil War, while the minority contrasted French aid in the Revolution with the fact that Hessians had fought for England. The leaders of the majority were influenced by the great mass of German-Americans in the United States, and prominent Republicans deliberately made an attempt to purchase German votes by expressions of sympathy with German aims in the war; while the leaders of the minority were influenced by the Irish-Americans, who strongly favored France and who controlled a large part of the Democratic party to such an extent that it became rabidly pro-French. The majority thought Prussia's civilization — her religion, her military system, her educational system — far superior to French culture, and conceived of the war as one between decadent French imperialism and healthy German nationalism. The minority rather saw the war as a struggle between a progressively democratic France and a militaristic, arrogant and despotic Prussia, under unscrupulous leadership which employed the slogan of German unity to hide a definite policy of territorial aggrandizement.

With the battle of Sedan, the overthrow of Napoleon and the establishment of the Third French Republic, a

noticeable shift occurred in American opinion. Not that all Americans changed their views immediately or completely, nor that the old causes for pro-Prussian sentiment suddenly disappeared; but new factors entered into the situation which were calculated to bring about a greater amount of sympathy for France. Americans continued to talk of the good will which Germans had shown to the United States in her time of need, Republican politicians continued to angle for German-American votes, Protestants continued to glorify the land of Luther, and American nationalists continued to look with favor on the struggle for German unification. But it is certain that a very respectable number of Americans came to see in the war a struggle between a heroic French republic fighting gallantly against tremendous odds, and a militaristic German empire intent on aggrandizement at the expense of France.

It is very difficult to estimate just how strong the current of sympathy for France was after the fall of Napoleon and the establishment of the republic. Dr. Clara E. Schieber makes the statement in her able monograph: "During a short period following the capture of Napoleon and the establishment of the French Republic sentiment slightly turned towards France. But with the continuation of the war, the lack of real leaders and the failure of so-called ones among the French, American attitude again favored Germany."¹ On the other hand, Professor E. N. Curtis declares: "Public opinion made a complete *volte-face*; the North now favored the new government, the South was hostile."² The author only partially agrees with either Dr.

¹ Schieber, *American Sentiment toward Germany*, p. 14. The author is much indebted to Dr. Schieber's work for many suggestions; he is in general agreement with her main thesis, and has borrowed freely from certain of her authorities.

² Curtis, "American Opinion of French Revolutions," pp. 264-266.

Schieber or Professor Curtis. It is quite clear that the change in American feeling was only temporary, and that the effect of the establishment of a republic in France had almost completely worn off by January, 1871. But it is questionable whether the shift in September and October was only slight. On the other hand, Professor Curtis' declaration seems perhaps too strong, and not quite complete. It is probably true that most Southern papers opposed the change of government in France, although he himself gives important exceptions in the *Richmond Whig* and *Galveston Tri-Weekly News*, to which might be added the *Richmond Enquirer*; it is not, however, strictly true that all the North was in favor of the change except perhaps for a few days at the very beginning.

The author's view, which will be elaborated in the following paragraphs, is that the fall of Napoleon and the establishment of a republic in France were hailed with joy by almost every element in the United States with the exception of certain Southern Democratic papers. Northern Democrats, like the *New York World* and the *Irish Citizen*, who had favored Napoleon before Sedan rejoiced in his overthrow, since the establishment of a republic in France gave them an opportunity to pose as the friends of French republicanism against Prussian autocracy. In addition, if the war should continue, the new form of government in France was sure to be a source of embarrassment to many Republican politicians, for if they persisted in championing the Prussian cause, as they must to win the German-American vote, they would inevitably put themselves in the position of upholding a monarchy against a republic. The Republican party in the United States was thus put into a dilemma: to favor French republicanism meant almost necessarily an attack upon Germany and thus the loss of German-American votes; to oppose French republicanism

was to bring down upon them the indignation of American believers in that form of government. The *Savannah Republican* (Dem.) gleefully exclaimed:

. . . the tables are turned; France is a free republic and neither the President nor his organs dare open their lips. Very awkward and anxious efforts are made even to explain away the President's recognition of the new republic for fear of bringing German hostility upon the party, while an expression of sympathy now for despotic Prussia as against republican France would be construed into treason to liberty.¹

The Northern Republicans, to whom everything Napoleonic was vicious and despotic, rejoiced in the overthrow of the Second Empire, and could not fail to sympathize with any country which had flattered American susceptibilities by adopting similar political institutions. But when the new French government refused to cede territory or to pay an indemnity, and persisted in carrying on the war, and when the republican leaders in France gave vent to mock heroics and at the same time hesitated to call a constituent assembly, the leaders of the Republican party in the United States attacked the new government in France and again gave their unqualified support to the German cause. By the middle of October, 1870, typical Republican papers such as the *New York Tribune*, *Philadelphia Press*, *Harper's Weekly* and the *Nation* had begun to doubt the success of the French Republic, to ridicule its leaders, to play up its mistakes and to make their peace with the German-American vote.

There is plenty of evidence to prove that there was more than a slight change in American opinion after the battle of Sedan. First, there are the claims put forward by strongly pro-French papers, which naturally desired to see such a

¹ *Savannah Republican*: Sept. 16, 1870.

shift in opinion. The New York *World* printed extracts from about a dozen newspapers, many of them Republican in politics, all of which seemed favorable to the new French government. The *National Quarterly Review* spoke of "a considerable change in the public opinion of this country since the declaration by the French of the republic." In the second place, there are the statements of Republican papers which had formerly ardently supported the German cause. *Leslie's Weekly* said: "But now . . . the current of American feeling is very naturally turning actively toward the French millions who are trying to re-establish the Republic." ¹ The correspondent of the New York *Times* in Chicago wrote of sentiment there, "The proclamation of the Republicans . . . in Paris has produced a revolution in the minds of thousands of our people." ² Very similar was the despatch of the Washington correspondent of the New York *Tribune*: "A wonderful change in sentiment has taken place, and many of those who were opposed to Napoleon now strongly sympathize with France." ³ Perhaps even more conclusive proof that a shift did occur can be found in the protest against it on the part of German-Americans, such as Gustave Koerner, who wrote in his *Memoirs*, "But that France had become a republic over night . . . worked here like a charm in favor of France." ⁴

It is also quite clear that the chief cause for the change in American opinion after Sedan lay in the sympathy and

¹ *Leslie's Weekly*: Oct. 1, 1870; New York *World*: Sept. 13, Dec. 30, 1870; *National Quarterly Review*: Sept., 1870.

² New York *Times*: Oct. 2, Sept. 25, Oct. 19, Dec. 30, 1870.

³ New York *Tribune*: Sept. 8, 1870.

⁴ Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, p. 515; New York *Tribune*: Sept. 16, 1870 (letter from Alfred Erbe); *North American Review*: Oct., 1870 (art. by H. W. Hemans).

joy which the American people felt for the triumph of republicanism in France. The attitude of the administration was friendly and the action taken by it prompt. As in 1848, it was the American Minister who was the first of the diplomatic corps to recognize the change in government, on September 7, 1870. But whereas Richard Rush in 1848 had made the recognition first and then asked for approval from his government, Elihu B. Washburne in 1870 acted upon the cabled request of his government. In his annual message for 1870, President Grant commented thus on the recognition of the new republic by his administration:

The reestablishment in France of the system of government disconnected with the dynastic traditions of Europe appeared to be a proper subject for the felicitations of Americans. Should the present struggle result in attaching the hearts of the French to our simpler forms of representative government, it will be a subject of still further satisfaction to our people . . . we can not be indifferent to the spread of American political ideas to a great and highly civilized country like France.¹

But although President Grant and his administration were strongly in sympathy with the new republic, Congress hesitated to take action. Early in February, 1871, the President was requested by Congress to furnish a ship to take supplies to the suffering people of both France and Germany, but an amendment suggested by Senator John Sherman that the President should offer to the French people "every aid, assistance, encouragement, and support consistent with the laws of nations and our treaties with other Powers, in establishing upon a firm basis a republican gov-

¹ Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. ix, pp. 4050-4051; Washburne, Elihu B., *Recollections of a Minister to France, 1869-1877* (New York, 1887), vol. i, pp. 119-125; Curtis, "American Opinion of French Revolutions," pp. 267-268.

ernment," never was brought to a vote. In the debate which it caused, however, can be seen very clearly the conflicting sympathies of the Senators, some strongly favorable to France, some intensely hostile and correspondingly friendly to Germany.¹

The advent to power of the French Republic in 1870 certainly did not arouse the same amount of interest or approval as had the republic of 1848, but nevertheless the event received much favorable comment, particularly in the early autumn of 1870. In the first place, there were expressions of congratulation from certain political bodies. The Wisconsin Legislature passed the resolution: "That the hearts' sympathy of the people of the State of Wisconsin is due and cordially extended to the people of any and every nation who are striving to establish a republican form of government."² The French Democratic Central Club of New York held a meeting at Cooper Union late in December. The speech of A. S. Sullivan deserves a short quotation: "As the grave clothes of Lazarus were loosened, so do I want the sympathizing lovers of France in America to loosen the grave clothes which envelop her unfortunate sister. . . . I believe the French republic will succeed."³

¹ *Congressional Globe*, 3rd Session, 41st Congress, pp. 867, 953-956. It is impossible to find partisan or sectional lines drawn at all clearly in the Senate debates. Those who showed themselves strongly pro-German were William M. Stewart of Nevada, Samuel C. Pomeroy of Kansas, Roscoe Conkling of New York, Oliver P. Morton of Indiana and Carl Schurz of Missouri. All were Republicans as were those who were strongly pro-French like Jacob M. Howard of Michigan and Joseph S. Fowler of Tennessee.

² *Wisconsin State Journal*: Jan. 26, 1871.

³ *New York Tribune*: Dec. 30, 1870. *Harper's Weekly* for Jan. 14, 1871, attacked the above-mentioned meeting as having been held "for home effect," called it "in no sense representative of American opinion," and said, "We do not recall any similar assembly of which the tone was so hollow and insincere."

The Republican Convention in New York resolved that: "We hail with unmingled joy a new Republic in France."¹

Several public meetings were held to celebrate the establishment of the new republic, in Chicago, New York, Washington, Richmond, Boston and Chattanooga. At the Chicago meeting a letter was read from Governor John M. Palmer, in which he said, "Every American will sympathize with the Republic of France."² A speaker at the Washington meeting condemned Prussia for continuing the war and accused her of attempting "to crush the Republic of France," while the Chattanooga meeting, after expressing sympathy with the French Republic, called upon the Germans to overthrow their rulers and establish republican institutions. The resolutions passed by a meeting of Irish-Americans in New York early in September were typically enthusiastic: "Long live the French Republic! Liberty! Equality! Fraternity! 1793! 1848! 1870! Irish America endorses the Republic."³

Almost every American newspaper and weekly journal of opinion used expressions, at some time or other, very favorable to the establishment of a republic in France in 1870. In some cases the number of unfavorable comments is much greater than the number of favorable ones, but the feeling of friendliness was strong enough to find some expression even in journals which were on the whole profoundly skep-

¹ *New York Times*: Sept. 8, 1870.

² *Wisconsin State Journal*: Sept. 24, 1870.

³ *New York World*: Sept. 8 (report of Irish-American meeting), Sept. 11, 1870 (report of meeting of New Democracy in New York); *New York Tribune*: Oct. 12 (report of Boston meeting), Dec. 30, 1870 (report of New York meeting at Cooper Union); *New York Times*: Oct. 27 (report of Washington meeting), Oct. 30, 1870 (report of Chattanooga meeting); *Richmond Enquirer*: Sept. 14, 1870 (report of Richmond meeting).

tical or hostile. Very often the joy at the formation of a republic in France was mingled with threats of withdrawal of American sympathy from Prussia if she continued to make war. Prussia had declared that her quarrel was with Napoleon alone, and now he had been overthrown. The very prevalent rumor in the United States that Bismarck and King William had refused to treat with a republic and were insistent upon the restoration of the empire, aroused almost universal disapproval. Many Americans frankly drew the contrast between French republicanism and Prussian despotism, and stated clearly that their sympathies could only be with the former. The positions of the "Hohenzollern lamb" and the "French wolf" were now almost completely reversed.¹

Among the papers which were not on the whole friendly to the new republic and yet which did say something favorable to it were the *New York Tribune*, the *Philadelphia Press*, *Harper's Weekly*, the *Portland Transcript* and the *Charleston Courier*. The *Courier* admitted that the character of the war had now changed to that of a struggle for the spread of republican ideas, the *Portland Transcript* thought that "every friend of free institutions will fervently pray" for the success of republicanism in France, and *Harper's Weekly* said, "Certainly none can wish success more sincerely than we to the efforts of the French people to establish and maintain a republic."² The *Philadelphia Press* felt that the lack of bloodshed and violence augured well for the success of the new government, and thought that the French should profit by the American example. No paper was really more hostile to France than the *New York Tribune*, yet it remarked, "There is no people in

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 325.

² *Harper's Weekly*: Oct. 8, Sept. 10, 1870; *Charleston Courier*: Sept. 26, 1870; *Portland Transcript*: Sept. 17, Oct. 29, 1870, Feb. 4, 1871.

whose welfare we take a warmer interest than the people of France . . . with hopes that it will do much for France and for civilization, we say, 'God save the French Republic!' " " ¹

The Cincinnati *Gazette*, the San Francisco *Bulletin* and the New York *Times* held to a fairly neutral attitude on the whole, but each of them had something good to say of the new republic. The *Gazette* thought that the issues in the war had changed with the founding of the republic in France, and hinted that American sympathies were quite likely to change also. The San Francisco *Bulletin* said, "The war is now not only against the French people, but it is against a Republic." ² The *Times* was sure that the prompt recognition of the republic by Washburne had "the approval of the great body of the American people," brought out very distinctly the difference between a war fought by Prussia against Napoleon III and one fought against the new government, and declared: "Now that there is no need to discriminate between the dynasty of Napoleon and the French people, every friend of Republican institutions may, without misgiving, swell the current of sympathy that every day sets more powerfully toward the new Democratic regime in France." ³

The more strongly pro-French papers, such as the Detroit *Free Press*, *Irish Citizen*, *National Quarterly Review*, *De La Salle Monthly*, *Irish American* and the New York *World*, were naturally even more enthusiastic. The *National Quarterly Review* joined in the praise of Minister Wash-

¹ New York *Tribune*: Sept. 9, Sept. 4, Sept. 12, Sept. 15, Sept. 27, Oct. 22, Nov. 16, 1870; Philadelphia *Press*: Sept. 6, Sept. 5, 1870, Jan. 30, 1871.

² San Francisco *Bulletin*: Sept. 12, Sept. 28, Oct. 6, 1870; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Sept. 6, Sept. 5, Oct. 21, 1870, Feb. 4, 1871.

³ New York *Times*: Sept. 13, Sept. 19, Sept. 8, Sept. 9, Sept. 10, Sept. 11, Sept. 12, Sept. 17, Sept. 25, Sept. 27, Oct. 30, Nov. 4, Dec. 13, 1870.

burne's prompt recognition, and the *De La Salle Monthly* said that the war was now between "an arrogant despotism" and "an infant republic." The *Detroit Free Press* thought that the rumored refusal of Prussia to treat with the French Republic could not be met by the United States with an open declaration of war, but yet said that it could not "but give rise to an embittered state of feeling" between the United States and Prussia. The *Irish Citizen* called the war one between "German feudalism and oligarchy on the one side, and French freedom and Republicanism on the other." The *Irish American* had for one of its headlines the phrase, "VIVE LA REPUBLIQUE." The *New York World* was the most enthusiastic of any paper examined. The *World* threatened Prussia with the loss of American sympathy if she continued the war, claimed that Americans would be recreant to their entire history if they failed to give their whole-hearted support to the new republic, and described the French situation rather poetically by saying: "Out of the nettle, danger, she magnanimously attempts to pluck the flower, freedom."¹ The *World* also printed on September 13, 1870, extracts from American papers favorable to the setting up of a republic in France. Among the papers cited were the *Boston Traveller*, *Philadelphia Enquirer*, *Buffalo Express*, *Boston Journal, Independent*, *Providence Journal*, *Brooklyn Union* and *Cleveland Leader*. The *Boston Traveller* wished the French people "God-speed in the work of reconstruction." The *Brooklyn Union* declared: "No king on the face of the earth, not William of Prussia . . . is so worthy of the respect of the

¹ *New York World*: Sept. 6, Sept. 7, Sept. 9, Sept. 10, Sept. 19, Nov. 10, Nov. 21, Dec. 31, 1870; *Detroit Free Press*: Sept. 19, Oct. 7, 1870; *Irish Citizen*: Jan. 7, 1871, Sept. 24, 1870; *Irish American*: Sept. 17, 1870; *De La Salle Monthly*: Feb., 1871; *National Quarterly Review*: Sept., 1870.

civilized world today, and particularly of the American people, as the one-week-old republic of France."¹

Individual opinions are more difficult to find, but are not entirely lacking. Wendell Phillips severely attacked Prussia for continuing to make war against the French Republic, George Bancroft said, "My joy is in the restoration of the republic," and Charles Sumner remarked, "A great hour for Humanity sounded when the Republic was proclaimed."² William James hoped that the republic might succeed; Henry W. Longfellow declared, "Now that the Empire is no more, let there be war no more, and *Vive la République!*;" while Walt Whitman wrote on September 15, 1870, "As things have gone on, and as the case stands, I find myself now far more for the *French* than I ever was for the Prussians."³ The reply of Washburne to a deputation of Frenchmen calling on him in Paris suggests that one reason for American approval of the new form of government in France was its similarity to that of the United States:

The American people feel the greatest interest in the grand movement which has just been inaugurated in France. . . . Living themselves under a republican form of government, they know how to appreciate its blessings, and to-day, with warm hearts and eloquent words, they felicitate their ancient ally on the accomplishment of that peaceful and bloodless revolution which must challenge the profound interest of all lovers of liberty throughout the world.⁴

¹ New York *World*: Sept. 13, 1870; *Wisconsin State Journal*: Sept. 7, 1870; *Richmond Enquirer*: Oct. 26, 1870; *Carthage Gazette*: Jan. 26, 1871; *Beecher's Magazine*: Oct., 1870; *Lakeside Monthly*: Oct., 1870; Smith, B. C., *Letters*, pp. 214-216.

² Sumner, *Works*, vol. xiv, p. 36; Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, pp. 240-241; New York *World*: Sept. 23, 1870 (art. by Wendell Phillips from *Anti-Slavery Standard*).

³ Whitman, *Calamus*, p. 75; *Letters of William James*, vol. i, p. 159; Longfellow, *Final Memorials*, p. 141.

⁴ Washburne, *Recollections*, vol. i, p. 125.

The following selection from a short poem which appeared in *Leslie's Weekly* is indicative of the American attitude:

Across the watery waste, Columbia speaks,
Benignant welcome to her sister France!
And calmly, strongly bids her take good heart,
And firmly hold her own against the world! ¹

But the general enthusiasm with which the American people greeted the establishment of a republic in France evaporated quickly and disappeared almost completely, except for certain papers which had been pro-French throughout the war. Some Southern newspapers which had been very friendly to Napoleon were opposed to the republic from the start, and considered that it was not a desirable form of government for France.² But the waning enthusiasm of the rest of the country was caused by other factors. In the first place, there were the same old beliefs of Americans that the French had no training in republicanism, lacked political education and were centralized in their local government. George Bancroft thought that he had never seen a Frenchman who really understood the essentials of republicanism, and said, "There is the republican wine, but where are the bottles to hold it?"³ Henry Ward Beecher's harsh words expressed the old belief in French centralization: "I believe when France is ground further—God grant it may be till every vestige of Centralization is ground out of her—when she believes in the liberty of every part of France, we shall see a resurrected France arising from the fields of

¹ *Leslie's Weekly*: Oct. 1, 1870 (poem by Arthur Matthison).

² *Charleston Courier*: Sept. 3, Sept. 15, 1870; *Savannah Republican*: Sept. 8, Sept. 14, Sept. 16, Sept. 20, 1870. Curtis adds the *Mobile Daily Register* and the *Memphis Avalanche*, "American Opinion of French Revolutions," pp. 266-267.

³ Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 241.

blood.”¹ In the second place, the new republic seemed to lack capable leaders. They talked altogether too much, they refused to admit French defeats, they boasted and lied and swaggered and accomplished nothing. Victor Hugo especially aroused the contempt of Americans. The *New York Tribune* called him Micawber, and even the *New York World* commented sarcastically: “Of course, it is not competent to anybody to object to Victor Hugo’s skipping about upon the ramparts . . . in the manner of a superannuated and masculine maid of Saragossa.”² In the third place, the new republic had kept up the war, had not accepted the German terms of peace, had taken up an unjust cause and made it its own. The French were openly accused of having overthrown the empire and of having set up the republic in order to escape their just punishment for having begun the war, or in order to prosecute the contest more efficiently. As *Harper’s Weekly* said: “Meeting reverses, the country apparently acquiesces in a change of government to prosecute the war more vigorously.”³

The fourth and most serious charge against the new government was that it was not a republic at all, but a self-

¹ Cited in *De La Salle Monthly*: Feb., 1871. Cf. also *New York Times*: Sept. 8, 1870; *Harper’s Weekly*: Oct. 8, Oct. 22, 1870; *Nation*: Oct. 27, 1870, Feb. 2, 1871; *North American Review*: Oct., 1870 (art. by H. W. Hemans); Smith, B. C., *Letters*, pp. 231-233.

² *New York World*: Sept. 18, 1870, Feb. 3, Feb. 7, 1871; *New York Tribune*: Sept. 21, Oct. 16, Oct. 31, Nov. 3, 1870; *New York Times*: Sept. 6, Sept. 18, Oct. 13, Oct. 15, Oct. 16, Oct. 20, Nov. 2, Dec. 9, 1870; *Nation*: Oct. 20, Nov. 3, 1870, Feb. 9, 1871; *Portland Transcript*: Nov. 19, 1870; *Carthage Gazette*: Jan. 26, 1871; *Irish Citizen*: March 4, 1871; Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, pp. 248-250.

³ *Harper’s Weekly*: Oct. 29, Dec. 17, 1870, Jan. 28, 1871; *New York Tribune*: Oct. 29, Nov. 16, Dec. 1, Dec. 3, 1870, Jan. 24, March 2, 1871; *New York Times*: Oct. 25, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Sept. 15, 1870; *Milwaukee Sentinel*: Oct. 3, 1870; *Scribner’s Magazine*: Dec., 1870.

constituted committee of republicans. It refused for several months to call a constituent assembly, apparently fearful that France would not accept the republic. It was nearly as much a personal government as that of Napoleon III had been. Little wonder that Bismarck felt that he could not make peace with such an irresponsible administration. The *New York Times* thought the only difference between the republic and the empire was that under the republic "there are several leaders instead of one." The *Nation* could see little distinction between "a couple of lawyers in black broadcloth" and "an adventurer dressed up as a field-marshal." The *New York Tribune* said, "As yet, there is no French Republic, even in form," and the *Savannah Republican* spoke of "the so-called republic."¹ The *Milwaukee Sentinel* was very pessimistic: "Unhappily there is very little that is encouraging in either the origin, the composition or the pretensions of the present revolutionary government."² *Leslie's Weekly* expressed the prevailing sentiment very vigorously: "There is no French Republic. . . . A few doctrinaires have a hazy idea of a Republic. . . . France, today, is neither a Republic nor a nation. . . . Its leaders, so far as it can be said to have any, are imposters."³ When the National Assembly finally did meet it was apparent to Americans that it was decidedly anti-republican, and many

¹ *New York Tribune*: Dec. 31, Sept. 26, Sept. 30, Nov. 2, Nov. 5, Dec. 1, Dec. 12, 1870, Jan. 7, 1871; *New York Times*: Nov. 9, Sept. 25, Oct. 2, 1870, Jan. 21, 1871; *Savannah Republican*: Sept. 8, 1870; *Nation*: Jan. 19, 1871, Sept. 15, Sept. 22, Oct. 27, Dec. 8, 1870, Jan. 5, Jan. 12, Jan. 26, Feb. 2, 1871.

² *Milwaukee Sentinel*: Sept. 9, Sept. 7, Oct. 21, 1870.

³ *Leslie's Weekly*: Nov. 19, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Sept. 19, 1870; *Philadelphia Press*: Oct. 13, 1870; *Charleston Courier*: Oct. 28, 1870; *Appleton's Journal*: Nov. 5, 1870; *Harper's Weekly*: Dec. 3, 1870; *Scribner's Magazine*: May, 1871; Schieber, *American Sentiment toward Germany*, pp. 28, 29.

predicted almost with pleasure the fall of the republic and the advent to power of the Orleanists. The *Tribune* wrote, "It has been a Republic only in name," and even the New York *World* admitted that the republic had failed, and spoke favorably of an Orleanist restoration. The *Nation* said: "If the Orleanists win the game at last, it is at least certain that France will commit her destinies to the hands of a family of pure, upright and accomplished gentlemen, who . . . are Frenchmen to the core."¹

A second cause for the change in American sentiment after the battle of Sedan lay in sympathy with the sufferings of France, in pity for the under dog, and admiration for a gallant nation fighting against tremendous odds. Certain it is that American pity for the sufferings of the French people was widespread, and was expressed in liberal gifts of money, food and supplies. It is difficult to gauge how valuable a contribution was actually sent. "Sanitary Fairs" were held by ladies in San Francisco and New York, and probably in other cities. So popular was the fair in New York with the society people of the city that the *Tribune* complained of discrimination against the German fair. The New York *Times* published an announcement that the Adams Express Company, the American Merchants Union and National Express Company, the United States Express Company and the Harlem Railroad Company were all willing to ship goods intended for the French sufferers free of charge. No less important as evidence of how the appeal reached even small communities was an announcement in the Carthage (Ill.) *Gazette* which gave the names and addresses of certain people in Chicago to whom cash, flour or packages might be sent. Early in February both houses of Congress

¹ *Nation*: Feb. 16, 1871; New York *Tribune*: Feb. 14, 1871; New York *World*: Feb. 13, Feb. 15, 1871; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Feb. 20, 1871.

voted unanimously that funds be appropriated so that an American naval vessel could be used to ship the gifts of supplies to the French sufferers.¹

In addition to the very natural compassion for the sufferings of individual Frenchmen, there was the almost equally natural sympathy for the nation which was being given a merciless beating and which was making a good fight. Americans might condemn the French for not making peace on any terms, but they could not fail to admire the heroism of the defense of Paris. Even the *Nation* in the same breath that it gave its good wishes to the Prussians, admitted that it could witness only "with sorrowful sympathy the despairing agony of a great nation." The *New York Tribune* was afraid that such sentiments might lead to disparagement of Prussia, but was not free from sympathy itself, when it said: "There are few Americans who will not grieve for France in her melancholy situation. Her people have gallantly borne privation like heroes, sacrificed everything to patriotism." ² *Leslie's Weekly* advised France to submit, but confessed, "No one . . . can fail to admire and respect her gallantry." ³ Asa Gray thought that no one but a German could see the "bitter humiliation of the French . . . without deep sorrow and pity," and Joseph

¹ *New York Tribune*: Jan. 30, Feb. 8, March 8, March 23, 1871; *New York Times*: Sept. 22 (mentions subscriptions for French in Boston, Philadelphia, Newark, Louisville, Mobile, Houston, Memphis, San Francisco, Chicago, Detroit and St. Louis), Sept. 25, Sept. 27, Sept. 29, Sept. 30, Oct. 8, Oct. 18, Oct. 25, Oct. 26 (appeal from H. S. Sanford), Dec. 6, 1870; *New York World*: Sept. 25, 1870, Feb. 7, 1871; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Jan. 11, Jan. 12, Feb. 8, 1871; *Carthage Gazette*: Feb. 23, 1871; *Nation*: Feb. 9, 1871; *Congressional Globe*, 3rd Session, 41st Congress, pp. 847, 869, 953-955.

² *New York Tribune*: Dec. 12, 1870, Feb. 2, 1871, Sept. 19, Oct. 8, 1870; *Nation*: Sept. 8, 1870.

³ *Leslie's Weekly*: Feb. 4, 1871.

H. Choate regretted the surrender of Strassburg, and thought that the French were "being pressed now a little beyond reason." The Richmond *Enquirer* compared France to the South, Prussia to the North, and said: "Suffering under foreign rule ourselves, we naturally sympathized with those who were opposing the approach of a foreign ruler."¹ The Milwaukee *Sentinel* thought that the plight of France "excites the pity, and challenges the sympathy of every Christian nation," and the Portland *Transcript* confessed that in spite of "all their bombastic rage, and want of practical energy . . . we have a sympathetic feeling for the gallant but unfortunate Frenchmen." Byron C. Smith was not pro-French in his sentiment, but he gave clear expression to the quite common sympathy with the losing side: "The cold hopelessness of their position and the ironical self-possession of their enemies make one's heart bleed for them. They are *so proud*, and must fall *so low*, that I, for one, find no satisfaction at the spectacle of their humiliated vanity, because it is too painful."²

A third and very important cause for a change in American opinion after the battle of Sedan can be found in the feeling that the Germans were conducting the war in a barbarous manner, and that they were demanding of France terms of peace so onerous as to leave that country prostrate, and so humiliated as to make the probability of permanent amity between the two nations very slight. Stories

¹ Richmond *Enquirer*: Sept. 17, Nov. 30, Dec. 14, 1870; Gray, *Letters*, vol. ii, p. 612; Martin, *Life of Joseph Hodges Choate*, vol. i, p. 294.

² Smith, B. C., *Letters*, p. 256; New York *Tribune*: Dec. 16, 1870; New York *Times*: Sept. 9, Nov. 12, Dec. 9, 1870; New York *World*: Sept. 29, 1870, Jan. 16, 1871; Milwaukee *Sentinel*: Oct. 24, 1870; Richmond *Enquirer*: Sept. 8, 1870; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Sept. 17, Oct. 28, 1870; San Francisco *Bulletin*: Oct. 6, 1870; *Appleton's Journal*: Nov. 26, 1870; Portland *Transcript*: Nov. 19, 1870, Feb. 4, 1871; *Irish American*: Sept. 10, 1870, Feb. 11, 1871; Gray, *Letters*, vol. ii, pp. 608-610.

of German cruelty began to circulate and became much more numerous as the war was prolonged. And as Americans became more sympathetic with French republicanism or French suffering they tended to give an ever greater amount of credence to the rumored German atrocities. Even strongly pro-German papers like the *Nation* and the *New York Tribune* were forced to confess that the Prussian conduct of the war left much to be desired. The *Tribune* feared that there was some truth in the stories, and the *Nation* said that "it must be admitted that the character of the troops, as regards kindness and honesty, was breaking down under the prolongation, the hardships, and the triumphs of the campaign." Protests were made by many Americans against the bombardment of Paris and against the entry of German troops into that city after its surrender. The *New York Times* thought that Prussia was rapidly becoming "the most relentless and malignant of conquerors that the Old World has seen since Attila and his Huns earned the title of the scourge of God," and the *Workingman's Advocate*, the American organ of the First International, attacked William I because he "butchers the French labor people." The *Irish Citizen* said that the German operations seemed to be "chiefly confined to the capture and plunder of open towns and villages, where they hang up men at their own doors for firing a single shot in defence of their homes, and leave ruined maidens to tear their hair in the desolated houses." The *New York World* showed to what an extent atrocity stories could be carried in such inflammatory headlines as the following: "Unexampled Barbarity of the Prussians to the French People—French Peasants Murdered by Prussian Soldiers—Two Thousand Villagers Roasted to Death."¹

¹ *New York World*: Sept. 28, 1870, Jan. 9, Jan. 15, Jan. 19, Feb. 20, 1871; *New York Tribune*: Oct. 3, 1870; *New York Times*: Sept. 28, Sept. 9,

Almost as soon as the news of Sedan reached the United States pleas began to be heard for magnanimous and generous terms of peace. Pro-German as well as pro-French Americans united in the hope that Germany might crown a glorious victory with a still more glorious peace, which should be based not upon ideas of aggression and revenge, but upon the principles of Christian charity. Certainly Germany's stakes in the war had been won and she could well afford to be forbearing toward a fallen foe. Napoleon III had been overthrown and nothing now stood in the way of the completion of German unity. No longer need Germany fear an aggressive enemy. For once both French and German sympathizers could agree upon a common platform. The most interesting example of such a plea for a generous peace can be found in a letter written to Bismarck by the American who probably knew and understood him best, John Lothrop Motley. Motley, who declared that he was writing in no wise an official letter, dropped entirely his usual bantering tone and begged almost pathetically for a peace which would not alienate American sympathy from the country he so much loved:

Of course I don't presume to hint as to terms, but I implore you for the sake of humanity, . . . and the best interests of your Sovereign and of Germany, to be moderate, and, if possible, expeditious. . . . I cannot bear the thought that the lustre of what is now the pure and brilliant though bloody triumph of Germany should be tarnished by even a breath.¹

Oct. 10, Oct. 12, Oct. 20, Oct. 24 (resolutions of American Positivists), Nov. 13, Dec. 19, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Oct. 1, Oct. 21, Oct. 28, 1870; *Richmond Enquirer*: Oct. 26, 1870; *San Francisco Bulletin*: Sept. 12, 1870; *Charleston Courier*: Oct. 26, 1870; *Nation*: Feb. 2, 1871, Dec. 29, 1870; *Workingman's Advocate*: Nov. 5, 1870; *Irish Citizen*: Dec. 24, 1870, Feb. 4, Feb. 18, 1871; *Portland Transcript*: Oct. 22, 1870; *Galaxy*: April, 1871; *National Quarterly Review*: Sept., 1870.

¹ *John Lothrop Motley and his Family*, pp. 292, 293.

But the agreement lasted only for a moment. For as the war did not stop, and as the German demands became more fully known, Americans again were split wide apart in their sympathies. The pro-French group attacked the Prussians for not having seized the favorable moment to offer a liberal peace to the enemy, for demanding too large an indemnity, and for insisting upon the cession of Alsace and Lorraine. The indemnity was not condemned so much in itself as in connection with the forced loss of territory. Nor is it clear that a very large number of Americans outside of the strongly pro-French group objected to the exaction of an indemnity from France. However the *Cincinnati Gazette* remarked, "Such a tribute is incompatible with the independence of France," while the *New York World*, a more ardent partisan, said, "Such exorbitance must revolt the sense of justice of all mankind outside of Germany."¹

But if the exaction of a large indemnity was not regarded by most Americans as unjust on the part of the conqueror, the forced cession of Alsace and Lorraine was very unpopular in the United States. As the establishment of a

¹ *Cincinnati Gazette*: Feb. 8, 1871, Oct. 6, 1870, Jan. 26, 1871; *New York World*: Feb. 4, 1871, Sept. 5, Sept. 6, Sept. 7, Sept. 11, Sept. 23, 1870 (art. by Wendell Phillips from *Anti-Slavery Standard*), Feb. 25, Feb. 27, 1871; *New York Tribune*: Sept. 7, Sept. 10, Sept. 12, Sept. 13, Sept. 14, Sept. 17, Dec. 12, 1870; *New York Times*: Sept. 8, Sept. 9, Sept. 10, Sept. 25, Sept. 26, Oct. 3 (resolutions of American Positivists), Oct. 20, Oct. 24 (resolutions of American Positivists), Oct. 26, Nov. 13, Dec. 20, 1870, Feb. 2, Feb. 17, Feb. 24, Feb. 25, 1871; *Detroit Free Press*: Sept. 9, Oct. 7, 1870; *Savannah Republican*: Sept. 29, 1870; *Richmond Enquirer*: Sept. 8, Sept. 9, Oct. 4, 1870; *Wisconsin State Journal*: Sept. 21, 1870 (letter from John M. Palmer, Governor of Illinois); *San Francisco Bulletin*: Sept. 3, Oct. 6, 1870; *Harper's Weekly*: Jan. 15, 1871; *Nation*: Sept. 15, Oct. 27, 1870; *Leslie's Weekly*: Oct. 1, 1870; *Workingman's Advocate*: Oct. 8, 1870; *Irish American*: Sept. 17, 1870; *Galaxy*: Feb., 1871; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, pp. 514-518; Sumner, *Works*, vol. xiv, p. 47 et seq.

republic in France had for a time created a large amount of pro-French sentiment, so did the seizure of the two French provinces cause the appearance for a time of a large amount of anti-German feeling. Several papers which were on the whole very strongly pro-German, such as the *Portland Transcript* and *Harper's Weekly*, had no sympathy with the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine to the new Germany. In the first place, the provinces were widely believed to be French in their nationality. They might speak German, they might originally have been German, but they were thought to be in 1870 unquestionably French in their preference. The *Milwaukee Sentinel* called the people of the provinces "the most decided Frenchmen in France," and *Harper's Weekly* thought the general conviction was that they were "now essentially French, and would much prefer to remain so." Byron C. Smith argued that the provinces had belonged to France for two hundred years, and the *San Francisco Bulletin* referred to the treatment of the German armies by the inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine to prove how unpopular German sovereignty would be. The *New York World* thought that the main question was the one as to whether the people desired to become German or to remain French, and said that the land belonged to those who inhabited it in 1870. The *Irish Citizen* claimed that all the educated people and all the townsmen spoke French, and called their annexation to Germany "the most odious public crime of modern times." The *New York Times* thought that Strassburg was just as much a French city as Marseilles, and said at another time that the people of the provinces were "beyond a doubt intensely and consistently French."¹

¹ *New York Tribune*: June 8, 1871; *New York Times*: Sept. 7, Nov. 6, Dec. 25, 1870, Jan. 5, 1871; *New York World*: Dec. 3, Dec. 31, Nov. 13,

Several propositions were advocated by Americans in place of the forcible annexation of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany. The feeling was quite widely entertained that Germany had a right to guarantees that the provinces should not be used again by France as a base for aggression. One alternative to the cession of territory was the dismantling of the fortresses on that frontier. The *Portland Transcript*, *San Francisco Bulletin* and *Harper's Weekly* favored this idea, the *New York Times* hoped for neutralization and the creation of a sort of buffer state, while *Harper's Weekly*, the *Charleston Courier* and Byron C. Smith wished a plebiscite to allow the inhabitants to choose for themselves.¹

The refusal of Germany to listen to any proposals of compromise and her insistence that the provinces be turned over to her, led to some pretty bitter attacks upon the terms of peace in general. The *Nation*, which itself held quite different opinions, bore witness to the fact that "many excellent people" were working themselves up into a fury against Germany for not giving magnanimous terms of peace. *Scribner's Magazine* thought the terms so severe that they could "hardly be accepted by France," while George E. Pond, writing in his "Driftwood" column in the *Galaxy*, thought that after the terms of peace had been wrung from France she might be "flung away as a squeezed orange," and said again: "Prussia, having pressed the cup of humiliation to the lips of France, now, it seems, must

1870; *Milwaukee Sentinel*: Sept. 13, 1870; *San Francisco Bulletin*: Sept. 12, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Sept. 15, Nov. 30, 1870, Feb. 20, 1871; *Harper's Weekly*: Feb. 11, 1871; *Irish Citizen*: April 15, Jan. 7, 1871; Smith, B. C., *Letters*, p. 208 *et seq.*

¹ *New York Times*: Nov. 22, 1870, Feb. 23, Feb. 26, 1871; *Charleston Courier*: Oct. 28, Oct. 29, 1870; *San Francisco Bulletin*: Sept. 28, 1870; *Harper's Weekly*: Sept. 10, Oct. 8, Oct. 15, Nov. 12, 1870, Jan. 21, Feb. 11, 1871; *Portland Transcript*: Oct. 8, 1870; Smith, B. C., *Letters*, pp. 214-216.

see it drained to the dregs.”¹ The *Irish Citizen* tried to bring home the issue to Americans by asking how they would like to have Illinois, Indiana and Ohio annexed to a foreign power without the consent of the people of those states, and *Harper's Weekly* claimed that Prussia had alienated a large part of the sympathy of the world which had formerly been with her. The *San Francisco Bulletin* thought that there ought to be a statute of limitations in regard to districts like Alsace and Lorraine, and the *New York World* said that the war had now become one for “piratical conquest and devastation.” The *Cincinnati Gazette* called the struggle one for the dismemberment of France, attacked Prussia on the ground that she had refused to demolish the French fortresses because she desired them to act as threats to France, and said that the initial aggression of France did not “carry an ineradicable guilt that demands the extermination of the whole people, or the destruction of the independence of a nation.” The *New York Times* warned Germany against imposing terms which it was impossible for France to meet, remarked that the custom of many nations to exact territorial compensation was beside the point, for “no amount of usage can render an injustice just,” and compared the attitude of Germany to that of a “man who had wounded his antagonist. . . but who should decline to lay aside his arms until the fallen foe was hopelessly maimed and disfigured for life.”²

¹ *Galaxy*: Nov., 1870, Feb., 1871; *Nation*: Feb. 2, 1871; *Scribner's Magazine*: Jan., 1871.

² *New York Times*: Sept. 28, Oct. 10, Oct. 27, Oct. 30, Nov. 17, Dec. 13, 1870, Feb. 28, 1871; *New York World*: Nov. 30, Nov. 11, Nov. 21, Nov. 28, Dec. 4, 1870, Feb. 4, 1871; *San Francisco Bulletin*: Sept. 28, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Sept. 26, 1870, Jan. 27, Feb. 22, Feb. 27, 1871; *Irish Citizen*: Nov. 5, Nov. 12, 1870, Feb. 4, 1871; *Harper's Weekly*: Oct. 8, 1870.

Many private individuals shared this point of view. The biographer of Louis Agassiz claims that "the autocratic and exacting terms" of Germany in 1871 turned the great American scientist against Germany, and William James lost interest in the success of the Germans "because I think it's time that the principle of territorial conquest were abolished." Byron C. Smith considered that Germany seemed "bent on the humiliation and laceration of France," and said: "There is a mean streak in the German which comes out very offensively in this war."¹ Charles Sumner thought the French could not alienate the provinces without their consent, pointed out the inconsistency between the slogan of German unity and the demand for the districts without any chance for the inhabitants to express their preferences, and while admitting that France would have asked for territory in case of success, added, "But the madcap menace of the French Empire cannot be the measure of German justice."² In October there was a peace meeting in New York, which was presided over by William Cullen Bryant. The most prominent speaker was Julia Ward Howe, who said boldly:

I . . . here declare war against Bismarck. . . . You, Bismarck, and your King, William, have gambled for a prize that can never rightly belong to either of you. . . . As a woman, I take ground plainly and absolutely against the possible occupation of one country by the military power of another. If the inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine are French in feeling, and in

¹ Smith, B. C., *Letters*, p. 215; Marcou, *Life, Letters, and Works of Louis Agassiz*, vol. ii, p. 179; *Letters of William James*, vol. i, p. 159.

² Sumner, *Works*, vol. xiv, p. 52 *et seq.* The *New York Tribune*: Oct. 27, 1870, considered that Sumner's arguments did "greater credit to his humanity than his statesmanship."

interest, French they shall be. Put it to vote, not of a swindling plebiscitum, but a pure and true process.¹

One of the chief reasons why so many Americans deprecated the cession of Alsace and Lorraine to Germany without a plebiscite was the feeling that such a peace could not be permanent, that France would seize the first chance for revenge, and that both countries would therefore be saddled with an overpowering and depressing militarism. Byron C. Smith thought that Prussia was establishing a precedent which might be turned against her at a later date, Charles Sumner said that any dismemberment of French territory must leave "a perpetual sting," and William James said: "But if Alsace and Lorraine be taken, there *must* be another war, for them and for honor."² *Scribner's Magazine* thought that France would take vengeance when her time came, and George E. Pond in the *Galaxy* hinted that Germany might some day be compelled to take "her own prescription." The chief reason why the *Nation* opposed the annexation was its fear that France would grasp the first opportunity to regain the lost provinces. The *San Francisco Bulletin* thought that a generous attitude on Germany's part would do more than anything else to preserve the peace of Europe for a quarter of a century, while a policy of annexation would intensify "the feud of cen-

¹ *New York Tribune*: Oct. 26, 1870 (peace meeting); *New York Times*: Oct. 7, Oct. 12, 1870; *New York World*: Sept. 13 (citation from *Chicago Tribune*), Sept. 23 (art. by Wendell Phillips from *Anti-Slavery Standard*), Dec. 22, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Sept. 23, 1870; *San Francisco Bulletin*: Oct. 1, 1870; *Milwaukee Sentinel*: Oct. 24, 1870; *Wisconsin State Journal*: Sept. 8, 1870; *Portland Transcript*: Oct. 29, 1870, Feb. 25, 1871; *Nation*: Nov. 3, 1870; *Galaxy*: Dec., 1870 (art. by George E. Pond), April, 1871; *National Quarterly Review*: Sept., 1870; Howe, *Reminiscences*, p. 327.

² *Letters of William James*, vol. i, p. 159; Smith, B. C., *Letters*, pp. 245 *et seq.*, 231-233; Sumner, *Works*, vol. xiv, p. 15.

turies" and compel Germany to maintain a tremendous army. The *Portland Transcript* claimed that it would be not only magnanimous but also wise on the part of Germany to refuse any territorial gains, and feared that if the opposite course was followed Germany would be regarded as the menace of Europe, against which the great powers would unite for self-protection. The *Cincinnati Gazette*, *Harper's Weekly* and the *New York Times* all felt the same way. The *Gazette* thought that France would not hesitate for a moment to break the treaty and make war "if she thought she stood a fair chance of regaining the lost territory." *Harper's Weekly* said that such a settlement could "not be other than hollow and temporary, and the next generation will see the struggle renewed, with fiercer hatred, and at a more terrible loss of life." The *Times* believed that France could not be expected to settle down into a peaceful development as long as Germany possessed Alsace and Lorraine as a constant base for aggression against her, and remarked with no small degree of prophetic insight: "It is not too much to say that the course of European history during the next fifty years turns mainly upon the terms of peace which Germany resolves upon offering to France."¹

But not all Americans, if even a majority, believed that Prussia was conducting the war in a barbarous manner or that the terms of peace which she had imposed were too rigorous. The *Portland Transcript* felt that nothing much would be lost by the bombardment of Paris, and *Harper's Weekly* thought Prussia's conduct in the war had been

¹ *New York Times*: Feb. 23, 1871, Nov. 22, 1870, Feb. 3, Feb. 26, 1871; *New York World*: Jan. 17, 1871; *San Francisco Bulletin*: Sept. 12, Oct. 1, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Sept. 21, Nov. 8, 1870; *Nation*: Oct. 6, 1870; *Portland Transcript*: Sept. 3, Oct. 8, 1870; *Harper's Weekly*: Sept. 17, Sept. 10, Oct. 15, Oct. 29, 1870; *Scribner's Magazine*: Jan., 1871; *Galaxy*: Feb., 1871 (art. by George E. Pond).

"irreproachable . . . neither relentless nor cruel nor exacting." The *New York Tribune*, *New York Times* and the *Nation* admitted that Prussia's actions might not always have been exemplary, but claimed that the Prussian troops had behaved much better than had the French, and pointed to the savagery of the Turcos and the treatment of the Germans in Paris in support of their contention. The *Nation* spoke of the "extreme humanity and even tenderness with which the French prisoners were treated on the march and now in camp in Germany." Horace Greeley was disgusted with the way in which Americans and even his own paper had protested against the entrance of the German troops into Paris, and wrote a characteristic note to his managing editor, Whitelaw Reid: "You can't guess how my gorge rises at all you have printed in depreciation of the Germans entering Paris. . . . If ever men won the right to march through a city the Germans have that right to go through Paris, and it is babyish to object to it. Bah!"¹

As has been noted above, nearly all Americans pleaded in vain for peace after the battle of Sedan. Quite widespread was the feeling that Bismarck should have offered magnanimous terms after the fall of Napoleon, but more widespread was the feeling that the first move towards peace should come from France. Her emperor had begun the war and she should have disavowed his action. She should have confessed her defeat and made offers of peace. It is probable that the majority of Americans considered that France was responsible for the prolongation of the war. The *Portland Transcript* thought that it was the business of the

¹ Cortissoz, *Life of Whitelaw Reid*, vol. i, p. 152; *New York Tribune*: Oct. 3, Dec. 16, 1870, Feb. 25, 1871; *New York Times*: Nov. 13, 1870, Feb. 16, Feb. 25, 1871; *Philadelphia Press*: Aug. 20, 1870; *Portland Transcript*: Oct. 15, 1870; *Harper's Weekly*: Oct. 8, 1870; *Nation*: Oct. 13, 1870, Feb. 9, 1871.

French ministry to make the first advances, and *Harper's Weekly* said: "The French people have adopted the Emperor's war, and it is for them to say that they wish to stop."¹ *Leslie's Weekly* called France "a punctured wind-bag," and asked: "Why do they not make peace? . . . The bully of Europe insists on retaining the champion's belt, when he is no longer champion."² The *New York Tribune* declared that the French leaders assumed "a fearful responsibility" in continuing the war, and said: "But while Germany has been negligent, France has been criminal. She has wasted her grand opportunity by not at once denouncing the crime and the criminal . . . France in accepting the war of the Empire, must accept also its consequences."³

The consequences to which the *Tribune* and other papers referred were the payment of an indemnity and the loss of territory. Since they believed that France was responsible for beginning the war, they very naturally considered that she should pay the piper. Probably most Americans thought that France should be compelled to pay an indemnity which would cover the costs of the war. The *New York Times* felt that Prussia might urge an indemnity "without pro-

¹ *Harper's Weekly*: Sept. 24, 1870; *Portland Transcript*: Sept. 24, 1870.

² *Leslie's Weekly*: Nov. 19, Nov. 5, 1870.

³ *New York Tribune*: Sept. 14, Sept. 5, Sept. 6, Sept. 8, Sept. 9, Sept. 10, Sept. 13, Sept. 16, Sept. 20, Sept. 21, Sept. 26, Sept. 30, Oct. 8, Nov. 11, Nov. 16, Dec. 16, 1870, Jan. 7, Jan. 30, 1871; *New York Times*: Sept. 5, Sept. 7, Sept. 15, Sept. 16, Oct. 25, Oct. 26, Nov. 2, Nov. 12, Dec. 20, 1870; *Milwaukee Sentinel*: Nov. 1, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Sept. 17, Sept. 19, Nov. 8, 1870, Jan. 26, 1871; *Philadelphia Press*: Sept. 5, Oct. 28, Oct. 31, 1870; *Richmond Enquirer*: Sept. 8, 1870; *Wisconsin State Journal*: Sept. 7, Oct. 12, 1870; *San Francisco Bulletin*: Sept. 15, 1870; *Carthage Gazette*: Jan. 26, 1871; *Nation*: Sept. 29, 1870; *Scribner's Magazine*: Dec., 1870, Jan., 1871 (art. by John Bigelow); Gray, *Letters*, vol. ii, pp. 608-610; Cortissoz, *Life of Whitelaw Reid*, vol. i, p. 182; Sumner, *Works*, vol. xiv, p. 48.

voking reasonable complaints of extravagance," and the *New York Tribune* did not consider the final amount exorbitant. When *Harper's Weekly* favored a plebiscite in Alsace and Lorraine, together with the dismantling of the fortresses, it also made clear its belief that France should bear the burden of the expenses of the war. When the terms of peace were first discussed, the *Nation* regretted that there was "no mention of payment for the cost of the war, which certainly ought to be exacted, if only in the interest of public morality, to the last cent."¹

The annexation of Alsace and Lorraine was justified almost completely by the *New York Tribune*, *Philadelphia Press*, the *Nation* and *Leslie's Weekly*. There were three general reasons why these papers, and others, did not blame the Germans for desiring to secure the two French provinces. In the first place, the provinces were thought to be inhabited by people who spoke German. They had originally been German territory and had been stolen by France. Germany was not following the principle of territorial aggrandizement but was only claiming what had unjustly been taken from her. Henry I. Bowditch thought that the Prussians ought to keep Strassburg because it "was stolen in the time of perfect peace by that great monarch, Louis XIV," and the *New York Tribune* said, "In recovering the city the Germans only get their own again."² The *New York Times* did not see anything "very outrageous in the

¹ *New York Tribune*: Feb. 25, 1871, Sept. 5, Sept. 9, Sept. 12, 1870; *New York Times*: Sept. 17, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Sept. 15, 1870; *Milwaukee Sentinel*: Sept. 13, 1870; *San Francisco Bulletin*: Sept. 28, 1870; *Harper's Weekly*: Sept. 10, Oct. 8, Oct. 15, 1870, Feb. 11, 1871; *Nation*: Sept. 8, Sept. 15, 1870; *Portland Transcript*: Oct. 8, 1870; *Scribner's Magazine*: Jan., 1871 (art. by John Bigelow); Smith, B. C., *Letters*, pp. 214-216; Schieber, *American Sentiment toward Germany*, p. 32.

² *New York Tribune*: Sept. 29, Sept. 23, 1870, Feb. 3, Feb. 25, May 27, 1871; Bowditch, *Life and Correspondence*, vol. ii, p. 197.

transfer back to Germany of a district which naturally belonged to it," and the New York *Tribune* said: "We justify Germany's claim of Alsace and Lorraine (among other reasons), because they were taken from her by conquest many years ago."¹ *Leslie's Weekly* considered Germany's request "the more reasonable as a majority of the inhabitants . . . yet speak the language of Germany." The comment of the Warsaw (Ill.) *Bulletin*, incorrect as it is in details, shows how this view was reflected in a small town newspaper of the middle west: "Both have always been German and you can count the years on the fingers since they have been annexed to France."² The Charleston *Courier* well summed up the feeling that Germany was only regaining lost territory when it said: "But it must be remembered that Alsace and Lorraine were both originally German Provinces, and the demand of the German heart everywhere is for a oneness of its people, and their unity under the same Government."³

Certain Americans justified the seizure of Alsace and Lorraine because they believed that France had intended to demand German territory in case of victory. France had always received territorial acquisitions from her victorious wars. Why should she not lose territory when she was defeated? Why didn't she play the game without whimpering? As the *Nation*, which called those who protested against the annexation, like the American Peace Society and the Women's Suffrage Association, "reforming geese," re-

¹ New York *Tribune*: Nov. 16, 1870; New York *Times*: Sept. 17, 1870.

² Warsaw *Bulletin*: Feb. 4, 1871; *Leslie's Weekly*: Nov. 5, 1870, March 11, 1871.

³ Charleston *Courier*: Oct. 26, 1870; Wisconsin *State Journal*: Aug. 13, Nov. 2, 1870; Schieber, *American Sentiment toward Germany*, pp. 33, 34 (citations from Philadelphia *Enquirer* and Springfield *Republican*).

marked: "France . . . went to war to rob and devastate Germany, and has used Alsace and Lorraine for a century and a half as a rendezvous and refuge when setting out on similar expeditions. . . . When men gamble, they must not wail because they lose the stakes."¹ The *New York Times* thought that France would have seized Rhenish Prussia in case of a French triumph, and said: "If a nation throw down the glove in a great war, she must accept the consequences . . . and one of them is disaster and a possible loss of provinces."² The *New York Tribune* called upon the French to surrender Nice and Savoy if they expected the Germans to give up Alsace and Lorraine, laid stress on the fact that whereas France had gone to war to gain Rhenish Prussia, she had been actually despoiled herself, and added: "Our judgment is that of most impartial people. . . . 'Served her right!'" At another time the *Tribune* declared: "France . . . has never hesitated to exact cessions of territory when her arms were victorious; and why should the rule work but one way?"³ *Scribner's Magazine* saw the hand of God in the Prussian schemes of annexation: "With a poetic justice that grows into something awfully divine, has Prussia inflicted upon France every evil which France, in her vanity and blood-thirsty hatred, had designed to inflict upon Prussia."⁴

The third argument by which Americans justified the German annexation of Alsace and Lorraine was based upon

¹ *Nation*: Oct. 27, 1870, Jan. 19, 1871, Sept. 29, 1870.

² *New York Times*: Oct. 8, Oct. 26, 1870, Jan. 21, 1871.

³ *New York Tribune*: Nov. 28, 1870, March 21, 1871.

⁴ *Scribner's Magazine*: May, 1871; *New York Tribune*: Sept. 17, Nov. 9, Dec. 20, 1870, Feb. 3, March 3, 1871; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Feb. 27, 1871; *Leslie's Weekly*: Feb. 18, March 11, 1871; *Galaxy*: April, 1871; Smith, B. C., *Letters*, pp. 231-233.

a claim that Germany needed a guarantee that the aggression of 1870 should not be repeated. The two provinces had been used time and again as the base for military aggression on the part of France against Germany. If a pacific power such as Germany possessed them the danger of future wars in Europe would be greatly lessened. The feeling that Germany needed guarantees was well nigh universal in the United States. Even papers like *Harper's Weekly* which were definitely opposed to the annexation of the two provinces recognized the need for security. Charles Sumner thought one of the essentials of a lasting peace would be the possession by Germany of security against future French aggression. At a meeting of Germans to celebrate the completion of German unity, William Cullen Bryant spoke favorably of the exaction of "guarantees, pledges of future peace, which it would be beyond the power of the aggressor to violate." Henry I. Bowditch considered that it would be "utter folly" on the part of Germany to give up Strassburg, "a citadel to be used as an eternal menace to the opposite shore of the Rhine," and John Bigelow thought it "reasonable" for Bismarck to "take such security as he can find against the repetition of the madness which the French nation is now expiating." The *New York Tribune* believed the Vosges Mountains to be the natural frontier of Germany, and the Moselle the natural defense of the Rhineland. The *Tribune* thought that the demand of the Germans for the provinces as guarantees against aggression was a demand "which dispassionate observers will agree that King William has a perfect right to ask," and while admitting that the punishment was a severe one to France, felt that "because it goes far toward securing the future tranquillity of the continent, Germany is justified in enforcing the punishment."¹

¹ *New York Tribune*: Sept. 15, Sept. 26, 1870, Jan. 27, April 11, 1871 (speech of Bryant at meeting to celebrate German unity), Sept. 6, Sept. 9,

The very causes which tended to create a stronger pro-French feeling in the United States—friendliness to the republic, sympathy with suffering France, and the feeling that Germany was not justified in seizing Alsace and Lorraine—all did much to discredit the cause of German unity itself. German unity was completed in the autumn of 1870 by the negotiation of treaties between the North German Confederation and the South German States. In January, 1871, King William of Prussia became Emperor of a united Germany. Naturally these events called forth much comment in the American press. The pro-French group, which it must be remembered had grown somewhat larger after the battle of Sedan, was inclined to be skeptical of the value of the changes in Germany—not that they attacked the conception of German unity itself, but that they saw but scant hope for progress in a Prussian union. Such a consolidation meant little more than that Prussia had devoured the minor German states, that Germany had become Prussianized. The *New York World* thought that Prussia had “clutched the German States in the iron grip of a military machine,” and the *Savannah Republican* attacked Bismarck, whose boast had been that he had “united Southern Germany to the North German Confederation,” for putting “the Saxons, Wurtembergers and Bavarians in the front rank of the German armies, where many of

Sept. 10, Sept. 12, Sept. 20, Sept. 24, Oct. 19, Oct. 27, Oct. 28, Nov. 9, Dec. 30, 1870, Feb. 1, Feb. 25, March 16, 1871; *New York Times*: Sept. 15, Oct. 30, 1870, Jan. 21, Feb. 3, 1871; *Philadelphia Press*: Jan. 30, May 16, 1871; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Sept. 5, 1870, Feb. 6, 1871 (speech of Bellamy Storer); *Leslie's Weekly*: Nov. 5, 1870, March 11, 1871; *Harper's Weekly*: Oct. 29, 1870, Jan. 21, 1871; *Nation*: Nov. 3, 1870; *Galaxy*: April, 1871; *Scribner's Magazine*: Jan., 1871 (art. by John Bigelow); Sumner, *Works*, vol. xiv, pp. 48, 49; Bowditch, *Life and Correspondence*, vol. ii, p. 197; *Letters of William James*, vol. i, p. 159; Smith, B. C., *Letters*, pp. 245 *et seq.*, 261.

them have been decimated." That the *Irish Citizen* felt that German unity meant Prussian predominance is clear from what it said on Nov. 5, 1870: "The Teutonic spirit rose above everything, mounted on its dunghill and crowed. It was German unity, 'honest Germanism,' and the poor little States which were absorbed against their will tried to comfort themselves with slang of this sort."¹ The *Cincinnati Gazette* accused Prussia of "consolidation for supremacy under the name of German unification," and claimed that all that German unity meant was "Prussia's reduction of the German States to her absolutism."²

The chief reason why many Americans distrusted a Prussian unification of Germany lay in their belief that Prussian political institutions were despotic and that Bismarck was using the national passion for unity to rivet the chains of Hohenzollern absolutism on the necks of the whole German people. The *De La Salle Monthly* believed that the new German Empire represented "the principle of centralization," and the *Cincinnati Gazette* was convinced that Bismarck was using the war to strengthen "imperialism and kingcraft . . . to build up and fortify a personal government." The *Workingman's Advocate* spoke of "the creation of a *consolidated despotism*," and Wendell Phillips attacked the new empire as being founded on divine right. William H. Channing regretted the establishment of "a vast central military despotism," and the *Irish American* thought that "the overwhelming force of feudalism" had been "revived in the new Germanic Empire." The pro-French meeting in New York late in December, 1870, made

¹ *Irish Citizen*: Nov. 5, 1870, Feb. 4, 1871; *New York World*: Dec. 30, 1870; *Savannah Republican*: Sept. 13, 1870.

² *Cincinnati Gazette*: Oct. 21, Dec. 31, Sept. 1, Sept. 19, Oct. 28, 1870, Jan. 27, 1871; *Portland Transcript*: Dec. 24, 1870.

a resolution against "the war . . . of conquest now waged by the Emperor Frederic William for the purpose of fastening his dynasty upon Germany." The *New York World* said that it could have no sympathy with the objects of the war "unless it shall secure for German liberty in the future as firm a basis as for German unity in the present."¹

It was also quite widely believed that the war would increase the power of the monarch and make it much more difficult for the liberal forces of Germany to secure control of the country. Even the *New York Tribune* admitted that "the vast and dazzling success of recent years has given to the present Kaiser an inordinate and perhaps unwholesome measure of personal reverence among his people." The *New York World* thought the power of the new rulers of Germany had been "manifestly strengthened by the new ascendancy which this war has given them over the national mind." William James believed that success would "redound to the credit of autocratic government," and when it became apparent that France could hold out no longer, said, "The German liberals will have the harder battle to fight at home for the next twenty years."² George M. Towle and Byron C. Smith felt much the same. The former, writing in *Appleton's Journal*, said: "As against the German liberal party, the victories . . . have terribly strengthened the autocrat. . . . It is probable that we may ere long see a united Germany, while a free Germany is only

¹ *New York Tribune*: Dec. 30, 1870 (French meeting in New York); *New York Times*: Feb. 8, 1871; *New York World*: Sept. 15, Sept. 23, 1870 (citation from article of Wendell Phillips from *Anti-Slavery Standard*); *Cincinnati Gazette*: Feb. 4, 1871; *Workingman's Advocate*: Feb. 4, 1871; *Irish American*: Feb. 4, 1871; *De La Salle Monthly*: Feb., 1871; Frothingham, *Memoir of William Henry Channing*, p. 382.

² *Letters of William James*, vol. i, pp. 159, 160, 161; *New York Tribune*: June 10, 1871; *New York World*: Feb. 16, 1871, Dec. 22, 1870.

one of the possibilities of the future.”¹ If anything, Smith was even more pessimistic:

Prussia and all Germany . . . have entered on a period of decided reaction. The church and monarchy have been strengthened enormously by the late national successes. . . . The feeble efforts that may have been made to get the control of government into the people's hands are given over, and, in the glorification of successful despotism, the interests of freedom are forgotten.²

The new constitution did not reassure this group of Americans, although, as will be seen later, it was quite popular with what was probably the majority. The *New York Times* thought that too much power had been given to Bavaria and particularly to the Bundesrath, while the *Nation* attacked the ceremonies at the opening of the new parliament as “strongly feudal,” and prophesied that the liberals would have a hard time to overcome the prestige which the conservatives had gained because of the war. The *New York World* ridiculed bitterly President Grant's praise for the new constitution, and said: “A panegyric on the German empire is a renunciation of all that is distinctive in our republican institutions. If the German government is as good as ours, there is no reason why we should not adopt it.”³ Part of a poem by Richard Henry Stoddard which appeared in *Appleton's Journal* is illustrative of the distrust with which many Americans regarded the new imperial government. Stoddard rejoiced over the downfall of Napoleon, and continued:

¹ *Appleton's Journal*: Oct. 15, 1870.

² Smith, B. C., *Letters*, pp. 266-267, 199 *et seq.*, 208 *et seq.*, 245 *et seq.*, 351.

³ *New York World*: Feb. 9, 1871, Nov. 30, 1870, Jan. 2, 1871; *New York Times*: Jan. 8, 1871, Nov. 19, Dec. 12, 1870; *Nation*: June 22, Dec. 28, 1871.

What though ye have one Caesar overthrown?
 Ye have set up another of your own.
 What is it, pray, to us?
 What is it to the Race
 Whether the Gaul or Pruss,
 The Latin or the Russ,—
 Is now in Caesar's place? ¹

A second cause for distrust of the German Empire lay in the belief that its formation would stifle liberty in the rest of Europe, and through its policy of militarism make future wars more probable. The very success of Prussian despotism would encourage the repression of liberal ideas in other parts of Europe. The *Irish Citizen* thought that Prussia had done everything in her power to destroy "the gains and treasures of popular freedom in Europe," the *Richmond Enquirer* believed that the armies of Prussia were crushing "the hopes of Democracy in Europe," and the *New York World* felt that the German Emperor was bent on destroying "the uprising fabric of constitutional government throughout Europe." The *Lakeside Monthly* claimed that Prussia's ambition was naturally military in character, and added: "That herein lies a probable danger to liberty, and a possible retardation of the cause of democracy in Europe, cannot be denied." ²

¹ *Appleton's Journal*: Oct. 22, 1870; *New York Tribune*: Dec. 23, Dec. 30, 1870 (resolutions of pro-French meeting in New York), Jan. 28, 1871; *New York World*: Sept. 23, 1870 (art. by Wendell Phillips from the *Anti-Slavery Standard*); *Cincinnati Gazette*: Sept. 1, Oct. 28, 1870, Jan. 27, Feb. 4, Feb. 22, 1871; *Irish Citizen*: Nov. 5, 1870, Feb. 4, April 15, 1871; *Galaxy*: Dec., 1870 (art. by George E. Pond); *National Quarterly Review*: Dec., 1870, March, 1871; Gray, *Letters*, vol. ii, pp. 608-610; *Congressional Globe*, 3rd Session, 41st Congress, pp. 953-955 (speech by Joseph S. Fowler of Tennessee).

² *Lakeside Monthly*: Nov., 1870; *New York World*: Jan. 16, 1871, Aug. 4, Aug. 23, Aug. 27, 1870, Jan. 20, 1871; *Richmond Enquirer*: Nov. 30, 1870; *Irish Citizen*: Feb. 4, 1871; *Irish American*: Feb. 4, 1871.

Nor was Prussia believed to be a state whose military predominance would be viewed with equanimity by the other European powers. The *Galaxy* wondered which state Prussia would attack next, and guessed either England or Russia. Charles Sumner thought Bismarck was lacking in an understanding of "that larger unity where nations will be conjoined in harmony." The *New York Times* feared that Germany would not be able to lay aside the sword, foresaw with misgiving the creation of offensive and defensive leagues against her, and concluded: "Germany will have, for a period that at present seems indefinite, to bear the burdens of an armed peace, and such a weight will impair both the development and the tranquillity of the people."¹ Charles A. Bristed, writing in the *Galaxy*, was very pessimistic for future European peace. To him Germany seemed nearly as militaristic as France had been. He pointed out the temptation to use a good army when it was prepared for war, and concluded: "But the worst feature of the Prussian system is that it intensifies the already enormous scale of war. The next power or combination of powers that goes to war with Germany will have to begin with a million of men in hand." At an earlier time Bristed had written to the *New York Times*: "We, yes, even we Americans, cannot afford to deceive ourselves with regard to the tendencies of the coming Prussian Empire. One never knows what political complications may happen."²

But by the vast majority of the American people the completion of German unification was looked upon with

¹ *New York Times*: Nov. 13, 1870; *Galaxy*: March, 1871; Sumner, *Works*, vol. xiv, p. 63.

² *Galaxy*: Nov., 1870; *New York Times*: Sept. 8, Aug. 20, 1870; *New York World*: Jan. 16, 1871; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Feb. 8, Feb. 22, 1871; *San Francisco Bulletin*: Oct. 1, 1870.

the greatest enthusiasm. At last the goal toward which patriotic Germans had labored for at least fifty years had been reached. Most Germans were now the citizens of a single state, united and powerful. The highly civilized German people would now be able to take its proper place in world affairs unhampered by petty jealousies and local divisions. John Lothrop Motley wrote to Bismarck: "Nor can any man, not born a German, have longed more earnestly to see the unity established of the great Mother Country of us all than I have done for years long."¹ *Harper's Weekly* stated its belief that "no nation has a right to quarrel with the chief German state for wishing to unite all the German states into a great nation," and *Leslie's Weekly* rejoiced that in Germany "the doctrine of 'State Rights' is no longer to be perverted in practices endangering the NATIONAL existence." The *Savannah Republican* spoke favorably of the German union, "beautifully realizing the tendency of the age for peoples of similar or common origin to coalesce and combine," and the *Charleston Courier* called it "the grand idea." The *Philadelphia Press*, apropos of the German-American celebration in that city, said with evident pleasure, "They are now for the first time an united people within their natural boundaries."² *Scribner's Magazine*, in describing the effects of the war, declared, "The virtual union of Germany under a single government is another of its good results."³ In *Harper's Magazine*, C. C. Hazewell called the unification of Germany "the greatest European event of the decade—greatest in

¹ *John Lothrop Motley and his Family*, p. 289.

² *Philadelphia Press*: May 16, 1871; *Savannah Republican*: Sept. 23, 1870; *Charleston Courier*: Oct. 21, 1870; *Leslie's Weekly*: March 11, 1871, Sept. 24, 1870; *Harper's Weekly*: Oct. 22, 1870.

³ *Scribner's Magazine*: Jan., 1871.

itself, and . . . in its probable consequences." The *New York Times* said: "That the great German Confederation should be practically complete, is unquestionably a matter on which the civilized world may well offer their congratulations."¹ The *New York World* admitted, "The national unity which he has accomplished is a great and beneficent achievement."² The *New York Tribune* rejoiced in "the restoration to Nationality and power of that reunited race which has ever been the greatest civilizing force of Europe," and said, "The unity of Germany is one of the most important steps in popular progress which Europe has witnessed during the present generation."³

However, Americans did not rejoice in German unity merely as an end in itself. That was good, true enough, but in addition it was widely believed that German unity was a necessary step in the direction of German liberty. The *New York Times* said that the greatest "obstacle to popular liberty in Germany has always been its separation into numbers of petty states and kingdoms." Similarly *Leslie's Weekly* spoke of Germany as having been "long distracted by internal local divisions." *Appleton's Journal* thought that German republicans would probably rejoice in the unity of Germany, for the reason that their adversary would now have but a single neck. The *New York Times*

¹ *New York Times*: Nov. 30, Sept. 17, 1870, Jan. 1, 1871; *Harper's Magazine*: Jan., 1871.

² *New York World*: Jan. 20, Feb. 16, 1871.

³ *New York Tribune*: Sept. 10, 1870, Jan. 30, 1871, Sept. 23, Oct. 8, Dec. 21, 1870; *New York Times*: Feb. 8, 1871; *Wisconsin State Journal*: Jan. 30, 1871; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Feb. 6, 1871 (speech by Hon. Bellamy Storer); *Philadelphia Press*: May 16, 1871 (speech by John Forney at German celebration); *San Francisco Bulletin*: Oct. 6, 1870; *Portland Transcript*: Dec. 24, 1870; *Galaxy*: Feb., 1871; *Beecher's Magazine*: Oct., 1870.

said: "The great stepping stone to liberty is attained. Germany is united from the Baltic to the Alps."¹

The very government of the new union was extolled as essentially democratic. *Leslie's Weekly* praised the attempts of the Germans to safeguard their personal liberties, admired their independence in the elections to the new Reichstag, and gave utterance to the somewhat extravagant eulogium: "The people everywhere through the world . . . are interested in the great practical lesson which Germany is now teaching in Self-Government—an indispensable guarantee of Popular Rights and well-ordered Political Liberty."² H. W. Hemans in the *North American Review* thought that German unity placed "political power firmly in the hands of the people, not, in all probability, leading at once to a republic, or rather a confederation of republics, but bringing the whole country nearer to that consummation." *Scribner's Magazine* spoke enthusiastically of the new empire, "rooting in German soil alone, and bearing on its banner the mottoes of personal liberty in action and in conscience, and of equality before the law and the moral claims of the State." The *New York Tribune* described "the perfect freedom of election and opinion which the Prussian Government accords to all its subjects," and called that government "the most liberal on the Eastern continent." The same paper regretted that the new government was to be an empire rather than a republic, but thought Americans should not quarrel with the form of the union, and believed that whatever shape it might assume it would be "a constitutional Government over free and intellectual peoples." The

¹ *New York Times*: Oct. 6, Sept. 12, 1870 (Republican platform of Missouri); *Leslie's Weekly*: Sept. 24, 1870; *Harper's Weekly*: Sept. 17, 1870; *Appleton's Journal*: Feb. 18, 1871; *Scribner's Magazine*: May, 1871.

² *Leslie's Weekly*: June 24, April 15, 1871.

New York *Times* pointed out that the suffrage in Germany was more liberal than in England and that the monarch governed by law, praised the existence of equality before the law, stated that the parliament possessed the power over the purse strings, and added: "Above all, it has a responsible minister—the Federal Chancellor" [!]. The *Times* also hoped "not for a necessarily rapid democratic progress, but for what is far better, a steady rational advance of all Germany in the paths of constitutional liberty," claimed "that a united Germany, under a Parliament, must be a free Germany," and declared that in spite of imperial forms "the reality is a government by law and under law."¹

It is perfectly clear that the chief reason why so many Americans admired the political structure of the new Germany and prophesied so many wonderful results from its operation was their belief that it closely resembled their own government. The fact that it was federal in form and was not highly centralized convinced many Americans that the differences between it and the government of their own country were purely formal and of little real significance. *Appleton's Journal* thought that the new government might appropriately be called the "United States of Germany," because it conformed "much more to our ideas of a free republican constitution than to the notions usually prevailing in regard to the nature of an empire." Early in October Asa Gray wrote that he hoped and expected "a close confederation of German states, in a restored and efficient German empire, the states of which will be as closely united as those of our Federal Union, but yet sover-

¹ New York *Tribune*: Oct. 29, Nov. 16, Dec. 12, Oct. 27, Dec. 21, Dec. 23, 1870, March 27, 1871; New York *Times*: Oct. 6, Oct. 21, Nov. 5, 1870, Jan. 8, Jan. 19, 1871; New York *World*: Nov. 27, 1870, Feb. 16, 1871; *North American Review*: Jan., 1871; *Scribner's Magazine*: May, July, 1871.

eignties in all that relates to internal concerns." The Milwaukee *Sentinel* thought the new government had introduced "those centripetal and centrifugal forces so inseparable from our own system of government," and believed the ultimate result would be "a government of, by and for the people—a regenerated and exalted Republic of Germany—a cogenitor of and co-worker with the American Union—a missionary in the cause of true Democracy among the nations of Europe." The New York *Tribune* thought that the new government bore a greater resemblance to that of the United States and Switzerland than to that of other powers, and said: "German unity, whether under Confederation, Empire, or as we hope may yet be attained, the Republic, will have upon the rest of Europe the same civilizing influence that American unity has had and still wields upon the other nations of this continent."¹ *Leslie's Weekly* spoke of the political construction of Germany as "considerably resembling the United States," and glorified German unity thus: "*E pluribus unum* is now substantially respected as a national motto by the United German States as well as among ourselves."² The New York *Times* declared that the Reichstag would have as popular a suffrage as the House of Representatives, and compared the executive branches of the two governments thus: "The Executive power is a strong one, but no more so than our own. It is conferred entirely on the King of Prussia. . . . But he is no more absolute than President Grant."³

Minister Bancroft at Berlin urged close relations between

¹ New York *Tribune*: Sept. 23, Dec. 23, 1870; Milwaukee *Sentinel*: Oct. 13, 1870; *Appleton's Journal*: Feb. 18, 1871; Gray, *Letters*, vol. ii, p. 609.

² *Leslie's Weekly*: Nov. 5, 1870, March 11, 1871.

³ New York *Times*: Oct. 21, 1870; *Scribner's Magazine*: July, 1871; Foulke, *Life of Oliver P. Morton*, vol. ii, pp. 208-209.

Germany and the United States partly because "Germany adopts from us the federative system. . . . German institutions and ours most nearly resemble each other."¹ Early in February, 1871, President Grant sent a special message to Congress in which he urged upon that body that the Minister to the German Empire be given a salary equal to that appropriated for the American Ministers to France and England. The President made the new German union the occasion for the request, and the message reflects American opinion to such an extent that it deserves to be quoted at some length:

The union of the States of Germany into a form of government similar in many respects to that of the American Union is an event that can not fail to touch deeply the sympathies of the people of the United States. . . . In it the American people see an attempt to reproduce in Europe some of the best features of our own Constitution. . . . Germany now contains a population . . . united, like our own, under one Government for its relations with other powers, but retaining in its several members the right and power of control of their local interests, habits, and institutions. . . . The adoption in Europe of the American system of union under the control and direction of a free people, educated to self-restraint, can not fail to extend popular institutions and to enlarge the peaceful influence of American ideas.²

¹ Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, pp. 246-247.

² Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, vol. ix, p. 4074. An attack was made upon this message by the *New York Times*: Feb. 8, 1871, and by the *New York World*: Feb. 9, 1871, the latter of which interpreted it thus: "It looks as if Mr. Bancroft, wishing to get his salary raised, had written to the President telling him what a capital stroke of policy he could make by adopting this method of recommending himself to the German voters of the United States." That the *World* had no love for the Prussian Minister was clearly shown in an earlier editorial in which it had attacked Bancroft as "the trivial and flighty literary flibbertigibbet" and blamed Grant for allowing him "to drivel at Berlin," Sept. 16, 1870.

CHAPTER IX

THE INFLUENCE AND OPINIONS OF THE GERMAN-AMERICANS

THE justification for a separate chapter devoted to the German-Americans and their attitude toward the struggle for German unity is twofold. In the first place, the German-Americans formed a constantly increasing element in American life, not only numerous but also wealthy, highly trained and well educated, an element unwilling to play a minor part in the economic or political affairs of the United States. In the second place, the German-Americans were intensely interested in the struggle going on in their Fatherland for national unity and political democracy. The problems of old Germany were very real to those who had emigrated. An element in the American population so powerful and at the same time so devoted to what it considered the best interests of Germany could not fail to influence American sentiment strongly and profoundly.

It is obvious that the author cannot in a single chapter make an exhaustive study either of the history of the German-American element in the United States during the period under review or, indeed, of the attitude of the German-Americans toward the struggle for German unification. Either problem in itself would be of sufficient importance for a doctoral dissertation. And yet for the reasons assigned above at least a general survey must be made of the

influence which the German-Americans exerted. Incomplete and fragmentary as such a survey must necessarily be, the author feels that further research would only serve to fill in with solid color the outline which it is intended to present.

The chapter will be divided into two main parts. In the first place, it seems necessary to make some survey of the place in American life which was being filled by the German immigrants. Just how important an element were they numerically? In what portions of the United States did they settle? How well liked were they by the native-born population? What factors tended to make them popular, and what ones unpopular? What part had they played in American politics? The second division of the chapter will analyse the attitude of the German-Americans toward the struggle for German unity. The organization will follow closely that of earlier chapters—the revolutions of 1848, the constitutional struggle in Prussia, the three wars of Prussia with Denmark, Austria and France. What was the attitude of the German-Americans toward the Frankfort Assembly? Did they support Bismarck in his struggle with the Prussian legislature? Were they favorable to Prussia or Austria in 1866? To what extent were they sympathetic with the North German Confederation? Why did they so strongly support Prussia in 1870? Did they believe in the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine?

THE GERMAN ELEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, 1848-1871

Before describing the attitude of the native American toward the German immigrant, the reasons why Americans generally looked upon the German with favor, and the faults which the natives saw in the newcomer, it is necessary to examine briefly certain statistics regarding the number of

Germans in the United States and their distribution throughout the country. Two census reports, those of 1850 and 1870, have been studied with some care. In 1850 the number of German-born in the United States amounted to somewhat less than six hundred thousand, out of an aggregate population of somewhat over twenty-three million, or approximately two and one-half per cent. In 1870 the Germans numbered nearly one million, seven hundred thousand, out of a total of thirty-eight and a half million, or a little over four per cent. The increase in percentage was only from two and a half to a little over four, but the Germans had nearly tripled their numbers, whereas the total population had only increased by about two-thirds.¹

After an examination of the distribution of the Germans in the various parts of the United States, two facts stand out very clearly. In the first place, the Germans located in large numbers in the Middle Atlantic and Middle Western states, but not in New England or the South. For purposes of comparison the country was divided into these four sections, and two sets of percentages were drawn up both for 1850 and for 1870. First the percentage of Germans in the total population of each section was taken, and resulted as follows:

	1850	1870
New England	.3	.8
South	.7	.9
Middle Atlantic	4.	6.
Western	5.	7.

¹ De Bow, *A Compendium of the Seventh Census*, pp. 40, 117; Walker, *A Compendium of the Ninth Census*, pp. 376, 392. Such figures, and the ones following, do not of course take into account the children of German-born who should be included if one is to get a proper idea of the German influence in terms of numbers, and who, if included, would probably double the percentages.

Second, and more significant, was the percentage of the total number of Germans who were living in each section of the United States :

	1850	1870
New England	1.2	1.6
South	9.2	5.7
Middle Atlantic	40.8	34.3
Western	48.6	56.1

The additional fact stands out clearly from the second set of figures that the incoming Germans from 1850 to 1870 were settling in greater proportions in the West than the earlier immigrants before 1850 had done. It is little wonder that the German vote was an important factor in the West and in the Middle Atlantic states, but that it could be almost totally disregarded in the South and in New England.¹

In the second place, the statistics show very clearly that although the great majority of the German immigrants went to the rural districts, the relative proportion of German-born who settled in American cities was much greater than the proportion of native-born living in urban centers. Statistics were taken from sixteen cities from all over the country, chosen either because of their general importance or because a newspaper from that city had been used in connection with the earlier chapters. Whereas a little less than seven per cent in 1850 and a little less than ten per cent in 1870 of the total population of the United States lived in the sixteen cities, twenty-seven per cent in 1850 and twenty-eight per cent in 1870 of the total German-born population lived in the same cities. And whereas the German-born only formed two and one-half per cent of the total population in 1850, they formed ten per cent of the population of the sixteen cities above mentioned, while in

¹ De Bow, *A Compendium of the Seventh Census*, pp. 40, 117; Walker, *A Compendium of the Ninth Census*, pp. 376, 392.

1870 the percentages were four and thirteen respectively. In seven states where a very large number of Germans were settled, a comparison was made for 1870 of the proportion of Germans who lived in the largest city of the state with the proportion of the total population of the state which lived in the same city. The result is as follows:

	<i>Per cent of total population of state</i>	<i>Per cent of German- born population of state</i>
New York, N. Y.	22.	48.
Philadelphia, Pa.	19.	32.
Chicago, Ill.	12.	25.
St. Louis, Mo.	18.	52.
Detroit, Mich.	7.	20.
Cincinnati, Ohio	8.	27.
Milwaukee, Wis.	7.	13.

The conclusion is evident that in many states a very large number of German immigrants was congregated in a single city, and that a much larger proportion of German-born than of native-born lived in urban centers. It is little wonder that American politicians hesitated to take action calculated to alienate the German vote in such cities as New York, Philadelphia, St. Louis or Cincinnati.¹

The great majority of Americans looked upon the ever increasing swarm of German immigrants as a valuable national asset. The reasons why Americans welcomed the thousands upon thousands who were annually coming to their shores were many and varied. Many of the general statements regarding German immigration were enthusiastic,

¹ De Bow, *A Compendium of the Seventh Census*, pp. 40, 117, 399; Walker, *A Compendium of the Ninth Census*, pp. 376, 392, 444, 448. The sixteen cities chosen were Brooklyn (no German population given for 1850), Boston, Charleston, Chicago, Cincinnati, Detroit, Milwaukee, New Orleans, New York, Portland (Maine), Richmond, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Savannah, St. Louis and Washington.

sometimes so much so as to arouse suspicion of the political situation at the time when they were written. The *Cincinnati Commercial* thought that it would be "an almost endless task to sum up the good they have done to this land," and Charles Dawson Shanly, a rather prominent Irish-American journalist, claimed that New York could not but be benefited by "the healthful combination of brain and muscle characteristic of its German element." *Harper's Weekly* wrote that every encouragement ought to be given to German immigration, while the *Richmond Enquirer* favored plans for inducing the Germans to settle in larger numbers in the South, and said, "Perhaps no class of immigrants are near so useful as the Germans."¹ Charles Sumner in a speech in the Senate declared that he was thankful for the German immigration "by which the Republic is strengthened and our civilization elevated." *Leslie's Weekly* wrote: "Thus in every way the Union gains by receiving them, and may congratulate itself that they come in twice as great a quantity as emigrants from any other nation."² The *New York Times* referred on one occasion to the Germans as "undoubtedly the healthiest element of our foreign immigration," and on another called them "the best element in Europe on which we have to draw."³

In attempting to find explanations why native Americans regarded the German element so favorably one is struck by the absence of certain arguments which he might reasonably have expected to find. There is almost no mention of the

¹ *Richmond Enquirer*: Feb. 4, 1869, Aug. 20, Oct. 13, 1868; *New York Tribune*: June 23, 1852 (citation from *Cincinnati Commercial*); *Harper's Weekly*: Sept. 24, 1859; *Atlantic Monthly*: May, 1867 (art. by Shanly).

² *Leslie's Weekly*: Jan. 1, 1870; Sumner, *Works*, vol. xiv, p. 152. vol. v, pp. 188-189.

³ *New York Times*: Jan. 31, May 6, 1869; Gray, *Letters*, vol. ii, p. 605. Also cf. *supra*, pp. 29, 30.

fact that the Germans were Teutonic, like the basic race in the American population, and that they would thus be easily assimilable. Nor is there very much sympathy expressed with the heroic German republicans who had broken away from a cruel tyranny, although it is very probably true that the Germans were considered lovers of independence and freedom largely because they were political exiles.¹

But there were certain traits in the character of the German immigrant which Americans frequently spoke of with warm admiration. They commonly described him as frugal, industrious, patient, orderly and peaceful. The Germans were believed to have furnished to the United States her best laborers, highly skilled artisans and mechanics, who combined a large amount of education and intellectual ability with thrifty habits. They brought with them more capital than most immigrants, and consequently made more substantial citizens after a shorter period of residence. They were willing to go to the rural districts where they were most needed. They were independent in character and great lovers of liberty, valuable qualities for the settlers of a young and vigorous country. The *Cincinnati Gazette* bore witness to the material benefits which German labor was bringing to the United States: "She builds our cities, makes our railroads, digs our canals, converts our sterile hills into blooming vineyards, and introduces her influence into every department and ramification of business."² *Harper's Weekly* wrote to the same effect: "When men so intelligent and orderly become American citizens, we may be confident that they will always be in the best sense con-

¹ But cf. *New York Times*: April 26, June 10, 1868; *Lakeside Monthly*: Oct., 1869 (art. by George P. Upton); Parker, *Life and Correspondence*, vol. i, p. 359; Sumner, *Works*, vol. v, pp. 188-189.

² *Cincinnati Gazette*: June 6, 1850.

servative.”¹ The *Nation* was very enthusiastic: “American society in general owes more than can be put down on paper, and more than most Americans understand or appreciate, for the solid additions they have made . . . to the national love of order, of industry, of frugality, of simple tastes and pleasures, and of quiet domestic life.”²

When the *Nation* referred to the “simple tastes and pleasures” of the Germans it hit upon a quite general cause of American praise for the German-Americans. They were believed to have discovered the key to true happiness in frequent and unaffected amusements. They were thought to be capable of enjoying themselves without excess and able to forget the mad rush for money-making in innocent pleasure. They seemed to possess a greater joy in living than did the average native of the United States. The *New York Times* remarked that the Germans seemed “to have learned the secret of amusing themselves in the gayest and most grotesque manner, without rudeness or extravagance.” Quite similar was the comment of the *Richmond Enquirer*: “Our German friends understand the true philosophy of life. They run into no dissipation—but every week or two, they have an agreeable Amateur Dramatic performance, winding up with a merry dance.”³ Many

¹ *Harper's Weekly*: Jan. 15, 1870, Sept. 24, 1859.

² *Nation*: Oct. 21, 1869; *New York Tribune*: June 23, 1852 (citation from *Cincinnati Commercial*), Nov. 23, 1855, Jan. 19, 1859, Nov. 9, 1866; *New York Herald*: Dec. 26, 1854, Feb. 6, 1856, July 15, 1857, Sept. 22, 1860; *New York Times*: Nov. 20, 1864, April 26, June 10, 1868, Jan. 31, Feb. 2, 1869; *Philadelphia Press*: Aug. 8, 1870, May 16, 1871; *Richmond Enquirer*: Feb. 4, 1869; *Leslie's Weekly*: Jan. 1, 1870; *Irish Citizen*: Nov. 19, 1870; *Harper's Weekly*: April 29, 1871; *Lakeside Monthly*: Oct., 1869 (art. by George P. Upton); *National Quarterly Review*: Sept., 1870; Foulke, *Life of Oliver P. Morton*, vol. ii, pp. 227-234; Sumner, *Works*, vol. v, pp. 188-189.

³ *Richmond Enquirer*: April 10, 1858; *New York Times*: Jan. 19, June 27, Aug. 26, 1868.

times the contrast was clearly drawn between the Germans and the Americans in this matter of ability to find true happiness in harmless amusement. The *North American Review* was referring to the Germans when it declared: "Well will it be, if we can temper our burning passion for the acquirement of wealth by something of that genial and refreshing spirit which stops in its hastiest flights after riches and honor to admire an image of the True and the Beautiful."¹ The *Portland Transcript* made the contrast very plain: "These Teutons know how to enjoy life, and we dyspeptic Yankees might follow their example with great benefit."²

Such comments as the foregoing were often called forth in connection with newspaper reports of gymnastic exhibitions of the Turners or of the so called "Shooting Festivals." Both were considered valuable as providing innocent pleasure and opportunity for physical development. In 1853 the New Orleans *Picayune* referred to the Turnverein, which had been established only a short time before, with warm appreciation of its benefits: "It has already acquired an enviable reputation, being productive of much sport and health to the members." The New York *Times* was no less favorable to the Shooting Festival, and claimed that it involved "elements of strength, skill, and intelligence . . . qualities that make peoples great."³

Even more favorable were the comments of the American

¹ *North American Review*: Jan., 1856.

² *Portland Transcript*: July 4, 1857; *New York Tribune*: July 13, 1860; *Harper's Weekly*: April 29, 1871; Faust, *The German Element*, vol. ii, p. 378 et seq.

³ *New York Tribune*: Aug. 18, 1851; *New York Times*: June 27, June 15, July 23, Aug. 26, 1868; *New Orleans Picayune*: May 5, 1853; *Lake-side Monthly*: Oct., 1869 (art. by George P. Upton); Faust, *The German Element*, vol. ii, p. 387 et seq.

press upon the spread of German music throughout the United States. In the German local and national orchestral societies, singing festivals and Liederkranz societies many Americans saw the beginning of real musical appreciation on the part of the American people, with all that such musical interest might mean for cultural development. In summing up the contributions of the German immigrants to American culture, the *North American Review* said, "Already they are elevating our musical taste."¹ The *New York Tribune* thought the German singing festivals gave "an excellent illustration of the capacity of our adopted fellow-citizens for innocent enjoyment," and went on to say, "We should be glad if native-born Americans would take a little inspiration from it." The *New York Times* considered that the Germans were performing "an incalculable service" in creating a love for good music on the part of many Americans, and the *Detroit Free Press* wrote: "It is to their love of song . . . that we Americans are so much indebted for the increased musical cultivation and taste lately perceptible among us."²

But unfortunately there were also causes for friction between the native and German-born Americans. In the first place, there was the feeling that the Germans were not becoming assimilated, that they were clinging to their own language and their own customs with a tenacity that was dangerous to American homogeneity. They were becoming a permanently alien element. Americans especially disliked the continued use of the German language and the

¹ *North American Review*: Jan., 1856.

² *Detroit Free Press*: Aug. 6, 1866; *New York Tribune*: July 13, 1869; *New York Times*: July 17, 1865, Aug. 12, 1867, Jan. 19, June 15, July 15, July 23, Aug. 26, 1868; *Portland Transcript*: July 4, 1857; *Nation*: Oct. 21, 1869; *Lakeside Monthly*: Oct., 1869 (art. by George P. Upton); Faust, *The German Element*, vol. ii, pp. 260-277.

persistent efforts of the German-Americans to force its adoption in the public schools on an equality with English in regions which were largely German in population. That many Americans sincerely believed in a German menace to American institutions and to the use of the English language is very evident. The *Cincinnati Gazette* mentioned the ever increasing number of Germans in Cincinnati, considered that the prospect of a homogeneous population for the city was becoming "more and more remote," and dreaded the permanent establishment of castes. The *North American Review* in an article upon the German element in the United States declared, "Their presence . . . has filled many a statesman with the deepest anxiety."¹ The *New York Herald* described the Germans in New York thus: "Here the Germans live in the old way, speaking the old language, drinking the old beer and wine, singing the old songs, and thinking the old thoughts."² James W. Alexander was somewhat pessimistic over what he observed in his walks in New York: "My way lay for above a mile through the German quarter—all the signs in German—children talking German."³ *De Bow's Review* complained of the same thing on an even larger scale: "The German bears with him his Teutonic instincts; wherever he goes he Germanizes. The tide of Germanic immigration grows stronger and stronger; whole States are German in ideas and in practice, rather than American."⁴ A friend of Charles Godfrey Leland's stated that Leland had often declared to him that "there seems to have been a prejudice

¹ *North American Review*: Jan., 1856; *Cincinnati Gazette*: June 6, 1850.

² *New York Herald*: April 25, 1859.

³ Alexander, *Familiar Letters*, vol. ii, pp. 187, 173.

⁴ *De Bow's Review*: June, 1868.

in those days against the American who showed signs of being 'Germanized,' " and that "his knowledge of German in his youth had been treated as if it were a weakness in him, or a vice." A very good statement of the attitude of patriotic Americans is given in an article on the German-American by George P. Upton, war correspondent and musical critic, in the *Lakeside Monthly*:

He seeks to Germanize us—or, in other words, to denationalize us. He demands that we shall take his manners and customs; that we shall read his literature, listen to his music, speak his language, drink his beer, eat his pretzels and sausage, and observe his Sabbath. . . . We may beneficially take much from him, but we cannot be Germans. The nationalizing process must work upon him. He must be Americanized.¹

As the German-American was distrusted by many ardent American patriots for his clannishness and devotion to the German language, so was he disliked by many earnest American Calvinists. There were several distinct grounds upon which the orthodox Protestants of the United States took issue with the German immigrants, but they were closely connected with one another, and boiled down to the feeling that the Germans were immoral and irreligious. In the first place, it was quite commonly believed that the Germans were infidel, materialistic and hostile to revealed Christianity. That the Americans were partly correct in their assumption is clear from the statement of Dr. Gottlieb Betz in his careful monograph, *Die Deutschamerikanische Patriotische Lyrik der Achtundvierziger und ihre Historische*

¹ *Lakeside Monthly*: Oct., 1869 (art. by George P. Upton); *Cincinnati Gazette*: Nov. 30, 1870; *Wisconsin State Journal*: Sept. 29, 1870 (citation from *Chicago Times*); *Nation*: Oct. 21, 1869; *De La Salle Monthly*: Sept., 1870; Pennell, *Charles Godfrey Leland*, vol. i, pp. 208-209; Gray, *Letters*, vol. ii, p. 605.

Grundlage, to the effect that many of the Forty-eighters were free-thinkers. Asa Gray accused the Germans of being "actively anti-Christian," and the New York *Tribune* thought that "German skepticism and German materialism" were things to be dreaded. The New York *Herald* charged that most of the German newspapers in the United States were "decidedly infidel in their tendencies," and George Fitzhugh wrote in *De Bow's Review*: "An immense immigration of German infidelity has but served to give a more loathsome and disgusting character to Yankee isms."¹ James W. Alexander considered that nine-tenths of the Protestant Germans in the United States were really infidel, and said: "Most of the German newspapers are infidel, and some blasphemous."² The *American Messenger* well expressed orthodox Protestant opinion when it said: "Few of our readers happily can know from their own reading the depths of infamy to which a portion of the German papers have sunk. . . . We have before us journals filled with atheism, opposing the marriage institution, and boldly avowing that their object is anarchy and unrestrained indulgence."³

In the second place, Americans felt that the German-Americans were desecrating the Sabbath by their Sunday picnics, festivals and parties, and making of it a day of pleasure rather than a day of worship. The New York *Times* thought that Americans had a right to protest against

¹ *De Bow's Review*: Dec., 1866; New York *Tribune*: Jan. 19, 1859; New York *Herald*: Dec. 26, 1854, April 1, 1852; Gray, *Letters*, vol. ii, p. 605; Betz, Gottlieb, *Die Deutschamerikanische Patriotische Lyrik der Achtundvierziger und ihre Historische Grundlage* (Philadelphia, 1916), p. 32.

² Alexander, *Familiar Letters*, vol. ii, p. 173.

³ *American Messenger*: Feb., 1851; New York *Tribune*: July 28, 1852; *Independent*: Nov. 7, 1850.

a Sunday parade of the Germans, and *Harper's Weekly* called the attitude of the Germans on the Sunday question "very ill-judged, and . . . calculated to do themselves and their cause no little harm." George P. Upton characterized the German Sabbath as "too often no Sabbath at all," and James W. Alexander complained of conditions in New York: "It was not only not like Sunday, but was like a 4th of July, or exactly like a Sunday in Cologne or Heidelberg. Every fourth house was a drinking place. Some of these were large, with numerous tables, and filled with as many women as men."¹ The last-named circumstance was especially novel in America.

As in the case of Alexander, many of the protests against the German Sunday were also protests against the attitude of the Germans on the liquor question. The two things were greatly confused in American thinking, largely because some of the first victories of the temperance people were gained in the passage of laws prohibiting the sale of liquor on Sunday. But Sunday was just the day on which the German most desired his lager beer. The result was considerable friction between the Germans and the advocates of prohibition. The *Portland Transcript* coupled the liquor and the Sunday question in a single condemnation: "They bring their institutions with them, and in New York devote the Sabbath to lager beer and theatrical exhibitions. Their numbers enable them to trample on the Sunday law with impunity."² Much more severe was the comment of the *New York Tribune*:

A good many of our German-born citizens, who cherish an abstract and sentimental devotion to the Freedom of Man, are

¹ Alexander, *Familiar Letters*: vol. ii, p. 187; *New York Herald*: July 30, 1855; *New York Times*: June 23, 1858; *Harper's Weekly*: Sept. 24, 1859; *Lakeside Monthly*: Oct., 1869 (art. by George P. Upton).

² *Portland Transcript*: Jan. 15, 1859.

yet more devoted to the Freedom of Lager. They would like to impel the car of Human Progress, but they must have their favorite tippie and social jollification on Sunday. There is a collision between their habits and the fundamental laws of our State.¹

No discussion of the German-Americans would be complete without a brief examination of their political activities in the period under review. It is quite certain that before 1848 and until 1854 the great majority of the German-Americans voted with the Democratic party. The *New York Tribune*, itself pro-Whig, admitted that such was the case. That the immigration of the Forty-eighters in itself did not make any serious change would seem to be proven by the fact that Pierce captured nearly the entire German vote in 1852. In the same year Gustave Koerner, not of course a Forty-eighter, but a very prominent German-American, was elected Lieutenant-Governor of Illinois on the Democratic ticket.²

There were several reasons why the German-Americans supported the Democratic party. First of all, the name "Democratic" made more of an appeal than did the name "Whig" to men who had gone into exile for democratic principles. Jefferson and Jackson certainly personified the spirit of democracy better than did John Quincy Adams and Webster. The *New York Tribune* charged that the

¹ *New York Tribune*: Nov. 7, 1866, July 13, 1869; *New York Times*: March 10, 1868; *Detroit Free Press*: Sept. 26, 1870 (speech at Republican Convention of Wisconsin); *North American Review*: Jan., 1856; Cooper, *Correspondence*, vol. ii, p. 693.

² *New York Tribune*: Nov. 10, 1852; *New York Herald*: Dec. 26, 1854; *North American Review*: Jan., 1856; Betz, *Patriotische Lyrik*, pp. 28-34; Faust, *The German Element*, vol. ii, p. 126; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. i, pp. 590-603. Both the *Herald* and the *Tribune* bore witness to the preponderant German vote for Pierce.

Germans had voted the Democratic ticket "rather from a liking for the label than because of any intelligent and hearty sympathy with the measures which that label was made to cover."¹ In the second place, the Democrats were thought to represent the lower classes of society, farmers, artisans and unskilled laborers, while the Whigs were believed to be controlled by manufacturers, merchants and bankers. The Germans thought of the Whigs as monopolists, and considered the Whig demand for a protective tariff a case in point. The choice seemed to be between the party of big business and the party of the masses.² Rightly or wrongly, they felt that most Nativists and Know-Nothings were allied with the Whigs. They thought of the Whig party as the more American party, in the narrow sense of the term, more strongly opposed to foreign influences such as the agitation for the continued use of the German language. Finally, the Whigs were regarded by the Germans as the party of New England Puritanism and Calvinism, the party which opposed the use of lager beer and the continental Sunday, the party which in general attempted to regulate morals and customs through legislation.³

The reasons why the Germans supported the Democrats will be more evident after a consideration of what the Germans stood for in politics. There were certain demands of the Germans which can be seen cropping out time and again throughout the entire period. Economically they

¹ New York Tribune: Oct. 8, 1851; New York Times: Oct. 19, 1864; Betz, *Patriotische Lyrik*, p. 29; Faust, *The German Element*, vol. ii, p. 126.

² New York Tribune: Oct. 2 (citation from *Abend Zeitung*), Oct. 11, 1852 (citation from *Deutsche Zeitung*); Betz, *Patriotische Lyrik*, p. 30; Faust, *The German Element*, vol. ii, pp. 126-127.

³ New York Tribune: Oct. 11, 1852 (citation from *Deutsche Zeitung*); Betz, *Patriotische Lyrik*, pp. 30-31; Faust, *The German Element*, vol. ii, pp. 126-127.

wished a liberal disposition of the public lands, a commercial policy of free trade, liberal laws regarding the formation and activities of trade unions, no national bank, no special favors to private monopolists and a limitation of the hours of labor. In 1849 Robert Dabney of Virginia spoke of the Germans "who are always *land-mad*." In 1851 a Land Reform Meeting was held in New York and a new party, the German Free Soil Democracy of New York, was formed. In both the mass meeting and the platform of the party the above-mentioned economic principles were formulated. The New York *Tribune* in 1852 quoted from the *Deutsche Zeitung* twenty reasons why German-Americans should not vote for General Winfield Scott, among which were the claims that he favored a protective tariff, that he was an aristocrat, and that he had opposed the Homestead Bill. In 1864 and in 1870 the *Staats-Zeitung* of New York demanded a lowering of the tariff.¹

Politically the Germans stood for complete manhood suffrage, the election of all officials and the referendum—in short, complete political democracy of a kind that is still regarded as radical. Moreover in 1852 the Germans were demanding American intervention in behalf of European revolution. The Democrats under the lead of Senator Cass of Michigan favored intervention more strongly than the Whigs under the lead of Webster had done. The Democratic party dodged the issue in its platform for 1852, but the Whigs definitely opposed all intervention. The New York *Tribune*, strongly pro-Whig, complained bitterly of

¹ New York *Tribune*: Aug. 26 (German Land Reform Meeting in New York), Sept. 9, 1851 (Platform of German Free Soil Democracy of New York), Oct. 2 (citation from *Abend Zeitung*), Oct. 11, 1852 (citation from *Deutsche Zeitung*); New York *Herald*: July 30, 1855; New York *Staats-Zeitung*: Sept. 9, 1864, Aug. 20, 1870; Dabney, *Life and Letters*, p. 118.

the stupidity of the party leaders in including a plank regarded so unfavorably by the German-Americans, and it is very probable that the outspoken hostility of the Whigs cost them a large number of German votes.¹

There were other demands of a social nature. The Germans wished an easy and short process of naturalization, and naturalization treaties with the German states to protect them from the claims for uncompleted military service when they returned to their native land. When the *New York Tribune* argued against the acceptance of the Bancroft treaty of 1868 with Prussia it cited "five leading German newspapers of the United States" which were dissatisfied with the provisions of the treaty. A non-partisan German mass-meeting, held in New York early in 1869 to demand a shorter process of naturalization, was addressed by Franz Sigel, a Forty-eighter, a prominent general in the Civil War and a man who possessed a wide influence with his fellow German-Americans.²

Very naturally the Germans were intensely hostile to the formation of any Nativist party. As has been noticed, they desired to perpetuate the use of the German language, and even to establish schools where German would be on an equality with English. As a matter of fact such schools were actually formed in certain parts of Ohio and Pennsylvania. Strongly patriotic Americans saw danger in such aggressive Germanism, and joined themselves to parties which were very definitely opposed to anything that seemed

¹ *New York Tribune*: Aug. 26 (German Land Reform Meeting in New York), Sept. 9, 1851 (Platform of German Free Soil Democracy of New York), June 24, Oct. 11, 1852 (citation from *Deutsche Zeitung*); *New York Herald*: Oct. 17, 1851 (letter signed Freiheit), July 30, 1855; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Dec. 1, 1851. Cf. *supra*, p. 69.

² *New York Tribune*: March 16, 1868, Feb. 22, 1869 (meeting of Germans in New York), Oct. 11, 1852 (citation from *Deutsche Zeitung*); *Detroit Free Press*: Sept. 19, 1870.

to threaten American institutions. There is almost certainly a connection between the fact that a veritable tide of German immigration poured into the United States during the late forties and early fifties and the fact that the Know-Nothing movement flourished in the early fifties. Rumors became current at that time that the Germans were **intent** upon founding a completely German state in America, which should be independent of the United States, and which should fly the German flag. In 1854 the Turners were refused a charter of incorporation by the New York legislature on the grounds that they were not Americans, were a secret organization, and were becoming too powerful in politics. A clash occurred between the Turners and other aggressive German organizations and bands of Know-Nothing sympathizers in Covington, Kentucky, in 1855, and in the same year there was a meeting of Germans in New York to protest against Know-Nothingism, sponsored by as prominent a German as Frederick Kapp, probably the leading Forty-eighter in the state. Gustave Koerner, who was of an older immigration and rather hostile to many of the radical ideas of the Forty-eighters, charged that the aggressiveness of the latter had caused much hostility to the Germans, and wrote: "A good deal of the very strong revival of the Native American feeling, just at this time [1850] and for some years to come, was owing to the arrogance, imperious and domineering conduct of the refugees."¹

¹ Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. i, p. 549; New York *Tribune*: July 28, 1852; New York *Herald*: March 29, 1854, May 24 (meeting of Germans to protest against Know-Nothings), July 30, 1855, April 25, 1859; New York *Times*: Oct. 20, Nov. 18, 1870; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Sept. 9, 1851 (meeting of Germans to get German language into the schools), Nov. 30, 1870; *Nation*: Dec. 30, 1869; Faust, *The German Element*, vol. ii, pp. 150-152, 391-394; Betz, *Patriotische Lyrik*, p. 33 *et seq.*

Finally the Germans were opposed to any legislative interference with their social habits. The most steady and consistent interest of the Germans in American politics throughout the entire period seems to have been opposition to Puritanism. In 1852 the *New York Tribune* printed news of a riot of Germans in Newtown, Ohio, caused by the Sunday liquor question. In 1854 when the Democrats made an attempt to rally the Germans to the support of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, they made the following appeal:

MAINTAIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ALL
CITIZENS

PRESERVATION OF THE UNION!
DEMOCRACY, NOT ABOLITION!
SELF-GOVERNMENT, NO TUTELAGE!
No Maine Law!

An attack upon the Maine law, which was a complete prohibition of the sale of spirituous liquors, was thus used as a bait to allure the Germans to a meeting the real purpose of which was the endorsement of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill.¹ The *North American Review* wrote in 1856: "The Germans are almost unanimously opposed . . . to any prohibition of the sale of intoxicating liquors."² In 1867 Charles Dawson Shanly wrote to the same effect in the *Atlantic Monthly*: "In his politics the German of New York is largely influenced by lager-bier [*sic*]."³

But if it is true that the great majority of German-Americans voted with the Democratic party as late as the

¹ *New York Tribune*: July 28, 1852, Feb. 23, 1854.

² *North American Review*: Jan., 1856.

³ *Atlantic Monthly*: May, 1867; *New York Herald*: March 5, 1854, May 24, 1855 (meeting to protest against the Liquor Law), Sept. 21, 1860; *Nation*: Oct. 21, 1869; *Irish Citizen*: Nov. 1, 1870; Faust, *The German Element*, vol. ii, p. 146; Betz, *Patriotische Lyrik*, p. 33.

election of 1852, it is no less sure that a decided shift occurred about 1854. The cause was opposition to the spread of slavery, and the occasion the Kansas-Nebraska Bill. The opposition of the Germans to the extension of slavery seems to have been twofold. As refugees from political tyranny, most of them had little sympathy with an institution which held men in personal servitude. As small farmers in the West, working their own farms and ever anxious for more land, they were jealous of the spread of a rival agricultural system based upon slave labor. That there was a large amount of pure idealism in the German dislike for slavery is clear from the fact that many Germans in the East were just as strongly opposed to the institution as their brothers in the West. There is some indication, however, that the economic motive was not lacking in the minds of many Germans, particularly in the West. Those Germans who had settled in the South, a small minority in comparison with those in the rest of the country, seem to have been loyal adherents of the Confederacy. A son of Francis Lieber fought in the Southern armies, the *Richmond Enquirer* stated that the Germans in the South supported the Southern cause, and the German-American Turners split into Northern and Southern branches over the question of slavery. There is an interesting statement in the *New York Tribune* from the *St. Louis Anzeiger des Westens* during the Kansas-Nebraska controversy. The German paper admitted that the bill would pass, but added: "It is necessary that free labor should immigrate in overwhelming masses to Nebraska, and thus cut off all prospect of slave-holding preponderance in the future."¹

¹ *New York Tribune*: Nov. 23, 1855, March 22, 1854, Aug. 26 (Land Reform Meeting in New York), Sept. 9, 1851 (Platform of German Free Soil Democracy of New York), Jan. 21, 1859, Feb. 11, 1863; *New*

Nor is proof lacking that the Germans did make a break away from the Democratic party and in the direction of the new anti-slavery Republican party. The Cincinnati *Gazette* drew up a list of eighty German-American papers which opposed the Kansas-Nebraska Act. In February, 1854, a meeting of Germans in New York resolved "that the Nebraska bill is a piece of rascality and iniquity with which the Germans of this city will have nothing to do." In March a similar meeting in New York was addressed by many prominent German-American leaders and drew out a crowd of two thousand. In Chicago the German-Americans burned Douglas in effigy. The Portland *Transcript* wrote: "The Germans throughout the country, protest, with scarce an exception, against the extension of slavery into Nebraska."¹ In 1856 the Germans seem to have voted in very large numbers for Frémont, the Republican candidate for President. A German Frémont meeting in Cincinnati was addressed by Judge John B. Stallo, whom Koerner called "in every respect the foremost representative of the German-Americans," and Frederick Hassaurek, later American Minister to Ecuador. Two meetings of German Republicans were held in New York, one in August and one in October. The New York *Tribune*

York *Herald*: April 25, 1859; Richmond *Enquirer*: Feb. 4, 1869, Nov. 23, 1867; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Dec. 1, 1851 (citation from Cleveland *Plaindealer*, letter from the German Political Club of Cleveland to a negro association in which the former promised that "the German people, as soon as they shall have obtained the Democratic Republic in the coming struggle, will use all means, which are adapted, to abolish slavery"); *North American Review*: Jan., 1856; Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. i, p. 363; Lieber, *Life and Letters*, p. 318; Betz, *Patriotische Lyrik*, p. 47 *et seq.*

¹ Portland *Transcript*: March 25, 1854; New York *Tribune*: Feb. 24, March 3, March 4, March 23, 1854; New York *Herald*: March 29, 1854; Faust, *The German Element*, vol. ii, pp. 127-131; Betz, *Patriotische Lyrik*, p. 62 *et seq.*

reported an audience of five thousand for each meeting. At the first Julius Froebel, nephew of the founder of the kindergarten, presided, and speeches were made by Frederick Kapp and Charles Heinzen, both leading Forty-eighters. At the second meeting Kapp presided, and addresses were made by Frederick Hecker and Gustave Struve, both leaders in the Baden uprising of 1849, and Frederick Münch, a political exile of an earlier immigration. Early in 1857 the New York *Tribune* published a letter from Münch to the effect that more than fifty German-American papers, numbering among their subscribers more than half of the total number of German newspaper subscriptions, had switched in 1856 from the Democratic to the Republican party.¹

In 1857 the Cincinnati *Gazette* reported that the Germans had voted the Republican ticket in local elections in Cincinnati, St. Louis and Chicago. In 1859 August Willich, later a brigadier-general in the Union army, led a demonstration and torchlight procession in Cincinnati as a protest against the execution of John Brown. The author has found no accounts of German Republican meetings in 1860, but nearly every prominent German-American voted the Republican ticket, among them Schurz, Koerner and Lieber. Early in March, 1861, the New York *Herald*, which regretted Lincoln's election, charged that nearly all of the Forty-eighters had supported him, and in 1862 Charles Sumner wrote to the German Republican Central Committee of New York that Lincoln could never have won in 1860 without German support. The gratitude which Lin-

¹ New York *Tribune*: Aug. 22, Oct. 8, 1856, Feb. 20, 1857; Cincinnati *Gazette*: June 21, 1856; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, p. 10; Faust, *The German Element*, vol. ii, pp. 131-133; Betz, *Patriotische Lyrik*, p. 65 *et seq.*

coln showed to his German friends was no less important evidence of their aid in the campaign of 1860. Schurz was rewarded for his services by an appointment as Minister to Spain, and was succeeded in that post by Koerner. There is an interesting note from Lincoln to Seward early in 1861, before the appointment of Schurz, in which Lincoln asked: "And then what about Carl Schurz; or, in other words, what about our German friends?"¹

But even as early as 1862 the German-Americans began to be dissatisfied with the Republican party. The restlessness increased, and in 1872 most of them were keenly in favor of the Liberal Republican movement, if not in favor of its candidate for the presidency, Horace Greeley. During the Civil War the German-Americans became disgruntled because of the administration's treatment of Generals Frémont and Franz Sigel, the latter of whom was the idol of the German-Americans, although his talents seem to have been none too highly regarded by General Halleck, the Chief of Staff. A letter appeared in the *New York Tribune* in June, 1863, from several prominent German-Americans, headed by Frederick Kapp, to President Lincoln, asking that Frémont and Sigel be allowed "to issue a call for volunteers to march at once to the defense of Pennsylvania and the nation." A year earlier Lincoln had asked Koerner to mediate between General Halleck and Sigel, a delicate piece of diplomacy which resulted in the promotion of Sigel to the position of major-general, much to the satisfaction of the German-Americans. In 1864 the

¹ Nicolay and Hay, *Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln*, vol. vi, p. 224; *New York Herald*: March 9, 1861; *Cincinnati Gazette*: April 9, 1857; Conway, *Autobiography*, vol. i, pp. 268-269; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, pp. 33, 90-91, 211-213; Lieber, *Life and Letters*, p. 314; Sumner, *Works*, vol. vi, pp. 376-377; Betz, *Patriotische Lyrik*, p. 79 *et seq.*; Faust, *The German Element*, vol. ii, pp. 133-135.

Germans seem to have favored the nomination of Frémont, but most of them voted for Lincoln after his renomination.¹

A second cause for German dissatisfaction was the gradual increase of power within the Republican party of the old Whig elements which the Germans so disliked. It is certainly true that to a large extent the Republican party came under the control of big business. More important still was the return to power of the Puritan elements. A good example is furnished by the Excise Law of 1866 in New York, which forbade the sale of all intoxicating liquors on Sunday. The New York *Tribune* claimed that the Excise Law had cost the Republican party five thousand German votes in the elections of 1866. The New York *Times* and the *Nation* felt that the Republicans had made a serious blunder, and blamed the more puritanical papers like the *Tribune*. Charles Dawson Shanly in the *Atlantic Monthly* described the conditions early in 1867 when he said: "'Liberty and Lager-Bier! [sic]' are vibrating upon the air in guttural German accents."² In 1868 the New York *Times* reported a meeting of Germans in the Bowery to protest against the law. The issue was still a live one in 1870 and played an important part in the campaign of that year along with the Franco-German War.

¹ New York *Tribune*: June 19, 1863, Jan. 25 (resolutions of Germans of Livingstone County, N. Y.), Nov. 1, 1862 (German mass meeting to support Republican ticket and to uphold German generals), Feb. 27, Sept. 21, Sept. 29, Sept. 30, 1864; New York *Times*: Nov. 4, 1864; New York *World*: Jan. 26, Feb. 29, March 4, 1864; New York *Staats-Zeitung*: Oct. 20, Oct. 21, 1864; Cincinnati *Gazette*: April 7, 1863; Nicolay and Hay, *Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln*, vol. vii, pp. 85-86; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, p. 196 *et seq.*; Bigelow, *Retrospections*, vol. i, p. 363.

² *Atlantic Monthly*: May, 1867; New York *Tribune*: Nov. 7, Nov. 9, 1866; New York *Times*: March 10, 1868, April 18, 1869 (petition of Germans against the Excise Law), Sept. 4, Sept. 5, 1870; Detroit *Free Press*: Sept. 19, 1870; *Nation*: Nov. 5, 1866; Faust, *The German Element*, vol. ii, pp. 131-134, 146.

It is interesting to note the attitude of three representative New York papers on the question. The New York *Tribune*, which spoke for the temperance group, was the most emphatic in its sympathies with German unification, favored rewarding the Germans for supporting the Republican party by giving them a share in the spoils, and championed the nomination of Franz Sigel as Secretary of State in New York in 1869, and that of Sigismund Kaufman as Lieutenant-Governor in 1870. But the *Tribune* stood firm in its opposition to Sunday liquor, and said: "We regard it as an insult to the Germans to expect them to sacrifice the principle for which so many of them have fought and suffered, for a beer barrel."¹ The New York *Times*, Republican, but of a different shade from the *Tribune*, also favored German unity but not so consistently, also campaigned for Sigel and Kaufman but not so vociferously, and definitely opposed the Sunday liquor law. It warned the Republicans that the Germans would desert the party if something was not done to satisfy their demands on the liquor question, and said that the excise law "infringes tastes and habits which they are not willing to abandon, and which they may be allowed to gratify without endangering the peace of the community." The New York *World*, radically Democratic, opposed the German cause in the Franco-German War, and based its claim for German-American support on the ground that the Democratic party had always been firmly opposed to all puritanical legislation. It attacked the Republicans, and went on to say, ". . . but German pleasure, the free saloon, the friendly evening spent in Doctor Martin Luther's way with

¹ New York *Tribune*: Oct. 17, 1866, Oct. 13, 1869, Oct. 1, 1852, March 11, 1861.

wine and song, imperatively require the defeat of . . . prohibition." ¹

In the third place, most of the German-Americans were indignant with the administration for allowing arms to be shipped from American arsenals to France. The attitude of the administration on this point seems to have more than counterbalanced all the pro-German planks in the Republican party platforms. Meetings of the German-Americans were held in Cincinnati, Washington, Chicago and St. Louis to protest against what they considered a breach of American neutrality. It was claimed that the American government had done much to prolong the war. The *Belletristisches Journal* pointed out that the Germans could decide who would be the next Republican candidate, and hinted strongly that Grant would not be supported. The same paper called upon Carl Schurz to take action that would compel the administration to stop the sale of arms to France, and drew a parallel to the Alabama case. The *New York Staats-Zeitung* said that it might be Grant's mission to unite the Germans of the United States as it had been the mission of Napoleon III to unite the Fatherland. Gustave Koerner well described the feeling among the Germans:

The Germans here remonstrated for months against this traffic, but in vain. Finally strong deputations went to Washington, called upon President Grant, and got him to promise to stop the sales. He pretended that he had not known that these sales were made to France. But no one believed this. . . . It

¹ *New York Times*: Sept. 4, 1870, Nov. 1, Nov. 20, 1864, March 10, 1868, Oct. 17, Oct. 25, Nov. 2, 1869, Sept. 6, Sept. 13, Sept. 24, 1870; *New York World*: Sept. 12, Sept. 13, Sept. 22, 1870 (speech by W. C. De Witt); *New York Staats-Zeitung*: Nov. 9, 1866, Sept. 21, 1870. *The Nation*: Nov. 5, 1866, agreed with the *Times*.

is no wonder that from that time on a great many German Republicans became alienated from Grant's administration, and were utterly opposed to electing him President for a second term.¹

In 1872 the Liberal Republicans refused to support Grant and nominated their own ticket. Prominent among their leaders were Carl Schurz, Gustave Koerner, John B. Stallo, Caspar Butz and Frederick Hecker. In that year Koerner ran for Governor of Illinois on a combined Liberal Republican and Democratic ticket, as he had run on the Democratic ticket for Lieutenant-Governor twenty years previously.²

The discussion thus far has been largely in the nature of a necessary introduction to the main purpose of the chapter, which is to analyse the opinion of the German-Americans in regard to the struggles in the Fatherland. But German-American opinion is important for the present study only because the German-Americans were themselves an important element in the American population. The need for proving that such was the case has been the justification for the foregoing pages. Three facts should be clear. In the first place, the immigration of Germans had been large enough to enable them to play an influential rôle in American life, but a much more influential one in certain sections of the country than in others. In the second place, it is certain that the native Americans considered that the German element could not be safely disregarded. On the whole the feeling was one of friendliness, often mixed

¹ Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, p. 524; New York *Staats-Zeitung*: Dec. 7, 1870, Jan. 10 (meeting in St. Louis), Jan. 13, Jan. 23 (meeting in Chicago), Jan. 25, Jan. 26, Feb. 9, 1871 (meeting in Washington); Cincinnati *Gazette*: Jan. 27, 1871; *Belletristisches Journal*: Jan. 13, Feb. 3, Feb. 17, 1871.

² Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, pp. 545-557. Caspar Butz was a leading German-American in Chicago, and later editor of the *Deutsch-Amerikanische Monatshefte*.

with a certain amount of distrust, to be sure, but never one of mere contempt. In the third place, the Germans were active and aggressive in making their influence felt, not only in social and economic affairs, but also in politics. The views of the German-Americans on European events, their enthusiasms and partisanships, could not fail to affect, consciously and unconsciously, their American neighbors. Thus in the whole body of American opinion the German-Americans played no inconsiderable part, and their share in creating American public sentiment, both in itself and in its influence on others, cannot be disregarded.

THE GERMAN-AMERICANS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
GERMAN UNITY

There can be no doubt that the Germans in America took a most active interest in the attempts to achieve unity and democracy for their Fatherland. At the crises of the struggle in 1848 and 1870, meetings were held, speeches were made, addresses drawn up and despatched to the German people, and money collected for the German cause. The German-American newspapers carefully watched the course of events, making frequent and intelligent comments. Several prominent German-Americans have left memoirs or letters giving their own feeling and that of their compatriots in the United States. Available materials are therefore plentiful to make an extended study of the attitude of the German-Americans towards that chapter in German history which culminated in the foundation of the German Empire. The author has been unable to do more than to tap some of the sources and only intends to sketch the feeling of the German-Americans in broad outlines.

It must be borne in mind that about three times as many Germans were living in the United States in 1870 as in

1850, and therefore it is quite natural that their expressions of sympathy should have been less prominent in the earlier than in the later period. Many of the outstanding German-American leaders in 1870—Carl Schurz, Frederick Hecker, Franz Sigel and Charles Heinzen—were not in the United States in 1848. But it is none the less clear that the sympathy of the German-Americans with the revolutionary movements of 1848 and 1849 was widespread and often profound. Germans participated in large numbers in the meetings which were held in many parts of the United States to sympathize with the establishment of the French Republic. In the New York meeting there was a separate speaking stand where only German was spoken. Later when the news of the German revolutions arrived, the German-Americans held meetings on their own account in many cities, among which were New York, Baltimore, Pittsburg, New Orleans and St. Louis. Rather flamboyant speeches, the singing of patriotic songs, resolutions of sympathy and the drawing up of addresses to the German people seem to have characterized most of the meetings.¹

At first the news produced great joy and evoked deep emotions in the minds of many German-Americans who had come to the United States as exiles from earlier struggles to gain for Germany that which she now seemed on the point of achieving. Optimism was widespread. A speaker at one of the New York meetings declared, "Germany would need at least a month."² On the receipt of the news of the French uprising, Francis Lieber confidently predicted a European war, "the end of which can only have one result—the unity of Germany." Gustave Koerner

¹ *New York Tribune*: March 24, April 4, April 15, 1848; *New York Herald*: April 4, 1848; *New York Evening Post*: April 4, 1848; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. i, pp. 515 *et seq.*, 533 *et seq.*

² *New York Tribune*: April 4, 1848.

tells of his own feelings when he heard of the news from all parts of Germany, revolutions in Prussia, and the convening of the Frankfort Assembly: "I must say, that my heart swelled with joy at the intelligence. The ideal of my youth for which I had sacrificed all, seemed in process of realization. . . . I must confess my enthusiasm felt no bounds." ¹ Lieber, who soon left the United States temporarily to observe and advise the Frankfort Assembly, described graphically in a letter to Samuel G. Howe his emotion when he first heard of the news:

The other day, when the German news had arrived, I was obliged to lecture. I began,—but I could not. I said: "My young friends, I am unfit for you this afternoon. News has arrived that Germany too is rising, and my heart is full to overflowing. I"—but I felt choked. I pointed toward the door. The students left it,—gave a *hearty* cheer for "Old Germany." ²

Probably nearly all German-Americans in 1848 and 1849 would have stoutly maintained that they desired a liberal and unified Germany. Koerner and Lieber both specifically mentioned greater personal liberty as a desirable goal. But it is more difficult to determine what the German-Americans would have done had they been members of the Frankfort Assembly. On one point they are clear—the destruction of the minor princes. Koerner, who drew up an address to the German people from the Germans of Belleville, Illinois, spoke contemptuously of trying to establish unity while "leaving in existence thirty-four principalities and recognizing their hereditary right over the people." Lieber was more emphatic. At one time he wrote, "Nor do I see how

¹ Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. i, p. 516; Lieber, *Life and Letters*, p. 213.

² Lieber, *Life and Letters*, pp. 213-214.

the unity of Germany can be brought about unless the princes are thrown overboard," and at another time he exclaimed: "Oh! for a besom to sweep away that whole trash of German princes."¹

It is very difficult to discover whether the German-Americans in 1848 considered German democracy or German unity as the more desirable goal, or whether one was felt to be dependent upon the other. If anything, the feeling seems to have been slightly inclined to the belief that liberty was more fundamental than unity, that a unified Germany was a corollary to a liberal and democratic Germany. Koerner wrote: "Only through liberty comes union such as Germany needs."² On the other hand Lieber felt that unity was "the first practical benefit required," and continued, "Liberty would soon follow."³ Perhaps a slight majority of German-Americans would have agreed with Koerner rather than with Lieber.

It is not so difficult to discover whether they preferred a monarchy or a republic for a united and free Germany. The great majority desired a republic. The address "To the free German People," which was formulated by the New York Germans at one of their meetings, declared, "Not upon the promises of princes rest [*sic*] our confidence."⁴ At another New York meeting of Germans, one of the speakers said that he "hoped his romantic Majesty the King of Prussia would be safely conveyed over the border of the sea, never to return." In Koerner's address to the German people which, it must be remembered, was accepted by the Germans of his community, he said:

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 213, 218, 222; *New York Herald*: April 14, 1848; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. i, pp. 533 *et seq.*, 515 *et seq.*, 531-533.

² Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. i, p. 535; *New York Herald*: April 14, 1848.

³ Lieber, *Life and Letters*, pp. 213, 219-221.

⁴ *New York Herald*: April 14, 1848.

Only upon the ruins of all thrones can you erect the edifice of German nationality, only a confederate Republic can solve the problem to unite all peoples of German tongue into one powerful common brotherhood. . . . And do you think that constitutional monarchy would give you peace, a chance to accumulate property and undisturbed enjoyment of life? Never! . . . The unity of Germany is lost as long as you tolerate hereditary rulers.¹

On the other hand, Lieber seems to have thought it would make little difference whether united Germany became a republic or a monarchy. He continually lamented the fact that Germany possessed no resolute ruler of the character of Frederick the Great who would dare to unite Germany, and felt that the constitution formulated by the Frankfort Assembly would have been satisfactory if it could have been accepted by the Prussian king. He summed up his position when he wrote: "Whether a republic or a monarchy would follow is immaterial; the requirement now is that Germany *be Germany*." ²

Although skeptical as to their success, German-Americans were sympathetic with the republican uprisings in 1849 in Baden, Saxony and other parts of South Germany. A son of Francis Lieber fought in the struggle, and Koerner said: "Collections were made by the Germans all over the United States to assist in arming and equipping the volunteers. In Belleville, principally by the efforts of the ladies, who arranged a bazaar, we raised \$470.00." ³ After the failure of the republican insurrection in 1849, many re-

¹ Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. i, pp. 535, 536, 538; New York *Tribune*: April 4, 1848. But Koerner was not always consistent. Cf. *Memoirs*, vol. i, p. 515 *et seq.*

² Lieber, *Life and Letters*, p. 220.

³ Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. i, p. 539.

publican leaders emigrated to the United States. Many of the so-called Forty-eighters, in which term these exiles of 1849 were included, were at first inclined to consider their residence in the United States as only temporary until such time as the struggle for liberty and unity could be renewed. The movements of Kinkel have been noted in an earlier chapter.¹ In the autumn of 1848 Frederick Hecker was greeted with a flattering reception from the American press, and meetings were held in his honor in New York, Cincinnati and St. Louis. In 1851 and 1852 many of the German refugees founded clubs to raise money and prepare for another struggle with the German tyrants. Koerner speaks of one club in Philadelphia, which "called upon all patriots to kill all monarchs, promising to pay rewards, and adopting a price-list according to the quality of the victims." A letter to the New York *Herald* in favor of the Kinkel movement was very optimistic, and declared: "That all Germany will strike a blow for liberty next spring, you may put down in your widely read sheet as a fixed fact."² At the end of January, 1851, a congress of German republicans was held in Philadelphia. It was decided to organize an "*American Revolutionary Union for Europe*," with branches in each state. The Union drew up a platform of democratic republicanism and called upon its members to agitate for revolution, to raise a revolutionary fund, and to form themselves into military corps in preparation for the coming struggle. In the summer of 1853 the Germans of New York City burned in effigy an alleged spy of the King of Württemberg. In December of the same year the German Revolutionary Committee proved its ac-

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 79.

² New York *Herald*: Oct. 17, 1851 (letter signed Freiheit); Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. i, p. 548.

tivity by presenting a letter on Prussia to the Society of Universal Democratic Republicanism. The letter prophesied a revolution in Prussia, and at the end showed that many of the Forty-eighters did not expect to remain in the United States for any length of time when it said: ". . . the simple return of the exiles, if well timed, would be sufficient to awaken the entire [*sic*] of Germany."¹

But in general the fifties seem to have been a period of disillusionment and sadness for the German-Americans who hoped great things of the Fatherland. Reaction reigned supreme in the German states. Unity came to seem only a beautiful dream. No attempt has been made to trace a German-American newspaper throughout the period, and the published comments of the German-Americans are few, except in the case of Francis Lieber. There is one letter from Carl Schurz to his old fellow-revolutionary, Gottfried Kinkel, dated 1855, in which Schurz denied that he had lost interest in the Fatherland, but declared his skepticism about any change in the near future, and wrote, "I have only faint hopes for the next few years." The letter continued with a prophecy that a united Germany would be the natural ally of the United States: "America is the only power in the civilized world that would not be jealous of a strong, united Germany. They can both grow without being rivals, and it will be to the interests of each to keep the adversaries of the other in check."² Lieber was very pessimistic throughout the whole decade. He blamed the Germans for being too visionary, for not possessing more

¹ New York *Tribune*: Feb. 5, 1852, July 19, Dec. 7, 1853 (letter read by German Revolutionary Committee); New Orleans *Picayune*: Jan. 15, 1852; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. i, pp. 528 *et seq.*, 533 *et seq.*, 547-549; Lieber, *Life and Letters*, p. 222.

² Bancroft, Frederick, editor, *Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz* (New York, 1913), vol. i, p. 19.

energy, for being so educated as to become highly individualized and thus incapable of unified efforts, and for being so much interested in theories as to let pass opportunities for action. He regretted greatly that a unified Germany could not have fought side by side with England in the Crimean War, called the condition of Germany in 1854 "disgraceful," thought Germany was moving "under a national pall," and cried out, "Away with the wretched little princedoms and the patchwork map of Germany." In 1859 and 1860 he envied the Italian successes in achieving unity, called for "one great, revolutionary King of Prussia," and declared that he believed the Germans "far better entitled" to what the Italians had accomplished, "unity, a country, national strength, and truth."¹ Aaron Friedenwald, who visited and studied in Germany in 1860 and 1861, was more optimistic. He considered the Prussian Regent "an excellent monarch," and thought the people seemed contented. However, even Friedenwald attacked the German nobility, the ignorance and poverty in many parts of Germany and the lack of political unity.²

During the early stages of the constitutional struggle in Prussia, before the Danish War of 1864, German-American opinion seems to have favored the cause of the Progressives and to have been very hostile to Bismarck. The files of the *Belletristisches Journal*, probably the leading German-American weekly, have been examined during this period. It was itself very hostile to the Prussian government, and at one time stated that no German-American newspaper took the side of the Prussian king in the controversy between him and the legislature. It rejoiced at the

¹ Lieber, *Life and Letters*, pp. 219-221, 240, 246-247, 272-275, 305-306, 311.

² Friedenwald, Harry, *Life, Letters and Addresses of Aaron Friedenwald* (Baltimore, 1906), pp. 39, 43, 46, 52.

increasing majorities in the legislature of those opposed to the Prussian government, and saw signs of promise for the future. In 1862 it was sure that the Progressive triumph must lead to better conditions, for worse would be clearly impossible. It accused the government of breaking its oath, called the king's attitude that of a madman, claimed that Frederick William IV had been a wise ruler in comparison with his successor, and was sorry that William did not have the courage to abdicate. When William I declared that he wished conciliation, the *Belletristisches Journal* advised him to send his ministry to the hangman, appoint an honest one and turn honest himself. It called the Prussian constitution a lie and a sham, and accused the government of stealing the people's money for its own illegal purposes.¹

At times the *Belletristisches Journal* was optimistic over the way in which the Prussian Progressives were standing out against the unconstitutional measures of their government. It was a good thing for the people of Germany to be shown that nothing in the way of German salvation could be expected from Hohenzollern leadership. The sooner the German people became convinced of that fact the better. It also saw signs of hope in the patriotic celebrations in memory of Schiller and Fichte in 1862 as well as in a certain convention in 1863 of riflemen from various parts of Germany. Such festivals seemed to point to the existence of sentiment in favor of a strong, united and free Fatherland.² But at other times the same paper was pessi-

¹ *Belletristisches Journal*: March 28, April 4, May 23, June 6, Aug. 8, Oct. 11, Oct. 31, 1862, Jan. 21, Feb. 20, March 13, April 24, June 5, June 19, Aug. 21, Aug. 28, Oct. 16, Nov. 13, Nov. 27, 1863.

² *Ibid.*, May 23, Aug. 8, 1862, Jan. 21, Nov. 13, Dec. 25, 1863. Cf. also Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, p. 357.

mistic. It thought that German unity could best be achieved under Prussian, if not Hohenzollern, auspices. And yet it believed that the attitude of the Prussian government, if persisted in, must destroy all liberal confidence in Prussian leadership. Austria seemed more democratic than Prussia. The Hohenzollerns were throwing away the wonderful opportunities which Prussia might have had of guiding the entire German people towards the goal of national unity. Nor were the German people yet free. On the contrary, they seemed to be still in bondage to their various princes—weak, disunited and oppressed. Such conditions did not give cause for rejoicing.¹

The course of the Danish War of 1864 was followed with interest by the German-American newspapers, which published long accounts of its military episodes and lengthy editorials on the merits of the question. But the published writings of Koerner and Lieber omit all reference to the war as if such a chapter in German history had never been written. There were probably some German-American meetings in the United States, but they could not have been numerous, for no account of such a meeting has been discovered in the American papers examined. Early in January, 1864, the *Belletristisches Journal* gave notice of a meeting to support the cause of the Danish duchies, but no account of the gathering was found either in that paper or in the *New York Staats-Zeitung*. The implication would naturally be that although the German-Americans were mildly interested in the events of 1864, there was no such widespread enthusiasm as in 1848 or in 1870.²

¹ *Belletristisches Journal*: June 6, Aug. 8, Nov. 21, 1862, Jan. 21, March 13, April 24, June 19, Aug. 21, Aug. 28, Sept. 18, Oct. 30, Nov. 13, Dec. 4, Dec. 18, 1863.

² *Ibid.*, Jan. 15, 1864.

German-American opinion seems to have been quite unanimous in upholding the independence of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein from Danish rule. It was taken for granted that they were German provinces and that every effort should be made to prevent Danish encroachments. Denmark was declared to be one of the hereditary enemies of German progress. Later in the war when a large part of Denmark had been occupied by the Austrian and Prussian armies, the *Belletristisches Journal* remarked that it was hard for a country to be subject to hostile and alien troops, but that such an experience would be a good lesson for Denmark. The great value of Schleswig and Holstein—their rich fertility, their fine harbors, especially that of Kiel, the possibility of a canal between the North and the Baltic Seas—a canal which the *Belletristisches Journal* claimed would be of as great importance as the one at Suez—was clearly recognized. It was pointed out that Germany could never become a great naval or mercantile power without the possession of the duchies. Whatever state held Schleswig and Holstein was mistress of northern Europe. The cession by Denmark of the duchies to Austria and Prussia was therefore hailed with joy. At last the provinces had been delivered from the Danes and had become irrevocably German. The New York *Staats-Zeitung* said that the main thing was to bring the duchies under German control, and the *Belletristisches Journal*, after predicting that in all probability they would be detached from Denmark, exclaimed, "Vivat Germania."¹

But the German-Americans felt little or no sympathy

¹ New York *Staats-Zeitung*: Jan. 13, Jan. 20, June 1, June 15, July 20, July 27, Aug. 26, Dec. 1, 1864; *Belletristisches Journal*: Aug. 5, 1864, April 25, Oct. 31, Nov. 21, 1862, April 24, Oct. 30, Dec. 4, 1863, Jan. 1, Jan. 15, March 4, April 29, June 17, July 22, Sept. 2, Oct. 14, Oct. 21, Nov. 25, Dec. 9, 1864, June 2, Dec. 15, 1865.

with the intervention of Prussia and Austria. They had hoped to see an uprising of the whole German people to deliver the duchies from Denmark, an uprising which might serve as a focus to unite all patriotic Germans in a common enterprise. Such an expedition, if successful, would assuredly aid in initiating a movement for closer political unity. Great was their disappointment when it became evident that Prussia and Austria had resolved to intervene themselves and were determined to prevent a united German effort against Denmark. Every possible motive which the two great German powers might have for such an intervention was distrusted by the German-American press. One interpretation was that Prussia and Austria had gone to the aid of Schleswig and Holstein in order to prevent German nationalism from gaining the prestige which might result from a successful war on the part of the whole German people. The New York *Staats-Zeitung* repeatedly referred to the treachery of the great German powers. It ill became Prussia and Austria who themselves had trampled upon struggling nationalities to pose as the champions of the oppressed Schleswig-Holsteiners. The most common explanation was that the allies, especially Prussia, were bent upon the annexation of the duchies. The *Belletristisches Journal* claimed that Prussia desired the provinces to be free from Danish control, the better to rob them herself, and that Austria had accompanied Prussia in order to prevent her from upsetting the balance of power in Germany.¹

¹ New York *Staats-Zeitung*: Jan. 13, Jan. 20, Feb. 2, Feb. 4, Feb. 10, Feb. 24, March 3, March 9, March 12, March 25, April 1, April 7, April 29, May 5, May 27, June 1, July 20, Aug. 11, Aug. 18, Aug. 26, Sept. 9, 1864; *Belletristisches Journal*: April 24, Oct. 30, Dec. 25, 1863, Jan. 1, Jan. 15, Feb. 5, Feb. 12, April 22, April 29, May 6, Nov. 11, Nov. 18, 1864.

Sometimes Prussia's action was interpreted as an attempt on the part of her despotic government to prevent the spread of liberal political institutions. The New York *Staats-Zeitung* claimed that the democratic Danish constitution had been the chief cause for conflict between Denmark and Prussia, and that the latter nation had fought the former mainly to destroy the liberal Danish constitution and particularly to prevent its application to Schleswig and Holstein. A more common explanation of Bismarck's intervention was that he was trying to divert the attention of the Prussian liberals away from the constitutional struggle at home, that he was attempting to rally the Prussian people around the dynasty on the issue of a foreign war, and that he was seeking to make the people forget his past illegalities by arousing their passion for military glory. Throughout the years 1864 and 1865 the German-Americans continued to attack the Prussian government for its illegal and illiberal course. Early in February, 1864, the *Belletristisches Journal* advised the Prussian people that the time had come for them to take up arms against their government. The same paper said that the world contained no greater fool than William and no more cunning miscreant than Bismarck. The *Staats-Zeitung* noted with regret that the success of the war had strengthened the hands of Bismarck and of the Junkers, while it had weakened the power of the Prussian liberals. In 1865 the *Belletristisches Journal* paid even more attention to the Prussian constitutional struggle. It compared William to Louis XVI and Bismarck to Calonne. It warned William that he was traveling a dangerous path, and exhorted the Prussian liberals to stand firm because the future freedom of Germany depended on their success or failure.¹

¹ New York *Staats-Zeitung*: Feb. 24, March 9, March 12, March 25, April 7, April 29, May 27, June 23, July 14, July 20, July 21, Aug. 18,

German-American opinion was not so united on the question as to the final disposition of the duchies. There were several possibilities. They might be made into a separate state under republican, or perhaps monarchical, government. If they became a monarchy, there were two claimants to the throne, the Duke of Augustenburg and the Duke of Oldenburg. Or they might be annexed to Prussia, or divided between Austria and Prussia. Perhaps they might be asked to vote on their future destiny in a plebiscite. The New York *Staats-Zeitung* very strongly favored a popular referendum. Such a solution would be democratic and in accordance with the principle of self-determination of nationalities. The only argument against a plebiscite was that such a solution had been advocated by Louis Napoleon. The *Staats-Zeitung* resented the intrusion of an outsider, and feared that Napoleon might seize the opportunity to demand some German territory for himself. It felt that to make a new state under the Duke of Augustenburg, who was the logical candidate, would mean but the creation of another sovereignty to oppose the consummation of national unity. It was hostile on the whole to Prussian annexation of the duchies because their inhabitants opposed such an outcome. Moreover, Napoleon would be sure to demand compensation for such an enlargement of Prussia, compensation which the *Staats-Zeitung* feared that Bismarck was only too ready to make. The *Staats-Zeitung* was frankly pessimistic. It saw no good result to Germany from the war, and declared that the German princes must be overthrown before German reorganization could take place.¹

Sept. 16, Dec. 8, Dec. 29, 1864; *Belletristisches Journal*: Jan. 8, Feb. 12, May 13, Dec. 30, 1864, Jan. 6, Feb. 10, Feb. 17, June 30, July 7, Aug. 11, Aug. 18, Sept. 1, Sept. 15, Oct. 13, Oct. 20, 1865.

¹ New York *Staats-Zeitung*: Jan. 20, Jan. 27, Feb. 2, Feb. 10, Feb. 24, March 1, March 9, March 12, March 25, April 1, April 7, April 14, April

The *Belletristisches Journal* had no objection to a plebiscite, but laid less emphasis upon it than did the *Staats-Zeitung*. It opposed the Duke of Augustenburg, the creation of a separate state, and any French intervention in German affairs. But at least in 1864 the *Belletristisches Journal* was quite favorable to the Prussian annexation of the duchies. It was just as hostile to Bismarck and his illiberal government as was the *Staats-Zeitung*, but it saw Prussia as the only German state which could possibly achieve German unity. At first it favored the entry of the duchies into the Zollverein and into a close military alliance with Prussia, but later advocated complete consolidation. It stated its belief that Bismarck's demand for Kiel was morally wrong but politically right, since there could be no strong German fleet without Schleswig-Holstein, and no strong Germany without a strong fleet, and since Prussia was the only state which could create such a fleet. It saw with pleasure in the seizure of the provinces by Prussia the beginning of a process of mediatization which would eventually lead to the incorporation with Prussia of Hanover and many of the other minor German states. Even the *Staats-Zeitung* had spoken favorably of a mediatization of the minor states but evidently had not thought of the annexation of Schleswig and Holstein in exactly that light. The *Belletristisches Journal* admitted that Bismarck's motives were not good, but was inclined to look upon him as an agent of Providence, a man who, as it often said, intended evil and yet accomplished good. But the same paper was bitterly hostile to the Convention of Gastein which divided the duchies between Austria and Prussia. Such an act seemed a betrayal of the sacred cause of German unity and one

29, May 19, June 1, June 9, June 15, July 14, July 20, July 21, July 27, Aug. 11, Aug. 18, Aug. 26, Sept. 1, Sept. 16, Oct. 5, Oct. 26, Nov. 18, Dec. 1, Dec. 8, Dec. 16, Dec. 22, Dec. 29, 1864.

which could be productive of little benefit to Germany. And later in 1865 the *Belletristisches Journal*, which earlier had been hopeful of real gains to Germany as the result of the Danish War, also became pessimistic. In connection with the Convention of Gastein it declared that the unity which should come through infamy could never lead to freedom, and called Bismarck a most dangerous and destructive enemy not only of Prussia but of all Germany. At another time it referred to Prussia as a piratical state and said that Bismarck would never be able to conquer German particularism until he had demonstrated his conversion to liberalism.¹

The interest of the German-Americans was much greater in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 than in the Danish War of 1864, but cannot be compared to the intensity of excitement which was to be exhibited during the Franco-German War of 1870. The German-American press printed longer articles and editorials than in 1864, and a slight mention was made of the war in the published works of Lieber and Koerner. But there seem to have been few public meetings. The only one which has been found was described by the *New York Tribune*. It was held in New York early in May before the outbreak of hostilities, and was called largely to protest against the war. From the account given by the *Tribune* it seems not to have been a mass meeting but a sort of preliminary conference of the leaders of German-American opinion.² Although difficult

¹ *Ibid.*, March 3, March 9, Sept. 29, Dec. 22, Dec. 29, 1864; *Belletristisches Journal*: Dec. 4, Dec. 25, 1863, Jan. 15, March 4, April 22, April 29, June 10, June 24, July 15, Sept. 2, Sept. 9, Oct. 14, Nov. 25, Dec. 2, Dec. 9, Dec. 30, 1864, Jan. 6, Jan. 20, Feb. 3, March 3, March 17, March 31, April 28, June 2, June 9, July 7, Aug. 18, Sept. 1, Sept. 8, Sept. 22, Sept. 29, Oct. 13, Oct. 27, Dec. 8, 1865.

² *New York Tribune*: May 4, 1866.

to prove, it is not difficult to make a pretty accurate guess as to the reasons why the war of 1866 failed to evoke a great popular enthusiasm among the German-Americans. Since it was a civil war it could not but be divisive in its effects. Such a conflict could not possibly have made a single appeal to all German-Americans, for some came from Prussia and some from South Germany. Moreover, as will be seen, the individual German-American was unable to sympathize wholly with one side or the other. His feelings were always somewhat mixed, and he was inclined at first to favor one party and then the other, but neither one for long or unreservedly. There were always reservations to the opinion of the German-American in 1866, reservations which were largely absent in 1870.

In the period preceding the outbreak of hostilities and up to the battle of Sadowa, the German-Americans were on the whole very hostile to Prussia and very skeptical about any possible gains to Germany which could result from such a war. The struggle seemed to them an unprovoked act of aggression on the part of the Prussian government upon Austria and the German Confederation. However it must not be imagined that they sympathized strongly either with Austria or the German Confederation, for they considered the former a state which had always hampered German unity and freedom and the latter an institution which had long ago outworn whatever slight usefulness it might have possessed. Austria was technically in the right and her appeal to the Bund was upheld as proper. But the *Belletristisches Journal* said that it could sympathize with neither party to the war; Austria was not to blame for beginning the struggle, but she was really not much better than Prussia; a Prussian victory would be a positive injustice, but an Austrian triumph could hardly be contemplated with pleasant anticipations by any one who looked forward to a

free and united Germany. The same paper hated to see a drop of blood shed in any cause but that of the people, and called the war the greatest German shame. The *Detroit Free Press* said that the German-Americans "seem to have been from the start pretty evenly divided in sentiment."¹

However, it must not be imagined that the German-Americans were hostile to a Prussian unification of Germany. What they did fear and distrust was a Bismarckian unification. It did not seem right for this man who had insulted the Prussian people and who had trampled upon the Prussian constitution to be posing as the friend of German unification. All that he really desired probably was the annexation of German territory to Prussia and the increase of Hohenzollern prestige. A Prussian victory under Bismarck would mean the fastening of a Caesarism and of a military despotism upon the neck of Germany. The *New York Staats-Zeitung* said that the Prussian government could not be trusted to look after the needs of the German people for freedom, unity or progress. Frederick Lexow, in an article in the *Deutsch-Amerikanische Monatshefte*, wished for a real reformer in Bismarck's place, instead of a man who was the curse of the nineteenth century, a man who would not Germanize Prussia, but who insisted on Prussianizing Germany, a man whose aim was a Prussian Germany under the control of the House of Hohenzollern and the Prussian Junkers. The *New York Staats-*

¹ *Detroit Free Press*: July 31, 1866; *New York Staats-Zeitung*: Feb. 2, March 2, March 24, April 7, April 12, April 21, April 27, April 28, May 10, May 18, May 19, May 29, June 1, June 26, June 28, June 29, July 31, 1866; *Belletristisches Journal*: March 30, April 6, April 13, April 20, April 27, May 4, May 11, May 25, June 1, June 8, June 15, June 22, June 29, July 6, July 13, Sept. 7, 1866; *Deutsch-Amerikanische Monatshefte*: Jan. (art. by Victor Ernst), March, July (art. by F. Lexow), Oct., 1866 (art. by F. Lexow); Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, pp. 454-457; Lieber, *Life and Letters*, p. 365.

Zeitung pointed out that Prussia, even under Bismarck, could easily have unified all Germany by a policy of liberalism, and the *Belletristisches Journal* remarked that if Bismarck preferred to use war rather than liberalism, he was indulging in wicked sport, and declared that there was a justice in history.¹

The constitutional struggle in Prussia continued in the spring of 1866 and centered about an attempt on the part of the government to deprive the deputies of their right of freedom of speech and about the election of a new chamber. The German-Americans continued to espouse the popular cause and to oppose that of the monarch and his ministers. The New York *Staats-Zeitung* advised a change of ministry, said that conditions were as bad as in the worst days of royal absolutism, and predicted that the Hohenzollerns would go the way of the Stuarts and Bourbons. The *Belletristisches Journal* counselled Bismarck to commit *hara-kiri* as the only way out of the hopeless situation into which he had plunged his country. So strong was the hostility to Bismarck and the Prussian government among the German-Americans that it resulted in a partial revival of the feeling that a republic was the best solution for Germany. The *Belletristisches Journal* was convinced that the future of Germany was republican, and hoped that the people would use the arms given them to fight each other for the purpose of ushering in a revolution, which it described as a most glorious, most beautiful and most deserving movement. The *Staats-Zeitung* predicted a gloomy time ahead

¹ New York *Staats-Zeitung*: March 24, April 7, April 12, April 21, April 27, May 3, May 18, May 19, May 25, June 8, June 26, June 28, June 29, July 4, July 7, July 12, 1866; *Belletristisches Journal*: March 16, March 30, June 1, June 8, 1866; *Deutsch-Amerikanische Monatshefte*: March, July, 1866 (art. by F. Lexow); Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, pp. 243-245; Lieber, *Life and Letters*, p. 365.

for Germany unless the people took courage, made a revolution while the two great German princes were weakened by war, and proceeded to create a free and united Germany.¹

An important change in German-American sentiment occurred almost immediately after the astounding Prussian victories, especially after that of Sadowa, a change which was very natural and human, but none the less pathetic and almost tragic. It would be difficult to find a more striking example in history than that afforded by the battle of Sadowa of the effect of military success, of the way in which a single victory can alter the sentiment and opinion of a large number of people as it did both in the Fatherland and among the Germans of the United States. Before Sadowa most German-Americans had been distrustful and suspicious of everything Bismarckian and had regretted that the Prussian ship of state, almost the sole hope of German unity and freedom, should have been intrusted to such a pilot. After Sadowa the same people, although still inclined to be distrustful and suspicious of the details of Bismarck's plans, were convinced that at least one of the great German goals, that of national unity, was about to be achieved. In the hope of that much desired consummation many illegalities and tyrannies were forgiven. The battle of Sadowa had destroyed the dualism in German affairs. No longer could Austria stand as a barrier to German liberty and unity. Great was the rejoicing at her fall. What matter if she had been formally right at the beginning of the war? The *Belletristisches Journal* pointed out that

¹ New York *Staats-Zeitung*: Feb. 15, Feb. 21, Feb. 23, March 2, March 3, March 10, April 21, April 27, May 25, May 29, June 1, June 8, June 26, June 28, 1866; *Belletristisches Journal*: Feb. 9, March 16, April 20, April 27, May 4, June 1, June 15, June 29, 1866; *Deutsch-Amerikanische Monatshefte*: July, 1866 (art. by F. Lexow); New York *Tribune*: May 4, 1866 (meeting of Germans).

the burden of sin was so heavy on the head of the Habsburgs that innocence in this one instance could not make the load any lighter. It went on to say that Prussia had a future while Austria had none, that Prussia must inevitably tend toward democracy while Austria could never do so.¹

No more regret was felt for the fall of the German Confederation of 1815, that outworn institution. What good had it ever accomplished for Germany? Frederick Lexow, in the *Deutsch-Amerikanische Monatshefte*, asked scornfully whether anyone had the insolence to desire that German blood should be shed in defense of the Confederation, and said that anything, no matter what, would be better than the defunct Bund. Moreover the war of 1866 had destroyed the power of some of the minor princes of Germany, those stumbling blocks to any possible unification of the Fatherland. Lexow wrote that his pleasure would be proportionate to the number of thrones which fell, the number of crowns that were trampled in the dust, and the number of princes who were forced to flee. Later the *Belletristisches Journal* described the North German Confederation as a union between one eagle and many sparrows, and remarked that no one would grieve if the eagle devoured the princely sparrows. The German-Americans rejoiced, then, because three of the great barriers which had long stood in the way of a more complete unity—the power of Austria, the inertia of the German Confederation and the petty opposition of the princes—had at last been swept away by the Prussian victories of 1866.²

¹ New York *Staats-Zeitung*: July 17, July 23, July 31, 1866; Detroit *Free Press*: July 31, 1866; *Belletristisches Journal*: Aug. 3, Sept. 7, 1866; *Deutsch-Amerikanische Monatshefte*: Aug., Sept., 1866 (articles by F. Lexow).

² New York *Staats-Zeitung*: June 18, July 31, Sept. 13, 1866; *Belletristisches Journal*: July 13, Aug. 3, Sept. 14, 1866, Jan. 25, 1867; *Deutsch-Amerikanische Monatshefte*: Aug., 1866 (art. by F. Lexow); Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, pp. 454-457; Lieber, *Life and Letters*, p. 362.

With the obstacles cleared away, should not the path be open for a more satisfactory union? Had not Bismarck proposed a new plan for German unification even before that remarkable campaign? And was not Prussia the one state in Germany which could possibly consolidate all the German people into a single political organization, a true German union? Such were the arguments which underlay the extravagant predictions and hopes of the German-American press. The deeply embedded belief in the destiny of Prussia as the only German state which could lead Germany toward national unification, now came to the surface and was expressed often and enthusiastically. Prussia was the kernel, the treasure of Germany, said Lexow. The *Belletristisches Journal* considered it as clear as day that Germany would be unified under Prussian auspices and the New York *Staats-Zeitung* thought that Prussia represented progress and freedom.¹

At last German unity, which the *Staats-Zeitung* called the fundamental point in a splendid plan, the dream of centuries and the desire of the youngest generation, seemed about to be fulfilled. True enough the German dream had included freedom as well as unity, and the German-Americans were astute enough to see that freedom might have to be abandoned at least temporarily if the union under Prussian auspices was to be accepted. Most of the leaders of German-American opinion had fought for the twofold German goal and had seen the complete and total failure of their plans in 1849 and 1850. At that time they had been unwilling to make any compromise and had fled to

¹ New York *Staats-Zeitung*: July 17, Nov. 8, 1866; *Belletristisches Journal*: July 27, Sept. 7, Oct. 5, Dec. 9, 1866, March 8, 1867; *Deutsch-Amerikanische Monatshefte*: Aug., 1866 (art. by F. Lexow); Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, pp. 454-457.

a new home. But they were older in 1866 than they had been in 1849 and probably more disillusioned. Here was a chance to accomplish one of the long sought for purposes. Was not half a loaf better than no loaf at all? Was it not the part of wisdom to accept thankfully what had already been gained? And so the German-Americans, many of them Forty-eighters, in 1866 subordinated political democracy and liberty to national unification. Perhaps they were inconsistent, probably short-sighted, but certainly very human. Their struggle of 1848 and 1849 had been widely characterized as the work of idealistic dreamers, impractical men who knew not how to compromise, men of words rather than of action. The characterization had been extended to include the whole German people, and it had burned deeply into the minds of the German-Americans. Frederick Lexow said proudly that now no one could any longer dare to speak of German slowness, German unwieldiness and German impracticality. The *Staats-Zeitung* denied that the Germans were ideologues, for they had accepted conditions as they were, and had created a union which was living and capable of development. The *Belletristisches Journal* said that the Germans must make up for lost time, advised them to be practical and resourceful and warned them that if they refused to accept what Bismarck offered they were incorrigible fools and would never attain the goal.¹

Since the battle of Sadowa was the turning point in German-American opinion, the event which brought about the adoption of a fundamentally different conception of Ger-

¹ New York *Staats-Zeitung*: March 15, April 5, 1866; *Belletristisches Journal*: Nov. 16, 1866, Jan. 4, March 8, 1867; *Deutsch-Amerikanische Monatshefte*: Aug., Sept., 1866 (articles by F. Lexow); Lieber, *Life and Letters*, pp. 362, 366-367.

man affairs, it is worth while to examine the comments of three prominent German-American papers upon their shift in attitude. Frederick Lexow wrote a series of monthly articles in 1866 in the *Deutsch-Amerikanische Monatshefte*. He regretted that he had to rejoice in anything which pleased Bismarck and said that he sympathized with Prussia, but neither with William nor with Bismarck, and not because of them but in spite of them. Nevertheless he felt that the united and free development of Germany must be the result of the war, denied that the gains of the struggle were trivial, and claimed that the war of 1866 had been fought for national unification, a contest which must precede a war for freedom and democracy.¹

Almost immediately after the battle of Sadowa, the New York *Staats-Zeitung* admitted that the German people had interests which were still opposed to those of the Prussian government, but denied that such a conflict of interests could be permanent. It rejoiced that the war had created for Germany a *Bundesstaat* instead of a *Staatenbund*, a federal state instead of a loose confederation. At a later time it declared that what remained to be accomplished for German unity was only the plucking away of the last hull which hid the ripe fruit. It thought that true German patriots could safely disregard the facts that the King of Prussia was about to become Emperor of Germany and that real political liberty had not yet been achieved. Even if the Prussian military caste should become too powerful temporarily, it was inevitable that the intelligent and freedom-loving German people should attain political liberty as soon as the goal of unity had been reached. In spite of many things which the *Staats-Zeitung* would have preferred to

¹ *Deutsch-Amerikanische Monatshefte*: Aug., Sept., 1866 (articles by F. Lexow). Cf. also *ibid.*, Jan., 1866 (art. by Victor Ernst).

see otherwise, it considered that Germany was nearer to her dream of centuries than she had ever been before.¹

The *Belletristisches Journal* made very clear its belief that German unity must be achieved before German freedom. The first aim must be union. It declared that it was absurd to quarrel as to whether Germany would become free through union, or unified through freedom. It said that the smaller powers must associate themselves with the stronger and denied that Germany would disappear in Prussia. Rather Prussia was bound to be absorbed by a united Germany. When some South German radicals were planning a South German republic in the autumn of 1866, the *Belletristisches Journal* stated its feeling that a South German republic would be very fine, but that no reasonable man could conceive of its becoming an actuality, and said that it would greet with pleasure as a step forward the union of all Germany under Prussia, even if accomplished by the princes, and even if freedom should be out of the question at first. Again it said that liberty could be possible only in a united Germany. Early in 1867 it thought that German unity seemed to be progressing satisfactorily, and declared that although the methods were not those of which it could approve, yet it rejoiced over the outlook more than it could say. A little later it took upon itself to explain and defend the attitude of the whole body of German-American opinion and ended the article by saying that the German-Americans had been republicans when they left Germany, had remained republicans, had fought for a republic in America, and had come to the conclusion that the main thing for national freedom was national unity.²

¹ New York *Staats-Zeitung*: July 17, July 31, Nov. 8, Nov. 15, Dec. 22, 1866, Feb. 28, March 8, March 15, March 21, March 29, April 5, April 12, April 19, 1867.

² *Belletristisches Journal*: July 27, Sept. 7, Oct. 5, Nov. 16, Dec. 7, 1866, Jan. 4, Jan. 18, Jan. 25, Feb. 1, Feb. 22, March 8, March 15, March 29, April 5, April 12, April 26, 1867.

The growing favor with which Bismarck was regarded after the battle of Sadowa by the great majority of German-Americans can be traced in great measure to the way in which he had foiled all attempts of Napoleon III to gain compensations in German territory for the growth of Prussia. Hatred of Napoleon III was nothing new among the German-Americans in 1866. He was commonly referred to as the murderer of the French Republic or the man of the Second of December. In 1858 August Willich, a prominent German of Cincinnati, organized a demonstration of protest at the time of the execution of Orsini, an Italian patriot who had attempted to assassinate Napoleon III. In the procession were bodies of German Turners and workmen, and among the transparencies carried was one which read, "Germany for ever! Liberty for ever! Death to the Tyrants!" Lieber and Koerner were both in a quandary in 1859 as to whether they should allow their feelings to be controlled by sympathy for Italy or by hatred for Napoleon. The attitude of Napoleon toward the American Civil War together with his Mexican enterprise increased the dislike. The *Staats-Zeitung* condemned Lincoln and Seward for a spineless policy toward Napoleon and Mexico and the *Belletristisches Journal* spoke of freedom being crucified in Mexico. In 1864 the German-American press had been very hostile to any French interference and had been skeptical toward a plebiscite in the duchies just because the plan had been advocated by Napoleon.¹

¹ Cincinnati *Gazette*: May 18, 1858, July 29, 1859; New York *Herald*: May 21, 1858; New York *Staats-Zeitung*: Jan. 13, Jan. 27, Feb. 2, Feb. 16, March 1, March 12, March 22, April 7, April 9, April 14, April 29, May 5, May 19, June 1, June 9, June 15, June 20, June 30, July 14, July 20, July 21, July 27, July 28, Aug. 11, Aug. 27, Nov. 18, Dec. 12, Dec. 29, 1864, Jan. 1, Jan. 15, Feb. 12, Feb. 23, Aug. 22, Sept. 6, 1866; *Belletristisches Journal*: May 16, June 13, Aug. 1, 1862, Feb. 20, April 24,

The request of Napoleon III for German territory in 1866 made an appeal to the pride of Germans everywhere, those in America included. Under no conditions must Germany yield to the insulting French demands. The war of 1866 was strictly a German affair and foreign interference, particularly that of France, was intolerable. Bismarck's curt refusal was the occasion for general rejoicing and praise for the man who had upheld Germany's honor. The German-Americans felt that the French Emperor's action had been an important factor in bringing the Germans closer together and the *Belletristisches Journal* sarcastically thanked Napoleon for his aid. It came to be believed quite commonly that a war with France would be the necessary preliminary to national unification. It was thought that Napoleon would attempt to gain South German aid in case of war and therefore the military treaties between Prussia and the South German states were regarded as important steps in the right direction. Already, said the German-Americans, Germany is unified in respect to foreign affairs. The *Belletristisches Journal* considered that Bismarck had rebuffed Napoleon, declared that Germany had become the arbiter of Europe and said that the German who was not aroused over that must be a curious fellow. The same paper admitted that Germany had become a military power, asserted that its power would be used to protect world peace, and maintained that everyone should be pleased to see a Germany strong enough to protect Europe against French aggression. The Luxemburg affair early in 1867 served

May 28, June 5, July 10, Aug. 7, Aug. 14, 1863, April 29, May 6, 1864, May 12, June 16, 1865, March 16, Aug. 24, Nov. 9, 1866; *Deutsch-Amerikanische Monatshefte*: Feb., 1864, Jan., 1866 (art. by Victor Ernst); Conway, *Autobiography*, vol. i, pp. 268-269; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. i, pp. 573-577, 582-585, vol. ii, pp. 78, 293-294, 308-309; Lieber, *Life and Letters*, pp. 271, 287, 305-306, 311.

but to increase the belief of the German-Americans that a war with France was inevitable. They were united in upholding Bismarck's position, desired to have Luxemburg annexed to Germany for strategic purposes, declared that such a war between France and Germany would put an end once and for all to French pretensions to the Rhineland, and predicted that it could result only in the reunion of Alsace and Lorraine with the Fatherland.¹

But although the great body of German-Americans went far in their acceptance of the changes in Germany which followed the war of 1866, their approval was never given wholeheartedly or without reservations. In the first place, they chafed with impatience at the slowness with which the desired steps toward unity seemed to be taken. They wished a complete unification of all Germany and that immediately. They were opposed to the division of Germany into North and South and accused Bismarck of having created such a division partly because he feared that Prussia might lose some of her identity in a united Germany, and partly because he feared that South Germany might compel the introduction of more liberal political institutions than he intended to grant to his new union. He was following a too narrowly Prussian policy and subordinating the interests of Germany to those of Prussia and the Hohenzollerns. Most German-Americans desired the convocation of a German

¹ *New York Times*: May 2, 1867; *New York Staats-Zeitung*: May 10, May 15, July 19, July 23, July 26, July 31, Aug. 2, Aug. 14, Aug. 22, Aug. 31, Sept. 6, Sept. 12, Oct. 12, 1866, Jan. 1, Jan. 10, Feb. 7, Feb. 14, Feb. 21, March 15, March 29, April 5, April 12, April 19, April 27, May 8, 1867; *Belletristisches Journal*: April 20, June 8, June 15, July 27, Aug. 3, Aug. 10, Aug. 17, Aug. 24, Aug. 31, Sept. 28, Oct. 15, Nov. 9, Nov. 23, Dec. 14, Dec. 21, 1866, Feb. 15, Feb. 22, March 1, March 8, March 29, April 5, April 12, April 19, April 26, 1867; *Deutsch-Amerikanische Monatshefte*: Sept., Oct., 1866 (articles by F. Lexow); Lieber, *Life and Letters*, p. 365.

parliament, composed of representatives from all Germany. France would not dare to oppose a German unity founded upon such a basis of democracy and national aspirations.¹

In the second place, the Prussian government was severely attacked for its treatment of the parts of North Germany which had been annexed to Prussia. Not that there was much sympathy for the King of Hanover or the Duke of Nassau, but Bismarck was acting as if he considered the annexed territories conquered provinces. German unity and harmony could hardly be reached by such an attitude. Moreover the Prussian government had acted without consulting the wishes of the people of Frankfort, or Hesse or Hanover. The *Belletristisches Journal* indignantly remarked that the treaty of peace provided for a plebiscite in North Schleswig but for none in Hanover. The annexation of these North German states to Prussia smacked too much of a centralized union on the French model. German unity must be federal, said the German-Americans.²

Finally, the German-Americans were quite dissatisfied with the provisions of the constitution of the North German Confederation. The executive and the individual states possessed too much power, and the Reichstag too little. There were no provisions adequate to safeguard the personal liberties like freedom of the press, of association and of

¹ New York *Staats-Zeitung*: June 8, July 17, July 26, Aug. 9, Aug. 11, Aug. 16, Aug. 29, Aug. 31, Sept. 6, Sept. 13, Sept. 19, Oct. 4, Oct. 12, Nov. 1, Nov. 8, Nov. 22, Dec. 1, Dec. 15, Dec. 22, Dec. 27, 1866, Jan. 1, Jan. 10, Feb. 14, April 29, 1867; *Belletristisches Journal*: May 4, Aug. 3, Aug. 10, Aug. 17, Aug. 31, Sept. 14, Sept. 21, Sept. 28, Oct. 5, Nov. 9, Dec. 7, Dec. 14, Dec. 28, 1866, Jan. 18, March 8, 1867; *Deutsch-Amerikanische Monatshefte*: Sept., Oct., 1866 (articles by F. Lexow).

² New York *Staats-Zeitung*: July 31, Aug. 11, Aug. 16, Sept. 13, Sept. 28, Oct. 4, Dec. 27, 1866, Jan. 1, Jan. 26, 1867; *Belletristisches Journal*: Aug. 17, Aug. 24, Sept. 7, Sept. 14, Sept. 28, Oct. 12, Oct. 26, Nov. 23, Dec. 7, Dec. 21, 1866, Jan. 4, Jan. 25, 1867.

speech. The New York *Staats-Zeitung* claimed that the constitution strengthened the power of the princes to a greater extent than it enlarged the rights of the people, declared that there was always a certain amount of perfidy in all Bismarck's work, and said that as long as Prussia adhered to the policy of monarchical absolutism, her achievements could only be a patchwork. The *Belletristisches Journal* thought the constitution contained much of mediævalism, that it was pervaded from beginning to end with the conception of princely sovereignty, and that even the little power which had been given to the people was so hedged about with provisos that it had become almost chimerical.¹

In 1869 there appeared in the *North American Review* an article on Bismarck by Henry Villard, a noted German-American journalist, later famous for completing the Northern Pacific Railroad. The article is interesting for many reasons. Appearing in one of the best American magazines, more than two years after the war of 1866, the product of a cultured and influential German-American, it traced the career of Bismarck from its beginning down through the war of 1866 and the formation of the North German Confederation. Nearly all of the article is an able, dispassionate account of Bismarck's public life, in which the author brings out his ability, his illiberal policy in domestic affairs and his lack of scruple in dealing with foreign powers. Villard condemned Bismarck for the worst kind of double-dealing in bringing on the war of 1866, and denied that

¹ New York *Staats-Zeitung*: July 31, Aug. 31, Sept. 13, Sept. 19, Oct. 4, Dec. 15, Dec. 27, 1866, Jan. 1, Jan. 10, Jan. 17, Jan. 24, Jan. 26, Feb. 14, March 2, March 15, April 5, April 12, April 19, April 20, 1867; *Belletristisches Journal*: Sept. 14, Oct. 26, Nov. 9, Dec. 28, 1866, Jan. 4, Feb. 22, March 1, March 15, March 22, March 29, April 5, April 12, 1867; *Deutsch-Amerikanische Monatshefte*: Oct., Nov., 1866 (articles by F. Lexow).

there was any essential likeness between the constitution of the North German Confederation and that of the United States. The former he described as "an ingenious contrivance for strengthening and perpetuating the hold, not so much of the kingdom of Prussia as of the house of Hohenzollern, upon the members of the new confederacy, and indirectly upon all Germany." He did not blame the South German States for being unwilling to sink their independence in such an organization. And yet Villard glorified the Prussian premier for his work in unifying Germany. It is clear that unification was the all important goal in Villard's mind. Toward the end of the article he wrote:

Despite all obstacles, however, Germany will move steadily on towards unity and liberty. . . . Yet, with all his failings, he [Bismarck] has been of great service to his countrymen, who will ever remember him as the trenchant instrument of Providence which hewed a way to national unity, and made their fatherland more respected abroad than it had been since the reign of Charles V.¹

The intensity of enthusiasm and the unanimity of opinion on the part of the German-Americans during the Franco-German War was in striking contrast to the reservations and qualifications which they had appended to their expressions of sympathy in 1864 and 1866. The space in his *Memoirs* which Koerner devoted to the war of 1870 was very considerable and the comments of Lieber were frequent. Both men were completely in harmony with the German aims in the war. The *New York Staats-Zeitung* and the *Belletristisches Journal* no longer felt it to be necessary in 1870 to apologize for upholding the cause of Bis-

¹ *North American Review*: Jan., 1869.

marck and his royal master, but gave vent to the most complete agreement with the German cause. Public meetings of the German-Americans seem to have been rare in 1864 and 1866, but they were very numerous in 1870 and 1871. Indeed, it is hardly necessary to examine the German-American newspapers for that period because the meetings were so many and so fully reported in the American press as to give a very accurate conception of what German-Americans thought about the war. Speeches by prominent German-Americans, addresses to King William, Bismarck or the German people, and resolutions of sympathy were the usual accompaniments. Some of the meetings were more in the nature of celebrations and often included a parade with elaborate pageantry and much music.

The German-American meetings began with the outbreak of hostilities. These early meetings in July and August, 1870, were usually held to express sympathy with the German cause, to condemn the action of Napoleon and the French nation, to give expression to the hope that the quite generally expected German triumph might bring in its train the completion of German unity. Meetings were held early in the war in St. Louis, Chicago, New York, Milwaukee, Baltimore, Cincinnati, Richmond, Jersey City and probably many other places. A good example of such a meeting was the one held in Belleville, Illinois, which was addressed by Gustave Koerner, and at which resolutions of sympathy with the German cause were drawn up and sent to Baron Gerolt, Minister of the North German Confederation at Washington. The *Wisconsin State Journal* told of a purse of five hundred dollars collected by German-Americans of Chicago and Bloomington, Illinois, which should be given to the individual or military organization which should capture the first French flag or regimental ensign. The early German victories were greeted with expressions of

great joy. Koerner described the scene in Belleville on one such occasion: ". . . we found the streets full of people, all rejoicing, singing and embracing one another without distinction of party or creed."¹

After the battle of Sedan, the meetings turned into celebrations of victory. The number of places where such celebrations took place is astonishing. Among them were New York, St. Louis, Chicago, Charleston, Syracuse, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Albany, Poughkeepsie, Richmond, Cincinnati, Louisville, Hoboken, Trenton, Buffalo, Hartford, Terre Haute and San Francisco. The Philadelphia *Press* spoke of a "triumphant procession" composed of German-Americans, "the like of which has not been seen in Philadelphia since the memorable Sunday of 1865 when the news of Lee's surrender thrilled the loyal heart of our goodly city." The three days' festival which was held at Jones' Wood near New York, partook of the nature of a pageant which depicted the important personages in the German war and the coronation of King William of Prussia as German Emperor. Koerner said of Belleville after the news of Sedan had reached there: "There was tumultuous rejoicing. Rhine wine and champagne flowed in streams." That Koerner was not greatly exaggerating is perhaps borne out by the statement of the *New York Times* to the effect that the number of beer stamps sold had increased three or four times over what it had been at the outbreak of the war.²

¹ *New York Tribune*: Aug. 2, 1870; *New York Times*: Aug. 2, Aug. 7, Aug. 9, Aug. 20, Aug. 23, Aug. 25, 1870; *Milwaukee Sentinel*: July 19, 1870; *Wisconsin State Journal*: July 19, July 26, 1870; Richmond *Enquirer*: July 22, July 26, July 27, Aug. 12, 1870; Cincinnati *Gazette*: July 22, 1870; *Belletristisches Journal*: July 22, 1870; *De La Salle Monthly*: Sept., 1870; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, pp. 507-514.

² Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, p. 514; *New York Tribune*: Sept. 10, Sept. 21, 1870; *New York Times*: Sept. 4, Sept. 5, Sept. 7, Sept. 8, Sept. 11,

But the German-American celebrations after Sedan were thrown into the shade by the magnitude of those held at the close of the war and to do honor to the newly established German Empire. The one in Cincinnati came as early as February, 1871, while the Philadelphia festival was not held until May, 1871. Chicago, New York, Brooklyn, Washington, Baltimore, Cleveland, Wilmington and Wheeling were the seats of similar festivals. In Philadelphia the Germans spent three days in the celebration, Saturday and Sunday with appropriate services at the synagogues and churches, Monday with speechmaking and parading. Gustave Koerner has given an interesting description of the Chicago celebration, which seems to have been an historical pageant of the military development of the German people. Germans dressed according to the descriptions of Tacitus, Germans dressed as Crusaders, Germans in the costume of the War of Liberation and Germans as Uhlans of 1870 formed part of the parade. The Kaiser, the Crown Prince, Moltke and Bismarck were all represented. "Besides this there were some half dozen fancy groups on floats, most beautifully arrayed, in which some of the handsomest German ladies figured." Probably the New York celebration outdid all the rest. Speeches were made by Oswald Ottendorfer, editor of the *Staats-Zeitung*, Sigismund Kaufman, who had been elected Lieutenant-Governor of New York in the preceding autumn, and William Cullen Bryant, that veteran speech-maker. The New York *Tribune* called it the largest parade that New York had ever seen and claimed that it was composed of forty thousand people. Business seems to have been for the most part suspended. An inter-

Sept. 12, Sept. 13, Sept. 15, Sept. 17, Sept. 18, Sept. 22, Sept. 26, Sept. 28, Oct. 4, 1870; *Charleston Courier*: Sept. 7, Sept. 8, 1870; *Philadelphia Press*: Sept. 6, 1870; *New York Staats-Zeitung*: Sept. 6, 1870; Taylor, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 531.

esting account of the New York celebration was given in *Leslie's Weekly* which devoted a large portion of one issue to that purpose. According to *Leslie's Weekly* there were twelve thousand horses, twelve hundred carriages, one hundred and thirty brass bands and twenty-five drum corps in the tremendous procession.¹

The sympathy of the German-Americans with their Fatherland did not stop with fair words. Early in the war there were established German-American Aid Societies to procure money, food and clothing for the widows, orphans and wounded of Germany. At first they were formed locally, and rather spontaneously, but later the organization was enlarged, systematized and placed upon a national basis. A federation of the Aid Societies met in August, 1870, at Chicago, and made a nation-wide appeal for charity in addition to drawing up a set of resolutions which were perhaps more representative of German-American opinion than similar addresses or resolutions passed by any local gathering of German-Americans. The *New York Times* listed fifty-six towns and cities in the United States where branches of the national organization had been established. Large as well as small towns played their part. Canojoharie and Keokuk each made its contribution, as well as New York City, Chicago and Washington. It is difficult to speak accurately as to the amount of money actually despatched to Germany, but conservative estimates place it at more than half a million dollars. Many were the devices employed to raise money. Bazaars were held in Washington and New York. President Grant patronized the one in Washington and William Cullen Bryant opened the one in

¹ *New York Tribune*: April 10, April 11, 1871; *Philadelphia Press*: May 15, May 16, 1871; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Feb. 4, Feb. 6, 1871; *Leslie's Weekly*: April 29, 1871; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, p. 530.

New York. By the sale of books, Mrs. Francis Lieber made fifteen hundred dollars at the New York bazaar which was held in the armory of the Thirty-seventh Regiment and which cleared between fifty and seventy-five thousand dollars. The National Shooting Festival in Washington appropriated twenty-five per cent of its receipts to the German Aid Societies. In Milwaukee one thousand dollars was cleared for the fund from a concert given by Ole Bull, the famous violinist, and at College Point, New York, three thousand dollars was raised from an auction of lager beer. The rural districts were canvassed by German ministers and teachers, and it was reported that thirty German-American surgeons were sent to Germany by the Aid Societies. A different kind of aid was described by Moncure D. Conway, war correspondent in Germany, who was startled to hear a troop of German soldiers singing "John Brown's Body." At least some German-Americans must have returned to fight for the Fatherland! ¹

There can be little doubt, then, that the German cause in the Franco-German War was supported enthusiastically, and almost unanimously, by the German-Americans. A brief analysis must be made, however, of their opinion upon some of the most important issues. In the first place, they apparently believed that France had begun the war on a frivolous pretext, and that the Germans were fighting a

¹ New York *Tribune*: Aug. 23, Dec. 23, 1870; New York *Times*: Aug. 5, Aug. 25, Aug. 31, Sept. 5, Sept. 6, Sept. 10, Sept. 11, Sept. 13, Sept. 14, Sept. 16, Sept. 17, Sept. 25, Oct. 1, Oct. 8, Oct. 17, Oct. 18, Oct. 19, Oct. 23, Oct. 24, Oct. 25, Oct. 29, 1870; New York *World*: Sept. 9, 1870; Charleston *Courier*: Sept. 8, Oct. 26, 1870; Milwaukee *Sentinel*: July 19, 1870; Wisconsin *State Journal*: July 19, July 26, Sept. 27, Oct. 6, 1870; Cincinnati *Gazette*: July 22, 1870; San Francisco *Bulletin*: Aug. 10, Aug. 19, 1870; Carthage *Gazette*: Dec. 8, 1870; *Belletristisches Journal*: July 22, July 29, 1870; *De La Salle Monthly*: Sept., 1870; *Scribner's Magazine*: April, 1871; Conway, *Autobiography*, vol. ii, p. 229; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, pp. 507-512; Lieber, *Life and Letters*, p. 401.

defensive struggle. Germany's honor, Germany's territory, Germany's union had been attacked by a jealous tyrant in Paris. The New York *Staats-Zeitung* thought that Prussia had yielded on every possible point, called the demands of Napoleon an attempt to humiliate Prussia, and blamed the whole French people as well as their emperor. The *Belletristisches Journal* claimed that France, in attempting to dictate as to who should or should not be king of Spain, was treating that country like a French colony, called the attitude of the French government an insane one, and a challenge to Germany, and compared Napoleon to a man who throws his cloak on the ground, and then warns no one to walk over it. In his description of the various German meetings in the United States, Koerner spoke of one of their purposes as being that of "denouncing the imperial government for its outrageous breach of the peace." The resolutions of a meeting in Washington declared that the war was "frivolous on the part of France, and a crime against humanity," and the Germans of St. Louis spoke of Napoleon's having begun the war on "a contemptible pretext." Sigismund Kaufman in the great meeting of April 10, 1871, in New York, thought the war had been started "to supply the wine of glory to an ever-thirsty people, and to sustain a rotten throne," while the resolutions of the same meeting claimed that the struggle had been begun by an act "of unprecedented frivolity." A Philadelphia rabbi claimed that the German cause was just, that the French had initiated the war on "a flimsy pretext, an imagined outrage upon the dignity of the French ambassador."¹

¹ New York *Tribune*: April 11, 1871, Aug. 2, Aug. 23, 1870; New York *Times*: Aug. 2, Aug. 25, Aug. 31, 1870; New York *World*: July 21, Sept. 9, 1870; Charleston *Courier*: Sept. 8, 1870; Wisconsin *State Journal*: July 26, 1870; Richmond *Enquirer*: July 27, 1870 (Washington meeting); Philadelphia *Press*: May 15, May 16, 1871; Milwaukee *Sentinel*: July 19,

It is very evident however that the German-American attacks upon Napoleon and the French people did not proceed entirely from their belief that France had begun an unrighteous war. In addition, the Germans of the United States disliked the Emperor of the French and the nation over which he ruled on general principles. The old hatred of Napoleon flared up again and the smouldering hostility to everything French came to a head. The Emperor himself was the subject of much unfriendly comment. Francis Lieber thought him clever but a man who would not shrink from any crime or infamy. The New York *Staats-Zeitung* denied that he was a great statesman and called him only a lucky dilettante and the general destroyer of Europe's peace. A meeting of Chicago Germans described Napoleon as a "perfidious traitor," and at one of the meetings of New York Germans he was spoken of as the wanton aggressor. Most severe on the French Emperor was the *Belletristisches Journal* which attacked the shamelessness of the French adventurer and referred to Napoleon as the destroyer of European peace and the enemy of the welfare of all peoples. It declared that peace could never be made so long as he remained ruler of France, and later rejoiced that his downfall had been neither tragic nor sublime, and that he could never be considered by posterity as a hero or a martyr. The same paper was bitter in its assault upon the French government which it described as being composed of an emperor who made more mistakes than could be counted, a queen who had been a courtesan, a minister of foreign affairs [the Duc de Gramont] who was a foiled intriguer,

1870 (St. Louis meeting); New York *Staats-Zeitung*: July 8, July 13, July 15, July 16, July 21, July 22, Aug. 2, Aug. 13, Sept. 5, Sept. 17, 1870, Feb. 28, 1871; *Belletristisches Journal*: July 15, July 22, Aug. 5, Aug. 12, Aug. 19, Oct. 14, 1870; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, p. 507; Lieber, *Life and Letters*, pp. 397-398.

and a premier [Émile Ollivier] who was a renegade and who possessed the trust or respect of no party.¹

But the antagonism was not directed at the emperor and his government alone. What he had done was only to follow the foreign policy bequeathed to him by nearly every French diplomat since the days of Richelieu, a policy which had been sanctioned moreover by many generations of Frenchmen. Richelieu, Louis XIV and Napoleon I were allotted a portion of the German-American wrath. The French people had ratified the imperial government but a few months before the outbreak of war and indeed had been more friendly to Napoleon after the beginning of his struggle than at any other time during his career. The German-Americans considered the French people then as responsible for the acts of their ruler and entitled to part of the hostility which was felt for him. The French had goaded Napoleon into demanding the rectification of the boundaries and into attempting the seizure of the Rhenish provinces from Germany.²

The national characteristics of the French people were also the subject of attack from the German-Americans. The New York *Staats-Zeitung* stigmatized the French as the boldest, most arrogant people in the world. The *Belletristisches Journal* accused them of being theatrical, of lacking

¹ New York *Tribune*: April 11, 1871 (New York celebration); New York *Times*: Aug. 25, 1870; *Wisconsin State Journal*: July 19, 1870 (meeting in Chicago); New York *Staats-Zeitung*: July 21, 1870; *Belletristisches Journal*: July 15, Aug. 12, Aug. 26, Sept. 2, 1870; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, pp. 507-512; Lieber, *Life and Letters*, pp. 397-398.

² New York *Tribune*: Sept. 16, Sept. 21, 1870, April 11, 1871; New York *Times*: Sept. 18, 1870; *Wisconsin State Journal*: July 29, 1870; New York *Staats-Zeitung*: July 19, Aug. 2, Aug. 27, Sept. 1, Sept. 5, Sept. 8, Sept. 17, Dec. 12, 1870, Feb. 25, 1871; *Belletristisches Journal*: July 15, July 22, July 29, Sept. 9, Sept. 23, Oct. 14, Oct. 28, Nov. 4, Dec. 9, 1870, Jan. 20, Feb. 3, March 3, 1871; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, pp. 504-507.

moral earnestness, and thought no people had ever shown themselves so entirely wanting in real character. The same paper said that it was no wonder that France had called in vain upon freedom to save her because she had so often betrayed freedom. If France wished to become great again she must become moral and educated like Germany, and must reform herself from the ground up. Even more severe was a comment by Francis Lieber:

A Frenchman . . . is . . . eminently ungentlemanly and cruel as soon as his boundless vanity has been injured. I use the term *cruel*, and it is a fact that no history is more bloodstained than that of France, and that Frenchmen appear to enjoy the revelling in blood as dogs when they have at last caught their long-chased prey.¹

The proclamation of a republic in France seems to have had little effect upon German-American opinion. The French people had consented to the war, they were as much to blame as Napoleon, and they could not escape the just penalty for their sins by the establishment of a republic, which the German-Americans called no real republic at all, but only an unsanctioned seizure of power by a group of men who thought themselves republican. The Executive Committee of the German Patriotic Societies of New York framed a despatch, signed by ex-Governor Edward Salomon of Wisconsin, to the effect that the establishment of a government in Paris which bore the name of a republic had in no way changed the original issues in the war. Sigismund Kaufman addressed a meeting in New York in which he said that Germany had not fought against Napoleon, but rather against the French nation which had invoked the

¹ Lieber, *Life and Letters*, pp. 412-413; *New York Tribune*: April 11, 1871; *New York Staats-Zeitung*: Aug. 2, 1870; *Belletristisches Journal*: July 29, Aug. 5, Sept. 2, Oct. 21, Dec. 9, 1870, Jan. 6, 1871.

war. Gustave Koerner wrote an open letter to the *Chicago Tribune* in which he criticised the arguments by which Wendell Phillips was endeavoring to change American opinion and to make it more favorable to the new French Republic. On August 12, 1870, the *Belletristisches Journal* had stated very definitely that no peace could be made with France so long as Napoleon remained emperor, but a week later when it seemed probable that Napoleon might fall at any moment, the same paper declared that Germany was not making war against a personality but against France, and said that a change of government could not change the issues in the war. Later the *Belletristisches Journal* appeared to wish success to the new republic, but employed the old argument of impracticality, that France was not ready for a republic, and that the requisite civil virtue for republican institutions was lacking. The republican leaders were accused of ambition to retain power and of unwillingness to call a constituent assembly for fear lest they should lose control. The same paper described the republic at one time as a government of madmen and Turcos, at another time as the balloon government in reference to the way in which Gambetta had escaped from Paris by air.¹

In the same way in which the German-Americans condemned everything French so did they laud everything German. The German leaders, Bismarck and King William, who had received little but execration from the Germans in

¹ *New York Tribune*: April 11, 1871; *New York Times*: Sept. 15 (address of Executive Committee of German Patriotic Societies of New York), Sept. 18, 1870 (speech of Kaufman); *New York Staats-Zeitung*: Sept. 8, Sept. 17, Sept. 21, 1870; *Belletristisches Journal*: Aug. 12, Aug. 19, Sept. 23, Oct. 7, Oct. 14, Oct. 21, Oct. 28, Nov. 4, Nov. 11, Nov. 18, Dec. 2, Dec. 9, Dec. 16, 1870, Jan. 27, Feb. 10, Feb. 24, March 3, 1871; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, pp. 514-518.

America in 1864 and 1866, were described in glowing terms in 1870. The *Irish Citizen* spoke with sarcasm of those Germans who had fled from before the troops of William in 1848 and 1849 and who were now in 1870 "triumphantly marching in procession" in his honor. Pictures of the German leaders and living representations of them were conspicuous features of many of the German-American celebrations. In the German meeting in Philadelphia after the battle of Sedan, three cheers were proposed for King William and Bismarck, "which were given with a will." The New York *Tribune* reported of Sigismund Kaufman's speech at the time of the German celebration of April, 1871, that when he referred to Moltke as a great general and to King William as having shown himself a genuine German monarch, there was cheering, but that the response was tremendous when Bismarck's name was mentioned. The New York *Staats-Zeitung* repudiated republicanism for Germany, contrasted the popularity of William in 1870 with his earlier unpopularity, called him the right man in the right place, and thought that he had accomplished more for Germany than Frederick the Great. The same paper praised Bismarck for his vital strength, breadth of view, depth of judgment and ability to turn off work. Although still rather hostile to William's ideas of divine right, the *Belletristisches Journal* considered him in the fullest sense a man of honor, praised him as a brave man and as one who had never lied to the German people, and felt that all German patriots must respect him regardless of how their views might differ from his. Its opinion of Bismarck was equally laudatory. It thought that he had accomplished a great work which deserved admiration and claimed that his opponents in statesmanship were pygmies in comparison to him. It declared that Germany and the world had much to thank

him for, since German unification had been very largely his handiwork.¹

The traits of the German national character were eulogized, naturally enough, by the Germans in the United States. The high standard of education and intelligence, the deep moral earnestness of the German people, were very frequently the subject of praise by the German-Americans. Gustave Koerner described the Germans as "the most humane, the most just, the most genial and noble of all peoples." In a speech at the New York celebration of the German-Americans in April, 1871, Oswald Ottendorfer, editor of the *Staats-Zeitung*, referred to the German victory over France as "a triumph of truth and justice over falsity and ambition, of decency over frivolity, and culture and true civilization over brutality and passion." One of the speakers at the Philadelphia festival in May, 1871, spoke of Germany as "the guide of civilization, the modern Hellas of art and science, . . . the tutor of nations in religion, art, and science." On the same occasion another speaker, a German-Jewish rabbi, explained the German victory by saying: "This feeling of *duty* it was that chained victory to the German banner, and well may we thank God that our liberty, our ideas, have conquered." The praise of the *Belletristisches Journal* for the German characteristics was frequently and strongly expressed. The quiet self-composure and resolute determination of the German in face of danger and warfare were remarked with favor. The heroic, majes-

¹ New York *Tribune*: April 11, 1871; New York *Times*: Aug. 2, Aug. 20, Aug. 25, Sept. 15, 1870; New York *World*: Sept. 6, 1870; Philadelphia *Press*: Sept. 6, 1870, May 15, 1871; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Jan. 27, 1871; New York *Staats-Zeitung*: July 20, Aug. 4, Aug. 27, Sept. 5, Sept. 8, Dec. 12, 1870, Jan. 20, Jan. 21, 1871; Irish *Citizen*: April 15, 1871; *Belletristisches Journal*: Aug. 5, Aug. 12, Sept. 9, Sept. 16, Oct. 14, Nov. 11, Dec. 16, Dec. 30, 1870, Jan. 27, Feb. 3, Feb. 24, March 3, 1871; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, p. 530.

tic, noble German people were surely entitled to recognition at the head of civilization. If the French wished to become truly great let them copy the Germans in regard to education, morality, truth and respect for the rights of others. French vanity was contrasted with the German trait of a true, self-respecting, noble pride. The Germans possessed a moderation and tolerance not to be found in any other people.¹

At times German-American sentiment took on a form almost lyrical. Praise for Germany, and still more praise! At the Philadelphia celebration in May, 1871, one of the speakers exclaimed: "Germania! it is the victoress," and at the same time a Lutheran clergyman saw the hand of God in Germany's triumph. The latter cried out: "That is the great secret in this war, that the Lord rent the clouds, and put forth his hand. A victory as won by the Germans can only be won through Him."² Carl Schurz wrote in a letter to Hamilton Fish, the American Secretary of State: "One thing is settled now. Germany is destined to be *the* great power of Europe, and it will be a very substantial one. There are no humbugs and shams about it. It is all solid and real from top to bottom."³ Early in the war Francis Lieber expressed his feelings with characteristic emotion: "I am writing at random, for my very soul is filled with one thought, one feeling—Germany." After the struggle was all over he was equally emotional: "God bless

¹ New York *Tribune*: April 11, 1871, Sept. 16, 1870; New York *Times*: Sept. 26, 1870; New York *Staats-Zeitung*: Jan. 21, 1871; Philadelphia *Press*: May 15, May 16, 1871, Sept. 6, 1870; *Belletristisches Journal*: July 22, July 29, Aug. 5, Aug. 12, Aug. 19, Aug. 26, Sept. 9, Oct. 28, Dec. 9, 1870, Jan. 6, Feb. 3, March 3, 1871; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, p. 509.

² Philadelphia *Press*: May 15, May 16, 1871.

³ Schurz, *Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers*, vol. i, p. 519.

Germany! The future history of mankind and humanity stand in need of her.”¹ At the opening of the war the *Belletristisches Journal* at the top of its editorial page brought to the notice of the German government the fact that the Germans in America were willing to make any sacrifice for Germany and invited the German government to call upon them. The same paper wished friendly handshakes to all patriots and curses to all traitors. It hoped that God might bless the Fatherland and its weapons, and exclaimed after the battle of Sedan: “High, high flies the German banner, the banner of freedom and humanity. . . . Honor to the German people, who have accomplished this miracle. . . . Hail to thee, Germania. . . . It is the beginning of a new, a better time which dates from September 2, 1870. We are happy, proud and satisfied.”² Frederick Lexow wrote a poem “Dem Vaterland” which expressed well the spirit of the German-Americans:

Gott segne dich, O Vaterland!
 Gott segne deine Wehre!
 Du trägst in deiner starken Hand
 Der Völker Glück und Ehre.
 Gott segne, Deutschland, dein Panier,
 Auf dass es herrlich walle!
 Ein jeder Sieg, errungen dir,
 Er ist ein Sieg für Alle.³

¹ Lieber, *Life and Letters*, pp. 398, 414.

² *Belletristisches Journal*: July 22, July 29, Aug. 5, Aug. 12, Sept. 9, Dec. 30, 1870, Jan. 6, Jan. 27, Feb. 3, March 3, 1871.

³ *Ibid.*, Aug. 26, 1870; *New York Tribune*: April 11, 1871; *New York Staats-Zeitung*: July 20, Aug. 2, Aug. 4, Aug. 31, 1870, Jan. 20, Jan. 21, Jan. 30, Feb. 25, 1871; *Wisconsin State Journal*: July 19, 1870; *Richmond Enquirer*: July 27, 1870; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Feb. 6, 1871; *De La Salle Monthly*: Sept., 1870.

The chief cause for such lyrical outbursts as the foregoing on the part of the German-Americans lay in their belief that German unity was at last being completed. By his very intervention Napoleon III had made sure that South Germany would be consolidated with the North German Confederation. Finally the great German dream of the century was about to be fulfilled. In his description of a meeting in Belleville, Illinois, Koerner wrote: "With three rousing cheers for a great, strong, united and free Germany the meeting broke up."¹ A German clergyman in Charleston, South Carolina, claimed that the aim of Germany in the war of 1870 was national unity. An address to the German nation from the Germans of St. Louis stated that German victory would secure German unity. A German Catholic priest of Cincinnati remarked at the German celebration in that city: "What a proud sensation does it call forth when we say to ourselves: Germany is one great and united country."² At the great meeting of Germans in New York at Steinway Hall, in September, 1870, it was resolved: "That we hope and expect to see a firm organic consolidation of all German States effected without delay."³ At the German jubilee in the same city in April, 1871, one of the speakers rejoiced that the war had given to "the German people that unity which it lacked so long," and the resolutions declared that the German-Americans looked "with pride and admiration upon . . . the abolition of the line of the Main, and the Union of the North and South German States as one German Empire." A poem which appeared as part of the celebration at 214 Bowery ended with the lines:

¹ Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, p. 510.

² *Cincinnati Gazette*: Feb. 6, 1871; *Charleston Courier*: Sept. 8, 1870; *Milwaukee Sentinel*: July 19, 1870 (meeting in St. Louis).

³ *New York Times*: Sept. 18, 1870.

'Tis realized the German dream—
Great Fatherland live long!¹

In the September meeting of the Germans of Philadelphia one of the banners had "embroidered upon it in the most elaborate style the figure of Germania, and upon the opposite side the words '*Eintracht ist Macht*' (union is power)." A delegation of German cabinet-makers carried a transparency which read: "Through the union of Germany the victory was won." "*Durch die Eintracht Deutschlands wurde der Sieg errungen.*" In the May celebration in Philadelphia one of the speakers rejoiced in "a union which we hope will surpass, in loftiness and durability, all the political connivances of past ages," and another speaker said: "We rejoice today in the unity of Germany—the realization of the dreams of her poets and the prayers of her patriots." The resolutions referred with pleasure to "'the unity of Germany' which has brought salvation and blessing to the dear old Fatherland."²

The German-American press was no less enthusiastic over the consummation of German unity. The *New Yorker Journal* exulted in German union as the highest triumph. The *New York Staats-Zeitung* called the achievement of German union the greatest event of the epoch and was delighted that the dream of centuries and the patriotic wish of the last generation had at last been realized through the establishment of a great and powerful German empire. The *Belletristisches Journal* was pleased at the disappearance of the line of the Main and thought that the chief aim of the war had been the realization of a more complete union between North and South Germany. It rejoiced that Ger-

¹ *New York Tribune*: April 11, 1871.

² *Philadelphia Press*: Sept. 6, 1870, May 15, May 16, 1871.

many had ceased to be a geographical expression and had become a living reality, maintained that there was nothing of patchwork in the new unity, and joyfully greeted the accomplishment of the dreams of youth, the formation of the German Reich.¹

In answer to the very natural question as to whether the German-Americans had completely forgotten their dream of German liberty in their joy over the fulfillment of their dream of German unity, it can be said that they had not forgotten German liberty but had definitely subordinated it, for the time being at least. There was some slight complaint that a constituent assembly had not been called, or that the new political structure of the German Empire seemed to give too much power to the Emperor and Bundesrath and too little to the popular Reichstag.² But such complaint was rare and not very characteristic of the real trend of German-American opinion. Of course German freedom and liberty and democracy were good and desirable goals, but they were for the present overshadowed. One commonly expressed thought was that patriotic German-Americans should not bother about the democratic goal while the patriotic goal was so near to achievement. Concentrate upon the latter for the present, and the former would take care of itself. A second thought was that German unity

¹ *New York Tribune*: Sept. 8, Sept. 10, Sept. 21, 1870; *New York Times*: Aug. 2, Aug. 5, Aug. 7, Aug. 24, Aug. 25, Oct. 4, 1870; *New York World*: Sept. 6, 1870 (citation from *New Yorker Journal*); *New York Staats-Zeitung*: Sept. 9, Nov. 25, Dec. 12, 1870, Feb. 11, 1871; *Wisconsin State Journal*: July 19, July 26, 1870; *Belletristisches Journal*: July 15, July 22, July 29, Aug. 5, Aug. 12, Sept. 2, Oct. 14, Oct. 21, Nov. 4, Nov. 11, Nov. 18, Dec. 2, Dec. 16, Dec. 30, 1870, Feb. 3, Feb. 24, 1871.

² *Philadelphia Press*: May 15, 1871; *New York Staats-Zeitung*: Oct. 21, 1870, Jan. 21, 1871; *Belletristisches Journal*: Dec. 16, 1870, Jan. 27, Feb. 3, 1871.

was the best if not the only road to German liberty, that unity must be achieved first and that liberty would inevitably follow in its wake.

In a despatch to Bismarck the Germans of St. Louis hoped as a reward for German victory "German unity, and a full and free representation of the people in Parliament." One of the speakers at the Cincinnati festival in February, 1871, remarked: "We would pray before all things for Germany, that the new-born unity shall be the basis of popular liberty." Frederick Hassaurek, a prominent Forty-eighter, said at the same time that he believed that German unification would be the foundation of German liberty.¹ At the Philadelphia celebration one of the resolutions read: "We hope and anticipate that upon the basis of this unity of Germany, civil liberty may assume a higher and nobler standard." At the same celebration a transparency was inscribed with the words:

As you have been united in war,
Germans, be united in progress,
And the world will praise you.²

A speaker at a German meeting in New York in August, 1870, thought that "Germany united would of necessity become also a free country." One of the resolutions of the Steinway Hall meeting in September illustrated the connection in the German-American mind between unity and liberty: ". . . the union of Germany and the unimpeded development of her freedom are indispensable to each other, and only union and liberty united can guard Germany." At the celebration of April, 1871, a speaker said in referring to German unity, ". . . on this firm foundation it [the

¹ *Cincinnati Gazette*: Feb. 6, 1871; *New York Times*: Oct. 4, 1870.

² *Philadelphia Press*: May 15, May 16, 1871.

German people] may continue to labor on the greater task of its future—the development and completion of its freedom.”¹

The *Belletristisches Journal* thought that freedom was assured as soon as unity was no longer in question, and said that there was more liberty in monarchical Germany than republican France had ever possessed. It felt that patriotism and unity were all that mattered for the present, that Germans should not be thinking of the struggle between republicanism and monarchism, and it praised those German-Americans who had fled from William as the grape-shot prince of 1848 and who were now sending congratulations to William as the Emperor of a united Germany. The New York *Staats-Zeitung* defended a monarchical form of government for Germany. A republic might be ideally the best type, but it was not suited to Germany. The same paper went on to attack those Americans who saw everything good in a republic and everything bad in a monarchy. The Forty-eighters had once felt much the same way, but they had dwelt in a republican country for more than twenty years and were inclined to look back upon their earlier opinions as idealistic dreams. True freedom is based upon unity, said the *Staats-Zeitung*. Without unity, freedom means anarchy. The form of government isn't so important, once Germany is unified. Truly the Forty-eighters had traveled a goodly distance since they had chosen exile for the sake of republicanism and democracy.²

¹ New York *Tribune*: April 11, 1871, Aug. 2, Sept. 21, 1870; New York *Times*: Aug. 20, Sept. 18, Aug. 2, Aug. 25, 1870; New York *World*: Nov. 18, 1870; Milwaukee *Sentinel*: July 19, 1870; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, pp. 507-512.

² New York *Staats-Zeitung*: Aug. 27, Sept. 8, Sept. 23, Oct. 31, Dec. 12, 1870, Jan. 21, 1871; *Belletristisches Journal*: Aug. 5, Oct. 7, Nov. 11, Dec. 16, 1870, Jan. 6, Feb. 3, Feb. 24, 1871.

By 1870 the German-Americans had become almost completely reconciled to Prussian and Hohenzollern leadership in the process of German unification. Although once in a while there was voiced an echo of the former distrust of Prussian leadership, the general feeling in 1870 seems to have been that Prussia must be completely identified with Germany, that no opposition must be offered to the plans of the Prussian leaders who represented Germany's interests in the national crisis. At a meeting of German veterans of the American Civil War it was stated that those Germans who had fought against Prussia in 1848 and 1849 must now forget their ancient animosity and must sympathize entirely "with Prussia, or rather with Germany." An authoritative pronouncement from the Federation of German Aid Societies maintained that the King of Prussia was the representative of the German nation under whose leadership alone German rights could be protected. At the outset of the war, Gustave Koerner indignantly denied that Napoleon would be able to separate Prussia from the rest of Germany. Francis Lieber thought that the first thing to be done after the end of the war would be to place the imperial crown of Germany on the head of William I. The *New York Staats-Zeitung* recited the benefits which Prussian leadership had rendered to Germany, claimed that whatever aided the Prussian dynasty also aided Germany, and declared that the House of Hohenzollern had reached its present power only as the champion of the unity and freedom of Germany. At another time it prophesied that Prussia under Hohenzollern auspices would henceforth be the firm kernel of Germany. The *Belletristisches Journal* completely identified Prussia with Germany and said that Prussia, or more correctly Germany, represented order and freedom not only for itself but for the whole world. The German who refused to put himself at the command of Prussia was a traitor

in the eyes of the *Belletristisches Journal*. The same paper thought that Prussian hegemony and preponderance in Germany was unquestionable and inevitable, and believed that the Hohenzollerns were about ready to abandon their past course and were willing to go hand in hand with the German people.¹

Almost as soon as the war broke out the German-Americans began to talk of the terms of peace. They were unanimous on one point, that Alsace and Lorraine must be annexed by the rejuvenated Germany. The provinces had been seized by the French in times past, and Germany would only be regaining territory which had been stolen by France. Alsace had remained German in speech and both provinces were really German rather than French. German safety demanded that the fortresses of Metz and Strassburg be taken from France. They had been stepping stones for French aggression against Germany, and must be held by peaceful Germany as perpetual barriers to further French schemes of conquest. German honor dictated that the shame of having two of Germany's fairest provinces in the control of the hereditary enemy must be swept away once and for all. Such were the arguments employed by the German-Americans to justify the seizure of Alsace and Lorraine.²

Both the New York *Staats-Zeitung* and the *Belletris-*

¹ New York *Times*: Aug. 7, Aug. 25, 1870; New York *Staats-Zeitung*: Aug. 2, Aug. 4, Aug. 27, Sept. 1, Oct. 21, Nov. 25, Dec. 12, 1870, Jan. 21, 1871; *Belletristisches Journal*: July 22, Oct. 14, Nov. 11, Dec. 16, 1870, Jan. 27, Feb. 3, 1871; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, pp. 507-512; Lieber, *Life and Letters*, p. 398.

² New York *Tribune*: Sept. 16, Sept. 21, 1870; New York *Times*: Sept. 18, Oct. 4, 1870; New York *Staats-Zeitung*: July 28, Aug. 24, Sept. 5, Sept. 8, Sept. 9, Nov. 7, 1870; Cincinnati *Gazette*: Feb. 6, 1871; San Francisco *Bulletin*: Oct. 1, 1870; *Belletristisches Journal*: Aug. 19, Aug. 26, Sept. 2, Sept. 23, Sept. 30, Oct. 21, Oct. 28, Nov. 4, 1870, March 3, 1871; *Nation*: Nov. 17, Dec. 22, 1870.

tisches Journal were insistent upon the reunion of the provinces to the Fatherland. The *San Francisco Bulletin* printed an anonymous letter from a German-American in favor of the annexation, and the *New York Tribune* had three such letters in its columns on one day alone. Four letters of Francis Lieber have been found to the same effect. He was insistent upon the annexation, seemed to feel it his duty to enlighten American public opinion on the subject, and wrote to James A. Garfield that no plebiscite was necessary, citing the American precedent in the annexation of Louisiana. A resolution of the Germans in Belleville, Illinois, at the beginning of the war called for "a restitution of the German provinces of France to a united Germany." After the battle of Sedan meetings of Germans were held in St. Louis, Newark and New York at which protests were voiced against any surrender of Alsace and Lorraine because France had now become a republic or for any other reason. The German-Americans in their celebrations in the spring of 1871 in Philadelphia, Cincinnati and New York all rejoiced in the return of the lost provinces.¹

An additional reason for the enthusiasm of the German-Americans over the return of Alsace and Lorraine lay in their belief that German unity would not be secure until those provinces should be reunited to the Fatherland. One of the German-American letters to the *New York Tribune* declared: "German unity were indeed incomplete with the

¹ *New York Tribune*: Sept. 8, Sept. 16, Sept. 17, Sept. 21, 1870; April 11, 1871; *New York Times*: Sept. 15, Sept. 18, Oct. 4, 1870; *New York World*: Sept. 9, 1870; *New York Staats-Zeitung*: Aug. 6, Aug. 24, Sept. 16, 1870, Feb. 18, 1871; *Philadelphia Press*: May 16, 1871; *Cincinnati Gazette*: Feb. 6, 1871; *San Francisco Bulletin*: Oct. 1, 1870; *Belletristisches Journal*: Sept. 30, Oct. 7, Oct. 21, 1870; *Nation*: Nov. 17, Dec. 22, 1870; Koerner, *Memoirs*, vol. ii, p. 510; Lieber, *Life and Letters*, pp. 401, 406.

tri-color of France floating over Elsass and Lothringen.”¹ The *Belletristisches Journal* similarly stated that German unity could not be achieved without Alsace and Lorraine. But some German-Americans thought that the process would still be incomplete and that yet other territories remained to be annexed before German unity could really be called accomplished. Francis Lieber urged that Luxemburg be kept if possible and the *Belletristisches Journal* was insistent on this point. It predicted that Luxemburg would surely become German before the end of the year 1871, admitted that the people of Luxemburg did not wish to become German, declared that a plebiscite as applied to the province would be ridiculous however, and wished that the matter could be settled by a mere invasion of the territory. The same paper hoped that German Austria and the German provinces of Russia (!) might be returned to the Fatherland. That the *Belletristisches Journal* was not alone in its desire for territorial aggrandizement is clear from one of the speeches at the Philadelphia celebration which went even further in its hope that Germany's boundaries might soon be widened: “When the sturdy Austro-German people shall be reunited to their brothers of the new Empire, when the brave sons of free Switzerland shall find their welfare promoted by a closer alliance to the old mother country, then the German Empire will have fulfilled its mission.”²

It was also thought by the German-Americans that the French should pay the costs of the war. An indemnity was therefore demanded. It was to be expected then that the Germans of the United States would be highly gratified

¹ New York Tribune: Sept. 16, 1870.

² Philadelphia Press: May 16, 1871; New York Times: Sept. 15, 1870; New York Staats-Zeitung: Oct. 1, 1870, Feb. 23, 1871; *Belletristisches Journal*: Sept. 2, Oct. 7, Nov. 4, Dec. 30, 1870, Jan. 6, Jan. 20, 1871; Lieber, *Life and Letters*, p. 401.

with the terms of peace. The New York *Staats-Zeitung* thought that the demands were not too large, not more than Germany was justified in asking, and said that Germany could hardly have made them less. The *Belletristisches Journal* thought that Germany would always be able to point to the peace terms of 1871 as proof of a spirit of magnanimity almost without precedent and said that no other people would have been capable of such moderation and tolerance in time of victory. It is interesting to note that the same German-Americans who were the loudest in demanding Alsace and Lorraine and in voicing their satisfaction with the terms of peace were also convinced that Germany was essentially a peaceful power which could never become militaristic nor a menace to European peace. The *Belletristisches Journal* remarked that no one with a pure heart need fear the mighty Germany, and one of the German-American letter-writers to the New York *Tribune* penned the following: "The free, united States of Germany can as little become the cradle of Caesarism, or a standing menace to the peace and liberty of Europe, as the United States of America to the Western World. With Germany victorious, peace and progress must forever reign in Europe."¹

There were more modest and less cocksure German-Americans than the letter-writer to the *Tribune* just quoted and the editor of the *Belletristisches Journal*¹. A few Workingmen's Associations took the view that the war was purely dynastic in character and that it could not possibly benefit the German people. A minority protest was made

¹ New York *Tribune*: Sept. 16, Sept. 21, 1870, April 11, 1871; New York *Times*: Aug. 20, Aug. 25, Oct. 4, 1870; New York *Staats-Zeitung*: Aug. 27, 1870, Feb. 2, Feb. 24, Feb. 25, Feb. 27, Feb. 28, 1871; *Belletristisches Journal*: Aug. 19, Aug. 26, Oct. 28, Dec. 30, 1870, March 3, 1871.

at the time of the German-American celebration in Philadelphia. It declared the jubilee a triumphal celebration, refused to rejoice in a German Emperor who had received his crown from the princes rather than from the people, and called the status of Germany in 1870 worse than under the Confederation of 1815. But such a protest was almost unheard in the great chorus of German-American exultation over the events of 1870. It is tolerably certain that the great mass of German-Americans were heartily in sympathy with the structure raised up by Bismarck in 1870 and 1871. When it is remembered that in 1848 German-American sentiment was almost completely in favor of a democratic union, that many of the German-American leaders in 1870 had been exiles from Prussian tyranny, that the Germans in the United States had damned all of Bismarck's and William's works until July, 1866, then the distance which they had traveled in their thinking stands out the more clearly. It is no wonder that the New York *World* spoke rather bitterly of "those of our German citizens who have allowed their passion for national unity to get the better of their love for national liberty." The *World* desired to prevent the Germans from voting the Republican ticket, but it was not far from correct in believing that the German-Americans had surrendered their earlier enthusiasm for political democracy and liberty in an outburst of joy and pride in national strength and unity. Patriotism and nationalism had conquered them as well as their German brothers in Europe.¹

¹ New York *Tribune*: July 28, July 30, Aug. 10, Aug. 23, 1870; New York *World*: Nov. 18, July 24, 1870; Philadelphia *Press*: May 16, 1871; Harper's *Weekly*: Aug. 27, 1870. Among the organizations which were hostile to the German cause in 1870 were the German Workingmen's Union, the Productive Cooperative Association of cabinet-workers, upholsterers, varnishers, and gilders, and the German Tailors of Williamsburg, N. Y.

CONCLUSION

THE student of public opinion cannot avoid the conclusion that popular sentiment is often faulty in respect to facts and often colored by all sorts of prejudices. American thinking on European affairs was more frequently and more egregiously incorrect in the middle of the nineteenth century than at a later time. True enough, less was known about the means and methods of propaganda, and consequently there were perhaps fewer sudden and irrational shifts of popular sympathy. On the other hand, Americans were less sophisticated than at present, and held to their preconceived opinions more tenaciously. It is the purpose of this concluding chapter to examine some of the more outstanding qualities of American thinking as revealed in the preceding narrative, and to analyse the causes for the confusion and error which characterized so large a portion of American opinion.

In the first place, Americans displayed certain traits which might have been found in the thinking of any people. For example, sympathy with one's fellow humans was an active motive power behind American public opinion. Back of this feeling is an instinctive desire to partake vicariously of the sufferings or joys of others. Thus the feeling of compassion for the under-dog is a perfectly natural expression of sympathy, and was often extended by Americans to defeated European nations. Americans sympathized with Hungary in 1849 and 1850, with Russia in 1855 and 1856, with Denmark in 1864, and what

sympathy they had for France in 1870 and 1871 was largely traceable to the under-dog psychology.¹ In each case other elements were present which help to explain the American attitude, but in each case there was at the bottom a feeling of pity for the conquered country. It is just as natural however to sympathize with the victor. The sense of pleasure at seeing a piece of work completed quickly and efficiently tends to evoke applause. Certainly Americans expressed sympathy with the success of the Germans over the French in 1870, and it is a question whether the feeling of joy over the completeness of the Prussian victories did not outweigh the feeling of compassion for the sufferings of the French. It is undeniably true that American pleasure at the Prussian victory in 1866 almost entirely overshadowed whatever pity with defeated Austria may have existed. Of course there were other reasons for the sympathy with Prussia in 1866 and with Germany in 1870 but, in addition to any such causes for sympathy, the American people, and particularly those in the North, were impelled to rejoice with Prussia in her victories by a remembrance of their own recent military successes.² "Nothing succeeds like success," especially with those who have themselves been successful.

A second human trait which Americans possessed in no slight degree was that of self-interest. Their opinions on European affairs were constantly being moulded by reference to what they considered to be their own welfare, and they seldom lost sight of the "main chance." In 1848 Americans were wondering what the effect of German unity might be upon their commercial relations with the German states; in 1866 they were speculating upon the way in which the war might affect American bonds or American food-

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 54-60, 94-96, 155, 156, 395-397.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 198, 199, 322-324, 344, 345.

stuffs; in 1870 and 1871 they gave their sympathy to Germany partially because the Germans had purchased large quantities of American bonds during the Civil War, but at the same time no sympathy with Germany could prevent them from selling arms to the French. Americans never felt any real antagonism for Prussia throughout the period under review except when they believed that the Prussian naturalization laws were prejudicial to American interests and derogatory to American honor.¹

Very closely connected with the natural human tendency of self-interest or self-preservation is that of self-aggrandizement. In American political life the combination of self-interest and self-aggrandizement produced American imperialism which was rampant throughout the period under review. The forties saw the addition of Oregon and the Mexican War, and the fifties witnessed the Ostend Manifesto and the Walker filibustering expedition against Nicaragua. American imperialists dreamed of a day when not only Mexico and Central America, Cuba and the other West Indian islands, but also Canada and South America might be annexed or at least brought under the veiled domination of the Stars and Stripes. The increasing hostility to France which was very evident in the fifties was certainly based on a fear that she might gain a foothold in Mexico or Central America and thus balk American imperialism. The extreme hatred of everything French in the decade of the sixties was largely conditioned by the conflicting French and American imperialisms in Mexico. No less a factor of course was the belief that the Second French Empire had menaced the American national existence at a time of crisis. It is probably true that the overwhelming sentiment favorable to Germany and hostile to France in

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 30-32, 126-128, 188, 189, 228-230, 330-335.

the early part of the war of 1870 was less a result of any love for things German or hatred for things French than it was an outcome of the fact that American interests had clashed with those of France almost continually since 1850 while, as George Bancroft said, "Our foreign political interests almost always run parallel with those of Germany."¹

Americans also possessed, to a great extent, that combination of sympathy and self-interest which psychologists sometimes refer to as "self-enhancement."² It is very human to feel friendly to those who seem to be similar to ourselves, perhaps just because we can better understand them. The friendship of course tends to increase if we can believe that the friend has become similar to us as the result of a conscious effort on his part. Americans were proud of American institutions and it enhanced or gratified their pride when those institutions were copied or appeared to be copied, especially by an older society. Self-complacency in respect to their political and social institutions is not only a twentieth-century characteristic of the American people. The very newness of their civilization and its manifest success, at least on the surface, tended to make Americans almost sophomoric in their cocksureness. Naturally, their applause became vociferous whenever there seemed a likelihood of institutions similar to their own being adopted by a European nation.

The political institution to which the American people were the most strongly attached was that of republicanism. If a nation overthrew a monarch and established a republican form of government, it was almost sure to receive the favor of the United States. Such was the case in respect

¹ Bancroft, *Life and Letters*, vol. ii, p. 246. Cf. *supra*, pp. 90-92, 290-309, 329-334.

² Cf. Edman, Irwin, *Human Traits and their Social Significance* (New York, 1919), p. 156 *et seq.*

to the Second and Third French Republics and the Hungarian Republic¹ as well as in respect to the Chinese and Russian Republics of more recent times. It has been flattering to American pride to see her form of government adopted by other countries. It was but natural to hate intensely the antithesis of a republic, namely a monarchy. A monarchical form of government was usually termed a despotism by Americans who always felt a certain amount of distrust even for the constitutional monarchies of Great Britain, Germany and Italy. Quite often their adherence to the word republic led Americans into notable errors of judgment. The passionate enthusiasm for Hungary in 1851 almost solely because that country had declared itself a republic is a case in point. The fact that Louis Napoleon directed his *coup d'état* against a republic greatly magnified the enormity of his crime in American eyes and led to the easy credence of stories of a huge massacre of the people of Paris by his soldiers. No more contemptuous term could be applied to a people by an American than that of being unfit for republican government.²

But the United States was more than a republic, it was a federal republic. Federalism therefore became a name to conjure with, federalism as opposed to centralization. Distrust was commonly expressed of French republicanism because it was bureaucratic and centralized.³ On the other hand Germany was federal in form of government, and to many Americans that virtue atoned for her vice in retaining royalty.⁴ In 1870, after the collapse of the Second

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 54-60, 234-242, 380-392.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 54-60, 248, 249, 260-264, 284, 285.

³ Cf. *supra*, pp. 249, 250, 260, 277, 284, 392.

⁴ Cf. *supra*, pp. 27, 100, 422-424.

Empire, the pro-French American rationalized his position by reference to the fact that France was republican while Germany was monarchical. The pro-German American rationalized his position by reference to the fact that France was centralized while Germany was federal. Both were constructing their rationalizations upon the same principle, that France or Germany, as the case might be, was deserving of American sympathy because it possessed a form of government similar to that of the United States.

By the great mass of Americans the Protestant religion was regarded as being almost as important as federal republicanism. A good American was apt to hold to his Protestantism just as fanatically as to his republicanism. America's Protestantism was believed to be a most essential and beneficial factor in her cultural and national life. On the other hand, Roman Catholicism was quite commonly thought to be decidedly un-American and a menace to American institutions. The typical American Protestant was convinced that his religion represented the highest type of individual morality as well as independence in thought and action—in a word, progress. On the contrary, he interpreted Roman Catholicism as standing for a hypocritical, low-grade morality and the subjection of the individual will to sacerdotal tyranny—in a word, decadence. In addition of course there was the fear of church supremacy over the state, and of clerical interference with matters of education.

The American Protestant's fear of Roman Catholicism was carried over into his judgments concerning European affairs. Austria was hated, among other reasons, because she was Catholic, and by no means the least of the counts against France lay in her adherence to Rome. A very important factor in the popular American dislike for Napoleon

III was his support to the temporal power of the Pope.¹ On the other hand Germany and Prussia were almost always spoken of as Protestant states. The large numbers of Roman Catholics in the Rhineland and in South Germany were usually overlooked when speaking of Germany as they are up to the present day. Germany had been the home of the Reformation, her people were commonly referred to as Protestants, and hence were held in high esteem by the Protestant makers of American public opinion.²

"Self-enhancement" also at least partially explains the favor with which Americans regarded the Prussian military and educational systems. It is hard to see a similarity between the Prussian system of conscription and the American militia system except as they were both different from the old-fashioned professional armies. It is true that conscription had been used by the Federal government during the Civil War, and the German principle of universal military service seemed democratic to many Americans.³ There certainly did exist a strong similarity between American and German education. But instead of Germany's having adopted her educational principles and methods from American educators, the reverse was the fact, namely that American educators had copied their methods and principles directly from Germany. And yet the author has never discovered in any of the numerous panegyrics on Prussian or German education an acknowledgment of what Americans owed to German educators. The implication was rather that Germany should be given credit for having an educational system similar to that of the United States.⁴

¹ *Cf. supra*, pp. 110, 118, 284, 287, 311, 353-355.

² *Cf. supra*, pp. 100, 101, 125, 140, 204, 223, 353-355.

³ *Cf. supra*, pp. 126, 224, 225, 351-353.

⁴ *Cf. supra*, pp. 40, 41, 350-353.

It is not difficult to trace the connection from the human traits of sympathy and self-enhancement to the favor with which Americans regarded the principle of national unification. Historically the American union had been the coming together of jealous states which possessed, however, a common culture. The Union had grown and prospered, and had become a shibboleth to be fought for and to be died for in the sixties; union had been a slogan which had served to focus all the loyalty of the North and West; national unity versus states' rights had been the issue of the fearful civil strife between North and South. The result of the conflict had but strengthened the belief that national unity was a sacred principle never to be violated. Was it remarkable that Americans should see the parallel between their own problems and the wars for Italian and German unity? Was it surprising that Americans should give a whole-hearted support to the Germans in 1870 when the latter were cementing their union in blood and were struggling against the nation whose rulers had for centuries opposed German unification? The feeling that German particularism was a vicious evil standing in the way of German progress, and the statement that Germany was justified in not allowing the permanent secession of Alsace and Lorraine, were but echoes of the comparison which many Americans were making between the German and American struggles for unity, a comparison which explains a large part of the sympathy with Germany in 1870.¹

But no satisfactory or complete analysis of the fundamental characteristics of American public opinion in the middle of the nineteenth century can be made merely by reference to the primitive human instincts or traits, or even to the more subtle applications of those traits. There were

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 158, 169, 170, 208, 209, 356, 357.

other outstanding characteristics which must be explained in other ways. For instance, the Americans were a young nation with many of the qualities of youth. The wild dreams of American imperialism and the almost arrogant self-complacency of the American were the natural accompaniments of youth. An almost boyish optimism was a notable trait of the American. He refused to believe in 1849 and 1850 that the reaction in Europe could be more than temporary; he could not bring himself to think that Bismarck and King William could possibly triumph over the principles of constitutional government; he was unable to see any menace to world peace in the German union of 1870, accomplished as it had been by three wars, in two of which even he had been able to recognize that Prussia was the aggressor.¹

Many of his most fundamental and cherished beliefs the American had inherited from his forefathers. His ancestors had formed stereotyped impressions of certain institutions and certain nations which had been handed down from generation to generation with comparatively little change. These stereotyped impressions or stereotypes, as Walter Lippmann calls them,² are mental pictures which tend to exclude all new impressions and which therefore form one of the most insuperable obstacles to gaining a true picture. Thus when anyone mentions the word England there appears instantly before his listener some mental image of England. Perhaps it is the image of the map; perhaps that of John Bull; perhaps that of a charming country house; perhaps that of arrogant Britannia; perhaps that of William E. Gladstone or Joseph Chamberlain or Ramsay MacDonald; or it may be any combination of these and innumerable

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 84-86, 137, 138, 165, 352, 353.

² Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, part iii.

other images. Each individual's picture will be slightly different and will inevitably affect his opinion regarding England and make it so much the more difficult for him to gain a picture of England as it actually is.

Every student of public opinion must deal with this problem of stereotypes if he is properly to understand popular thinking. Thus the favor with which Americans regarded republican government and the hatred with which they regarded monarchical government cannot be traced entirely to a desire to have other countries copy the American Republic. Rather most Americans had inherited certain beliefs in regard to republics and monarchies which made it almost impossible for them to judge impartially. When they thought of a republic they pictured the embattled farmers of Lexington, or the Fathers of the Constitution, or the Stars and Stripes. Similarly the word monarchy brought to their minds the picture of George III and to the more educated of them that of Charles I or James II.

Their opinions regarding Protestantism and Catholicism and in respect to the value of national unification were no less the result of stereotypes. When an American Protestant spoke the word Protestant there probably came to his mind a picture of John Calvin, or Oliver Cromwell or the Pilgrims. Similarly Catholicism created a mental picture of the most corrupt days of the Papacy and of the regular orders, or of the most ignorant of the Irish workingmen or servants whom he had ever seen. When an American of the sixties thought of the significance of national unity he thought very possibly of the evil days preceding the formation of the American Union, and he almost certainly visualized Abraham Lincoln or some dear one who had fought and maybe died during the Civil War.

It is safe to conclude that stereotypes of France and Germany had likewise been formed, some of them having been

handed down from earlier generations. Others had been created in the early part of the period under review. In either case they were persistent and very influential in moulding popular thinking. A large number of the errors in American public opinion concerning France and Germany can be traced to the persistence of a stereotype long after the conditions which caused the stereotype to be formed had disappeared. In like manner much of the confusion and inconsistency in American public opinion, its fickleness and frequent changes, can be explained by reference to the fact that two almost diametrically opposite and contradictory stereotypes of each country had been formed. Nearly every individual American had absorbed certain features of each stereotype and confusion was the result.

Thus an American in the middle of the nineteenth century had two mental pictures of France which were by no means in harmony with each other. On the one hand France was thought of as the early friend of America, the country of Lafayette, the champion of popular liberty and freedom, the leader in the advance guard of European civilization, brave, gallant, intelligent and witty. This was the France that Americans loved and the image of which was present to some extent in almost every American's mind.¹ On the other hand he was just as apt to picture France and the French people as fickle, shallow, gay, immoral and decadent; fond of martial glory to an insane extent and willing to surrender their liberties to any tyrant who might promise them military success; centralized, bureaucratic and incapable of forming a truly liberal and stable republic.² The second picture was at almost complete variance with the

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 238, 283, 361-363, 370-372, 385-388.

² Cf. *supra*, pp. 142, 249, 285-288, 347, 348.

first and yet just as omnipresent. When France established a republic in 1848 the first image became for the moment dominant but the second one did not disappear and gained strength as a result of the June Days of 1848, of Louis Napoleon's *coup d'état* of 1851, and of his Mexican adventure. With his downfall the first image again became dominant for a while, only largely to disappear when the Republic made its early mistakes and particularly during the days of the Paris Commune of 1871.

Similarly, it seems, there were two discordant pictures of Germany, the opinions concerning which were complicated by the failure to distinguish between Germany and Prussia. On the one hand, one stereotype of the Germans pictured them as honest, frugal, patient, industrious, home-loving, virtuous, full of sentiment, with simple tastes and pleasures, highly educated, the best scholars in Europe, lovers of peace and prosperity. In this picture Germany was usually referred to as the home of Luther and Protestantism. Americans loved this Germany, and the large number of Germans actually living in the United States made it impossible for Americans ever to erase this image completely from their minds.¹ But there was another Germany which Americans also could not completely erase from their minds, a Germany the image of which was more largely Prussian than most Americans realized. This second Germany was a despotism whose rulers governed by divine-right and had belonged to the Holy Alliance, and whose people were too impractical and theoretical ever to be able to shake off their chains; a militaristic Germany bent on aggrandizement, the Germany of Frederick the Great, the despoiler of Poland. Complementary to this picture was the very common visualization, strengthened again by the large German immigra-

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 33, 34, 139, 142, 225-228.

tion, of the beer-guzzling, Sabbath-breaking Germans.¹ The two images were hopelessly confused in American popular thinking. On one day the typical American might praise Germany as the educational center of Europe, a country whose people were so intelligent and so democratically trained that it could never become a menace to European peace, while on the next he might condemn her as the most aggressive and despotic power which Europe had ever known, a nation which lived on the misfortunes of her neighbors. The conflict of stereotypes and the refusal to distinguish carefully between Prussia and Germany had caused the confusion.

A still further disorder in popular thinking resulted from the tendency to personify a nation and a people in the figure of its ruler or popular leader. The individual must make a visualization and Lenin becomes the symbol for Red Russia, and Kaiser William II the symbol for militaristic Germany. The fact that the leader does have a definite impress upon the country he is leading is of course a cause and partial justification for the tendency, and yet any such personification leads to gross errors. In the first place, the influence of the leader is magnified and the whole nation is either made a saint or a devil along with him. In the second place, the leader is saddled with the virtues or the vices which the popular stereotype has pictured as belonging to the nation of which he is the leader.

For instance, Louis Kossuth with his striking appearance, magnetic personality, highly heroic career and comparatively democratic ideas became a symbol to Americans of Hungary which in turn became a highly heroic nation, dramatic and romantic, struggling for the sacred principles of democracy and nationalism. The almost total disregard of the two

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 35, 46, 378, 437-439.

principles by the Hungarians when applied to the people of Transylvania and Croatia was overlooked by Americans who had placed too much reliance upon such words as "republic" and "independence," and who had gained a wrong impression by making of the colorful Magyar leader a personification of Hungary.¹

Louis Napoleon furnishes an even better example of the danger of personification. While he was her president and emperor France was hardly ever represented in American cartoons as a lovely, heroic female figure, but rather as Louis Napoleon himself, or as a vulture often dressed in the fashion of the Emperor. The identification of France with her ruler became almost complete. It is true that he dominated France to a much greater extent than any other Frenchman of the mid-century, and yet the result of such a complete identification was unfair to the French people as well as to him. The whole French nation was condemned in the same breath with its ruler. He was considered unscrupulous and to have an ambitious foreign policy; consequently France was said to be unable to govern herself, and was accused of being intent upon territorial aggrandizement. Napoleon favored the Catholic Church and, in accord with the popular stereotype of the effects of Catholicism, Americans said that France was ignorant and degraded and superstitious. Nor was justice meted out to Napoleon. Since he was unpopular in the United States, and since in the minds of most Americans all Frenchmen had loose moral standards, Napoleon was consequently pictured as the most horrible monster of moral depravity, "the very Beelzebub," as Theodore Parker called him.²

In the case of Germany the identification never became

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 53-73.

² Parker, *Life and Correspondence*, vol. ii, p. 301. Cf. *supra*, pp. 251-289.

complete. Whereas the German people were regarded with great favor in the United States, Bismarck was generally unpopular, was regarded as the evil genius of Germany and was made a scapegoat for everything unpleasant in the German character and national life. But his sins were not visited upon the German people nor were the virtues popularly ascribed to the German attributed to the Iron Chancellor. On the other hand, Napoleon was unpopular and so were the French people and thus the transfer of qualities from the one to the other followed very naturally.

To understand public opinion is not easy. It is not rational nor is it usually strictly in accord with the facts. Rather it has a distorted viewpoint and sees "as through a glass darkly." It has all the caprices of an individual, pride, sensitiveness and an eye to its self-interest. It possesses prejudices or stereotypes handed down from one generation to another, prejudices of which the average person cannot easily divest himself. It cannot take the time to form its conclusions rationally and so it must make for itself symbols which are readily recognizable, which carry with them a whole train of associations, and which nevertheless make it almost impossible to accept new and unfamiliar facts which contradict the recognized symbol. And yet public opinion is a force which becomes ever more important as western civilization gropes its way toward democracy. If it is to remain a blind, irrational, obstinate and lazy god it is hard to see how democracy can ever function properly. Not that it is possible or even desirable for each atom in the mass which is called public opinion to attempt to see the whole picture. Such an attempt would occupy all of his attention in the complexity of modern life. But how to enlighten public opinion, to make it more rational, more tolerant of change and more responsive to new truth—there is the problem.

THE SOURCES OF AMERICAN OPINION IN THE MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY

THE author does not pretend to have made a definitive study of the sources of American opinion during the period under review. Such an investigation offers great allurements for future research, but has not been attempted in the present essay, which is rather intended to be a discussion and partial justification of the sources which have been drawn upon in the preceding chapters. An attempt will be made to classify the sources, to describe each class and the more important examples of that class which have been used, and to determine upon the importance of the class and the examples in the class as sources of public opinion. At the end the author will try to show that he has made a sampling of the sources which is perhaps not the best that could be made but which is sufficient to make a fairly accurate estimate of the trend of American public opinion.

First and most important as sources for American public opinion in the period under review are the newspapers, and the author has devoted more time to a study of them than to all the other types of sources put together. In 1848 the typical American newspaper was a four-page sheet with pages ranging in size from those of the *New York Herald*, which were considerably smaller than those of the present-day newspaper, to those of the immense "blanket sheets." Fairly good type was used in some of the better papers but in most cases it was very small and difficult to read. Quotations from speeches and citations from other

papers were printed in still smaller type. News, anecdotes and editorials were often put on the same page and even in the same column. In as well-conducted a paper as the New Orleans *Picayune* one never knew exactly where to look for the editorials, whether on the first or second page. Anecdotes of two-headed calves, of Enoch Arden cases, of strange disappearances, of daring rescues and of startling crimes competed with local gossip and with the more serious news of the day. During a political campaign many newspapers stopped giving any other news at all. Advertisements were scattered throughout the paper and large parts of the first and last pages were devoted to them. They were very small, seldom taking more than a dozen lines in one column, and of all kinds, immoral places of resort and quack medicines of the most harmless as well as the most disgusting sort sharing the space with the legitimate business and personal advertisements. The possibilities of the large headline as a means of influencing public opinion were almost unthought of, although the large head line occasionally, and the small headline often were employed to attract attention.

The news which was not local in character was derived largely from special correspondents. During the session of Congress or of the state legislature one of the editors would go to the seat of government and write weekly or semi-weekly letters to his paper. The Washington letter was always a very important and nearly always a highly interesting part of a paper, filled with anecdotal material on the great political figures as well as with accounts of the latest speech or piece of legislation. It was in 1848 and 1849 that the first Associated Press organization was formed in New York City. The European news was labelled as "News from the *Cambria*," or "News from the *Arabia*," and was apt to be meagre in character except in a period of

exceptional European turmoil when the more enterprising New York papers would have their own correspondents in Europe who wrote long and able letters which often admirably combined editorial comment with news. The great metropolitan newspapers were frequently quoted at great length by the provincial press and the New York *Herald* maintained a free news service to the papers of the interior which in return gratefully supplied the *Herald* with the first accounts of the news in their particular localities.¹ Most of the large dailies had weekly or semi-weekly editions which had a tremendous circulation in the country districts, often larger than the circulation of their daily edition.

By 1870 the physical aspects of the newspapers had undergone considerable change for the better. In the first place, the size of the individual page had become more convenient and the number of pages had normally become twelve, although the metropolitan papers printed occasional editions of sixteen pages. The type was larger, the paper better, and the arrangement much more logical than in 1848. The editorials had been gathered together on one page and in the aggregate were often more than a page in length. The advertisements had become more respectable and were much larger. In 1870 half-page or even full-page advertisements, while not the rule, were by no means uncommon. The headline as a news feature had become more important during the Civil War and in 1870 was employed to some extent as a device to influence opinion. In 1870 the first general Associated Press organization was formed. The special correspondent still played an important part in the portrayal of the news, but he had usually become an anonymous individual by 1870. The telegraph had become an ever more

¹ Lee, James Melvin, *History of American Journalism* (Boston, 1917), p. 200.

common carrier of news and by 1870 the Atlantic cable had made possible the publication of foreign news before it was stale and in much larger quantities than had ever been practicable before.

From the standpoint of public opinion, by far the most important feature of the newspaper was the editorial. In his *History of American Journalism*, James Melvin Lee says, "During the decade of 1850-60 the editorial policy reached its highest development in the matter of influence." Lee also claims that the Civil War tended to destroy the influence of the editorial in favor of the news columns,¹ but it is clear that the editorials continued to wield an enormous power over public opinion. The present comparative indifference of the public to the editorial page can only have been reached gradually. The fifties were the period of the great editorial giants, but the sixties were no less so—of Greeley, of Bennett, of Raymond and of Forney. The author has devoted most of his time and attention in his examination of the newspapers to the editorial page, the opinions therein expressed have furnished the greatest number of references in his footnotes and have constituted the most important source of his judgments concerning public opinion. When individuals were silent, and when periodicals were silent, the editorial page would occasionally contain a reference to indicate the trend, and in dealing with certain phases of the study editorial comment has been found to be the only recorded expression of public opinion.

The foreign news columns did not yield much of importance in the way of public opinion. They were mostly bare summaries of events with little or no comment. More important were the letters of special European correspondents, especially in the earlier period when editorials on foreign

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 276, 318.

affairs were rare and when the letters were signed so that it was possible to discover whether they were written by Americans and were thus real expressions of American opinion, or by foreigners whose writings may have influenced American opinion, but which are hardly in the same category with the others. But the letters to the New York *Tribune* from Albert Brisbane, the American socialist, or from Charles A. Dana who was in Europe as the special correspondent of the *Tribune* in 1848 and 1849 and who became managing editor of the same paper shortly after his return, were important in forming American opinion. In the same class may be mentioned George Wilkins Kendall, who had achieved national prominence as a correspondent during the Mexican War, who was the chief editorial writer of the New Orleans *Picayune*, and who was also in Europe during the mid-century revolutions. Kendall was described by the *International Magazine* as "a new Chevalier Bayard, baptised in the spirit of fun, and with a steel pen in lieu of a blade of Damascus." One other testimonial to the man whom the author has quoted so frequently in the early chapters cannot be omitted: "If the god of Wit and Humor had been in New Orleans when Kendall lived there, he would have crowned him with the brightest and gayest of flowers."¹ Headlines have not been used to any extent to indicate public opinion except in 1870, when they began to be no longer mere summaries of news, but to take on the character of attempts to influence popular thinking. Domestic news in time of especial interest in European affairs has been carefully examined for letters, and reports of speeches or meetings. Open signed letters to the newspapers were quite common and some interesting material

¹ *International Magazine*: May, 1851; Hudson, Frederic, *Journalism in the United States from 1690 to 1872* (New York, 1873), p. 494.

has been found in them. More important were the accounts of public speeches, of sermons, and particularly of public meetings. But such meetings were only held, or at least only reported to any extent, in 1848, 1851 and 1870. Of course the public meetings with their speeches, their banners and their resolutions, are invaluable sources of opinion, whether they were called to create or to express the public sentiment. Again at times of especial interest in foreign affairs, the metropolitan newspapers printed extracts from the editorial comments of their rivals and contemporaries which have also been found to be of considerable value.

The individual papers and magazines are then the author's most important sources. Among the newspapers, the list is headed by four New York papers, the *Tribune*, the *Herald*, the *Times* and the *World*. Most important of all was the New York *Tribune* which was under the editorship of Horace Greeley throughout the entire period. In 1848 it boasted an aggregate circulation of more than twenty-eight thousand, which was only a little less than that of its chief rival, the *Herald*. The circulation grew by leaps and bounds until the *Tribune* claimed in 1860 the tremendous number of nearly two hundred and eighty-seven thousand. At the end of the period its estimated circulation according to Rowell and Evans respectively was as follows:

Daily	45,000	30,000
Semi-weekly	25,000	32,000
Weekly	150,000	160,000
Total	220,000	222,000 ¹

¹ The whole problem of newspaper circulation for this period has been a most perplexing one. The census reports are silent and the almanacs tell nothing. At times the newspapers held circulation contests, but the figures were apt to be padded. However in 1852 there was published *Livingston's Law Register* which gave the circulation of most of the

It is probably safe to conclude the aggregate circulation was over two hundred thousand in 1871. Such a circulation was probably the greatest in the United States. Very significant is the fact that although its daily circulation was surpassed by several papers, the weekly circulation of the *Tribune* was more than double that of any other newspaper examined. The daily edition was sold in and near New York City, but the weekly edition went throughout the country into farm-houses and country stores. The widespread influence of the *Tribune* is amply attested. In 1866 the *Nation* wrote: "The Tribune . . . has actually formed the political opinions of the great bulk of the country population of the Northwest. . . . Horace Greeley edits a hundred, yes, a thousand, newspapers in America."¹ No less conclusive was the estimate of Charles Francis Adams: "The *New York Tribune* . . . during those years was the greatest

newspapers of the country and which claimed to have taken its figures from the census reports of 1850. In 1869 there began the publication of an annual by George P. Rowell under the title *The Men Who Advertise, an Account of Successful Advertisers together with Hints on the Methods of Advertising*. Two years later this publication changed its name to that of the *American Newspaper Directory*. In 1871 there also appeared a publication called *Evans' Advertising Hand-Book, Containing a List of the most Desirable Advertising Mediums in the United States*. The figures on circulation for the *Tribune* and other papers have been taken almost entirely from one of these three sources. The figures which they quote are often those claimed by the paper itself and must be taken with due allowance for exaggeration. They must be regarded only as approximate and not in any sense exact. Cf. tables on circulation, *infra*, pp. 565, 566.

For the *Tribune* statistics cf. also *New York Tribune*: April 25, 1859, April 10, 1860, April 10, 1861, April 10, 1862; Hudson, *Journalism in the United States*, p. 529. Hudson quotes figures from a contest in circulation in 1847 between the *Herald* and the *Tribune*, a contest which was decided by outside judges. Livingston gave the *Tribune* circulation for 1850 as over seventy thousand, an almost unbelievable increase over the twenty-eight thousand of 1848.

¹ *Nation*: May 8, 1866.

educational factor, economically and morally, this country has ever known.”¹

The *Tribune* was a strongly partisan paper, at first Whig, and later Republican. It entered into every contest with a vigor and enthusiasm almost unequalled. It was usually the best printed and most carefully edited paper in the city. Once it had taken a position the *Tribune* seldom abandoned it, but held to its ground with a tiger-like tenacity. It was always perfectly sincere, and often fanatically so. It used the language of invective with better effect than any other paper examined. The hobbies of the *Tribune* were many: it was the foremost champion of a protective tariff; it supported Fourierism so strongly as to be regarded with suspicion by many conservatives; it was fanatically Protestant, prohibitionist, and opposed to any laxity in the observance of the Sabbath; it stood for the highest type of personal morality and frowned upon undue frivolity. The New York *Tribune* was perhaps more representative than any other paper in the country of the respectable and religious business, professional and farming classes. The *Tribune* was almost completely identified with its picturesque and able founder and editor, Horace Greeley, of whom it has been said that he “represented better than any other man in history what is noble and lasting in journalism.”²

In some respects the New York *Herald* was an even more important paper than the *Tribune*. Its aggregate circulation in 1848 was very nearly twenty-nine thousand, and thus slightly larger than that of the *Tribune*. In 1871 its aggregate circulation was very much smaller than that of the *Tribune* although its daily circulation was much larger. At that time it had about the following circulation:

¹ Payne, George H., *History of Journalism in the United States* (New York, 1920), pp. 281, 270.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 332, 270; *North American Review*: April, 1866.

Daily	85,000
Weekly	25,000
Total	110,000

The daily circulation of the *Herald* was nearly twice as large as that of any other newspaper examined. The strength of the *Herald* lay particularly in its news and financial features. In April, 1866, the *North American Review* wrote: "It is impossible any longer to deny that the chief newspaper of that busy city is the New York *Herald*." ¹

The editorial influence of the *Herald* is open to some question. The *North American Review* thought that the *Herald* was almost insignificant as an organ of opinion, and the *Nation* believed that the *Herald* editorials catered to people who had no rational opinions, but who nevertheless possessed "the most bitter prejudices." But one is tempted to wonder whether the *Nation* and the *North American Review* were not so self-righteous as to believe that the classes who were not quite respectable really did not constitute a part of public opinion. Thus the *North American Review* spoke of the "reckless disregard of principle, truth and decency" in the editorial columns of the *Herald*, and the *Nation* complained that the *Herald* was "read by a class who cannot, in any proper sense of the word, be said to have opinions." ² The New York *Herald* was read by nearly everyone in the metropolis, and its editorials probably appealed to the less respectable classes, the sporting element, and to a large foreign group. It was generally well-printed and always entertaining. But the *Herald* cared little for

¹ *North American Review*: April, 1866. As in the case of the *Tribune*, Livingston makes the circulation of the *Herald* very much larger in 1850 than had been claimed in 1847, a change from twenty-nine thousand to more than forty-four thousand.

² *North American Review*: April, 1866; *Nation*: May 8, 1866.

principle, and was apt to change its opinions frequently to meet the shifts in popular thinking. It often argued on both sides of the same question, or at least uttered sentiments within a very short space of time which were logically inconsistent. It probably reflected the fickle and illogical changes of popular sentiment to a greater extent than it moulded public opinion. The *Herald* had few hobbies or few fixed ideas. There was perhaps only one idea which it invariably supported—that of American imperialism. It was chauvinistic and imperialistic always. Nowhere did its tendency to imperialism show itself more strongly than in connection with the Mexican question.¹ The *Herald* claimed to be strictly independent in politics, and during the period under review supported Democrats, Republicans and Know-Nothings as their principles appealed to the editor. The opinions expressed in the *Herald* were almost invariably those of its founder, owner and editor, James Gordon Bennett, who held supreme control until about 1866 when the power passed to his son of the same name. Perhaps the name of James Gordon Bennett is less honored than that of Horace Greeley, but it is hardly less important in the history of American journalism.

During the latter part of the period the author has leaned rather heavily on the *New York Times* and the *New York World*. The *Times* was founded by Henry J. Raymond in order to create “a paper that would be less radical, less addicted to all the ‘isms,’ than the *Tribune*.”² It was unquestionably successful in its aim. It was not extreme in any respect. It supported the conservative element, whether in business or politics. It remained loyal to Andrew Johnson

¹ Cf. *supra*, pp. 299-301.

² Payne, *History of Journalism in the United States*, p. 282; *Nation*: May 8, 1866.

when he had few friends, or perhaps it was loyalty to William H. Seward. The *Times* was a strictly partisan paper on the Republican side. But in foreign affairs the *Times* shifted from one side of the fence to the other with startling rapidity. Its comments on foreign matters were more numerous and longer than those of any other paper studied, and yet they lacked consistency and veered from one side to the other like a weathercock. Its editorial page seems to have been designed, like that of the *Herald*, to please its readers rather than to influence them. But it is no less important on that account as an index of opinion. The *Times* was found to be particularly valuable in respect to the care with which detailed reports of meetings and speeches were given in its columns. The paper was the organ of Henry J. Raymond until his death in 1869 when it passed into the control of George Jones who had long been connected with the business end of the enterprise, and under whose editorship the paper increased its prestige, particularly in connection with its exposure of the Tweed Ring. That the *Times* was an important paper can be seen from its estimated circulation in 1871 :

Daily	35,000
Semi-weekly	4,000
Weekly	20,000
Total	59,000

The New York *World* was a contrast to the *Times* in almost every respect. If the *Times* was the organ of the respectable conservative business classes, the *World* was the organ of the lower, laboring and foreign classes who were often not quite so respectable. It was a sensational paper and often violent in its vituperation of its enemies. It had gained notoriety during the Civil War as one of the leaders

of the Copperhead press, and was probably the most influential Democratic paper of the North. It was a comparatively new paper and yet had achieved great power by 1870. Its editor, Manton Marble, had served his apprenticeship with the *Boston Journal*, *Boston Traveller* and *New York Evening Post*, had been with the *World* since its beginning in 1860 and had become editor and proprietor in 1862. In 1866 the *Nation* wrote of the *World*: "We differ widely from the *World* on almost every question, and think very poorly of its morals, but it has a genuine weight with a large class, and it owes that weight to the vigor, learning, and ability of its leading articles."¹ Its circulation was remarkable for a young paper and was about as follows in 1871:

Daily	26,000
Semi-weekly	5,000
Weekly	72,000
Total	103,000

The very large weekly circulation would seem to indicate that the *World* had already begun its rivalry with the *Tribune* for the country districts. The *World* was frankly and staunchly Democratic, usually pro-Tammany and consequently usually pro-Irish and at least partially pro-Catholic. Next to those of the *Tribune*, the *World* editorials were the most vigorous and interesting among the New York papers.

One other New York newspaper deserves some comment, the *New Yorker Staats-Zeitung*. It was probably the leading German-American daily newspaper in the United States. From 1852 until 1859 it was under the ownership and operation of the remarkable Anna Behr Uhl who in 1859 had married Oswald Ottendorfer who subsequently became

¹ *Nation*: May 8, 1866.

editor. Ottendorfer was well known as a prominent Forty-eighter, had been connected with the *Staats-Zeitung* for some time and brought to the paper brilliant editorial abilities. In the list of German-American editors no name is more honored than that of Oswald Ottendorfer. Of all the newspapers studied the *Staats-Zeitung* had one of the largest daily circulations. Its total circulation was about as follows in 1871 :

Daily	41,500
Weekly	29,000
Total	70,500

The *Staats-Zeitung* was usually Democratic in its political affiliations, and while thus at variance with a very large number of German-Americans throughout the country, it seems to have reflected well the opinions of the German-Americans at least on German politics.

Outside of New York City, one other daily newspaper in the East, the *Philadelphia Press*, deserves some mention. It was owned by the famous John Forney and was under his editorial direction. Forney had begun his editorial and political career as a Democrat, but during the Civil War had become a strong Republican. Throughout the reconstruction era the *Press* was conspicuous among the fanatically Radical Republicans. Forney was an active politician for each party which he successively supported, and by his vehemence often aroused against himself violent passions. He was either bitterly hated or warmly defended. For a while Forney conducted two newspapers successfully, the *Washington Chronicle* and the *Philadelphia Press*. His boast of "two newspapers, both of them daily," became rather a joke to contemporary editors. Both Lee and Payne speak of Forney as one of the "editorial giants" along with

Bennett, Greeley and Raymond, and Lee calls the *Press* "one of the most influential newspapers during the Civil War Period."¹ In its general editorial policy the *Press* belonged in the same class with the *New York Tribune* and the *New York Times*, Republican and quite respectable. But the *Press* was far more interested in domestic than in foreign affairs, and when dealing with foreign matters gave the impression of trying to state public opinion rather than to create it. In this respect it resembled the *Times*. In comparison with the *New York papers*, the circulation of the *Press* is disappointing, although it claimed to have next to the largest circulation of any paper in Pennsylvania:

Daily	15,000
Semi-weekly	5,000
Weekly	12,000
Total	32,000

Four Southern papers have been examined for different parts of the study. Almost equal in importance were the *New Orleans Picayune* and the *Richmond Enquirer*. The first named was a paper of large influence in the early part of the period and was credited in 1850 with a circulation of twelve thousand. Under the able leadership of George Wilkins Kendall, mentioned above, and of A. M. Holbrook, a prominent Southern journalist, the *Picayune* became a real power in the South. Its comparative independence in politics and its distinct literary flavor incline the author to agree

¹ Lee, *History of American Journalism*, pp. 276, 336; Payne, *History of Journalism in the United States*, p. 239. Evans credited the *Press* with a daily circulation of only 10,000. It will be noticed that no Boston paper has been examined. This has not seemed necessary since the *New York Tribune* and *Portland Transcript* represented well New England feeling, and numerous magazines and individual opinions from New England have been used.

with the estimate given in the *International Magazine* in 1851, which described it as "the most witty and brilliant and altogether successful journal ever published in the southern or western States."¹ As was the case with nearly all the Southern newspapers, the *Picayune* was forced to suspend during the Civil War, and again like the other Southern papers, it had not regained its previous excellence or influence by 1871. The circulation which it claimed in that year varies considerably from the estimate given by Evans:

	<i>Claimed in Rowell</i>	<i>Evans' estimate</i>
Daily	12,260	5,000
Weekly	5,100	
Total	17,360	

The Richmond *Enquirer* under the editorship of Thomas Ritchie became one of the leading Democratic papers in the South and retained its powerful position until the Civil War. After the elder Ritchie's retirement it came at first under the editorship of his son, William F. Ritchie, until 1860, and then under that of O. Jennings Wise, son of the famous governor of Virginia, Henry A. Wise. In 1859 it claimed a circulation of twenty thousand.² During the course of the Civil War the *Enquirer* was for a while edited by John Mitchel, the well known Irish patriot and editor, and after the war it came under the direction of James C. Southall. It was staunchly Democratic in character, supported the Confederate cause in the Civil War, and was inclined to have strongly imperialistic tendencies. By 1871 the circulation which it claimed was very small, about the same as it had been in 1850:

¹ *International Magazine*: May, 1851.

² *Richmond Enquirer*: Jan. 5, 1859.

	1850	1870
Daily	4,000	2,600
Semi-weekly		2,000
Weekly	2,700	1,800
Total	6,700	6,400

For the period after the Civil War, two other Southern papers have been examined, the *Savannah Republican* and the *Charleston Courier*. Both had been strongly secessionist, and the *Courier* could boast of an ancient and honorable career, having had an estimated circulation in 1850 of five thousand. In 1871 its circulation was even smaller than it had been in 1850:

Daily	3,000
Semi-weekly	1,800
Total	4,800

In 1871 the circulation of the *Republican* was claimed to be:

Daily	5,000
Weekly	2,500
Total	7,500

By far the most important Western paper which has been used was the *Cincinnati Gazette*. It dated from 1819 and in the period just prior to 1848 had been under the exceptional editorship of Charles Hammond, "one of the ablest journalists of the country."¹ Hammond was succeeded by John C. Wright, a prominent lawyer and politician. In 1853 the paper came under the control of William Schouler whom Lee put into the same class of journalists as Greeley, Raymond and Forney.² Certainly the paper prospered. Its growth will be apparent from the following statistics:

¹ Payne, *History of Journalism in the United States*, pp. 209-210.

² Lee, *History of American Journalism*, p. 276.

	1853	1861	1871
Daily	1,800	16,000	22,000
Semi-weekly	400		2,500
Weekly	6,000	27,000	56,000
Total	8,200	43,000	80,500

Its weekly circulation shows that the *Gazette* must have been a power at least throughout Ohio. It was usually well written and printed and on the whole very fair-minded and judicial. It was Republican but not violently so, it was highly respectable and catered to the better classes of society, and was probably the most important paper examined outside of the New York dailies.¹

Three other Middle Western papers have been studied for part of the period under review—the *Detroit Free Press*, the *Milwaukee Sentinel* and the *Wisconsin State Journal*. The *Detroit Free Press* was an admirable Democratic paper, well written and quite unbiassed in comparison with most Northern Democratic papers, not at all of the sensational character of the New York *World* or the Chicago *Times*. Payne speaks of it as “one of the country’s famous and most successful newspapers.”² It claimed a circulation in 1871 as follows:

Daily	8,328
Semi-weekly	1,704
Weekly	16,440
Total	26,472

The *Milwaukee Sentinel* was a Republican paper and was much less restrained than the *Free Press*. The *Sentinel* was

¹ On circulation cf. *Cincinnati Gazette*: Jan. 19, 1861; Hudson, *Journalism in the United States*, p. 198. Curiously enough, Livingston estimated the circulation of the *Gazette* in 1850 as nineteen thousand.

² Payne, *History of Journalism in the United States*, p. 215.

ably edited but not exceptionally so. Nevertheless Lee speaks of it as one of the "leaders of Wisconsin journalism."¹ Its claimed circulation for 1871 would seem to prove the truth of his statement:

Daily	7,000
Semi-weekly	2,000
Weekly	19,000
Total	28,000

Much less important was the *Wisconsin State Journal* which was published at Madison. It was strongly Republican and partook of the character almost of a country newspaper in comparison with the Milwaukee *Sentinel*. Its circulation for 1870 was claimed to be:

Daily	1,200
Semi-weekly	1,200
Weekly	3,000
Total	5,400

One newspaper from the Far West was examined, the San Francisco *Bulletin*, to which too much praise can hardly be given. It had been founded by James King, who was murdered because his paper had been "unrestrained in abuse and vehement denunciation of public and private criminals." The character given to the paper by King was retained by Loring Pickering, its editor after the Civil War. It refused to accept low medical advertisements, and was very impartial and discriminating in its judgments on foreign affairs. Lee says of Pickering that he "never forced his personality upon his readers, but he gave his paper a state-wide reputation for incorruptible honesty."² The *Bulletin*

¹ Lee, *History of American Journalism*, p. 338.

² *Ibid.*, p. 337; Payne, *History of Journalism in the United States*, p. 375.

started as a Democratic paper but became Republican in 1861, and called itself independent in 1870. Although not to be compared of course in importance with the New York papers, the *Bulletin* was conspicuous as embodying perhaps a higher type of journalism and a finer spirit than any of them. Its claimed circulation in 1871 was as follows:

Daily	11,000
Weekly	5,500
Total	16,500

The magazine press has furnished a second source for the discovery of American opinion. There were many weeklies, monthlies and quarterlies published during the period and some prominent examples of each type have been sampled. The weekly magazines were numerous and very influential. A considerable number printed regular editorials on all sorts of public affairs, including foreign matters. In addition most of the weeklies contained short stories, continued novels, descriptions of travel in strange countries or of some great catastrophe, sketches of the lives of figures prominent in the public eye, brief criticisms of art and literature, humorous skits and jokes. Most of the weeklies were printed on much smaller pages than the daily newspapers and on much better paper with larger and clearer type. Of course it is chiefly in the editorial columns of the weeklies that American public opinion can be studied. In addition there were occasional articles on the lives of prominent European statesmen such as Bismarck or Napoleon III which are also important as sources for popular sentiment.

One of the best weeklies which has been used was the *Portland Transcript*, a paper which approximated quite closely to the character of a newspaper although it also possessed the features peculiar to the magazine which were

mentioned in the previous paragraph. Throughout the entire period under review it was under the control of E. H. Elwell, a man who possessed an unusual amount of common sense and good nature and real literary ability. The *Transcript* does not seem to have been a very widely known paper, but it certainly must have had large local support to have lasted without a break for the whole period. It seemed to typify New England and to present the ideas of the better classes in the smaller New England cities and larger towns. That it was not without influence can be seen by the fact that it was estimated to have possessed a circulation in 1850 of four thousand six hundred, and that it claimed a circulation in 1871 of more than seventeen thousand, a circulation which was indeed large for a semi-literary weekly in Portland, Maine. According to its advertisement in the *American Newspaper Directory* for 1871, it claimed to have "the largest circulation in Maine; going into every town and post-office in the State, and in northern New Hampshire and Vermont." Interesting, well balanced, with a rare sense of humor, and an especial facility in summing up a situation in a few words, the *Portland Transcript* proved of great value in sensing the popular feeling of cultivated New England.

Two of the most interesting and most important of the weekly magazines were *Leslie's Weekly* and *Harper's Weekly*. Both were profusely provided with cuts and pictures and had an additional feature in their cartoons. *Leslie's Weekly* was the product of that remarkable English-born journalist, Frank Leslie, who had had his pen name made his legal one. Beside his weekly, the full title of which was *Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper*, Leslie published the *Chimney-Corner*, *Ladies' Journal*, *Pleasant Hours*, *Boys' and Girls' Weekly*, and the *Budget of Fun*. Their importance may be judged from the fact that Frederic

Hudson in his *Journalism in the United States* claimed their aggregate circulation in 1873 to have been a half-million.¹ His weekly alone had a circulation of seventy thousand or more. It was always an interesting paper with its gaudy pictures perhaps of the most recent fire, perhaps of the filthy conditions in the dairies which supplied New York with milk, perhaps of the draft riots or perhaps of the masked ball of the Liederkrantz Society. Its editorials were seldom profound, but it undoubtedly must either have exerted an influence on its readers or have reflected their sentiments. It seems to have catered to much the same class as did the New York *Herald* and there are striking similarities between the two papers. *Leslie's* might almost have been edited by Bennett. It was rabidly imperialistic and patriotic and had but few other fixed political principles.

The outward form of *Harper's Weekly* was much like that of *Leslie's Weekly*, but there the resemblance ceased. With a brilliant staff of editorial writers, it stood half-way between the highly intellectual *Nation* and the rather vulgar *Leslie's Weekly*, and it appealed to a large and fairly cultured constituency. Mention must be made of Thomas Nast's inimitable cartoons, many of which had as their inspiration public affairs in France and Germany. But the chief editorial writer on *Harper's Weekly* was none other than George William Curtis. Curtis had been with the *Tribune* for a short while after 1850, was one of the editors of *Putnam's Magazine* during the early fifties, and contributed regularly to *Harper's Magazine* under the caption *Editor's Easy Chair*, work which he carried along with his labors on *Harper's Weekly*. *Harper's Weekly* was always well written, well printed and well edited. Its influence may be measured by reference to the fact that it claimed a circula-

¹ Hudson, *Journalism in the United States*, p. 706.

tion in 1871 of one hundred thousand. It was slightly Republican in character, but never aggressively so, and on the whole was independent and disinterested in its attitude toward foreign as well as domestic affairs. Its tone was usually admirable.

Much less important from the standpoint of circulation than *Harper's Weekly* was the *Nation*, which only claimed a circulation in 1871 of slightly more than seven thousand. But the *Nation* was owned and edited by Edwin Lawrence Godkin who also became editor of the New York *Evening Post* in the later sixties. The *Nation* had no illustrations and no popular articles, and was chiefly directed to the upper layer of the intellectual classes. Editorial paragraphs on the topics of the day, letters from distinguished scholars, longer essays on public affairs and book reviews were the chief features of the *Nation*. But the *Nation* is important because its editor moulded and reflected the opinions of America's best brains. It is difficult to overestimate the influence of the pessimistic Englishman, Godkin, upon his American contemporaries. Payne called him "the leading conservative editor of the country" from the close of the Civil War to the end of the century, and William James bore eloquent tribute to his power: "To my generation, his was certainly the towering influence in all thought concerning public affairs, and indirectly his influence has certainly been more pervasive than that of any other writer of the generation, for he influenced other writers who never quoted him, and determined the whole current of discussion."¹ The *Nation* was conservative in the best sense of the word, was usually Republican in its politics during this period,

¹ Payne, *History of Journalism in the United States*, p. 348; Godkin, *Life and Letters*, vol. i, p. 221.

and in its attitude on foreign affairs was more strongly pro-German and anti-French than any other paper examined.

Several other weekly magazines must be mentioned, the *Irish Citizen*, the *Irish American*, the *Freeman's Journal* and the *Belletristisches Journal*. As its name suggests, the first was one of the organs of Irish opinion in the United States. It was under the direction of John Mitchel, the Irish patriot who had been driven from Ireland as a result of his anti-English activity in 1848, who had espoused the cause of slavery in the United States, had become editor of the *Richmond Enquirer* during the Civil War and later of the *Irish Citizen*. Mitchel rebelled against the social and political supremacy of Northern Protestantism. His paper was full of contempt and hostility for what he considered the cant and hypocrisy of the respectable, self-righteous, Calvinistic ruling class of New England, the Middle Atlantic states and the Middle West. He was master of an invective that might well have made Horace Greeley or Manton Marble envious, and he seldom wrote but in superlatives. He was strongly Democratic, pro-Irish and pro-Catholic. But the *Irish Citizen* was not a great success and had a circulation in 1871 of only a little more than six thousand. It may however be taken as typical of the more extreme Irish-Americans. The *Irish American* was a much more temperate paper. Its editors always attempted to keep it non-partisan and non-religious, although it was certainly hostile to the Calvinist and Republican majorities in the North. Although it was estimated to possess a circulation of four thousand in 1850, and claimed one of thirty-five thousand in 1871, the *Irish American* was not much interested in European affairs and made but few comments on subjects which were not closely connected with Ireland.

The most powerful Catholic weekly in the United States was the *Freeman's Journal* of New York, which probably

possessed a circulation in 1871 between twenty-two and twenty-five thousand. The *Freeman's Journal* was under the editorship of James A. MacMaster, whom *Appleton's Cyclopoedia of American Biography* calls the chief Catholic journalist in the United States. Bitterly anti-Protestant and anti-Prussian, it was well written and well printed, a first class weekly in every respect.

The *Belletristisches Journal* was a very different paper. Under the able leadership of Frederick and Rudolph Lexow, it was undoubtedly the most important German-American weekly in the country and exercised a wide influence upon the more cultivated of the German immigrants. Professor Julius Goebel of the University of Illinois has described the *Belletristisches Journal* as the organ of the Forty-eighters, and as "the foremost Literary and Political German-American Weekly."¹ The circulation of forty thousand which it claimed in 1871 would seem to reinforce the latter of Professor Goebel's statements. In addition to its regular page of editorials, the *Belletristisches Journal* printed a weekly political review of events in Europe which was an interpretation as well as a summary, and which proved to be more valuable for the purpose of this study than the editorials themselves. There were also novels, poems and criticisms in the *Belletristisches Journal*, which was really a magazine of *belles-lettres*.

Less important than the weekly magazines as sources for American public opinion were the monthlies and quarterlies. Volume after volume of monthly or quarterly magazines has been examined without yielding any material at all, and then suddenly one might discover a twenty or thirty-page

¹ The above quoted statement was written to the author by Professor Julius Goebel, a prominent German-American distinguished as a college professor and author, who was himself editor of the *Belletristisches Journal* from 1888 to 1892.

article summing up a whole series of events such as the career of Bismarck, Napoleon III or Kossuth by a more or less scholarly or well trained publicist. Such articles were sometimes signed but were often anonymous. Most of the monthly magazines were not much different from those of the present day. Short stories, continued novels, articles on travel, biography and history, poems, humorous sketches, book reviews and editorial comments made up the table of contents of the monthly magazines, some of which were illustrated. They had a wide circulation and probably a corresponding influence on the more thoughtful classes of society.

Of the monthly magazines which have been examined, two stand out as far ahead of the others—*Harper's Magazine* and the *Atlantic Monthly*. The former was much more popular and much less intellectual than the latter. *Harper's Magazine* was under the editorship in 1870, as it was to be for several more decades, of Henry M. Alden who had earlier been connected with *Harper's Weekly* and who had written a *Pictorial History of the Rebellion*. Back in 1857 *Putnam's Magazine* had attacked *Harper's* for being too popular in character, and had written: "In the very reasons of its success lay the impossibility of its becoming an intellectual power in the country. It sought to be universally acceptable, and its complaisance inevitably destroyed its force."¹ The very popular but none too scholarly histories of the Rev. John S. C. Abbott, who was connected with *Harper's Magazine* for some time, together with his decided pro-Napoleonic bias, probably did much to confirm the opinions of those who agreed with *Putnam's*. In addition to many scattered articles on European affairs, the interesting and brilliant page which George William Curtis con-

¹ *Putnam's Magazine*: March, 1857.

tributed each month under the caption of the *Editor's Easy Chair* has been found to be of great value. In 1871 *Harper's Magazine* claimed the amazing circulation of one hundred and twenty thousand.

The *Atlantic Monthly* was much more scholarly in tone than *Harper's Magazine*. It had been started in 1857 by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow and Ralph Waldo Emerson, and its first editor had been James Russell Lowell, who was Professor of Modern Languages at Harvard University. He was succeeded by James T. Fields, publisher, author and traveller, who kept up the high standards of the founders of the *Atlantic Monthly*. By far the most intellectual of American monthlies, its circulation in 1870 reached a remarkably high number, somewhere between thirty-five and fifty thousand. Many scholarly and brilliant articles on foreign affairs made it of much use in interpreting the attitude of American intellectuals.

Several minor monthly magazines deserve especial mention. *Putnam's Magazine*, *Graham's Magazine* and the *Knickerbocker* were attempts in the earlier part of the period to create rivals of *Harper's Magazine* or the *Atlantic Monthly*. Signed and unsigned articles from each of them have been found to be of great value. The *Galaxy* was a real competitor in the latter part of the period and possessed a circulation in 1871 of thirty thousand or more. Its articles were excellent. An editorial page similar to the *Easy Chair* of George William Curtis was conducted by George E. Pond, who wrote under the pen name of Philip Quilibet. *De Bow's Review* was unquestionably the leading Southern monthly magazine. Its able editor, James D. B. De Bow, Professor of Political Economy and Commercial Statistics at the University of Louisiana, and head of the census of 1850, was a power in the South. Except for a few book reviews and one or two short articles, it has been found of

little value for this study. De Bow had loyally supported the Confederacy and his review had lost much of its influence after the Civil War, as can be seen by the fact that its circulation only amounted to about two thousand five hundred in 1871.

The quarterly magazines which usually went under the name of reviews were not merely monthly magazines published quarterly, but they possessed a form peculiar to themselves. They were really reviews. Several books on a related subject were given a common review which was in effect a scholarly disquisition on the same subject as the books criticised. Thus several books on Bismarck might furnish the occasion for a criticism of his career. The *North American Review* stood in a class by itself. In 1866 the *Nation* spoke of it as "our leading review."¹ Its articles were almost never signed but were usually able, scholarly and thoughtful. In the early part of the fifties it had been edited by Francis Bowen, who aroused violent passions against himself for daring to attack the Hungarians. No less able were its editors in the late sixties, James Russell Lowell and Charles Eliot Norton. Artistocratic and highly intellectual, the *North American Review* claimed a circulation of only two thousand in 1871.

Similar to the *North American Review* in form were the *American Review*, the *Democratic Review*, the *Massachusetts Quarterly Review* and the *New Englander*. The first and second were partly political in character, the *American Review* having as its subtitle *A Whig Journal*. Both were used for the early part of the study as was also the *Massachusetts Quarterly Review*. The *New Englander* was published at New Haven, and was merged with the *Yale Re-*

¹ *Nation*: May 8, 1866.

view at a later time. Not much material, however, was found in any of these reviews.

Much more important for this study were *Brownson's Quarterly Review* and the *Catholic World*, prominent representatives of Roman Catholic opinion. Orestes Augustus Brownson was reared as a Presbyterian, and became in turn a Universalist, an Owenite, a Unitarian and a Roman Catholic. A squib on Brownson's frequent changes in religion which was printed in the *Portland Transcript* probably expressed the common orthodox opinion:

Brownson needs not—his character to show,
His own keen pen, nor that of friend or foe,
Pope has portrayed it in immortal song,
“He's everything by fits, and nothing long.”¹

In the late forties, all of the fifties and early sixties, *Brownson's Quarterly Review* printed many able articles on political matters, particularly on French affairs. It was strongly Catholic and strongly Democratic. For the later sixties the *Catholic World* has been used. Although a monthly, it should be classed with the reviews in respect to its form. Able, well written and scholarly, the *Catholic World* was described as the chief Catholic magazine in the United States.² Its editor, Isaac T. Hecker, was well known as missionary, author and founder of the Paulists. In 1871 the *Catholic World* had a circulation of somewhat less than five thousand. But it was less political than theological in character, and carried fewer articles than *Brownson's Quarterly Review* had done on French and German politics.

The third great source of American opinion lies in the

¹ *Portland Transcript*: June 19, 1852.

² Wilson, James G. and Fiske, John, editors, *Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography* (New York, 1887), vol. iii, p. 157.

biographies, autobiographies, letters, speeches and diaries of the people who lived in the period. The material which is to be found in such works varies greatly in value. It is perhaps worth while to repeat in this connection the fact that personal or individual opinion can only be found for the more important figures, and that almost no records have been left by the common people. Letters and diaries furnish the most important evidence for they are usually free from any desire to win public approval or to influence opinion. In that sense they are more impartial and independent of outside pressure than any other source of opinion. Speeches are important for they are an attempt either to interpret or to create public opinion. Autobiographies ordinarily explain events long after they have happened, and frequently later occurrences warp the judgment which had been formed at the time of the original event. Thus any American autobiography which dealt with American opinion of the Franco-German War, but which had been written after 1917, could hardly fail to be influenced by the fact of war between Germany and the United States in 1917 and 1918. The material to be found in such sources is usually scattering and difficult to find, hidden in stray sentences of letters and speeches to which the index offers no guide.

The ordinary biography is seldom of much value for it deals mainly with the subject's personality and career instead of concerning itself with his opinion of such external events as contemporary politics in Germany and France. Thus many volumes have been examined without yielding a single reference which could be of any value for such a study as the present. The author is convinced that such references are absent not so much because the individual gave no thought to foreign affairs as because the biographer or editor considered the opinion of his subject on events in Europe of little value. For example, the collected works

of Carl Schurz contain almost no comments on the struggle for German unification, and yet it is almost unbelievable that Schurz ceased to be interested in German affairs, to correspond with friends in the Fatherland or to keep in close touch with other German-Americans.¹

Some of the most important and frequently used examples of biographical material must be mentioned separately. The works of certain men have proved nearly as valuable as some newspapers and quite as important as many magazines. For 1848 the works of James Buchanan, Secretary of State under the Polk administration, and the diary of President Polk himself have proved invaluable. Buchanan's letters to his personal friends, and particularly his letters to American diplomats, state clearly his own views and often make an attempt to interpret the state of public opinion. Polk's diary was as candid and revealing as could be desired; it records not only his doings but also his opinions and beliefs on a variety of subjects. One can only wish that more American statesmen had had the diary habit. Slightly later the works of Daniel Webster, particularly as Secretary of State under the Fillmore administration, are nearly as important and in much the same way as those of Buchanan. In the Civil War and reconstruction periods the diary of Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy under Lincoln and Johnson, is useful because it records not only the opinions of its author but also the feelings of Johnson, Seward and Grant, particularly upon the Mexican affair. Quite differ-

¹ For example, among the biographies, autobiographies, letters, speeches and diaries which have been examined without yielding any results were those of Judah P. Benjamin, Schuyler Colfax, Margaret Fuller, Edward Everett Hale, Philip Hone, George F. Hoar, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Henry James, Amos Kendall, Samuel F. B. Morse, Lucretia Mott, William W. Seaton, Francis Parkman, Jared Sparks, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Alexander H. Stephens, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Henry D. Thoreau and Henry Watterson.

ent from any of these works are the collected speeches of Charles Sumner, who was always making addresses on every occasion and to all kinds of people. His almost painfully learned speech on the Franco-German War has furnished material illustrative of almost every phase of American opinion on that subject.¹

The letters and diaries of Henry Wadsworth Longfellow are full of references to the trend of events in Europe, and state not only his own views but also those of his friends. Hardly less important are the letters or diaries of James Fenimore Cooper, Asa Gray, Ralph Waldo Emerson, James Russell Lowell and William Wetmore Story. Of invaluable aid in the chapter on German-American opinion were the letters of Francis Lieber and the memoirs of Gustave Koerner. Lieber, who had come to the United States early in life and had become a college professor and an authority upon international law, wrote long and extremely frank letters on German affairs to his many influential friends in Germany and in the United States. Koerner, who came to the United States shortly after 1830, was a prominent Illinois politician, a friend of Lincoln and Minister to Spain under the Lincoln administration, and has left two volumes of memoirs which are a mine of information to the student of German-American life or opinion. His speeches and reminiscences generally reflect German-American opinion clearly, and his references to individual German-Americans prominent in their own day but now forgotten are more valuable than any of the American biographical dictionaries.

The writings of Americans in Europe have been found to be fruitful sources of American opinion. First of all

¹ The exact titles of the books which have been used in connection with individual opinions have been given separately when they have appeared for the first time in the preceding chapters, and will be found collected in the general bibliography.

there were the transient travellers, American men of affairs, who had access to many prominent Europeans and have recorded their impressions in diaries, letters or autobiographies which are significant to the student of American opinion. Their comments, which are often incorrect on matters of fact, are none the less important as evidences of American attitudes and prejudices. The letters of Charles Loring Brace, clergyman and philanthropist, from Germany and Hungary, and those of Horace Greeley and Theodore Parker from France, furnish highly interesting and valuable impressions of those countries. No less important were the letters from John Sherman, one of America's greatest Secretaries of the Treasury, to his brother, General William T. Sherman, or the highly enthusiastic descriptions of Germany by Senator James W. Grimes of Iowa. The opinions of such travellers are important not only in themselves, but also because they must have filtered through to those Americans who could not go abroad.

The published works of American diplomats are even more important to the student of opinion. Usually they contained the diplomatic correspondence and hence show not only the opinions of the ministers but also of the secretaries of state under whom they served. In addition many American diplomats of the period were men of letters who kept up a wide correspondence with prominent people at home. John Bigelow, Minister to France during the Civil War and most of the Mexican trouble, has left three bulky volumes of retrospections which include diplomatic correspondence, and therefore a large number of despatches from William H. Seward, and also contain letters on all sorts of questions, ranging from a discourse on international politics by Francis P. Blair, to a request from Salmon P. Chase for autographs for his daughter's collection. Next to Koerner, Bigelow has furnished the most important personal material.

George Bancroft in Berlin in 1870 and 1871 had an equally wide personal correspondence, and was especially useful for his detailed analysis of conditions in Germany. John L. Motley at Vienna was the personal friend of Bismarck, and also of Charles Sumner, who carried on an extensive correspondence with nearly everyone of importance in the United States. Motley's letters to his daughter are charming summaries of the opinion of a cultured American historian. Of less importance but still of considerable interest are the recollections of Elihu Washburne at Paris in 1870 and 1871, the letters of George P. Marsh at Constantinople in the fifties, and of Charles Francis Adams in London in the early sixties.

Bancroft and Motley had both been students in Germany at an earlier date and were both enthusiastically pro-German. The American students in Germany at a later time were more skeptical. It is most fortunate that at least two able American students have left many letters bearing on German conditions in the late sixties. William James, perhaps next to Emerson America's greatest thinker, wrote many letters home in 1866 and 1867, while Byron C. Smith, who was in Germany in 1870 and 1871, and who later returned to the United States to become Professor of Greek at the University of Kansas, was an even keener observer of political conditions in Germany. It is true that the comments of these students did not mould public opinion at the time to any great extent. But they were among the most intelligent American observers, and deserve nearly as important a place in an analysis of American public opinion as the *North American Review* or the *Nation*.

In addition to the three chief sources of American opinion, newspapers, magazines and personal records such as collections of letters and speeches, some miscellaneous sources have been used. The census reports have been employed

chiefly for the German-American chapter. The *Congressional Globe* has been used to a slight extent in particularly important periods. But public opinion on Germany seldom found expression in Congress, for American relations with Germany were seldom important enough to call forth debate. However the revolutions of 1848, the reception of Kossuth, the Mexican enterprise and the Franco-German War were provocative of debate, and some examination of the congressional records has been made for these periods. Diplomatic records and correspondence have been used slightly, but no attempt has been made to examine all such correspondence. The author has not pretended to make the present study one of diplomatic relationships but of public opinion, and diplomacy enters into the field of public opinion only in an incidental way.

Thus far the sources for American opinion which have been discussed have been classified according to type or kind, namely as newspapers, as magazines or as books of various kinds which expressed individual sentiment. Merely to cull opinion, however, from influential newspapers, widely read magazines or prominent persons would not be enough. The opinion of any periodical or individual usually is conditioned and colored by environment, political and religious affiliations or racial sympathies. Several questions may be asked and must be answered. Have the different geographical sections of the country, North, South and West, been given a fair representation? Have important organs of the chief political parties of the period, Whig, Democratic and Republican, been examined? Have the large and well organized Catholic and Protestant groups received proper attention? Have the different classes who lead and create public sentiment been adequately represented? And has a fair sampling been made of the opinion of the German-American element?

There can be little question that the North and East have been adequately represented. Their possible overrepresentation has, perhaps, a justification. Of course the great majority of the people of the United States, in the period under consideration, lived in those sections of the country. It is also true that the people in the North and East thought more about foreign affairs than did those of the South or West. They had more leisure for culture and reflection; they were farther removed from the struggle for a bare living; they had more newspapers, magazines, colleges and churches; they travelled to Europe in greater numbers and saw more directly the importance of foreign trade. In other words, the leaders of public opinion lived in the North and East and the people of those sections were brought into closer contact with Europe than the rest of the United States. The newspapers of the East were copied by those in the South and West. Nearly all of the magazines of the country were published in the East. Public opinion in the West and South would have been more important if the struggle for German unification had affected the United States more directly. As it was, however, the lead in forming public opinion was left largely to the cultural elements in the East. It would be impractical to list all those examples of Eastern opinion which have been taken. Eight different daily papers, more than forty magazines of various kinds, and more than a hundred books concerning individuals have been examined to discover sentiment in the East.

The people of the West were more intent upon earning a living, upon meeting the problems of a frontier community, and upon laying the foundations for a new civilization than they were upon forming opinions about conditions in Germany or France, or about the character of Bismarck or Napoleon III. Most of their newspapers and magazines printed fewer editorials or articles upon European affairs

than did the great newspapers and magazines of the East, and their prominent men and women did less thinking on such matters and travelled to the Old World less frequently than the people near the Atlantic seaboard. Among the Western newspapers examined were the *Cincinnati Gazette*, *Cincinnati Chronicle*, *Detroit Free Press*, *Milwaukee Sentinel*, *Wisconsin State Journal*, *Carthage (Ill.) Gazette*, *Warsaw (Ill.) Bulletin* and *San Francisco Bulletin*. Among the Western magazines were the *Danville Review* (Danville, Kentucky and Cincinnati), *Lakeside Monthly* (Chicago), and *Overland Monthly* (San Francisco). Prominent among the individuals of the West whose works have been of some value for the present study were Salmon P. Chase, James W. Grimes, John Hay, Gustave Koerner, Abraham Lincoln, Oliver P. Morton, John Sherman, William T. Sherman, Byron C. Smith and Elihu B. Washburne. It will be noticed that most of the above men were statesmen rather than publicists, college professors, ministers or literary men.

As the people of the West were chiefly interested in settling a new community, so the people of the South were mainly intent upon the slavery issue. Before the Civil War they gave more attention to European affairs than at a later time, but even before the war their minds were filled with the coming contest. During the war and during the days of reconstruction the affairs of the lands south of the Potomac almost excluded from their minds the affairs of Germany. After the war their papers were poor and small and not to be compared in importance with those of the North. The South had by no means recovered from her troubles in 1870. As has been observed, the Southern newspapers which have been used were the *Richmond Enquirer*, *New Orleans Picayune*, *Charleston Courier* and the *Savannah Republican*, and the Southern magazines from which material has been taken were *De Bow's Review* (New Orleans),

Land We Love (Charlotte, N. C.), *Southern Quarterly Review* (New Orleans) and *Southern Review* (Baltimore). Valuable references have been found in the works of the following Southerners: John C. Calhoun, Moncure D. Conway, John J. Crittenden, Robert L. Dabney, Henry W. Hilliard, James K. Polk and John Tyler.

The chief parties at the beginning of the period were Whigs and Democrats, the former being the more aristocratic. The New York *Tribune* was staunchly Whig as was the New Orleans *Picayune*, and the Washington *National Intelligencer* was the organ of President Taylor. The *American Review* called itself "*A Whig Journal*," and Horace Greeley and Daniel Webster were prominent in the Whig Party. But the party was disrupted in the fifties and most of its leaders became members of the new Republican Party. Since this new party was especially strong in the North and West, it is little wonder that more Republican than Democratic papers have been examined. Among the newspapers used the Cincinnati *Gazette*, Milwaukee *Sentinel*, New York *Times*, New York *Tribune*, Philadelphia *Press* and Wisconsin *State Journal* were all strongly Republican in their political affiliations. The works of many prominent Republican statesmen and publicists have proved to be of use, among whom may be included Charles Francis Adams, George Bancroft, John Bigelow, Elihu B. Washburne, Abraham Lincoln, William H. Seward, Salmon P. Chase, James W. Grimes, John Hay, Henry Cabot Lodge, Oliver P. Morton, John Sherman, Henry Wilson, Gideon Welles, Charles Sumner, Horace Greeley, Samuel Bowles and Thurlow Weed.

The Democratic Party was recruited chiefly from the South, and the Charleston *Courier*, Richmond *Enquirer* and Savannah *Republican* were all staunchly Democratic in their political affiliation. The works of John C. Calhoun,

John Tyler and James K. Polk, who were all prominent Southern Democrats, have already been referred to. In the North, many of the large cities were Democratic strongholds. Among the Northern Democratic papers, none was more powerful than the *New York World*. The *New York Staats-Zeitung* and the *Detroit Free Press* were also strong Northern Democratic papers. Daniel S. Dickenson and James Buchanan were good examples of Northern Democrats.

From a religious standpoint the United States was divided into two main groups, Catholic and Protestant. Probably the Protestants were even more powerful in the social and political life of the nation at that time than they are today. Except for the Irish and South Germans, nearly all of the earlier racial stocks of the United States had been Protestant; the Italian, French Canadian and Polish immigrations had hardly begun by 1870. No strictly Protestant denominational paper has been examined except the *American Messenger*, which was the organ of the American Tract Society and which boasted an enormous circulation, and the *Danville Review*, which was edited by an association of clergymen. For all practical purposes, however, the *New York Tribune* and the *Portland Transcript* can be said to have represented Protestant opinion. In addition the writings of many prominent Protestant clergymen have been used for the study, among whom were James W. Alexander, Henry Ward Beecher, Charles Loring Brace, Phillips Brooks, William H. Channing, Robert L. Dabney, James Freeman Clark, Theodore Parker and Henry Boynton Smith.

The Catholic organs of opinion which have been found valuable have already been mentioned. *Brownson's Quarterly Review* and the *Catholic World* were both able and representative papers, and as the *New York Tribune* may for practical purposes be said to have interpreted Protestant-

ism, so may the *Irish Citizen* be said to have interpreted the more extreme elements in Roman Catholicism. In addition the *De La Salle Monthly*, published at West Chester, N. Y., the *Irish American* and the powerful *Freeman's Journal* of New York, have been used for parts of the study.

It was found to be much more difficult to get at the opinions of certain classes of society. The laboring man seldom leaves many reminiscences, and the powerful labor journals of the present did not exist for the most part at that time. The *Workingman's Advocate*, which was the organ of the First International, has been used for the latter part of the period, but was not found to be of great value. It is also very difficult to get at the opinions of the business classes of the community, although such papers as the *New York Herald* and the *New York Times* may perhaps be said to represent business interests. The only real business man whose biography has yielded much was John Murray Forbes, international banker and special agent of the United States government in England during the Civil War. But the business classes and the laboring classes are not the chief organizers of public opinion. Rather it is the clergymen, the editors and publicists, the teachers, the literary men and the statesmen who actually create and disseminate opinions and sentiments. They have the time and have always considered it part of their duty to think about public affairs and to formulate their opinions to be passed on to the other classes in the community.

The clergymen whose works have been used have already been mentioned. In respect to the other classes perhaps it will be sufficient at this point to list the names of the most prominent individuals whose recorded opinions have been found helpful. Among the educators must be mentioned the following: Henry Adams, Louis Agassiz, James B. Angell, Frederick A. P. Barnard, Asa Gray, William James,

Francis Lieber, Horace Mann, Josiah Quincy, John Howard Raymond, Benjamin Silliman, Byron C. Smith, George Ticknor and Andrew D. White. Many men whose prominence has been gained chiefly as editors or publicists have been quoted extensively for the present study, among whom should be noted Samuel G. Bowles, William Cullen Bryant, James T. Fields, William Lloyd Garrison, Edwin L. Godkin, Horace Greeley, Wendell Phillips and William J. Stillman. Somewhat longer is the list of those people who are chiefly famous for their literary activity as novelists, poets, essayists or critics. Important among them are the following: Louisa May Alcott, James Fenimore Cooper, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Julia Ward Howe, Washington Irving, Charles G. Leland, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, James Russell Lowell, Donald G. Mitchell (Ik Marvel), Charles Eliot Norton, Bayard Taylor and Walt Whitman. Largest of all is the number of men whose greatness has been achieved through political service or activity. The soldiers, the statesmen and the diplomats belong to this group and are very numerous. The works of all of the following have been found to be of some use in the present study: Charles Francis Adams, George Bancroft, John Bigelow, James Buchanan, John C. Calhoun, Salmon P. Chase, Rufus Choate, John A. Dix, John Hay, Abraham Lincoln, Henry Cabot Lodge, John Davis Long, George P. Marsh, Oliver P. Morton, John L. Motley, James K. Polk, William H. Seward, John Sherman, William T. Sherman, Philip H. Sheridan, Charles Sumner, John Tyler, Elihu B. Washburne, Daniel Webster, Thurlow Weed, Gideon Welles and Henry Wilson.

One further question remains to be answered. What material has been used to determine German-American opinion? Almost equal in importance were the daily *New York Staats-Zeitung* and the weekly *Belletristisches Journal*. Less important was a monthly magazine, *Die Deutsch-*

Amerikanische Monatshefte, edited by Frederick Lexow, and devoted to politics, art and literature. It was found to be valuable particularly for the year 1866. The works of Gustave Koerner and Francis Lieber have already been referred to. Both were invaluable. It has also been noted that in striking contrast the works of Carl Schurz proved to contain almost no material for the present study. Of very slight importance were the letters of Aaron Friedenwald, a German Jew, born in Germany and brought to the United States as a baby. However he took his medical education in Germany from which country he wrote several letters which described political conditions there in the early sixties. In addition, and for 1870 particularly, considerable material for German-American opinion has been found in native American newspapers which printed letters from German-Americans as well as detailed accounts of German-American meetings and celebrations.

Following are lists showing the circulation for 1850 and 1871 of the more important newspapers and magazines used. The figures for 1850 have been taken from *Livingston's Law Register for 1852*; those for 1871 from Rowell's *American Newspaper Directory*, and *Evans' Advertising Handbook*. Where two figures are given for 1871, the first is from Rowell, the second from Evans.

DAILY NEWSPAPERS	1850				1871			
	Daily	Semi- or Tri-weekly	Weekly	Total	Daily	Semi- or Tri-weekly	Weekly	Total
Charleston Courier	3,000				3,000	1,800		4,800
Cincinnati Gazette				19,000	22,000	2,500	56,000	80,500
Detroit Free Press				1,500	22,000	1,704	16,440	26,472
Milwaukee Sentinel	965	640	2,580	4,185	6,000	2,000	19,000	28,000
New Orleans Picayune	7,000		5,000	12,000	12,260		5,100	17,360
New York Evening Post	1,500	3,000	2,800	7,300	5,000	4,900	9,000	22,400
New York Herald	32,640		12,000	44,640	8,500		25,000	110,000
New York Staats-Zeitung			3,420		41,500		29,000	70,500
New York Times					35,000	4,000	20,000	59,000
New York Tribune	19,480	2,640	48,000	70,120	35,000	25,000	150,000	220,000
New York World					45,000	32,000	160,000	222,000
Philadelphia Press					30,000	5,200	72,000	103,200
Richmond Enquirer	4,000	2,700		6,700	26,000	5,000	12,000	32,000
San Francisco Bulletin					10,000	2,000	1,800	6,400
Savannah Republican	900				2,600		5,500	16,500
Wisconsin State Journal					11,000		2,500	7,500
Washington National Intelligencer ..				15,000	5,000	1,200	3,000	5,400
					1,200			

APPENDIX—Continued

Weeklies—Name and Place	1850	1871
<i>Appleton's Journal</i> (New York)		22,000
<i>Belletristisches Journal</i> (New York)		40,000
<i>Carthage</i> (Ill.) <i>Gazette</i>		1,000
<i>Freeman's Journal</i> (New York)		22,000
		25,000
<i>Harper's Weekly</i> (New York)		100,000
		100,000
<i>Irish American</i> (New York)	4,000	35,000
<i>Irish Citizen</i> (New York)		6,300
<i>Leslie's Weekly</i> (New York)		77,000
		70,000
<i>Nation</i> (New York)		7,300
Portland (Maine) <i>Transcript</i>	4,608	17,280
		17,300
Warsaw (Ill.) <i>Bulletin</i>		500
Monthlies—Name and Place		
<i>American Messenger</i> (New York)	211,000	172,000
<i>Atlantic Monthly</i> (Boston)		35,000
		50,000
<i>Beecher's Magazine</i> (Trenton, N. J.)		3,000
<i>Catholic World</i> (New York)		4,800
<i>De Bow's Review</i> (New Orleans)		2,500
<i>Galaxy</i> (New York)		35,000
		30,000
<i>Godey's Lady's Book</i> (Philadelphia)	60,000	96,000
		106,000
<i>Graham's Magazine</i> (Philadelphia)	30,000	
<i>Harper's Magazine</i> (New York)		120,000
		112,000
<i>Overland Monthly</i> (San Francisco)		5,000
Quarterlies—Name and Place		
<i>Brownson's Quarterly Review</i> (Boston and New York)	1,500	
<i>New Englander</i> (New Haven)	1,000	1,500
<i>North American Review</i> (Boston)	1,000	2,000
<i>Southern Review</i> (Baltimore)		1,500

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New York *Herald*.
New Yorker Staats-Zeitung.
New York *Times*.
New York *Daily Tribune*.
New York *World*.
Philadelphia *Press*.
Richmond *Enquirer*.
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Savannah *Daily Republican*.
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